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Abstract 
The protection of the emerging right of conscientious objection to military service is 
one of the most challenging questions in international human rights law. The primary 
objective of this doctoral thesis is to clearly identify the minimum international legal 
standards on the phenomenon of conscientious objection to military service as emerging from 
the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies. Furthermore, this study aims to 
explore and assess how the Member States of the Council of Europe are effectively 
implementing these standards within their domestic laws and practice. The implementation of 
legal standards on conscientious objection in the Council of Europe varies considerably 
between the 47 Member States of the organisation due to a rapidly transforming socio­
political landscape that affects the speed in which legislative and procedural amendments 
take place. Some of the themes explored throughout this thesis include: the legal contours of 
the right to conscientious objection to military service, including the grounds legally accepted 
to justify a conscientious objection; procedural guarantees with regard to the application 
process to be granted conscientious objectors status; the provision of accurate information to 
members of the public affected by mandatory military service and the extension of these 
principles to professional members of the armed forces. The thesis is structured as a thematic 
presentation of applicable international human rights standards and State practice and 
explores common issues, best practices and future challenges between the Member States of 
the organisation. The study does not merely aspire to describe the present situation in the 
Council of Europe, but rather aims to contribute to academic know ledge by proposing the 
development of a more coherent framework of legal and procedural obligations, based on the 
need to review and adapt national legislation in accordance to indicators and benchmarks 
derived from the Council's standard-setting policies. 
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Chapter 1: Preliminary matters 
1.1. Background to the stwdiy 
Persons liable for mandatory military service or specific military duties may often be 
confronted with moral dilemmas regarding their participation in war-like activities. Incidents 
involving the refusal of individuals to perfolTIl military service or military duties because of 
moral reservations regarding the use of arms or military force have been documented by 
historians as 'conscientious objections' from as early as 1820. 1 Nevertheless, the 'human 
right' to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience has for a long time been 
described as an 'emerging right' in international human rights law.2 Such characterization is 
principally due to the fact that, although the right in question is expressly recognised in 
domestic jurisdictions, a 'right to conscientious objection' to military service is not expressly 
codified in any of the existing international or regional treaties for the protection of human 
rights. In addition, despite the recognition of the right to conscientious objection to military 
service in numerous instruments adopted by international inter-governmental organizations, 
the somewhat ambiguous jurisprudence of some human rights monitoring bodies - including 
the European Court of Human Rights - on the question of conscientious objection has meant 
that the status of the right to conscientious objection to military service under international 
law has remained, until recently, unclear. 
The legal status of the right to conscientious objection has been part of an ongoing debate 
In international human rights law and numerous recommendations and other soft law 
documents have underpinned the development of a standard-setting framework that continues 
to develop rapidly. However, the turning point in relation to the recognition of the right to 
conscientious objection to military service as a protected human right under treaty law has 
been reached only in recent years, with the recognition by international and regional human 
rights bodies of the fact that the right to be released from military service on grounds of 
conscience is an integral aspect of the treaty-protected right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. 
I Commentators suggest that the term 'conscientious objection' with respect to military service dates back at 

least to 1820 when it was used in an anti-pacifist pamphlet by John Sheppard. See P. Brock and N. Young, 

Pacifism in the twentieth century (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 23. 

2 See, e.g., M. Lippman, 'The recognition of conscientious objection to military service as an international 

human right', Calijhrnia Western International Law Journal, vol. 21 (1990), p. 30. See also E. Marcus, 

'Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right', Virginia Journal ojInternational Law, vol. 38 (1997), 

p.507. 
1 
-

I 
The development of consistent principles and legal standards on a right to conscientious 
objection to military service in international law gained momentum when the Human Rights 
Committee, the body entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter 'ICCPR' or 'the Covenant'),3 recognised 
that the refusal to carry out military duties on the basis of religious, moral or other relevant 
considerations fell under the scope of Article 18 of the Covenant, protecting freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.4 Within the Council of Europe, similar developments took 
place a few years later when the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 'the European 
Court' or 'the Court') finally accepted in 2011 that an applicant's conscientious objection to 
military service was to be regarded as a 'manifestation of belief' which, at least in principle, 
is capable of attracting the protection of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereinafter 'ECHR' or 'the European Convention,)5 that protects the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 6 
The aforementioned shift in the approach of international human rights bodies regarding 
the acceptance of the right to conscientious objection as a protected right under treaty law has 
created the need to initiate a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the current legal 
regime and applicable standards in relation to the right of individuals to be released from 
military service on grounds of conscience. 
This thesis purports to set out clearly the scope of application of the newly recognised 
right to conscientious objection to military service as a human right and to identify its legal 
contours. The scope and the limits of the right, and its procedural guarantees, are explored 
through the analysis of both 'soft law' instruments, such as resolutions, recommendations, 
guidelines and standards adopted by international organizations, and the decisions ofjudicial 
and quasi-judicial human rights monitoring bodies, and in particular of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee. 
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (New York, 16 December 1966), 999 D.N.T.S. 171 

(entered into force 23 March 1976). 

4 The practice of the Human Rights Committee on the question of conscientious objection is discussed in detail 

below in Chapter 2, section 2.4. 

5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950), E.T.S. 

No.5 (entered into force 3 September 1953). For the ratification status of the Convention and its Protocols see 

<http://conventi ons.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheS ig.asp ?NT =00 5&CM=8&DF= 10/10/2013&CL= EN G> 

accessed 10-10-13. 

6Bayatyan v. Amlcnia [GC], App. no. 23459/03,7 July 2011. For discussion of the case and of the relevant 

case-law of the European Court and Commission on Human Rights see in particular, below, Chapter 3.4. 
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The development by the treaty monitoring bodies of consistent legal principles on the 
right of individuals to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience gives rise 
to a number of legal obligations for States which have ratified international human rights 
treaties. 
The recognition of the binding nature of the right means that this is the right time to carry 
out an assessment of the current practice of Council of Europe Member States. It is now clear 
that failure by a State Party to either the ECHR or the ICCPR to put in place domestic 
guarantees safeguarding the right to be exempted from military service on grounds of 
conscience or to guarantee in practice the access to alternative forms of service to those who 
object to military service on conscientious grounds will, in appropriate circumstances, 
constitute a violation of the State's obligations under those treaties. Against this background, 
the present thesis will analyse and develop the substantive and procedural obligations which 
have been identified by international human rights bodies through non-binding instruments 
and reiterated by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The study will then examine the current 
practice of the Member States of the Council of Europe in order to assess whether those 
States are complying with their treaty obligations as well as respecting the non-binding 
guidelines developed by international and regional human rights bodies. The purpose of this 
examination of domestic practice is to identify gaps in domestic legislation and, through an 
emerging pattern of common issues, problems and good practices relating to conscientious 
objection, to propose suggestions for reform based on the need to align domestic legislation 
with international human rights standards and emerging legal obligations. 
1.2. Aims ofthc study 
Against the background set out above in the introduction to this chapter, this thesis 
provides an analysis of the international legal standards governing the right of conscientious 
objection to military service and their application within the domestic legal systems of 
Council of Europe Member States. In particular, the study aims to: 
• 	 Examine the legal status of conscientious objection to military service under 
contemporary international human rights law, both with regard to conscripted and 
professional members of the armed forces. 
3 
• 	 Clearly define the scope of application of the right, by outlining, inter alia, what 
beliefs are covered by definition and to what extent this current scope may be said 
to extend to processional members ofthe armed forces. 
• 	 Identify and critically assess the substantive and procedural guarantees that States 
should offer to those individuals who refuse to perform military duties on the 
basis of their religious convictions or other beliefs. 
• 	 Assess the current practice of Member States of the Council of Europe with a 
view to identifying gaps and challenges in domestic legislation. 
• 	 Assess levels of compliance with international human rights standards. 
• 	 Make suggestions for the development of a consistent jurisprudential framework 
of legal standards and binding obligations for States, as reflected in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies 
at international level. 
The originality of the present work lies in the fact that the study adopts a novel 
approach by thematically exposing binding State obligations on the effective protection of the 
right to conscientious objection to military service, as these emerge from the jurisprudence of 
international and regional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The project itself is a valuable 
contribution to the area of emerging human rights, as it documents the transfonning views of 
international treaty-monitoring bodies, and ultimately, the synthesis of binding human rights 
obligations. 
Despite a wealth of information on the phenomenon of conscientious objection to 
military service, no overall study has yet systematically dealt with the implications and 
impact of the recent developments on the right to conscientious objection to military service.7 
This thesis makes a valuable contribution to the current academic literature on conscientious 
objection and conceptualises the existing framework governing internationally-agreed 
standards on the subject. It suggests, inter alia, that the recent decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee on conscientious objection to 
military service provide the jurisprudential context for the development of legal obligations 
for States, such as binding duties, rather than a discretionary right, to ensure that individuals 
have access to effective legal and procedural mechanisms when they have a genuine 
conscientious obj ection to military service. 
7 See 'Research Methodology', below section 1.4. 
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1.3. Scope ofthe research 
As to the geographical/political scope of the analysis carried out in the present study, 
it was decided to narrow the focus of research to the legal framework applicable to 
conscientious objection to military erivce (or lack thereof) in the 47 Member States of the 
Council of Europe. 
Those States are all parties to the ECHR and are subject to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to consider, inter alia, applications 
brought by individuals in relation to alleged violations of the Convention. In addition, all of 
the 47 Member States to the Council of Europe are also Parties to the ICCPR, one of the two 
major UN human rights treaties, covering civil and political rights. As of October 2013, the 
majority of Council of Europe Member States - with the exception of Monaco, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom - have ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,8 thereby 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee to hear individual complaints 
alleging violations of the Covenant. 
The choice of limiting the scope of the research to a comparatively narrow sample of 
States, which, as far as the subject matter of the present thesis is concerned, are Parties to the 
same international treaties, has allowed the present work to better identify practical issues 
encountered after the implementation of international standards on conscientious objection, 
such as, for example, the range of accepted grounds justifying a genuine conscientious 
objection, as well as various other legal and regulatory gaps that are discussed in a thematical 
context. Finally, the fact that all States Parties to the ECHR are automatically subject to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court means that domestic practice is subject to a form of 
international judicial scrutiny since the European Court can examine individual complaints 
for Convention violations once local remedies have been exhausted.9 Even though the 
primary guardian of the rights protected under the Convention are the High Contracting 
Parties themselves,lo the Convention is clear in that the role of the Court is the monitoring of 
8 As of 17 August 2013, there are 35 signatories and 114 parties to the Protocol. See First Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966), entry into force 23 
March 1976, U.N.T.S. vol. 999, p. 302, ratification status available at 
<http://treaties.un .org/PageslVi ewDetails.aspx?src=TREA TY &mtdsg_ no= IV-5 &chapter=4&lang=en.> 
accessed 28-10-13. 
9 European Convention on Human Rights (above n 5), Article 26: 'The Commission may only deal with the 
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of 
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.' 
10 Article 1 EClIR (above n 5): 'The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.' 
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the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties under the 
Convention. 11 In addition, the Council of Europe is a particularly appropriate field of analysis 
for a thesis which purports, inter alia, to identify the mutual influences between the domestic 
and the international level. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that the European Court 
tends to justify some 'evolutive' decisions on the basis of an emerging consensus among the 
Member States of the Council of Europe, and on the other, to the recognition of the fact the 
ECHR has come to be considered as a constitutional instrument of European public order 
(ordre public) in the field of human rights. 12 
With regard to the development of a progressive consensus on the right to 
conscientious objection in Europe, it may also be noted that, with regards to those Council of 
Europe Member States which are also Members of the European Union (EU) , the right of 
conscientious objection to military service is well-settled as a matter ofEU law in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 10(2) of which recognizes the right to ~ 
conscientious objection. 13 Although no EU Member State has joined the European Union :;a 
without being a member to the Council of Europe, it has been decided that the inclusion of all ,11...'.1' 1..:...  Council of Europe Member States serves better the overall aims of this study, since the 
Council of Europe has demonstrated that it possesses important mechanisms to assist 
governments in bringing their national legislation in line with international human rights 
standards. Thus, it was appropriate to observe how the various institutional bodies of the 
Council of Europe interact with the activities of its judicial organ, i.e. the European Court of 
Human Rights in cases where weak implementation is the primary cause of Convention 
violations, most notably in Council of Europe member states that are not EU Member States. 
With regards to the scope ratione personae of the present work, among other 
questions that are relevant to the existing framework of standards on conscientious objection, 
the study investigates whether the right to be exempted from military duties on grounds of 
conscience is applicable to professional members of the armed forces, a category which 
includes not only soldiers, but also persons who are contracted to perform other roles within 
the military forces of a State. The relevance and the topicality of the question of the 
application of a right to conscientious objection to the category in question is clearly illustrate 
11 Article 19 ECHR (above n 5). 

12 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) ECHR (1995) Series A, No. 310, para 75; reiterated in 

BosphonJs Hava Yollari Turizm ve Tiearet Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App no. 45036/98, judgment of30 June 

2005, para 156. 

13 Charter of Fundamental Rights ofthe European Union, Official Joumal ofthe European Communities 2000lC 

364101, 18 December 2000, Article 10. 
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by the fact that, for instance, in its latest recommendation on the human rights of members of 
the armed forces, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recommended that 
Member States ensure that professional members of the armed forces are able to leave the 
armed forces for reasons of conscience. 14 
The study excludes mercenaries who are, by definition, not considered as members of 
the armed forces I5 and private military contractors. 16 
Although there is no standard treaty-based definition for 'private military companies' 
(PMCs), according to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, private military companies 
'[ ... ] may provide a range of different services. At one extreme they may provide forces for 
combat. The number of PMCs doing this appears to be limited' [ .. .]. Much more usual are 
other services such as advice [ ... J, training [ ... ], logistic support [ ... ], supply of personnel for 
monitoring roles [ ...] and demining,.17 Peter Singer, who prefers to use the term 'privatised 
military firms' , defines them as 'profit driven organisations that trade in professional services 
14 Recommendation CMlRec (2010) 4, text adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 February 2010 at the 
lO77th meeting ofthe Ministers' Deputies. 

15 Under international humanitarian law, a mercenary is defined by Article 47(2) ofthe First Additional Protocol 

to the Geneva Conventions, as any person who: 

(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in 
fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a 
Party to the conflict; 
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces ofa Party to the conflict; and 
(f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a 
member of its armed forces. 
See Article 47(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Geneva, 8 June 1977), entered into force on 
7 December 1979; U.N.T.S. vol. 1125, p. 3. 
The employment and use of mercenaries by governments is a highly controversial issue in international law and 
numerous resolutions have been passed by the United Nations expressing concerns over the activities of 
mercenaries. In 1989, the first Convention condemning and criminalizing mercenarism was adopted in Geneva. 
See International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training ofMercenaries (New York, 
4 December 1989), entry into force on 20 October 2001, D.N.T.S., vol. 2163, p. 75. A regional Convention 
criminalising the use ofmercenaries in the African continent is the OAU Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenaries in Africa O.A.U. Doc. CMl433IRev.L, Annex 1(1972), entry into force 22 April 1985. 
16 Even though no legal instrument defines explicitly the term 'private military contractors', these may be 
described as individuals employed by private military companies to provide martial services through a corporate 
legal framework. See H.Yan Liu, 'Leashing the corporate dogs of war: the legal implications of the modem 
private military company', Journal oJConjlictand Security Law, vol. 1 (2010), p. 141; See also N. D. White 
and S. MacLeod, 'EU operations and private military contractors: issues of corporate and institutional 
responsibility', European Journal o.(International Law, vol. 19 (2008), p. 965. 
17 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation (London Stationery 
Office, 2002), p. 7. 
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intricately linked to warfare' .18 In 1998, the UN Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries 
as a means ofviolating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self­
determination, referred to 'private military, advisory, training and security companies' 
concluding contracts with States and argued that such companies may have some mercenary 
traits. The decision to exclude private military contractors from the scope of the research is 
justified on the basis that private military contractors are undertaking contractual obligations 
and accompany the armed forces providing, inter alia, training and logistic support but are 
not, at least in theory, taking direct part in an armed conflict. 19 More importantly, there is no 
indication in any international or regional standard-setting text with regard to the right of 
conscientious objection to suggest that mercenaries or private military contractors should 
enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligations to perform military duties. In those 
circumstances, the refusal by an employee of a private military company to carry out 
particular duties and hislher subsequent dismissal would seem to fall within the scope of 
contract or employment law.2o The lack of case law determining the existence of a right to be 
released from duties on grounds of conscience for private military contractors was an 
additional important consideration for excluding this category from the scope of research. 
Lastly, it should be clarified that due to the nature of this study which focuses on the 
principled and systematic analysis and evaluation of legal standards and obligations in 
relation to the right of conscientious objection to military service, this work does not touch 
upon questions related to the jurisprudential discourse on conscientious objection either 
generally to compulsions under the law, or specifically to military service. Nevertheless some 
bibliographical references to useful sources for further discussion are provided where 
appropriate. 
1.4. Research methodology 
One of the principal aims of the present work is to identify and examine the main 
legal principles and standards associated with conscientious objection to military service and 
to identify gaps in existing law and current challenges to the implementation of these 
18 P. Singer, 'Corporate Warriors: The rise of the privati sed military industry and its ramifications for 

international security', International Security, vol. 26 (2001), p. 186. 

19 K. Fallah, 'Regulating private military contractors in armed conflicts' in S. Gumedze (ed), Private Security in 

Atica: Manifestation, challenges and regulation (Institute for Security Studies, 2007), p. 97. 

2 L. Dickinson, 'Contract as a tool for regulating private military companies' in S. Chesterman and C. Lehnardt 

(eds.), From Mercenaries to Market (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 217. 
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standards in the domestic legal order of Council of Europe Member States. In order to 
accomplish this aim, a doctrinal analysis21 has been undertaken. The adopted methodology 
comprises of an examination of primary sources including treaty law, international, regional 
and domestic case law and' soft law,22 whilst utilising qualitative research findings. 
The research project was implemented in four different phases that are outlined 
below: 
Phase one: Literature review and case law analysis 
One of the first steps of this project was to synthesize and scrutinise a literature 
review on the subject matter in order to identify gaps and opportunites in academic literature. 
An assessment of relevant literature indicated that while a number of authors have attempted 
to examine the legal and social contours of conscientious objection to military service, 
significantly fewer have pursued to examine the question of conscientious objection to 
military service as a protected right under treaty law.23 
Various academic journals have explored the right to conscientious objection to 
military service from different viewpoints in light of growing jurisprudential challenges at 
international and regional levels.24 For the purposes of this study, which focuses on a 
thematic exposure of international standards on conscientious objection and examines their 
21 C. Hart, Doing a literature review: Releasing the Social Science Research Imagination (Sage Publishing, 
1998) , p.174; P. Chynoweth, 'Legal Research' in A. Knight (ed.), Advanced research methods in the built 
environment (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), p.56. 
22 Soft law may be described as collection of normative statements or texts addressed to the international 
community as a whole or the membership of an institution or organisation that is prepared to adopt a treaty. In 
the absence oflegally binding standards that are codified in treaties, soft law instruments such as resolutions and 
recommendations may declare or reaffirm previously accepted standards. See. D. Shelton, International Law 
and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation and Persuasion (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
f:i15. d' . f hI" f . fr . 1 • al . d h hi fFor a ISCUSSlOn 0 t e secu ansatlOn 0 conSClence om a SOClO Oglc perspectIve an t e story 0 
conscientious objection in the United States at the time of the Vietnam War see Ch. C. Moskos and J. 'Whiteclay 
Chambers II, The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (Oxford University Press, 
1993). Further to this, a doctoral study published in 2009, explored the relationship between the right to 
conscientious objection and the duty to disobey manifestly unlawful orders as protected in international law and 
under different regional human rights systems. See H. Takemura, 'International Human Right to conscientious 
objection to military service and individual duties to disobey manifestly illegal orders', (Springer, 2009). Lastly, 
the social movements formed by conscientious objectors in Turkey, South Africa, Greece, Paraguay, Chile, 
Spain and Israel and the legal challenges posed to conscientious objectors in these regions, have been discussed 
by O. H. Cinar and C. Usterci, Conscientious Objection: Resisting Militarized Society (Zed Books, 2009). 
24 In 2001, Howard Gilbert looked at the slow pace in which the right to conscientious objection has developed 
in ED law, expressing the view that the failure of the European Court ofHuman Rights to identify what sort of 
beliefs would fall within the scope of the right to freedom of religion and belief as well as the lack of a precise 
definition of the right to conscientious objection has led to considerable confusion as to the status of the right in 
international law. See H. Gilbert, 'The slow development of the right to conscientious objection to military 
service under the European Convention on Human Rights', European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5 (2001), 
p.554. 
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implementation in the Council of Europe Member States, various reports issued by 
international human rights bodies and non-governmental organisations have been collected 
and examined.25 These reports contain essential infonnation that supplemented other primary 
data obtained by the researcher. 
The next step in this first phase of the study was to examine the relevant jurisprudence 
of international human rights bodies. Due to the depth of the subject it was essential to limit 
the scope of the research to one regional human rights system in order to test how effectively 
international human rights standards are implemented at regional level. From the first steps of 
the literature review, it was foreseen that a number of important developments were 
underway in the European region. From an analysis of the jurisprudence of the UN Human 
Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, it was clear that the European 
Court of Human Rights was facing similar challenges with case law addressing conscientious 
objection. In 2011, the Court achieved a breakthrough and recognised conscientious objection 
to military service as a human right protected under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. It was envisaged that a landmark turning point would support the main thesis of the 
research, suggesting that the Court is in the process of developing legally-binding principles 
in relation to the right of conscientious objection to military service. 
Phase two: Further research planning 
The literature review and examination of relevant case law played a pivotal role in 
establishing a coherent research planning strategy for the second phase of the research 
project. Having identified legal gaps in academic literature, it was soon realised that the 
Council of Europe offered a suitable platfonn to investigate and assess compliance with 
international human rights standards on conscientious objection. In order to identify common 
problems relating to the protection of the right to conscientious objection to military service 
25 See, inter alia, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Conscientious Objection to Military 
Service (New York and Geneva, 2012) available at 
<http://www.ohchr.orgIDocumentsfPublications/ConscientiousObjection _ en.pdf> accessed 30-8-13; For NGO 
reports see, inter alia, M. Stolwijk, TheRight to Conscientious Objection ill Europe: A Review ofthe Current 
Situation (Quaker Council for European Affairs, April 2005); Andreas Speck, Conscientious objection: Legal 
Practices and Framework among EU Member States - Presentation for the Subcommittee on Security and 
Defence of the European Parliament (War Resisters International, 15 January 2007); War Resisters' 
International, World Survey on Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service (Updates), 
available at <http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtbalindex.html> accessed on 30 August 2013; European Bureau of 
Conscientious Objection, Report to the Council a/Europe: The Right to Conscientious Objection in the Council 
ofEurope Member States, 18 July 2011, <http://ebco-beoc.org/files/2011-EBCO-REPORT-CoE.pdf> accessed 
on 10 July 2013. 
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in the Member States ofthe Council of Europe, and to substantiate important information that 
was available through third parties, it was important to conduct a survey with the use of 
questionnaires distributed electronically to three groups that were identified in order to 
triangulate the information held by the author and present an accurate result. These groups 
consist of a) state agenCIes and governmental departments, b) national human rights 
institutions and c) relevant non-governmental organisations and national experts on 
conscientious objection matters. For the purposes of the survey, it was essential to prepare 
two types of questionnaires, the first for countries with conscripted and professional armies, 
and the second for countries constructing their armed forces solely with the use of 
professional (contracted) military personnel. 26 
The survey was undertaken with a view to assess the means and levels of compliance 
with international legal standards on conscientious objection in the Council of Europe 
Member States and to create an overview of the current situation which is based, inter alia, 
on information received from the relevant governmental bodies, as well as publicly available 
data compiled in databases of non-governmental organisations which are updated at regular 
intervals.27 By February 2013, twenty-two responses were received by governments or their 
embassies in the United Kingdom, with detailed information on questions relating to the 
purposes of this study. Further email correspondence with competent authorities was entered 
into by the author when additional clarifications were required. The questionnaires have also 
been submitted to non-governmental organisations in all Member States of the Council of 
Europe, and the European Bureau of Conscientious Objection (EBeO) circulated a call for 
participation to its members. 
Further to collecting information by survey, a crucial task in this process was to 
investigate the consistency of implementation of international standards in national 
legislation, and subsequently explain how constitutional principles, laws and practices affect 
the legal protection of the right to conscientious objection. In this investigation, regular 
reports submitted to the Human Rights Committee by Member States to the ICCPR and the 
26 Questionnaire Type 1 applies to: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cyprus, Denmark, 

Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 

Questionnaire Type 2 applies to: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, the Former Yugoslavian 

Republic of Macedonia, France, Gennany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 

Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 

United Kingdom. See Appendix A. 

27 War Resisters' International, World Survev on Conscientious objection, available at <http://www.wri­

irg.orglco/rtbalindex.html> accessed on 20 February 2013. 
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Concluding Observations of the Committee have been used to scrutinise relevant 
developments on a country-by-country basis. Furthermore, short reports provided to the 
Committee by non-governmental organisations with an interest in the field of conscientious 
objection to military service as part of the ICCPR monitoring process have been used in the 
present analysis. 
Phase three: Overview ofstructure and writing 
The qualitative research findings were adequately used to conceptualise the final 
structural parts of the thesis in a way that tackles the research questions of the study 
effectively and supports the researcher's thesis. In this regard, it was decided that the aims of 
the research would be achieved more efficiently following the overview of structure 
presented in section 1.5 below. 
Phase four: Follow-up process to include recent developments 
Lastly, in order to keep up with recent judicial, jurisprudential, political and other 
developments in the Member States of the Council of Europe, a follow-up process was 
maintained until the completion of this project. This included a regular review of pending 
complaints and cases brought before the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court 
of Human Rights and domestic courts and tribunals across the Council of Europe. 
Furthermore, governmental bodies have been frequently contacted to maintain the accuracy 
of information presented in this study. 
1.5. Overview of structure 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the study and addresses preliminary matters, 
including the main research questions and methodology employed. It provides a brief 
overview of the scope and limits of this research, and supplements definitions and 
descriptions of key concepts and terms used throughout the project. 
Chapter 2 examines the emergence of the right of conscientious objection to military 
service in international human rights law, and explains how soft-law instruments were 
developed by the UN human rights bodies to construe a set of coherent guidelines for States 
to guarantee the right to conscientious objection effectively within their domestic 
jurisdictions. It further discusses the practice of the Human Rights Committee and explores 
12 
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how it gradually recognised the right to conscientious objection as a right deriving from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Chapter 3 investigates the developments that led the key institutions of the European 
human rights system to adopt relevant international human rights standards on conscientious 
objection and promote them at regional level. It also discusses the relevant practice and 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights this is the regional judicial body of the 
Council of Europe, and identifies a number of legal obligations that have been considered, 
upheld and developed by the Court. 
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth thematic analysis on specific international standards 
on conscientious objection to military service, in order to demonstrate how the key 
institutions of the United Nations and the Council of Europe have attempted to protect the 
right under their treaty systems of human rights protection, namely the ICCPR and 
the ECHR. This chapter also features a more extensive analysis of practice in domestic 
legislation and policies; adapting it in the thematic presentation of applicable standards in 
order to enable the process of drawing up more meaningful conclusions. 
Chapter 5 moves beyond conscription and examines the applicability of the right to 
conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces. International standards 
and State practice are examined closely in order to reveal best practices and commonly 
identified issues in the Council of Europe Member States. 
The last chapter brings together the main findings and conclusions of this study and 
expands on the judicial impact of the recognition of conscientious objection to military 
service as a human right protected under the international and European treaty systems of 
human rights protection. 
1.6. Use ofterms 
The present section defines the main terms used throughout this study including: the 
methods used to compel (through conscription) or recruit (through voluntarily enlistment) 
individuals into the armed forces of a State; notions related to objections of conscience 
against the performance of military service or duties; and fmally, how States respond to 
claims for exemptions from military and what alternatives are currently offered to 
conscientious objectors. As this section aims to provide a brief interpretation of key terms, 
13 

the notions mentioned in this section will be examined further in greater depth in the relevant 
chapters and sections of this thesis. 
To begin with, the term 'armed forces' usually describes the structure of the military 
forces of a State, which typically consists of three units; the Territorial Army, the Navy, and 
the Air Force.28 The armed forces of a State may be constructed in different ways, the most 
notable being through the use of mandatory military service or professional service on a 
voluntary basis. Mandatory military service, often referred to as 'conscription' has been 
defined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (hereinafter 'PACE'i9 as 
the legal obligation imposed on individuals to serve in their State's military forces for a 
period oftime prescribed and limited by law.3o The origins of mandatory military service as a 
comprehensive national system of recruitment can be traced back to the era of the French 
revolution and the rise of Napoleon who institutionalised conscription in 180331 and used it to 
a large extent during the Napoleonic Wars from 1803 up to 1815.32 The compulsory 
enrolment or enlistment of soldiers for service, otherwise described as 'the obtaining of 
recruits by compulsion,33 is still practiced in many countries around the world and has been 
the subj ect of debate in academic literature. 34 
28 G. Berman and T. Rutherford, Defence Personnel Statistics (House of Commons Library, 2013), p. 3. 
29 The Parliamentary Assembly is one of the key institutions of the Council of Europe and it consists of a 
number of individual representatives from each Member State, with a President elected each year from among 
them for a maximum period of two sessions. For more information on the work ofPACE, see R. Kicker, The 
Council ofEurope: Pioneer and Guarantor for Human Rights and Democracy (Council of Europe, 2010). 
30 PACE Resolution 1166 (1998) on the Human Rights of Conscripts, text adopted by the Assembly on 22 
September 1998 (26th Sitting), available at 
<http://assembly.coe.intiDocuments/AdoptedTextita98/eresI166.htm> accessed on 10 October 2013, para 1. 
See also PACE, Recommendation 1380( 1998), Human Rights of Conscripts, adopted at the 687thMeeting of 
Ministers' Deputies, 17-18 November 1999, available at 
<http://assembly.coe.intiMain.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta98IERECI380.htm> accessed on 10 
October 2013. 
31 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Conscription', available at 
<http://www.britannica.comJEBcheckeditopic/133307 /conscription> accessed 10 August 2013. 
32 K. Linch, 'Conscription' in European History Online' (Leibriz Institute of European History, 30 January 
2012), available at <www.ieg-ego.eullinchk-2012-en> accessed on 10 August 2013. 
33 The Chambers Dictionary (9th Edition), p.87. 
34 The use of mandatory military service has been the subject of debate in academic literature where it is often 
noted that conscription has been historically maintained to arm and mobilise the population as an expression of 
patriotic virtue, while others have argued that civil society itself has, through conscription, an active role in the 
operation of the military. Debates over the financial sustainability of conscription systems have also been on­
going for many years. Although it may appear that conscripted armies are a more cost-effective method of 
constructing a State's armed forces rather than employing smaller fully-professional armies, some commentators 
suggest that conscripted armies pose a heavier burden on a State's economy. For further discussion see M. 
Broers, 'The Concept of "Total War" in the Revolutionary- Napoleonic Period', War in History, vol. 15 (2008), 
p. 250; P. Poutvaara and A. Wagener, 'Conscription: Economic Costs and Political Allure', The Economics of 
Peace and Security Journal, vol. 2 (2007), p. 6. See also P. Poutvaara and A. Wagener, The Political Economy 
o/Conscription, rZA DP No. 4429 (Institute for the Study of Labour, September 2009), available at 
<http://ftp.iza.org/dp4429.pdf> accessed on 10 August 2013. 
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In particular, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4 below, out of the 47 Member States of 
the Council of Europe, at present 15 lay their military defence, in whole or in part, on 
mandatory military service.35 In the Council of Europe Member States retaining conscription, 
only men are liable to perform national military service, with the exception ofNorway which 
has recently extended conscription to both genders.36 
The term 'conscript' or 'conscripted soldier' refers to an individual who is performing 
his/her period of mandatory military service, i.e. is enlisted in the State's armed forces for a 
defined period of time prescribed by law, not by personal free choice but due to a call-up 
order to perform mandatory military service.37 Conscripts are usually assigned combatant or 
non-combatant roles depending on their physical capabilities. Mandatory service may also be 
performed in a nursing capacity for conscripts with a medical background.38 Support 
personnel performing other non-combatant tasks in the armed forces such as technicians, may 
comprise of both persons perfonning mandatory military service as well as permanent or 
hourly-paid technical staff employed by governments on a contractual basis.39 
The term 'professional members of the armed forces' , on the other hand, is used in the 
present work to describe professional service personnel that join the armed forces of their 
own free will, voluntarily choosing to pursue a military career for a fixed or indeterminate 
period of time.40 In some States, conscripted personnel are offered the opportunity to 
continue in military employment under a contract of service at the end of their mandatory 
military service.41 According to the Explanatory Memorandum to Committee of Ministers 
35 See Table 1 Overview of the current situation in the Council ofEurope, p. 86. 
36 'Norway votes to extend conscription to women', (The Telegraph, 17 June 2013) available at 
<http://www.telegraph. co. uklnews/worldnews/ europe/norway /10 124998/Norway-votes-to-extend-conscription­
to-women.html> accessed on 4-8-13. 
37 On this point, see Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)4 of the Committee of 
Mirusters, prepared by the Secretariat in co-operation with the Chairperson ofthe Committee of Experts for the 
Development of Human Rights' Group on Human Rights of Members of the Armed Forces (DR-DEV -FA) 
(Council of Europe, 2010), p.23. 
38 For example in Finland, physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and students of these disciplines are 
placed in Army, Navy or Air Force brigade-level units at the call-ups. After the basic training period they are 
assigned to the Centre for Military Medicine for conscript medical training. See Government of Finland, 
Conscript 2013: A Guide for you who are preparing to carry out your military service, p.62, available at 
<http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcrn! ed0543 804 fD41 bcaa4b6f7 489 88c 8728/Conscript2013_ WEB.pdf?MOD= 
AJPERES> accessed on 18-8-13. 
39 Employment practice may differ from State to State. See for example Republic of Cyprus, Organisation of 
Ministry ofDefence and shared responsibility, available at 
~http://www.mod.goy.cy/mod/mod.nsf/page08_gr/page08~r?OpenDocument> accessed on 2-9-13. 
Ibid, p. 23. 
41 See the detailed report prepared by Tobias Pfluger (MEP), 'Professional soldiers and the right to 
conscientious objection in the European Union', October 2008 available at 
<http://www.forceswatch.netlresourceslprofessional-soldiers-and-right-conscientio us-objection-european­
union> accessed 10-5-13. 
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Recommendation (2010) 4 on the Human Rights of Members of the Armed Forces, the nature 
of the relationship between professional servicemen and the Armed Forces is'akin to that of 
an employer and an employee, albeit with the specific characteristics essentially linked to 
military discipline, hierarchy andjustice.,42 The choice to use the term 'professional members 
of the armed forces' rather than the shorter term 'professional soldiers' is justified on the 
basis of two considerations. First, it includes individuals belonging to the armed forces but 
maintaining a non-combatant function, such as military personnel administrators, healthcare 
personnel and medical assistants, technicians maintaining or operating equipment, 
information technology specialists and construction personnel. Second, the term is used to 
avoid confusion with mercenaries and 'private military contractors' which, as discussed in 
the above section are not considered being members of the armed forces of a State.43 
The concept of 'conscientious objection' has attracted the interest of academic 
commentators and legal theorists over the years.44 The definition of conscientious objection 
in legal philosophy is rather open-ended with the traditional key element of the refusal of a 
legal duty for moral reasons as the central characteristic of this phenomenon. 
It should be emphasised that there is no international human rights treaty-based 
definition of conscientious objection.45 Although the term, in a general sense, can refer to the 
resistance to a diverse range of legal obligations, it has been closely linked to objections to 
military service. Drawing upon the formulation contained in the first resolution on the right 
of conscientious objection adopted by PACE in 1967, conscientious objection to military 
service usually refers to the refusal by a person liable to conscription for military service to 
perform armed service for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from 
religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives.46 It should, however, 
be noted that such a definition would restrict the scope of conscientious objection to persons 
42 Explanatory Memorandum to CMlRec (2010)4 (above n 37), p.23. 

43 See above, section 1.4, text accompanying fn. 16. 

44 On the jurisprudential debate on conscientious objection see, inter alia, J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 

(Clarendon Press, 1972); J. Raz, The Authority ofLaw: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 

2009); K. Greenawalt, Conflicts ofLaw and Morality (Clarendon Law Series, 1987); Raz J., 'The Obligation to 

Obey: Revision and Tradition', Notre Dame Law Journal ofEthics and Public Policy, vol. 1 (1984), p. 139. 

45 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Civil and Political Rights, Including the 

Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service', UN doc. E/CN.4/2004/55 (2004), p. 21. 

46 This description is based on the formulation contained in the first resolution of the PACE dealing with the 

question of conscientious objection to military service, adopted in January 1967. See PACE, Resolution 337 

(1967) on the right of conscientious objection, text adopted by the Assembly on 26th January 1967 (22nd 

Sitting), para 1. 'Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound 

conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuse to 

perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to perform such service.' 
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'liable to conscription,.47 However, in light of the recent developments, briefly mentioned 
above, which have seen human rights bodies and organizations advocating the extension of a 
limited right to conscientious objection to professional members of the armed forces,48 such 
defInition appears to be unduly narrow for the purposes of the present study. 
Accordingly, the working defInition of the term needs to be broader so as to cover 
both conscripts and professional members of the armed forces. For the purposes of this 
study, 'conscientious objection to military service' is therefore defined in very broad terms as 
the refusal by an individual to perform military service or engage in a particularly military 
operation due to a genuinely held religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or 
similar belief. 
State practice on the question of conscientious objection to military servIce 
demonstrates that an objection can take two principal forms, either as an absolute or as a 
selective objection, depending on the beliefs of the individual raising the objection. An 
'absolute conscientious objection' is characterised by a general objection to military 
conflict where the person is willing to undertake a genuinely civilian service as an alternative 
form of national service, but is not willing to perform service that is in any way associated 
with the military services of the State. This is not to be confused with 'total objection' which 
is used to describe situations where conscientious objectors object to any kind of mandatory 
national service, either military or altemative.49 An absolute objector, therefore, is someone 
who is opposed to any form of military service in principle, for example a pacifIst50 or 
member of a religious order that is fundamentally opposed to the use of anned force/military 
force. 51 
47 Another example of a restrictive definition of conscientious objection to military service is provided by 
Lippman who defines the term as 'the refusal to participate in the armed services based upon opposition to war' ; 
see M. Lippman, 'The recognition of conscientious objection to military service as a human right', California 
Western International Law Journal, vol. 21 (1990), p. 31. 
48 CMlRec (2010) 4 (above n 14). 
49 See PACE Report on conscientious objection to compulsory military service (Rapporteur: Mr de 
Kwaadsteniet), Doc. 5663, 9 December 1986, p.7. Such cases have been examined by the European Court of 
Human Rights and are discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
50 'Pacifism' is defined as the policy, doctrine or belief of rejecting war and every form of violent actions as 
means of solving disputes, especially in international affairs, and the belief in and advocacy of peaceful methods 
offeasible and desirable alternatives to war. See, e.g., 'Pacifism' in Chambers Dictionary (9th edition). 
According to a commentator, 'pacifism' is described as a personal duty: see E. L. Allen, 'Pacifism as an 
Individual Duty', in The case for Conscientious Objection: A reply to Professor G. C. Field, Part 1 (Central 
Board for Conscientious Objectors, 1946), p. 11. 
51 C. Eller, Conscientious Objectors and the Second World War: Moral and Religious Arguments in Support of 
Pacifism (Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 89. 
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Objections against performing military servIce on grounds of conscience are, 
however, accepted in many States without fully exempting an objector from other civic 
obligations. Most States require conscientious objectors to perform an 'alternative service' 
which is, principally, civilian in nature. For the purposes of this study, 'alternative service' is 
defined as a form of national service that is performed in replacement of military service. 52 It 
may be carried out outside the armed forces, although unarmed military service is optional in 
some States. 53 
52 Chambers dictionary (9th edition), p. 92. 

53 See Table 3 'Duration of military service and alternative service', p. 125. 
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Chapter 2: The emergence of the right to conscientious objection in the UN system for 
the protection of human rights 
2.1. Introduction 
The question of the recognition of a right of conscientious objection to military service at 
the international level has been the object of discussion within the UN ever since the early 
'60s. The present chapter aims to provide an overview of the terms of the debate and of the 
way in which it developed throughout the years, up to the final recognition of the right in 
recent times. 
The first aim of this chapter is to offer a closer examination of the text of the ICCPR and, 
in particular, the drafting history of the treaty in order to understand why the right to 
conscientious objection to military service was not spelled out within Article 18 ICCPR as a 
manifestation of religion or belief and whether some attempts were made to provide some 
procedural guarantees under the Covenant. Having outlined the main arguments of the 
drafters of the ICCPR and the adopted provisions relating to conscientious objection to 
military service, the chapter focuses on the activities of UN Charter-based bodies in order to 
explain how the right to conscientious objection attracted the attention of UN human rights 
bodies and what steps were taken to improve the domestic situation of conscientious 
objectors through various standard-setting texts, including resolutions and guidelines calling 
for the effective recognition of the right in the domestic legal order of UN member states. 
Finally, the chapter scrutinises the practice of the Human Rights Committee and the 'views' 
it has historically adopted with regard to the right of conscientious objection to military 
service as a treaty-protected right in a number of complaints that arose before it. 
2.2. The text ofthe ICCPR 
As noted above, the ICCPR does not, as such, expressly recognise a right to 
conscientious objection. The question whether a right to conscientious objection to military 
service should be expressly included in what was designed to be the principal UN treaty 
dealing with civil and political rights was debated at length during the long process which led 
to the adoption of the ICCPR in 1966. The attempts made, particularly in the period between 
1949 and 1950, by several civil society organisations, such as, for instance, the 'International 
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Peace Bureau' and the 'Friends World Committee for Consultation', to include a provision on 
conscientious objection to military service in the Covenant were unsuccessfu1.54 
The task of drafting the international treaty which would translate into binding legal 
obligations the rights and freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was entrusted to the UN Commission on Human Rights.55 As known, by 1952 it had become 
clear that consensus would not have been reached on a single human rights instrument and 
the Commission was directed by the General Assembly to prepare two Covenants instead of 
one; with the first Covenant addressing civil and political rights and the second focusing on 
economic social and cultural rights.56 
The question of whether the UN Covenant dealing with civil and political righs 
should recognise a right to conscientious objection to military service came to the negotiating 
table in 1950 in the context of preparation of the text of the provision protecting freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, which would eventually become Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
The travaux preparatoires of Article 18 (draft Article 16 in the draft Covenant) indicate that 
the delegation of the Philippines had formally proposed the inclusion of the right to be 
exempted from military service on grounds of conscience as one of the aspects of the 
provision on freedom of thought, conscience and religion.57 In particular, the proposal 
provided that the text of draft Article 16 should include a paragraph (draft paragraph 3), 
stating that' [p]ersons who conscientiously object to war as being contrary to their religion 
shall be exempt from military service'. 
The Philippines later withdrew their proposal as a result of the opposition expressed 
by some members of the Commission to the express recognition of a right to conscientious 
objection under the Covenant, on the basis that such an inclusion would complicate the text 
of the Covenant and would make it unfavourable for States with conscription in place.58 The 
54 R. Brett and L. Townhead, 'Conscientious Objection to Military Service' in G. Gilbert, F. Hampson and C. 

Sandoval (eds.), Strategic Visions for Human Rights: Essays in honour ofProfessor Kevin Boyle (Routledge, 

2011), p. 98. 

55 The Commission on Human Rights was instructed by the UN Secretary General on a note of 29 July 1949 to 

draft an International Covenant on Human Rights. The draft International Covenant on Human Rights was 

presented to the Secretary General on 22 March 1950. See Commission on Human Rights, Compilation of the 

Comments on the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and the Proposed Additional Articles (6th 

Session, 22 March 1950), UN doc. E/CNAI365. 

56 See General Assembly Resolution 543 (VI) of 4 February 1952. 

57 Compilation of the Comments on the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and the Proposed 

Additional Articles, UN doc. E/CNAI365 (PI) (above n 55), p. 44. 
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Chilean delegate, for example, expressed the view that 'in the first place, the amendment 
concerned conscientious objectors who were opposed to war on religious grounds; war, 
however, was equally hated by all and there was no doubt that it also violated the collective 
conscience of all the citizens of a country.' 59 It was further argued that war and military 
service were not the same, and that military service was not exclusively a preparation of war, 
but it was also used to prepare the youth for other national disasters.6o The US delegate 
argued that the question of military service was outside the scope of draft Article 16; in 
particular, 'it was questionable whether a specific provision of that nature should be included 
in a general convention of fundamental rights' .61 Finally, Uruguay argued that draft Article 
16 in its original fOIU1 protected freedom of conscience and it was unnecessary to recognise a 
right of conscientious objection, since military service was already mentioned in draft Article 
8 (the provision prohibiting forced labour) which is discussed below,62 while the Australian 
member agreed that the proposed amendment seemed to be out of place in draft Article 16.63 
Article 18, as fmally adopted, reads: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief ofhis choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect 
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 
56).For details on the drafting history of Art.18 see M. J. Bossuyt, Guide to the 'travaux preparatoires ' to the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 351-371. 

59 Ibid, para 5l. 

60 Ibid. 

61 Ibid, para 52. 

62 Ibid, para 54. 

63 Ibid, para 55. 
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religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions. 
Quite apart from the attempt to include an express recognition of the right to 
conscientious objection as one of the aspects of the right to manifest one's thought or 
religious beliefs, the main discussions amongst the members of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the question of conscientious objection to military service took place in the context 
of the drafting of Article 8(3) of the ICCPR which concerns the prohibition of forced labour. 
The travaux preparatoires of that provision reveal that two key proposals aimed at including 
some fonn of legal safeguard to conscientious objectors in the Covenant were put forward 
during the negotiations.64 Although an exclusion of work undertaken by conscientious 
objectors from the definition of 'forced labour' was included in the relevant provision, a 
number of attempts were made by members of the Commission during the drafting phase to 
at least provide conscientious objectors with some minimum guarantees regarding their 
treatment in comparison to persons performing military service. These attempts and their 
outcome are briefly explained below. 
The first proposal, tabled by the United Kingdom, concerned the inclusion in draft 
Article 8 of a clause providing that the services of conscientious objectors should 'be carried 
out in conditions equal to those accorded to all other citizens' .65 The second proposal, put 
forward by the Lebanese delegation suggested that a sentence be added to Article 8 providing 
that 'the service of conscientious objectors is compensated with maintenance and pay not 
inferior to what a soldier of the lowest rank receives' .66 
Supporters of the aforementioned proposals emphasised that in certain countries 
where conscientious objectors were released from military obligations, they were subjected to 
treatment inconsistent with human dignity, and should therefore be provided with some 
minimum safeguards.67 In particular, the Lebanese delegate added that conscientious 
objectors in certain countries were 'set to compulsory labour, were paid little or nothing, and 
in many cases their health or sanity broke down'. 68 The British delegate opposed the 
64 For details of the drafting history of Article 8 ICCPR, see ibid., pp. 161-186 .' . 
65 Commission on Human Rights, Summary record of the one hundred and fourth meetmg (Fifth sesslOn), UN 
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67 Ibid, E/CNAISR.94, p. 12. 
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Lebanese proposal to include a provision on equal pay for conscientious objectors on the 
basis that 'the reference in the text was inappropriate in an article dealing with compulsory 
labour' .69 Other opponents of the motion were similarly of the view that it was inappropriate 
to go into details concerning the treatment of conscientious objectors.7o The Belgian 
representative expressed the view that details such as the pay of conscientious objectors were 
'of secondary importance and were not necessarily appropriate for inclusion in the 
Covenant' .71 The proposal to insert the sentence 'provided that the service of conscientious 
objectors be compensated with maintenance and pay not inferior to what a soldier of the 
lowest rank receives' was finally rejected by 5 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions. 
The UK's proposal to amend the provision by adding the words 'provided that the 
service of conscientious objectors be carried out in conditions equal to those accorded to all 
other citizens subjected thereto' was also rejected by 3 votes to 1, with 12 abstentions.72 
France however, suggested that the provision on the prohibition of forced labour 
should contain a reference to work undertaken by conscientious objectors, followed by the 
phrase 'in countries where they are recognised,.73 The French amendment to paragraph 3 of 
Article 8 was adopted by 11 votes to 3, with 4 abstentions. 74 Accordingly, the relevant part of 
Article 8 (paragraph (3)(c)(ii)) as fmally adopted provided that '[ ... ] the term 'forced or 
compulsory labour' shall not include: [a]ny service of a military character and, in countries 
where conscientious objection is recognised, any national service required by law of 
conscientious objectors'. 
It may be noteworthy to point out that the voting on the inclusion of the French 
amendment above in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) at the time, was taken by roll-call because, as the 
Chilean delegate emphasised, of the 'grave responsibility involved in the case of those 
countries which did not recognise the concept of conscientious objection' .75 It may be argued, 
therefore, that the phrase was added to avoid the likelihood of reading the provision as 
69 Ibid, E/CN.4/SR.94, p. 6 (United Kingdom). 
70 Ibid, E/CN.4/SR94. See also AlC.3/SR.290, para 40 (New Zealand). 
71 Ibid, E/CNAISR.94, p. 6 (Belgium). 
72 Commission on Human Rights, Summary record of the one hundred and third meeting (Fifth session), UN 
doc. E.CNA/SRl03, 7 June 1949, p. 10. 
73 ElCNAISRl04 (above n 65), p.7 (Lebanon). 
74 Commission on Human Rights, Summary record of the three hundred and thirteenth meeting (Eighth session) 
UN doc.E/CNAISR.313, 10 June 1952, p. 12. 
75 Ibid, E/CNAISR.94, p. 6 (Chile). In a subsequent statement the delegate from the Philippines (Mr. Ingles) 
expressed fears that the inclusion of a reference to conscientious objection in the Covenant might jeopardise th:t; 
national security of his country. 
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imposing an obligation on States that did not recognise conscientious objection at the time to 
recognise the right in their domestic legislation. 
. ~he i~plications of the inclusion of a statement on conscientious objection to military 
servlce III ArtIcle 8 instead of Article 18 of the ICCPR, and th d' f h .. 
e wor mg 0 t e prOVISIOn of 
Article 8(3)( c)(ii) itself, have contributed to a long debate over the applicability of Article 18 
in cases concerning conscientious objection to military service.76 The position of the Human 
Rights Committee that put an end to this long debate will be examined in more depth in 
section 2.4 of the present chapter. 
2.3 Activities of the UN Charter-based human rights bodies 
In parallel with the discussion on the degree of protection to be afforded to 
conscientious objectors to military service within the framework of UN treaties for the 
protection of human rights, starting from the early '60s the question of conscientious 
objection to military service was also addressed by a number of UN bodies involved in the 
protection of human rights and of the UN General Assembly itself. The present section 
examines the activities of the so-called UN Charter-based bodies, and particularly of the 
Commission on Human Rights and its subsidiary bodies up to 2006,77 and of the Human 
76 See for example the Turkish government's recent argument in Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey where it relied 
upon the travauxpreparatoire of Article 8 ICCPR to convince the Human Right Committee that Article 18 does 
not include a right to conscientious objection. See Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey, UN doc. CCPRJC/104/D/1853­
1854/2008 (19 June 2012). 
,- The Commission on Human Righs was created by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with 
Resolution 9(II) of21 June 1946. It was an intergovernmental body initially composed on 18 Member States 
which gruadually expanded to 53 Member States by 2006. The Commission had a broad mandate to address any 
human rights matter, even though in its first 20 years the Commission was engaged in standard-setting and 
preparing the first drafts on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two Covenants. See J. Steiner, 
P. Alston and R. Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 742; According to the terms of reference adopted by resolution 9 (II) of21 June 1946, the 
Commission comprised of representatives of 18 States that were designated by ECOSOC, including 5 
permanent Security-Council members; see Economic and Social Council, resolution 9 (II) of21 June 1946. By 
the mid-90s the Commission had become the object of harsh criticism regarding its composition and politically 
influenced decisions, as well as its lack of credibility due to the selective attitude towards the human rights 
records of governments which led to ongoing discussions for refoTIn. See N. Rodley 'The Evolution ofthe 
United Nations Charter-Based Machinery for the Protection ofHuman Rights', European Human Rights Law 
Rt!vierv, vol. 1 (1997), p. 4; see also N. Ghanea 'From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights 
Council: One step forwards or two steps sideways?', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, voL ?5 
(2006), p. 695. The Commission concluded its activities in 2006, when it was succeeded by the Human Rights 
Council (on which, see below, n. 78). 
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Rights Council from 2006 until present,78 and their contribution to the legal and policy debate 
on the protection of the right to conscientious objection to military service. 
The phenomenon of conscientious objection to military service first came to the 
attention of UN Charter-based human rights bodies in a somewhat tangential way in 1960, 
when, in the context of a study on 'discrimination in the matter of religious rights and 
practices', Ascot Krishnaswami, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,79 noted that the question of 
conscientious objection to military service had been left to the discretion of States and that no 
uniform solution to that issue was foreseeable at the time. 8o In particular, the Special 
Rapporteur noted that 'the arrangement to leave the recognition of the claim of conscientious 
objectors to full or partial exemption from military service to the discretion of the State has 
been recognized in Article 8 of the draft covenant on civil and political rights, that was 
adopted by the Third Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with forced or 
compulsory labour' .81 The Special Rapporteur noted that a number of problems arose in 
practice with regard to religious discrimination of conscientious objectors. For example, 
arrangements for the exemption of individuals from military service were significantly 
7S The Human Rights Council which succeded the Commission on Human Rights was created by UN General 
Assembly resolution 60/251 on 15 March 2006 and discusses thematic human rights issues in cooperation with 
the UN Special Procedures established by the former Commission on Human Rights. A complaints procedure 
was originally established through Council resolution 5/1 (para 85). Resolution 60/251 sets out the functions of 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and the means available for mandate-holders of Special Procedures to 
exercise their mandate. It also sets up the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee which functions as a 
think tank for the Council and works at its discretion. See P. Alston, 'Reconceiving the UN Human Rights 
Regime: Challenges confronting the new UN Human Rights Council', Melbourne Houmal ofInternational 
Law, vol. 7 (2006), p. 185; O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 865. 
79 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was established by 
ECOSOC in 1954 with the task ofundertaking research on discriminatory practices and making 
recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights. See ECOSOC, Resolution 9(ll) of 21 June 1946, 
adopted 21 June 1946, UN doc. El56IRev.1, para 9 (Sub-Commission on Protection ofMinorities), para 10 
(Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination). The Sub-Commission's mandate was progressively 
expanded throughout the years to cover studies on a broad range of critical human rights issues and in 1999 the 
Sub-Commission was renamed to 'Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights'; see 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection ofHuman Rights, Final report ofthe fifty-eighth session, 
Geneva, 7-25 August 2006, available at <http://www2.ohchr.orglengJishibodies/subcoml> accessed on 18 
October 2013. The Sub-Commission ceased to exist in 2006 when the Commission on Human Rights was 
replaced by the Human Rights Council. See J.A. Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a 
New Era (Routledge, 2009), p. 13. J. P. Humphrey, 'The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection ofMinorities', The American Journal ofInternational Law, vol. 62 (1968), p. 
869; B. Thiele and M. Gomez, 'A review of the fifty-eighth session of the United Nations Sub-Commission on 
and Promotion the Protection of Human Rights', Netherlands Quarterly ofHuman Rights, vol. 24 (2006), p. 
703. 
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different from country from country, with many not allowing exemptions from military 
service and some not accepting conscientious refusals on non-religious grounds; furthermore, 
it noted that there were impediments by the public to the access of conscientious objectors to 
employment and social life. 82 The Special Rapporteur pointed out that, although the decision 
whether to recognize the possibility of exemption from military service was one left to the 
domestic authorities, 'in a country where the principle of conscientious objection to military 
service is recognised, exemptions should be granted to genuine objectors in a manner 
ensuring that no adverse distinction based upon religion or bel ief may result.' 83 This principle 
was incorporated in the 'Draft Principles on Freedom of Discrimination in the Matter of 
Religious Rights and Practices' which were annexed to the Krishnaswami study. Principle 11 
provided that the right to 'exemption for genuine conscientious objectors to military service, 
where it is recognised, [should] be granted in such a manner that no adverse distinction based 
upon religion or belief may result'. 84 The Draft Principles were examined by the Commission 
on Human Rights at its eighteenth session in 1962,85 where it adopted five preambular 
paragraphs; nevertheless, consideration of the Draft Principles was subsequently 
discontinued, with the result that, inter alia, the recommendation on conscientious objection 
was never adopted. 86 
In 1971, the Commission on Human Rights decided to carry out a study specifically 
on the question of conscientious objection to military service; the decision was motivated on 
the basis of the increasing interest among young people in the question of conscientious 
objection to military service and the calls of the World Youth Assembly to introduce the 
question of conscientious objection on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights at its 
twenty-seventh session. 87 In March 1971, the Commission requested the Secretary-General to 
make available to it the information on conscientious objection to military service that had 
already been collected by Krishnaswami in the context of the preparation of his 1961 report.88 
The Commission also requested the Secretary-General to seek from Member States up-to­
82 Ibid, p. 43. 

83 Ibid, p. 65. 

84 Ibid, ElCNAISub.21200/Rev.44, Part II. 

85 Economic and Social Council, 'Report of the Commission on Human Rights', UN doc. E/3616/Rev.l, 
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87 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the twenty-seventh session, UN doc. E/4949, 22 February-26 
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88 Resolution 11 B (XXVII), adopted at its 1128th meeting on 19 March 1971. 
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date infonnation on national legislation and other measures and practices relating to 
conscientious objection to military service and alternative service.89 
In preparation of his report to the Commission, the Secretary-General suggested that 
in their replies Member States should bear in mind such questions as: 
• 	 Whether there was any national legislation, other measure or practice relating 
to conscientious objection to military service and alternative service; 
• 	 The grounds upon which conscientious objection could be claimed, the 
authorities competent to determine exemptions from military service on 
grounds of conscience and the procedure available, including any provisions 
for appeal; the penalties and sanctions applicable to conscientious objectors; 
• 	 The forms of alternative service required or permitted, and the conditions of 
such alternative service in relation to military service; 
• 	 Whether national legislation or other measures and practices relating to these 
matters apply equally in peacetime and emergency situations.9o 
Section I of the Secretary-General's report, presented to the Commission on Human 
Rights at its twenty-ninth session in 1972, contained a compilation of the information on 
conscientious objection to military service included in the country studies prepared in 1958 in 
connection with Krishnaswami's study on discrimination on religious grounds, while Section 
II contained substantive extracts of information about national legislation and other measures 
and practices relating to conscientious objection to military service and alternative service as 
received from 57 Member States.91 Following the submission of the Secretary-General' s 
report, the discussion on conscientious objection within the Commission was repeatedly 
postponed. 
A reference to the question objection was only made in 1976, when the Commission 
stated that it would give 'adequate consideration' to the problem of recognition of 
conscientious objection to military service during its thirty-fourth session of 1978;92 however 
the question of conscientious objection was not placed as an agenda item. Similarly, on 14 
March 1979, the Commission on Human Rights postponed once again considering the role of 
89 Ibid. 
90 Commission on Human Rights, The role ofyouth in the promotion and protection of human rights: The 
question of conscientious objection to military service (Report of the Secretary-General), UN doc. E.CNAI1118, 
15 December 1972. 
:~ Ibid. F?r ~ detailed account of the information provided by Member States, see pp. 3-26 of the report . 
. Commission on Human Rights, Discussion on agenda item 15 of the Commission on Human Rights at the 
thirty-fourth session, UN doc. E/CN!1241 , 7-8 February 1978. 
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youth in the promotion and protection of human rights, including the question of 
conscientious objection to military service. 93 
In Resolution 38 (XXXVI) of 12 March 1980, the Commission requested the 
Secretary-General to collect from Member States up-to-date information on national 
legislation and practices relating to conscientious objection to military service and alternative 
service and the following year it mandated the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to study the question of conscientious 
objection.94 The Sub-Commission requested two of its members, Asbj0rn Eide and Chama 
Mubanga-Chipoya, to examine the materials collected from Governments, special agencies, 
regional inter-governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations 111 
consultative status and provide a concise report to the Sub-Commission with a view to 
developing principles in relation to conscientious objection.95 The two rapporteurs presented 
their preliminary report in 198296 and were requested by the Sub-Commission to prepare a 
final report to be presented to the Commission on Human Rights. 97 
The final report presented to the UN Human Rights Commission in 198398 provides 	 'I 
!•
an in-depth analysis of the scope of the recognition of a right of conscientious objection to 
military service in the domestic legal systems of UN Member States, and of the various issues 
surrounding the exercise of such right which appeared to emerge from the survey of State 
practice. The report identified five broad categories of States on the basis of the different 
approaches to military service and conscientious objection, namely: 
a) States with no conscription,99 
b) States which had conscription by law but did not enforce it,100 
c) States which had conscription and enforced it, but recognised 
conscientious objection on at least some grounds, 101 
93 Yearbook o/the United Nations 1979, E.82.I.1 (United Nations, 1982), p. 864 . 
.: 	 94 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 40 (XXXVII) of 12 March 1981. 
95 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 14 (XXXIV) of 10 September 1981, para .2. 
96 Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya, Question o/Conscientious Objection to Military Service, 35 UN ESCOR 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Provisional Agenda Item 18, UN doc. E/CNA/Sub.2/1982/24. 
97 Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1982/30 of 10 
September 1982. 
98 A. Eide and C. Mubanga-Chipoya, 'Conscientious objection to military service, Report prepared in pursuance 
of resolutions 14 (XXXIV) and 1982/30 of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities', UN doc., E/CNAISub.2/1983/301Rev.l (1983) 
99 Ibid, Annex II, List 1. 
JOO Ibid, Allex II, List 3. 
101 Ibid, List 3. 
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d) 	 States which enforced conscription and did not recognise the right to 
conscientious objection, but allowed objectors, in certain circumstances, to 
be given non-combatant roles in the armed forces,102 
e) 	 States with conscription which did not recognise conscientious objection 
by law and did not allow objectors to perform unarmed services within the 
armed forces, even by administrative decision. 103 
In particular, the two rapporteurs found that, out of 90 Member States of the UN with 
conscription in place, only 27 recognised in their domestic legal system a right to be 
exempted from military service on grounds of conscience. 104 
The report examined in detail various issues concerning the legal framework 
applicable to conscientious objection in the various Member States which had been raised by 
the Human Rights Commission in 1971.105 
With regard to the question of accepted grounds for conscientious objection, on the 
basis of a comprehensive survey of the domestic practice of States where the right to be 
exempted from military service on the basis of conscience was recognised by law, the report 
noted that, in general, domestic laws and regulations tended to regard religious convictions as 
an accepted ground for objection more readily than philosophical convictions. 106 N on­
religious grounds were most commonly accepted in Northern European States. 107 
Furthermore, the report indicated that a number of countries recognised a right of 
conscientious objection only to members of specific religious groups. 108 
Particularly relevant for present purposes is the fact that, in their conclusions and 
recommendations, the Special Rapporteurs requested the Sub-Commission on Prevention oj 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to make, inter alia, the follow in!:! 
recommendation to the Commission on Human Rights: 
102 Ibid, Annex II, List 4. 

103 Ibid, Annex II, List 5. 

104 Ibid, p.23. 

105 Resolution 11 B (XXVII) of 19 March 1971; for the list of questions, see above, text accompanying fn 88. 
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States should recognise by law the right of persons who, for reasons of 
conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, 
humanitarian or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service, to be 
released from the obligation to perform military service. 109 
Having noted that, at the time, the possibility to be exempted from military service on 
grounds of conscience in most UN Member States was recognised only on religious grounds, 
the report suggested that States should extend the right of conscientious objection to persons 
whose conscience forbids them to take part in armed service under any circumstances and 
where their objection might not have a religious background; it was also recommended that 
independent decision-making bodies should be established to examine the validity of 
conscientious objections under nationallaw. IIO 
The extensive report has played a major role in promoting the recognition of the right 
to conscientious objection to military service at the international level. III 
In Resolution 1987/46 adopted in 1987, the Human Rights Commission endorsed the 
report submitted by Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya, and appealed to States to 'recognise that 
conscientious objection to military service should be considered a legitimate exercise of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion recognised by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,.112 The 
Commission further invited States to take measures, within their domestic legal systems, to 
recognise the right to conscientious objection to military service and called those States with 
a compulsory military service system in place to introduce various forms of alternative 
service that were compatible with the reasons for conscientious objection and to establish 
impartial decision-making procedures within their national legal systems. l13 
As discussed in section 2.4, this new approach, which saw the characterization of 
conscientious objection to military service as one of the aspects of the internationally 
recognised right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, was swiftly followed by the 
109 Ibid, p. 25. 
110 For a detailed account of the recommendations proposed by the authors, see A. Eide and C. Mubanga­
Chipoya (above n 98), Annex 3. 
111 For further commentary, see M.F. Major, 'Conscientious Objection to Military Service: The European 
Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee', California Western International Law 
Journal (2001), vol. 32, p.l. On the effects and impact ofthe Eide and Mubanga-Chipoyareport on the question 
on conscientious objection within the United Nations see Takemura (above n 23), p. 42. 
112 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1987/46, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, UN doc. 
E/CNA/1987/46, 10 March 1987, para 1. 
113 Ibid, paras 2-4. 
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Human Rights Committee, initially in General Comment No. 22, adopted in 1993.114 
However, as discussed below, in General Comment No. 22 , the Committee, despite 
suggesting that the right to conscientious objection to military service could be derived from 
Article 18 ICCPR, did not unequivocally recognize that the right to conscientious objection 
was protected as a manifestation of religion or belief. 115 
Building on the rather vague and non-committal statement of the Committee in 
General Comment No. 22,116 the Human Rights Commission was ready to take the protection 
of the right to conscientious objection forward. A number of resolutions adopted by the 
Commission from 1995 until 2004 led to a significant progress within the United N ations.117 
In order to document the transformation of domestic laws and policies during this time, the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights l18 was requested to prepare and 
submit to the Commission at its 62nd session an analytical report with a view to provide 
information in relation to best practices on conscientious objection within the United 
Nations. 119 The report was published in 2006.120 
From the fmdings of the analytical report of the UNHCHR it emerges that, until 2006, 
most States had recognised either in their Constitution or in legislation a right to 
conscientious objection.121 Nonetheless it noted that although some States had recognised the 
right in their Constitution, some countries did not introduce legislation on alternative 
service. 122 
In June 2013, a new analytical report on conscientious objection to military service 
was published by the Office of the UNHCR. 123 The report was submitted in accordance with 
Human Rights Council Resolution 20/2 which requested the Office of the UNHCRC to 
114 The practice of the Human Rights Committee is discussed in section 2.4 below. 
115 See discussion in section 2.4. 
116 See discussion in section 2.4. 
117 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1998177 on conscientious objection to military service, UN.doc. 
E/CN.4IRESI1998177, 22 April 1998; Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2000/34 on conscientious 
objection to military service, UN doc. E/CNAfRES12000/34, 20 April 2000; Commission on Human Rights, 
Resolution 2002/45, UN doc. E/CNAIRES12002/45, 23 April 2002; Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 
2004/35 on Conscientious Objection to Military Service, UN doc. E/CN.4IRES/2004/35, 19 April 2004. 
118 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is the coordinating body for all the UN human 
rights machinery that provides practical assistance with the implementation of international human rights 
standards. See Mertus (above n 79), p.l3. 
119 UN doc. E/CNAfRES/2004/35 (above n 117), para 5. 
120 'Analytical report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on best practices in relation to 
conscientious objection to military service', UN doc. E/CNA12006/51, 27 February 2006. 
121 Ibid, para 21. 
122 Ibid, para 23. 
123 Human Rights Council, Analytical report on conscientious objection to military service, UN doc. 
AlHRC/23122 Report ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights (twenty-third session), 3 June 2013. 
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prepare an analytical report on conscientious objection to military service, focusing on recent 
developments, best practices and future challenges and to submit its first complete report to 
the Human Rights Council at its twenty-third session. 124 The report demonstrates the 
significant developments that took place in the international sphere since the 2006 analytic 
report of the UNHCHR but also acknowledged that some Member States have not yet 
recognised the right to conscientious objection within their domestic legislation, either for 
conscripts or professional soldiers. Moreover, it emphasises the inadequacies of the legal 
framework on conscientious objection in some States and the incompatibility of alternative 
service with the reasons of conscientious objection in some others, which, according to the 
report, may cause an impediment to the enjoyment of the right in practice. 125 
On 23 September 2013, a new resolution on conscientious objection to military 
service was adopted by the Human Rights Council.126 It is noteworthy that this is the first 
time that a UN resolution explicitly and unequivocally recognises that 'the right to 
conscientious objection to military service can be derived from the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion,.127 The resolution acknowledges the recommendations 
made in previous years regarding the recognition of the right to conscientious objection not 
only to conscripted soldiers but also to those serving voluntarily,128 while it outlines a number 
of obligations in relation to the administration of alternative service and procedural 
guarantees for applicants wishing to acquire conscientious objector status. Perhaps one of the 
unique characteristics of the resolution is that for the first time, the Human Rights Council 
urges States to respect freedom of expression of those who support conscientious objectors or 
who support the right of conscientious objection to military service. 129 This recent resolution 
demonstrates that the UN Charter-based bodies have now fully accepted that the right of 
conscientious objection is inherent in Article 18 of the ICCPR and those international 
standards on conscientious objection will continue to evolve with greater consistency. 
124 Human Rights Council, Resolution 20/2 on conscientious objection to military service, UN doc. 

AfHRCIRES/20/2, adopted on 16 July 2012 (twentieth session). 

125 UN doc. AIHRC/23/22 (above n 122), paras 68-69. 

126 Human Rights Council, Resolution 2013124 on conscientious objection to military service, adopted on 23 

September 2013 (twenty-fourth session). 

127 Ibid, para 1. 

128 Ibid, para 5. 

129 Ibid, para 17. 
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2.4 Practice of the Human Rights Committee 
Apart from the activities of Charter-based bodies that brought the question of 
conscientious objection to the forefront of the UN agenda, treaty-based bodies such as the 
Human Rights Committee,130 the body that is mandated to monitor the implementation of the 
ICCPR, have also been required to adopt a position as to whether the right of conscientious 
objection to military service is a protected right under the ICepR. This is due to the fact that, 
apart from considering States' periodic reports about measures adopted in order to implement 
treaty obligations and to ensure compliance of domestic law and practices with the ICCPR, 
the Human Rights Committee is also a quasi-judicial body that is mandated to receive and 
consider individual communications from persons claiming to be victims of violations under 
the ICCPR. The aim of the present section is to outline the practice and jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee with regard to conscientious objection to military service and to 
examine how the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the Covenant as encompassing a 
right of conscientious objection. 
Ever since it started operating, the Committee had to deal with communications from 
conscientious objectors who complained that the way in which their refusal to perform 
military service had been dealt with by the domestic authorities constituted a breach of their 
rights under the Covenant.13l 
In L.T.K v. Finland,132 decided by the Human Rights Committee in 1985, a Finnish 
citizen had complained of an alleged breach of his rights under Article 18 and Article 19 
130 The Human Rights Committee was established in 1976 pursuant to Article 26 ofthe International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights in order to oversee the implementation of the ICCPR and to monitor State parties' 
compliance with their obligations under the Covenant. An optional individual complaint mechanism was 
established by the first Optional Protocol to to the Covenant conferring jurisdiction to the Human Rights 
Committee to consider individual communications. See. Y. Tyagi, The UN Human Rights Committee 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
131 Although the Committee was first met with a case brought by a conscientious objector in 1981 concerning an 
alleged violation of Article 18 ICCPR, the case was declared inadmissible under Article 18 on the basis that the 
applicant was no longer a victim of a violation. The applicant was a Finnish national who had refused to serve in 
the armed forces on the basis of his ethical convictions. His application to perfonn alternative service was 
rejected on the basis that he had not proved that he had serious moral considerations based on ethical conviction 
that would have prevented him from performing armed or unarmed military service. His appeals to the Finnish 
Ministry ofJustice were rejected and consequently, having rejected the call for military service, he was 
sentenced by an ordinary court offirst instance to 11 months' imprisonment. Before the Committee, the 
applicant complained, inter alia, of a violation ofArticle 18 of the Covenant, insofar as the Finnish authorities 
had not respected his ethical convictions. Given that the case was declared inadmissible, there had been no need 
for the Committee to take a position on whether the right to refuse military service on grounds of conscience fell 
within the scope of Article 18 ICCPR. See Muhonen v. Finland, Communication no. 8911981, UN doc. 
CCPRlC1241D189!1981 , 8 April 1985. 
132 L. TK v Finland, Communication no. 18511984, UN doc. N40!40 (1985), admissibility decision of9 July 
1985, para 5.2. 
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ICCPR (protecting the right to freedom of expression) due to the failure of the Finnish 
authorities to recognise him as a conscientious objector and for prosecuting him due to his 
refusal to carry out military service. 133 The Human Rights Committee declared the 
communication inadmissible ratione materiae, on the basis that the right to conscientious 
objection was not expressly recognised, nor implied, in the provisions invoked by the 
applicant, nor in any other provision of the Covenant. 134 In particular, the Committee noted 
that: 
[ ... J according to the author's own account he was not prosecuted and sentenced 
because of his beliefs or opinions as such, but because he refused to perform 
military service. The Covenant does not provide for the right to conscientious 
objection; neither article 18 nor article 19 of the Covenant, especially taking into 
account paragraph 3 (c) (ii) of article 8, can be construed as implying that 
right. 135 
Particularly relevant to the present discussion is the fact that the Committee appears to 
exclude the possibility that the refusal to perform military service, even when such refusal is 
motivated by ethical convictions, may be regarded as a protected 'manifestation of belief' 
under Article 18 ICCPR. The laconic reference made by the Committee to the clause 
contained in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) illustrates a problem that also arose in the case law of the 
monitoring bodies of the ECHR with regard to the analogous 'military service' exception 
contained in Article 4 of the Convention prohibiting forced labour. 136 
A first important change in the approach of the Committee to the question of the 
characterisation of conscientious objection as a protected 'manifestation of religion' took 
place in 1993, with the adoption of General Comment No. 22 on Article 18 of the 
Covenant.137 In General Comment No. 22, the Human Rights Committee expressed the view 
that, although 'the [ICCPRJ does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection, [ ... J 
such a right can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may 
133 The Finnish Examining Board rejected his application on the basis that the applicant had not provided 
sufficient evidence to prove his convictions. His appeal had been declared inadmissible by the Supreme 
Administrative Court ofFinland and was referred to the Ministry of Justice for a final decision. 
134 L.T.K v Finland (above n 132), para 5.2. 
135 Ibid. 
136 These cases are examined in Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
137 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion), UN doc. CCPR/C/21IRev.lIAddA, 30 July 1993. 
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seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's religion or 
· f' 138be1Ie. 
In the same paragraph it is added that '[w ]hen this right is recognised by law or 
practice, there shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the 
nature of their particular beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination against 
conscientious objectors because they have failed to perfonn military service.' 139 
Despite using a tentative fonnulation to suggest that the right to conscientious 
objection may be derived from Article 18 ICCPR rather than declaring in more absolute terms 
that the right is derived from Article 18 ICCPR, the Human Rights Conunittee seemed more 
determined to acknowledge that conscientious objection should be regarded as a right 
guaranteed under the Covenant. As discussed in the next passages, the Human Rights 
Committee would take longer to uphold its statement in General Comment No. 22 regarding 
the applicability of Article 18 ICCPR in its quasi-judicial function. 
In its role as a quasHudicial body, the Committee was confronted with new individual 
complaints concerning violations of the right to conscientious objection from South Korean 
citizens in 2004.140 
Yoon and Choi v. Korea was the first decision of the Human Rights Committee on 
Jehovah's Witnesses conscientious objectors that were arrested and charged under the Korean 
Military Service Act for evasion to enlistment.141 Before the Human Rights Committee, the 
South Korean government argued that: 
In view of its specific circumstances, conscientious objection to military 
service needs to be restricted as it may incur hann to national security. Unlike 
the freedom to form or determine inner conscience, the freedom to obj ect to 
fulfilling military service duty for reasons of religion may be restricted, as 
138 Ibid, para 11. 

139 Ib'
 1d,para 11. 
140 Human Rights Committee, Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. Republic ofKorea, Comm. nos. 
l321/2004 and l322/2004, UN doc. CCPR/Cl881D11321-1322/2004, 23 January 2007. The applicants 
complained that the absence of an alternative to compulsory military service in the South Korea was in violation 
of their right to manifest their religion as protected by Article 18(1) ICCPR. Apart from the limitations in Article 
18(2) of the Covenant on the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion, limitations were also present 
within national legislation in Article 37(2) of the South Korean Constitution, providing that 'the freedoms and 
rights of citizens may be restricted by an Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law 
~d o.rder or for public welfare... '. 

IbId, para. 4.1. 
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recognised in Article 18 of the Covenant, for public causes in that it manifests 
· , . 1.._ gh' Ii 1421 passIve non-per orrnance. or rea Ises one s conSCIence tlUOU 
The argument presented by the South Korean government was not in accordance with 
the Committee's clear statement in General Comment No. 22 that the right to conscientious 
objection to military service can be derived from Article 18 since the obligation to use lethal 
force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's 
religion or belief. 143 The complainants argued to the contrary, that far from threatening public 
safety or public order, the pacifist rejection of violence and the willingness to perform 
alternative civilian service strengthens the real value of conscience, and that conscientious 
objection is a noble value based on deep and moral reflection. l44 
While recognising that objection to military service on grounds of conscience was a 
manifestation of religious belief subject to limitations, the Human Rights Committee agreed 
with the authors and held that respect on the part of the State for conscientious beliefs and 
manifestations was an important factor in ensuring cohesive and stable pluralism in society 
and that the State party had not demonstrated that in the present case the restriction in 
question was necessary.145 In finding that Article 8(3)( c )(ii) ICCPR neither recognises, nor 
excludes the right to conscientious objection to military service,146 the Human Rights 
Committee held that South Korea was in violation of Article 18(1) of the Covenant as there 
was no procedure for the recognition of conscientious objection. The Committee also held 
that the respondent State had failed to show that the fact of allowing the applicants to be 
exempted from compulsory military service by providing for an alternative form of civic 
service would have any adverse impact on the security of the State. 147 
The Committee's decision in Yoon and Choi v. the Republic ofKorea represents the 
first instance in which the Committee expressly departed from the restraints allegedly 
imposed by the forced labour clause in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) and pointed out that, while the right 
to manifest one's religion or belief does not as such imply the right to refuse all obligations 
imposed by law, it provides certain protection, consistent with Article 18(3), against being 
forced to act against genuinely-held religious belief. 148 
142 Ibid, para. 4.2. 
143 General Comment No. 22 (above n 137), para 11. 
144 Yo on and Choi v. Korea (above n 140), para 5.2. 
145 Ibid, para. 8.4. 
146 Ibid, para. 8.2. 
147 Ibid, para. 8.4. 
148 Ibid, para 8.3. 
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In 2007, the Committee received further communications by South Korean 
conscientious objectors who had been imprisoned by the authorities for their refusal to 
perfonn military service due to their pacifist beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. In Eu-Min Jung 
et al v. The Republic ofKorea, decided in 2010,the Human Rights Committee confirmed its 
earlier position in Yoon and Choi and held that the authors' refusal to be drafted for 
compulsory military service was a direct expression of their religious beliefs, which had not 
been contested by the State authorities, and that these were genuinely held; the Committee 
further opined that the authors' subsequent conviction and sentence amounted to an 
infringement of their freedom of conscience and a restriction of their ability to manifest their 
. [149re1IglOn· or be1·Ie . 
More recently, in 2011, the Human Rights Committee delivered its decision in the 
case of Min-Kyu Jeong et al v Republic of Korea. 150 The case arose from communications 
received from over one hundred applicants, all Jehovah's Witness conscientious objectors, 
who claimed that the South Korean authorities were in violation of Article 18(1) ICCPR as 
the applicants were sentenced to one and half years imprisonment for their refusal to be 
drafted for military service due to their religious beliefs. The South Korean government 
repeated that restricting the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion on the basis 
of preserving national security was crucial on the basis that the introduction of alternative 
service would jeopardise national security as the armed forces would not be equipped with 
enough ground forces to face the threat of guerrilla warfare given the tension created by the 
conflict between North and South Korea. 15I 
The Committee, fmding a violation of Article 18(1) of the ICCPR by South Korea 
reiterated its earlier fmdings in Yoon and Choi and Eu-Min-Jung. 152 It further recognised that 
the right to conscientious objection to military service 'inheres,153 in the right to freedom of 
conscience and religion and that Article 18 ICCPR also entitles any individual to an 
exemption from compulsory military service if the performance of military duties cannot be 
reconciled with that individual's religion or beliefs. 154 
149 Human Rights Committee, Eu-Min Jung et al v. The Republic a/Korea, Comm. nos. 1593-1603/2007, UN 
Doc. CCPRlC/981D11593-1603/2007, 14 Apri12010.para 7.4. 
ISO Ibid, para 7.5. 
151 Ibid, para 4.4. 
152 Human Rights Committee, Min-Kyu Jeong et al v. The Republic a/Korea, Comm. nos. 1642-1741/2007, UN 
Doc. CCPRlC/l OlID11642-1 74112007, 5 April2011.para. 7.3. 
153 Ibid, para 7.2. 
154 Ibid, para 7.3. 
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The Committee had come a long way in setting aside the restraints of Article 
8(3)(c)(ii) and finally acknowledging that the Covenant neither recognises or excludes the 
right to conscientious objection to military service .. In its jurisprudence, the Committee has 
been clear in asserting that respect for objections of conscience is important to ensuring 
pluralism in society and that restricting the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief in 
cases concerning conscientious objection to military service was in principle not to be 
regarded as 'necessary' and could not be justified by the permissible limitations described in 
Article 18(3) ICCPR. 155 The acknowledgment that the right to conscientious objection to 
military service falls within the scope of Article 18 of the Covenant marked an important 
shift in the quasi-judicial body's jurisprudence that aligned its position with the one of 
Charter-based bodies. As the next chapter will discuss, the impact of the Committee's views 
has been far-reaching and influential for other regional human rights systems; and in 
particular, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
155 Yoon and Choi v. Korea (above n 140), para 8.3. 
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Chapter 3: The emergence of the right to conscientious objection in the Council of 
Europe 
3.1. Introduction 
For a number of years, the monitoring bodies of the European Convention on Human 
Rights have not recognized that the right to conscientious objection to military service was 
per se protected under the Convention. The reluctance of the European Court and the 
European Commission to recognize the right to conscientious objection has partly been 
justified on the basis of an arguably erroneous textual interpretation of two provisions of the 
Convention, namely Article 4 and Article 9 ECHR. This chapter analyses the text of those 
provisions, and the (admittedly quite sparse) information on the debate which has 
accompanied their adoption. It then moves on to examine the practice of the key organs of the 
Council of Europe and the way in which those bodies have approached the question of 
conscientious objection since 1967, when the Parliamentary Assembly for the first time 
acknowledged that conscientious objection shall be regarded as a right deriving from Article 
9 ECHR. The final sections of the chapter focus on the evolution of the jurisprudence of the 
Convention monitoring bodies from the initial restrictive interpretation of the Convention as 
not encompassing an obligation for Member States to recognise a right to be exempted from 
military service on grounds of conscience, to the landmark ruling of the Grand Chamber in 
the case of Bayatyan v. Armenia, which recognized that conscientious objection to military 
service is a 'manifestation of belief deserving of protection under Article 9 of the 
Convention. The shift in the Court's approach to the question of conscientious objection and 
the recognition of the right to conscientious objection as a treaty-protected right enhances the 
deVelopment of legal obligations for States related to the right of conscientious objection to 
military service, as these emerge from the standard-setting texts of the Council of Europe's 
key institutions and human rights bodies. These obligations are briefly outlined at the end of 
this chapter, and further elaborated in the succeeding chapter. 
3.2. The text ofthe European Convention on Human Rights 
The right to be released from the obligation to perfonn military service on grounds of 
conscience has been recognised in the domestic legal systems of a number of European States 
long before adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights, the main regional 
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instrument for the protection of human rights, in 1950. 156 Nevertheless, the only reference to 
conscientious objection contained the European Convention is found under the forced labour 
clause contained in Article 4(3)(b). No mention of the right to conscientious objection 
appears in Article 9 of the Convention, the provision protecting the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. It should further be emphasised that the travaux 
preparatoires of Article 9 ECHR contain no reference or any statements relating to 
conscientious objection to military service. IS7 
The only mention of the notion of conscientious objection appears in Article 4 of the 
Convention, concerning the prohibition of slavery and forced or compulsory labour. From the 
drafting history of what became Article 4 ECRR, it appears that initially there was no 
intention by the drafters of the Convention to make any reference to conscientious objection 
in Article 4.158 The travaux preparatoires of Article 4 ECHR do not appear to give any 
indication as to the discussions on the text of the Convention in the drafting phase, but only 
give an indication as to what changes were made to the draft provision until the text was 
finally adopted. 159 On 6 March 1950, the delegation of the United Kingdom proposed an 
amendment on the preliminary draft prepared by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights, 
concerning the provision on slavery and force labour (draft Article 6). The UK amendment 
was aimed at excluding work carried out by conscientious objectors from the scope of the 
prohibition of forced labour. The first draft which incorporated the formulation proposed by 
the United Kingdom read in relevant part: 
[ ... J the term 'forced or compulsory labour' should not include: [ ... J any 
service of a military character or service in the case of conscientious objectors 
exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws. 160 
156 As discussed below, some European States had codified this right in their legislation from as early as 1916. 
See below, Chapter 4, section 4.2.2. 
157 European Commission on Human Rights, Preparatory works on Article 9 ofthe European Convention on 
Human Rights, doc. DH (56) 14, 16 August 1956. 
158 D. Ch. Decker and L. Fresa, 'The status of conscientious objection under Article 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights', New York University Journal ofLaw and Politics, vol. 33 (2001), p. 379. 
159 European Commission ofHuman Rights, Preparatory works ofArticle 4 ofthe Convention, Doc no. DH (62) 
10, 15 November 1962, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.intlDocumentslLibrary_TP _Art_04_DH(62)10_BIL.PDF>, accessed on 17 October 20l3, 
para 23. 
160 Committee ofExperts, 'Amendment to Articles 1,2,4,5,6,8 and 9 ofthe Committee's Preliminary Draft 
Proposed by the United Kingdom', doc. no. CMIWP I (50) 2, 6 March 1950, reproduced in European Court of 
Human Rights, Preparatory works ofArticle 4 ofthe European Convention on Human Rights, Doc no. DH (70) 
5, 5 March 1970, available at <http://www.echr.coe.intIDocumentslLibrary_TP_Art_04_ CDH(70)5 _BIL.PDF> 
accessed on 17 October 2013, p. 9 .. 
40 

III 
Given the subject regulated by the provision under consideration, it is clear that the 
only intention ofthe drafters was to exclude alternative service from being characterized as a 
fonn of 'forced labour' prohibited under the provision in question. Decker and Fresa express 
the view that a possible explanation for the British proposal to include an express mention of 
conscientious objectors in the forced labour clause was based on the fact that the United 
Kingdom was previously involved in the drafting of what became Article 8 of the ICCPR 
where the British delegation submitted similar proposals and therefore wished to include the 
same in the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights. 161 
A second draft prepared by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights - the so­
called 'Alternative B' draft - contained more detailed definitions relating to the provisions as 
opposed to the first draft with resembled a more straightforward 'list of rights' for 
consideration. Slightly amended, draft Article 5(3) provided: 
For the purposes of this article, the term 'forced or compulsory labour' shall 
not include: 
[...] 
(b) any service of a military character or, in the case of conscientious 
objectors, service exacted instead [replacing 'in virtue' in the Britich 
proposal] ofcompulsory military service laws. 162 
When the amended draft was submitted by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights 
to the Committee of Ministers for their comments, the Committee of Ministers did not 
comment upon the suggested provision on the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. 163 
At the next stage of consideration, the Conference of Senior Officials examined the 
previous two drafts and proposed a single unified version. The updated anti-slavery provision 
as amended by the Conference reads: 
3. For the purposes of this article, the tenn 'forced or compulsory labour' shall 

not include: 

[...] 

161 Decker and Fresa (above n 158). 
162 European Commission ofHuman Rights, Preparatory works ofArticle 4 ofthe Convention (above n 165), 
para 10. 
163 Ibid, excerpts from 'Draft Convention adopted by the Committee ofMinisters and submitted by it to the 
Consultative Assembly for an opinion', p.l3. 
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b. any service of a military character or, in the case of conscientious objectors 

in countries where they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory 

military service. 164 

This was the first time that the phrase 'in countries where they are recognized' was 
inserted to the text of the provision. According to Decker and Fresa, who carried out a 
systematic examination of the travaux preparatoires of both Article 4 and Article 9 of the 
Convention, there is no guidance as to why these drafters included this new phrase. 165 
The final draft of what, by that stage, was draft Article 4 ofthe Convention, provided: 
3. For the purposes of this article, the term 'forced or compulsory labour' shall 

not include: 

b. any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in ~ 
countries where they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory ~I 
<II 
military service. 166 !: 
~ 
Before its final adoption, the draft was returned to the Committee of Ministers for any (: 
further amendments; nevertheless the text of the provision remained unchanged. The wording ~ 
"of Article 4(3)(b), as described in the final draft above, was finally accepted during the ~ 
(
Conference of the Senior Officials in 1950.167 According to the travaux preparatoires of " 
Article 4, during the First Part of the Second Session of the Consultative Assely in August 
1950, Article 4 was not the subject of any special comments during the debate. The 
Convention was signed at Rome on 4 November 1950. 
Article 4(3)(b) ECHR was the only provision of the Convention containing a statement 
on conscientious objection, even though it is, paradoxically, umelated to the meaning of 
Article 4 that concerns the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. 
In conformity with the textual limitation it contains ('in countries where 
[conscientious objectors] are recognized'), Article 4(3)(b) has been interpreted by the 
Convention monitoring bodies as not encompassing an obligation for Contracting States to 
164 Ibid, Text of the Report Submitted by the Conference to the Commilte of Ministers, p.16 .. 

165 Decker and Fresa (above n 158). 

166 Travau:x preparatoires of Article 4 ECHR (above n 162), excerpts from 'Draft Convention adopted by the 

Committee of Ministers and submitted by it to the Consultative Assembly for an opinion', p.13. 

167 European Court of Ruman Rights, Preparatory works ofArticle 4 ofthe European Convention on Human 

Rights, Doc no. DR (70) 5,5 March 1970, available at 

<http://www.echr.coe.intlDocumentslLibrary_TP_Art_04_CDH(70)5 _ EIL.PDF> accessed on 17 October 2013. 
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recognise a right to conscientious objection in their domestic legislation and provide for 
alternative civilian service. Indeed, in addition to this, the text of Article 4(3)(b) has for a 
long time been regarded by the Convention monitoring bodies (and particularly the 
Commission) as an obstacle to the recognition of conscientious objection to military service 
as a manifestation of belief (religious or otherwise) deserving of protection under Article 9 
ECHR. 
In response to the problems created by the way in which the drafters of the Convention 
had dealt (or failed to deal) with the question of conscientious objection to military service, in 
the years since the adoption of the Convention, various attempts have been made by the 
organs of the Council of Europe, as well as by some EU institutions, to achieve the express 
incorporation of conscientious objection within the text of the Convention. 
In a 2001 recommendation, PACE called the Committee of Ministers to 
[ ... ] incorporate the right of conscientious objection to military service into 
the European Convention on Human Ilights by means of an additional 
protocol amending Articles 4(3)(b) and 9. 168 
The Committee of Ministers did not agree to the proposal and rejected it, referring to 
measures already taken up in Recommendation No. R (87)8. 169 In particular, in its response 
the Committee of Ministers emphasised that 
[...Jrather than elaborating an additional protocol amending Articles 4, paragraph 
3b, and 9 of the European Convention of Human Ilights, as suggested in the 
Assembly's Recommendation, presently, it is preferable to make a sustained effort 
to implement the 1987 Recommendation 170 
Attempts to place the right of conscientious objection expressly within the scope of 
the Convention have also been made by organs of the EU, and in particular by the European 
Parliament. l7l In 1989, the European Parliament, in a resolution promoted by Barbara 
168 PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) exercise of the right of conscientious objection to military service in 

the Council of Europe Member States, text adopted by the Standing Committee acting on behalf of the 

Assembly on 23 May 2001. 

169 CoM Recommendation No. R (87) 8 regarding conscientious objection to compUlsory military service, text 

adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 April 1987, at the 406th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. 

170 PACE, Reply from the Committee of Ministers on Recommendation 1518 (2001) adopted at the 758th 

meeting ofthe Minister's Deputies (26-27 February 2002), Doc. 9379, 1 March 2002. 

171 The European Parliament is one of the EU's main law-making institutions, along with the Council of the 

European Union ('the Council'). The European Parliament has three main roles. First, debating and passing 

European laws, with the Council, second, scrutinising other ED institutions, particularly the Commission, to 
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Schmidbauer (Gennan social democrat, MEP, 1987-99), called on the European 
Commission172 and the Member States of the EU '[ ... ] to press for the right to alternative 
civilian service to be incorporated in the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as a human right'.173 
The' Schmidbauer resolution' quoted above demonstrated clearly the determination of 
the European Parliament not only to emphasise the need for a more effective recognition of 
conscientious objection as a Convention right, but also to enable a process of change to 
ensure that Member States incorporate minimum international standards in their domestic 
legislation. In the 1990s and before the enlargement of the European Union, three EU 
Member States adopted legislation recognising conscientious objection to military service 
and providing for alternative civilian service within their domestic legislation; Portugal 
(1992), Greece (1997) and Italy (1998).174 Thus, by 1998 all fifteen EU Member States had 
adopted legislation recognising conscientious objection, while the Member States that joined 
the Union during the 2004 and 2007 enlargement had already adopted legislation prior to 
their accession.175 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which became binding on EU institutions and 
national governments when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009/ 76 is 
the only regional human rights instrument that explicitly includes the right to conscientious 
objection to military service under the same provision protecting the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. In this regard, Article 10(2) of the Charter provides that 'the 
right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing :i!i
mil' 
make sure they are working democratically, and thirdly, debating and adopting the EU's budget, with the 

Council. See D. Judge and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament (Palgrave and McMillan, 2008). 

172 The European Commission is the ED's executive body and represents the interests of Europe as a whole (as 

opposed to the interests of individual countries). The Commission's main roles are to set objectives and 

priorities for action, propose legislation to Parliament and Council, manage and implement EU policies and the 

budget, enforce European Law (jointly with the Court of Justice) and represent the EU outside Europe 

(negotiating trade agreements between the EU and other countries, etc.). For further infonnation on the role of 

the European Commission see P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law: Text, cases and materials (Oxford University 

Press, 2008), p. 32; M. Horspool and M. Humphreys, European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 

62. 

173 European Parliament, 'Resolution on conscientious objection and alternative civilian service', Doc. A3­
15/89, Official Journal C291 (1989), p. 122, para 11. 

174 See Table l. 

175 Ibid. 

176 For academic commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, see D. Denman, 

'The Charter ofFundamental Rights', European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 4 (2010), p. 349; 1. 

Blackstone, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: scope and competence', Justice Journal, vol. 9(2012), 

p.l9; S. 1. Sanchez, 'The Court and the Charter: the impact of the entry into force ofthe Lisbon Treaty of the 

ECl's approach to fundamental rights'. Common Market Law Review, vol. 49 (2012), p 1565. 
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the exercise of this right' .177 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
became binding on EU institutions and national governments when the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force in December 2009.178 With its entry into force the Charter is, by principle, 
binding across all EU Member States when they implement ED policies and law, except 
Poland and the United Kingdom which have 'opted out' from the Charter.179 The Charter 
applies only when fundamental rights are affected as far as the implementation of ED 
legislation is concerned. Therefore, if a national authority violates fundamental rights 
protected under the Charter when implementing EU Law, the European Commission can take 
the matter to the Court of Justice of the EU. ISO When the issue at stake does not involve the 
implementation of EU legislation, then the Charter does not apply and the appropriate body 
that may address an issue is the European Court of Human RightS. ISI The Charter is read in 
accordance with international and European human rights law which it draws its inspiration 
from. 182 The impact of the Charter on fundamental rights is important as an agreement 
concluded between the Member States of the European Union to protect fundamental rights 
and it is viewed as a declaration of rights for EU citizens, nevertheless individuals, as 
explained above, may only challenge the performance of their States when implementing EU 
law. 
The Charter is therefore an additional means of human rights protection that must be 
brought within an ED law context; the commitments undertaken by EU Member States under 
the European Convention on Human Rights are independent of their obligations under ED 
law. In this regard, there is an explicit condition for EU membership that all EU member 
states must have ratified the ECHR and be members of the Council of Europe. IS3 It can be 
177 Charter ofFundamental Rights of the European Union (above n.13), Article 10. 
178 For academic commentary see S. 1. Sanchez, 'The Court and the Charter: the impact of the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty ofthe ECl's approach to fundamental rights', Common Market Law Review, vol. 49 (2012), p 
1565. 
179 Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to 
the United Kingdom, OJ C 3061156, 17 December 2007 available at <http://eur­
lex.europa.euiLexUriServlLexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0156:0157:EN:PDF> accessed on 15 October 
2013. 
180 J. H.H. Weiler, 'Human rights: Member State, EU and ECHR levels ofprotection', European Journal of 

International Law, vol. 24 (2013), p. 47l. 

lSI European Commission, 2012 Report on the Application ofthe ED Charter of Fundamental Rights (European 

Union, 2013), p.20, available at <http://ec.euTopa.euljustice/fundamental­
rights/fileS/charter report 2012 en.pdf> accessed on 15 October 2013. 

182 ED Network ofIndepe;dent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4-2005: The right to conscientious 

objection and the conclusion by Members States of Concordats with the Holy See, 14 December 2005, p. 4, 

available at <http://ec.europa.euljustice/fundamental-rightslfiles/cfr_ cdfopinion4_ 2005_ en.pdf> accessed on 15 

October 2013. 

183 W. Weiss, 'Human rights in the EU: rethinking the role ofthe European Convention on Human Rights after 

Lisbon', European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 7 (2011), p. 64. 
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concluded that although the European Parliament did not achieve the incorporation of the 
right to conscientious objection in the European Convention on Human Rights earlier, the 
European Union managed to explicitly recognise the right to conscientious objection its its 
own human rights treaty for the protection of fundamental human rights several years later. 
The explicit acknowledgment in the EU Charter of conscientious objection to military service 
as a manifestation of religion or belief protected under the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion was certainly an influential statement. 
3.3. Activities of the PACE and CoM 
The first formal recognition of a right to conscientious objection to military service in 
the context of the Council of Europe predates the analogous recognitions by the United 
Nations. Resolution 337, adopted by PACE in 1967 at the peak of the Vietnam War, is the 
first resolution on the issue of conscientious objection to military service adopted in the 
Council of Europe. 184 In that resolution, PACE placed the right of conscientious objection to 
military service within the scope of Article 9 ECHR.185 At the time PACE Resolution 337 
was adopted, the Council of Europe comprised of eighteen member states, out of which nine 
had already adopted legislation on alternative service, six had no legislation recognising the 
right of conscientious objection, and three (Iceland, Ireland and Malta) had no armed 
forces. 186 The Parliamentary Assembly noted that 
[the right to conscientious objection] shall be regarded as deriving logically from 
the fundamental rights of the individual in democratic Rule of Law States which 
are guaranteed in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 187 
The need to expand the protection of conscientious objectors in all members of the 
Council of Europe was subsequently expressed in Resolution 478 (1967) where the 
184 PACE, Resolution No. 337 (1967) on the right of conscientious objection, text adopted by the Assembly on 

26th January 1967 (22nd Sitting). 

185 Ibid: '1. Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound 

conviction arising from religious, etlrical, moral, humanitarian, plrilosophical or similar motives, refuse to 

perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to perform such service. 2. 

Tlris right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the fundamental rights of the individual in democratic 

Rule of Law States which are guaranteed in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.' 

186 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.2. 

187 Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46). 
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Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers188 instruct the 
Committee of Experts on Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the Council of Europe invited 
by the Committee of Ministers to give its opinion on draft legal and political texts produced 
by other bodies/89 to formulate proposals giving effect to the principles in Resolution 337 
through either a legally binding text, i.e. a convention, or a recommendation to governments 
in order to facilitate the recognition of the right across the Member States of the 
. • 190
organIsation. 
In Recommendation 816 (1977), PACE reiterated this position and recommended that 
the Committee of Ministers, fIrst, urge the Governments of Member States, insofar as they 
had not already done so, to bring their legislation into line with the principles set out in 
Resolution 337 and Recommendation 816, and, second, to introduce the right of 
conscientious objection to military service into the European Convention on Human 
RightS. 191 More importantly, PACE for the fIrst time talked about the 'right' of conscientious 
objection, stating that: 
[t]his right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the fundamental rights 
of the individual in democratic rule of law states, which are guaranteed in 
Article 9 ofthe European Convention on Human Rights. 192 
However, the Committee of Ministers did not take any action with regard to the 

recommendations of PACE. 193 

Recognition of the right of conscientious objection by the Committee of Ministers 
carne a few years later in Recommendation R(87)8 of April 1987 where the Committee called 
upon Members States to bring their national law and practice into line with the basic 
principles previously laid out by the Parliamentary Assembly and reiterated by the 
188 The Committee of Ministers is the Council ofEurope's decision-making body. It comprises the Foreign 

Affairs Ministers of all the member states, or their pennanent diplomatic representati ves in Strasbourg. It is both 

a governmental body, where national approaches to problems facing European society can be discussed on an 

equal footing, and a collective forum, where Europe-wide responses to such challenges are fonnulated. 

For more information on the role ofthe CoM see M. Bond, The Council afEurope: Structure, History and 

Issues in European Politics (Routledge, 2011). 

189 The Committee of Experts on Human Rights was the predecessor of the Steering Committee for Human 

Rights (CHHD). For more information on the mandate and work ofthe Committee see 

<https:!!wcd.coe.intNiewDoc.jsp?id=140703 9&Site=COE> accessed on 22-8-13. 

190 PACE, Resolution 478 (1967) on the right ofconscientious objection, text adopted by the Assembly on 26 

January 1967 (22nd Sitting). 

191 PACE, Recommendation 816 (1977) on the right of conscientious objection to military service, text adopted 

?~ th~ Assembly on 7 October 1977 (10th Sitting), Preamble, para 4(b) . 

• IbId, para. 2. 

193 Takemura (above n 23), p. 90. 
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Committee of Ministers. 194 In particular, the Committee echoed the recommendation 
expressed earlier by PACE in 1967, stating that: 
Anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling reasons 
ofconscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall have the right to 
be released from the obligation to perform such service, on the conditions set 
out hereafter. Such persons may be liable to perform alternative service. 195 
New momentum to the progressive recognition of the right to conscientious objection 
within the Council of Europe came from the events which took place in the territory of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s.The dissolution of the 
Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) led at least 100,000 conscientious objectors 
and draft resisters to flee the region and request refugee status in other countries on the basis 
of their refusal to take part in the conflict. 196 The escalation of violence in the region, coupled 
with the intention of several countries to deport conscientious objectors who fled their 
countries to avoid persecution197 meant that the Council of Europe was under pressure to 
adopt a more robust approach on the question of conscientious objection to military service. 
In Resolution No. 1042 (1994) dealing specifically with the question of deserters and 
draft resisters from the dissolved States of the former SFRY, PACE recalled its 
Recommendation No. 816 (1977) in which it had expressly characterised the right to 
conscientious objection as a 'human right' .198 
Against the background of the conflict which accompanied the secession of Croatia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina from the SFRY,199 PACE noted that, despite the existence of a right 
of conscientious objection in the Croatian Constitution,20o Croatia had failed to recognise the 
right of conscientious objection in practice and severely punished men refusing to take part in 
194 CoM, Recommendation No.R (87) 8 regarding conscientious objection to compulsory military service, text 

adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 April 1987, at the 406th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. 

195 Ibid, para l. 

196 PACE, Resolution 1042 (1994) on Deserters and Draft Resisters from the RepUblics of Former Yugoslavia, 

text adopted by the Assembly on 1 July 1994 (23rd Sitting). 

197 Ibid, para 10. 

198 Ibid, para 7. See above n. 192. 

199 S. Jansen, 'The violence ofmemories: Local narratives of the past after ethnic cleansing in Croatia', Journal 

o/Theory and Practice, vol. 6 (2002), p. 77. 

200 According to Article 47.2 of the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 'conscientious objection shall 

be allowed to all those who, for religious or moral beliefs, are not willing to participate in the performance of 

military duties in the armed forces. Such persons shall be obliged to perform other duties specified by law.' See. 

Official Gazette No. 56/90 of22 December 1990 available at 

<http://www.servat.unibe.chlicl/hrOOOOO_.html>accessed on 18-4-12. 

48 

--
military operations deemed by the international community to be serious violations of 
international law and a form of 'ethnic cleansing' .201 It further called upon the authorities of 
Serbia and Montenegro to recognise in practice the right to conscientious objection to 
military service and declare an amnesty for deserters and draft resisters, and the governments 
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to give protection to all people fleeing the fighting and to 
refrain from drafting them against their wilL202 
In the years that followed, the situation in the Balkans remained unsettled since the 
Croatian and Bosnian conflicts were succeded by the war in Kosovo and the NATO bombing 
of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) which ended with the conclusion of an agreement between 
Kosovo Force ('KFOR'), an international security force established by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 of 10 Jl.Ule 1999,203 and the governments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia on 9 June 1999.204 
The turbulent situation in the Balkans during the 1990s and the large numbers of 
conscientious objectors fleeing the region in fear of persecution played an important role in 
bringing the question ofconscientious objection at the forefront of the human rights debate in 
Europe. 
By the early 2000s, although the right to be exempted from military service on 
grounds of conscience was recognised in law and in practice in many European States at the 
time, and had progressively been recognized by the organs of the Council of Europe, there 
were no clear international standards or guidelines as to the actual scope ofprotection and the 
guarantees which States should adopt in order to make the right effective in their domestic 
legal order. PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) was one of the first texts after the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia that reiterated in more clear terms the standards on 
conscientious objection as first set out in Resolution 337 of 1967, despite considerable 
variations with regard to the legal position of conscientious objectors across Europe.205 
Recommendation 1518 was also the first text of the Council of Europe in which the 
Parliamentary Assembly called Member States to include in their legislation the right for 
201 Resolution 1042 (1994) (above n 196), para 8. 
202 Ibid, para 14. 
203 Resolution 1244 (1999) adopted by the Security Council at its 2011 th meeting on 10 June 199, para 9. 
204 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ('KFOR') and the governments of 
the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, available at 
<http://www.nato.intikosovo/docuJa990609a.htm> accessed on 20 October 2013. 
205 PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) (above n 168). 
49 
permanent members of the armed forces to apply for the granting of conscientious objector 
status.206 
Even though PACE had attempted earlier in 1977 to influence the Committee of 
Ministers to enable the incorporation of a provision in the ECHR that would expressly 
recognise the right to conscientious objection under Article 9, the Committee of Ministers 
had not taken any action in this regard.207 In Recommendation 1518 of 2001, PACE made 
another attempt and recommended the adoption of some amendments to the text of the 
ECHR, which, in PACE's view, would have allowed the European Court to extend the 
protection of Article 9 ECHR to cases of conscientious objection. In particular, PACE 
recommended that the Committee of Ministers call for an amendment of Article 4(3 )(b) 
ECHR in order to ensure the applicability of Article 9 to cases concerning violations of the 
right of conscientious objection to military service.208 The proposal was subsequently rejected 
by the Committee of Ministers.209 
In addition to the obligation to recognise a right of conscientious objection for 
conscripts, the various organs of the Council of Europe have encouraged Member States to 
recognise the right to be exempted from particular military duties on grounds of conscience 
for professional members of the armed forces. In this regard, PACE, which had first ~ 
foreshadowed this possibility in 2001,110 emphasised in 2006 that the right of conscientious 
objection to military service does not apply exclusively to conscripts, but rather it applies to 
career servicemen and reservists on an equal footing. 2I1 In this regard, PACE noted that, as of 
2006, only two Council of Europe Member States - Germany and the United Kingdom - had 
206 Ibid, Recommendation 1518 (2001), para 5: The Assembly accordingly recommends that the Committee of 
Ministers invite those member states that have not yet done so to introduce into their legislation: 
i. the right to be registered as a conscientious objector at any time: before, during or after conscription, or 
performance of military service; 
11. the right for permanent members ofthe armed forces to apply for the granting of conscientious objector 
status; 
1Il. the right for all conscripts to receive information on conscientious objector status and the means of 
obtaining it; 
iv. genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in 
character. 
207 See text above accompanying n 191. 
208 Ibid, para 6: 'The Assembly also recommends that the Committee of Ministers incorporate the right of 
conscientious obj ection to military service into the European Convention on Human Rights by means of an 
additional protocol amending Articles 4.3.b and 9.' For a discussion on the problems raised as a result of the 
restrictive interpretation of Article 9 in light of Article 4(3)(b) ECHR, see Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
209 PACE, Doc. 9379 (above n 170). For a detailed discussion on the proposal see above text accompanying fn 
168. 

210 Recommendation 1518 (2001) (above n 168). 

211 PACE, Recommendation 1742 (2006) Human rights of the members of the armed forces, text adopted by the 

Assembly on 11 April 2006 (11 th Sitting), Doc.1 0861, para 40. 
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procedures enabling professional soldiers to request demobilisation and discharge from the 
armed forces on grounds of conscience.212 In 2010, the Committee of Ministers adopted 
Recommendation CMiRec(2010)4 placing emphasis on the right of professional members of 
the anned forces to leave the armed forces for reasons of conscience.213 
3.4. The practice of the Sttasbourg monitoring bodies 
Similarly to the position of the Human Rights Committee, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, excluded the applicability of Article 18 ICCPR in cases concerning conscientious 
objection to military service, the European Court of Human Rights also failed to recognize 
until relatively recently that conscientious objection to military service constituted a 
manifestation of belief which fell under the scope of Article 9 ECHR. In a number of cases 
decided between 1966 until 2011, the European Court (and the European Commission) 
preferred to avoid examining cases concerning conscientious objection to military service 
under Article 9 ECHR and assessed the applicants' claims with reference to other Convention 
rights. This was largely due to a narrow (and arguably erroneous) interpretation of the 
reference to conscientious objection contained in Article 4(3)(b) ECHR as an indication of 
the fact that there was no obligation for Contracting States to recognise the right to 
conscientious objection within their domestic laws. 
The origins of this approach to the question can be traced back to the case of 
Grandrath v. the Federal Republic of Germany, decided by the European Commission in 
1966.214 The case was the first in which the Strasbourg bodies were called to examine issues 
pertaining to the question of conscientious objection to military service; it oncemed a case of 
'total objection', in that the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness who claimed to be a religious 
minister, argued that his religious and conscientious beliefs entitled him to exemption from 
both military service and alternative civilian service.215 Although the domestic authorities had 
recognised the applicant as a conscientious objector and requested him to perform substitute 
civilian service, the applicant refused to undertake the civilian service he was offered and 
212 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Human rights of members of the armed forces (Rapporteur: 

Mr Alexander Arabadjiev, Bulgaria, Socialist Group), Doc. 10861, 24 March 2006, para 40. 

213 Recommendation CMlRec (2010) 4 (above n 37). The application of the right to professional members ofthe 

armed forces is discussed in Chapter 5 ofthis study 

214 Grandrath v. Federal RepUblic ofGermany, Ap~ no 2299/64,10 Yearbook ofthe European Convention on 

Human Rights 626. 

215 Ibid, para 9. His claim was contested by the Government which submitted that his religious activities were 

not a permanent occupation in order to be in a comparable situation to that of ordained ministers of the two 

principal religions in Germany, namely Roman Catholic and Protestant. See ibid, para 12. 
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requested an exemption from alternative service, a request that was ultimately rejected by the 
domestic authorities.216 Before the Commission, the applicant complained of a breach of 
Article 9 ECHR; his complaind had two different but arguably inter-linked aspects. First, he 
claimed that his right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by Article 9 
would have been violated had he had been required to perform a service that was contrary to 
his conscience due to his genuine religious conviction against military service; and second, 
that undertaking civilian alternative service would have restricted his right to manifest his 
religion as any service would not have allowed him sufficient time to perform his religious 
duties towards his community.217 
The German government claimed that Article 9 ECHR did not foresee a right of 
exemption from military or alternative service on conscientious or religious grounds and that 
the development and administration of alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors 
was a question left to the discretion of the State parties to the Convention.218 
With regards to the aspect of the applicant's Article 9 complaint, the Commission 
noted that the applicant had not alleged that the compulsory service would have interfered 
with the private and personal practice ofhis religion.219 In relation to the second question, the 
Conunission considered that compulsory alternative service would allow the applicant 
sufficient time to perform his religious duties; therefore his right to manifest his religion 
would not have been impaired in those circumstances.22o Most interestingly for present 
purposes, the Commission also held that, under the Convention, objections of conscience did 
not entitle a person to exemption from substitute service and that, on the contrary, Article 
4(3)(b) foresees that compulsory alternative service may be imposed as a substitute for 
military service.22J Finding it superfluous to examine any questions of the interpretation of 
the term 'freedom of conscience and religion' as used in Article 9 of the Convention, the 
Commission examined the applicant's allegation primarily on the basis of Article 4 of the 
216 Ibid, para 9.The applicant's claim was rejected by the Federal Minister for Labour and Social Structure. His 
argument before the Government was that his performance of substitute civilian service would hinder his 
religious activities as a religious minister, since he was requested to undertake a number of tasks in his spare 
time but not as full-time occupation. 
21 i Ibid, para 31. 
218 Ibid, para 10. Furthermore, it was argued that, in any case, the applicant's freedom to manifest his religion 
would not have been hampered as many options were available, for example either exercising his duties outside 
his hometown, or requesting to perform civilian service in his hometown, a request that the government had 
allegedly accommodated in previous occasions for members ofthis particular religious community. 
219 Ibid, para 30. 
220 Ibid, para 32. 
221 Ibid, para 32. 
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Convention222 and concluded that Article 9, considered separately, had not been violated in 
1·, 223the app lcant s case. 
Having dismissed the applicants complain under Articles 9 and 4, the Commission 
decided proprio motu to consider whether the conduct of the authorities had breached the 
prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 14 ECHR, taken in conjunction with 
Articles 9 and 4, due to the fact that the applicant had not been granted an exemption from 
both military and alternative civilian service, an option which, under domestic law, was open 
to Roman Catholic and Protestant ministers. 
With regards to the possible violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 4 
ECHR,224 the Commission concluded that the applicant had not been subjected to a treatment 
which was in any way less favourable than that accorded to ministers of other religious 
communities.225 This was due to the fact that the applicant's religious ministry was not his 
principal occupation and that certain differentiations may be legitimate and not precluded by 
Article 14. Therefore the question whether differential treatment in respect of exemption 
from compulsory service had been an issue in this case could not be given a conclusive 
answer in relation to the applicant's occupational status. 
In relation to whether there was a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, 
the Commission unanimously concluded that there was no violation in the applicant's case as 
it had already concluded that the service required of the applicant would not have interfered 
with the private and personal practice of his religion, nor would it have restricted his freedom 
to manifest his religion by teaching within his community. It was also found that as the 
applicant had not established that he had been subjected to a treatment which was in any way 
less favourable than that accorded to ministers of other religious communities the question of 
discrimination did not arise. 226 Finally, the Commission held that the question of 
discrimination should be determined solely in the light of Article 4 of the Convention and in 
this case could only arise from a consideration of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4 of 
the Convention. Nevertheless as decided earlier, the applicant could not be considered to 
have been the victim of a discriminatory treatment in the application of the relevant German 
m Ibid. 
223 Ibid, para 33 
224 Art. 4(3) ECHR provides that, 'for the purpose ofthis article the term forced or compulsory labour shall not 
include (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are 
;~~ognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service'. 
:::: G~andrath v. Germany (above n214), para 44. 
" Ibid, para 44. 
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legislation, and therefore, the Commission found no violation of Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 4.227 
The case of Grandrath provided an early opportunity for members of the Commission 
to express their views on the relationship between Article 4 and Article 9 of the Convention. 
One of its members, Constantin Eustathiades, appended an individual opinion, noting that 
Article 4(3)(b) ECHR defmes the notion of forced or compulsory labour within the meaning 
of the Convention and that this 
[ ... J should not lead to the conclusion that Article 4(3)(b) excludes the 
applicability of Article 9 of the Convention in cases where such work as falls 
under the said paragraph (3)(b) affects one of the rights guaranteed by Article 
9 of the Convention [ ... ] in this respect and more generally in regard to the 
limitations laid down in Article 9(2) the margin of appreciation which is given 
to the Government concerned is extended as a result of Article 4, paragraph 
(3)(b) of the Convention?Z8 
Eustathiades's note appears to reflect a more correct reading of the relevant provision of 
the Convention than the one proposed by the majority of the Commission. Nevertheless, the 
facts of the case, i.e. the total objection of the applicant to both forms of service (military and 
alternative) do not offer an opportunity to conclusively assess the Commission's position on 
the applicability of Article 9 of the Convention in cases concerning conscientious objections 
to military service per se. However, the legacy of the decision in Grandrath is an important 
one, since reliance upon Article 4(3)(b) ECHR with a view to exclude the existence of an 
obligation for State parties to recognise a right of conscientious objection to military service 
in their domestic legislation, would subsequently stir up a heated debate on the reading of 
Article 4(3)(b) into Article 9 cases. 
For instance, in X v. Austria the Commission acknowledged that the Austrian 
Constitutional Court had acted within its margin of appreciation by rejecting the applicability 
of Article 9 ECHR in a case concerning a Roman Catholic university lecturer convicted by a 
national court for his refusal to perform compulsory military service?Z9 
227 Ibid, para 40. 

228 Ibid, para 47. 

229 Xv. Austria, App. no. 5591172 (1973)43 CD p.161. 
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The applicant had complained of violations of his rights under Articles 9 and 13 of the 
ECHR. In interpreting Article 9, the Commission, relying upon its decision in Grandrath 
noted that the terms of Article 4(3)(b) ECHR demonstrated that a choice is left to each State 
Party as to whether or not to recognise a right to conscientious objection to military service 
and to provide for the possibility of alternative civilian service?30 As held by the 
Commission, the Convention did not prevent a State which has not recognised conscientious 
objectors from punishing those who refused to perform military service.231 
Similarly, in A v. Switzerland, decided in 1984, the Commission observed that m 
countries where compulsory service existed, the imposition of a penalty for failure to 
complete military service did not give rise to a violation of Article 9 since that provision did 
not require States to provide the option of alternative civilian service to conscientious 
objectors?32 The Commission invoked once again Article 4(3)(b) ECHR, and found that 
Article 9 was not applicable to the applicant's situation, as 'the Convention does not give 
conscientious objectors the right to exemption from military service, but leaves each 
contracting State to decide whether or not to grant such a right' .233 The same approach was 
followed in a number of subsequent cases.234 
However, whenever possible, the Court tried to avoid dealing directly with the question 
of whether Article 9 was applicable to cases of conscientious objection to military service, 
but rather preferred to examine claims brought by conscientious objectors under different 
provisions of the Convention. 
Thus, in Thlimmenos v. Greece the Court, whilst noting the need to reconsider the 
Commission's case-law regarding the right to conscientious objection to military service in 
the light of present-day conditions, 235 still decided to examine the case under Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 9 ECHR, rather than also under Article 9 taken on its own.236 
Similarly, in Vlke v. Turkey, the Court did not frod it necessary to pursue its examination of 
230 Ibid, para l. 
231 Ibid, para 1­
232 The applicant refused to undertake military service on grounds of conscience. He was sentenced to four 
months imprisonment and his appeals to have his sentence upheld were rejected. He complained that his 
conviction for failure to perform military service was in violation of Articles 5, 7, 9 and 14 of the Convention. 
See A v. Switzerland, App. no. 10640/83 (1984) 38 DR 219. 

233 Ibid, p. 223. 

234 See, in particular, Johansen v. Norway, App. no. 10600/83 (1985) 44 DR 155, p.162; Heudens v. Belgium, 
App no. 24630/94, Commission decision of22 May 1995 and Autio v. Finland, App no. 17086/90, Commission 
decision of6 December 1991. 
"35 . . ~ Thlzmmenos v. Greece [GC], Reports 2000-IV 263, para 50. 

"36 Ibid, paras 39-49. 
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the applicability of Article 9 with reference to the same approach being followed III 
Thlimmenos, and preferred to examine the case under Article 3 ECHR?37 
3.5. Bayatycm v. Armenia 
The long lasting judicial debate over the recognition of the right to conscientious 
objection as a right attracting the protections of Article 9 of the Convention came to an end in 
2011. A landmark decision that was adopted that year signified that Council of Europe 
Member States are no longer justified to prosecute individuals holding a genuine 
conscientious objection to military service and are, in fact, under a legal obligation to allow 
individuals with moral objections to perform an alternative civilian service that is compatible 
to their beliefs. 
The applicant in Bayatyan v. Armenia was a Jehovah's Witness who, following his 
refusal to perform military service due to his religious convictions, was charged with draft 
evasion and sentenced to two-and-a-half year detention.238 The applicant complained of his 
conviction for draft evasion relying on Article 9 of the Convention. He claimed that his 
refusal to serve in the army had been a manifestation of his freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion and that his conviction amounted to an unlawful interference with this 
freedom.239 
It should be noted that in 2003, shortly after the applicant's arrest and conviction, a 
law on alternative service was adopted in Armenia recognising the right to conscientious 
objection.24o Nevertheless, at the material time when criminal proceedings were instituted 
against the applicant, the right to conscientious objection was still not recognised in Armenia 
and failure to perform military service carried heavy implications. 
The adoption of the legislation in question constituted the fulfilment by Armenia of 
one ofthe commitments undertaken at the time of accession to the Council of Europe. 
In this regard, in May 2000, in its report providing information as to Armenia's 
application for membership to the Council of Europe, the Committee on Political Affairs and 
237 alke v. Turkey, App no. 39437/98 (2006), reprinted in 48 E.H.R.R. 48, paras 53-54. 
238 Bayatyan v. Armenia, App no 23459/03, ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 27 October 2009 (hereinafter 
'Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber] '); Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. no. 23459/03, ECtHR, Grand Chamber 
judgment of 7 July 2011 (hereinafter 'Bayatyan v. Armenia [GCn. 
239 Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber], para 51. 
240 Republic ofArmenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, amended in 2004, 2006 
and 2013 [the text of the legislation is available in Armenian only; unofficial translation on file with the author]. 
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Democracy of the Council of Europe241 indicated that one of the commitments of the country 
with regard to human rights was 'to adopt, within four years of its accession, a law on 
alternative military service and, pending the adoption of that law and within six months of its 
accession, to take measures allowing conscientious objectors to perform military service in 
non-armed units under the existing legislation and, on the occasion of its accession, to pardon 
conscientious objectors currently serving prison sentences or in disciplinary battalions' .242 
In examining the facts of the Bayatyan case, the European Court observed that, 
despite Armenia's pledge at the time of negotiations for accession to the Council of Europe 
that it would, inter alia, pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms, the 
applicant had not been pardoned and therefore he was not released from his prison sentence. 
The initial judgment on the case was handed down by a Chamber of the Court in 
2009.243 In examining the applicant's complaint, the Chamber of the Court found that the 
Armenian authorities could not be regarded as having acted in breach of their Convention 
obligations for convicting the applicant for his refusal to perform military service.244 This was 
not unsurprising, considering that a reading of the Chamber's judgment reflects the 
customary position of the Commission and the Court as to the applicability of Article 9 in 
cases concerning conscientious objection to military service. The Chamber thus following the 
established jurisprudence of the Court on the question of conscientious objection concluded 
that 
[ ... ] since Article 4(3)(b) clearly left the choice of recognising conscientious objectors 
to each Contracting Party, the fact that the majority of the Contracting Parties have 
241 PACE, Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, 'Armenia's application for membership of the 
Council of Europe (Rapporteur: Mr. Demetrio Vo1cic, Italy, Socialist Group)', Doc. 8747,23 May 2000, 
available at < http://assembly.coe.int/ ASPlDoc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=8942&Language=en> accessed on 
2-9-13, para 13(iv)(c). See also PACE, Opinion No. 221 (2000), 'Armenia's application for membership of the 
Council of Europe', text adopted by the Assembly on 28 June 2000 (21st Sitting), para.l3. The Committee on 
Political Affairs and Democracy is a subsidiary body ofthe PACE, which is mandated to consider the general 
policy of the Council ofEurope and all political matters which fall within the competence of the organisation. It 
considers requests for membership to the Council of Europe and applications for observer status with the 
Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly, while it also considers the human rights situation in States 
which are not members of the Council of Europe. The Committee reports directly to the PACE. See PACE, 
Resolution 1842 (2011) on the terms of reference of Parliamentary Assembly committees - implementation of 
Resolution 1822 (2011) on the reform of the Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. No. 12717, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 7 October 2011 (36th sitting). 
242 Ibid, Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, 'Armenia's application for membership of the Council 
of Europe, para.13(iv)(d). 
243 Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber] (above n 238). 
244 Ibid, para 64. 
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recognised this right cannot be relied upon to hold a Contracting Party which has not 
done so to be in violation of its Convention obligations.245 
The Chamber held that Article 9 of the Convention did not in and of itself guarantee a 
right to refuse to perform military service on conscientious grounds and that it was therefore 
inapplicable to the applicant's case.246 It therefore held by six votes to one that there had been 
no violation of Article 9 of the Convention?47 
The decision of the majority of the Chamber endorsing the case law of the former 
Commission was met with harsh criticism, including by some of the dissenting judges. In her 
dissenting opinion, Judge Power emphasised the 'dynamic and evolutive nature of the 
Convention as a living instrument'248 and noted that 'the Court cannot but be influenced by 
the developments and commonly accepted standards and policy of the member states of the 
~~~;:~ "Council of Europe' .z49 In this regard, she argued that the majority's fmding failed to reflect 	 ••n.,.".
••11"1"" 
rl'llii:'~I:'" ~::: the almost universal acceptance of freedom of thought, conscience and religion within 1'1'''1 .~~ III,'I I')democratic societies that is recognised in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 	 , ~I"""'~"ill ''''ill~j~
and the European Convention on Human Rights,250 and went on to criticise the inconsistency ~::~I
'·,r'l
of the Court's findings with European standards on conscientious objection to military ~~~: ll::.l~ 
',:lt~ service.
251 Judge Power concluded that 
111I~fH,l' 
"'tll[ ... ] in view of the foregoing, it would appear that the majority's finding is not i~::il 
!;t~~;:;just incompatible with current European standards on the question of 	 ,,~J,'~v 
'~i~'li i1':~11' 
245 Ibid, para 63. 

246 See also Bayatyan v. Amlenia [Chamber] (above n.238), concuning opinion of Judge Fura, para.3:'the 

existing case-law on conscientious objection is clear in as much as there is no right of conscientious objection to 

military service within the Convention generally or under Article 9 in particular. So to apply general law to 

someone who refuses to do military service on grounds of conscience would not violate Article 9. In some 
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247 Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber] (above n 238), para 66. 

248 Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber] (above n.238), dissenting opinion of Judge Power, para 3. 

249 Judge Power dissented from the majority and invited the Grand Chamber to interpret and apply the 

Convention in the light of current legal norms and standards. She condemned the majority's approach, asserting 

that the Court now seemed to be taking a dissimilar approach by looking at the case from the viewpoint of 

Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 because of the consequences of the applicant's earlier criminal 
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(recalling Tyrer v. UK, App. no. 5856/72 (1978), Series A no 26, reprinted in 2 E.H.R.R. 1, para 31). 

250 Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber] (above n.238), dissenting opinion of Judge Power, para 4. 

251 Ib'd 51 ,para 
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conscientious objection but that it parts company with the Court itself in tenns 
of the overall direction ofthe jurisprudence as discernible in the case law.252 
Judge Power then considered the question of 'proportionality' of the interference with 
the applicant's right to manifest his religion, stating that 'notwithstanding the lawfulness of a 
pennitted interference with a Convention right, the Court retains its supervisory role in 
assessing the proportionality of any measure taken' .253 Having noted that that restrictions on 
the enjoyment of the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs under Article 9 were 
pennissible to reconcile the interests of various groups and to ensure respect of the freedom 
of belief, she noted that Annenia had not provided any justification as to whether a 'pressing 
social need' existed which justified the limitations imposed on the ability of the applicant to 
manifest his beliefs by objecting to perfonn military service254 and that, in the circumstances, 
the applicant's imprisonment for refusing to perfonn military service had not been necessary, 
thus the State had failed the proportionality test. 255 
The case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of the applicant.256 The 
Grand Chamber was called upon to reconsider the question of whether conscientious 
objection fell within the scope of Article 9 ECHR. 
As a first step in its approach, the Grand Chamber was required to detennine whether 
the alleged interference with the applicant's right was 'prescribed by law'. It was held that 
even though the applicant's conviction was based on Article 75 of the then Criminal Code, 
which prescribed the penalty for draft evasion, at the time of the interference there was no 
law on alternative service in Annenia?S7 The Grand Chamber held that it was not necessary 
to to resolve question of whether, in light of the changes in the domestic law since the 
applicant's conviction and Armenia's commitment to pardon conscientious objectors serving 
252 Ibid. 
'53 Ib'
• ld, para 2. 
254 Ib'd1 ,para 7. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Referral ofa case to the Grand Chamber is possible under Art. 43 ECHR according to which: 
1. Within a period ofthree months from the date of the judgment ofthe Chamber, any party to 
the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. 
2. A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept the request ifthe case raises a 
serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto, or a serious issue of gen-eral importance. 
3. If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber shall decide the case by means of a 

judgment.

257 
Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 114. 
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II 
prison tenns,258 the impugned interference was 'prescribed by law,259 and proceeded to assess 
whether the measures in question had been 'necessary in a democratic society'. 260 In this 
regard, it noted that the requirements of 'necessity' or 'proportionality' of the measure in 
order to achieve one of the legitimate aims included in Article 9(2) implied the detennination 
of whether the impugned measures pursued a 'pressing social need' ,261 and went on to recall 
that, in assessing whether and to what extent an interference with a Convention right was 
'necessary in a democratic society', the domestic authorities enjoyed a 'margin of 
appreciation' ?62 
The Grand Chamber specifically noted that: 
According to its settled case-law, the Court leaves to State parties to the 
Convention a certain margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what 
extent an interference is necessary. This margin of appreciation goes hand in 
hand with European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions 
applying it. The Court's task is to detennine whether the measures taken at 
national level were justified in principle and proportionate. 
In order to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation in the present 
case the Court must take into account what is at stake, namely the need to 
maintain true religious pluralism, which is vital to the survival of a democratic 
society. The Court may also have regard to any consensus and common values 
emerging from the practices of the States parties to the Convention?63 
In order to determine whether such consensus existed, the Grand Chamber set out to 
assess the situation within the Council of Europe in relation to the recognition of a right to 
conscientious objection and noted that, at the time of the alleged interference with the 
258 See discussion above, text accompanying fn 242. 

259 Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 116. 

260 Ibid, paras 118-128. 

261 Ibid, para 123. 

262 Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 121. In this context, the Court's approach is to examine 
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and H. Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection ofHuman Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 75. 
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applicant's rights, the overwhelming majority of its Member States had recognised the right 
in their domestic laws with the exception of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.264 
In light of the evolving consensus over the recognition of the right of conscientious 
objection and the adoption of legislation on alternative service by the Member States of the 
Council of Europe, the Court held that the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the domestic 
authorities was not as wide as it used to be but it was in fact narrowed by considering the 
acceptance and development of legal standards on conscientious objection both within the 
United Nations and the Council ofEurope.265 The Grand Chamber specifically noted that: 
[ ... ] almost all the member States of the Council of Europe which ever had or 
still have compulsory military service have introduced alternatives to such 
service in order to reconcile the possible conflict between individual 
conscience and military obligations. Accordingly, a State which has not done 
so enjoys only a limited margin of appreciation and must advance convincing 
and compelling reasons to justify any interference. In particular, it must 
demonstrate that the interference corresponds to a 'pressing social need' .266 
The Court made reference to the relevant recommendations and resolutions of PACE 
and of the CoE demonstrating the importance of these guidelines in safeguarding that 
Member States are not only recognising the right to be exempted from military service and 
assigned alternative civilian service in their domestic legislation, but most importantly the 
obligation to provide a legal framework in their domestic legal systems that is practically 
accessible and effective?67 
In parallel with the evolution of the internal situation within the Council of Europe, 
the Grand Chamber also considered the important developments which had taken place in 
recent years in the practice of other international human rights monitoring bodies, most 
notably the Human Rights Committee.268 Amongst other developments, the Grand Chamber 
noted that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000, 
264 Consensus has been taken account by the Court in several occasions in its recent jurisprudence. See . .x; Yand 

Z v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 21830193, ECHRReports 1997-II, para. 44; Dickson v. United Kingdom 

[GC], App. No. 44362/04, ECHRReports 2007-XIII, para. 78. 

265 Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238) para 123. 

266 Ibid, paras 121-123. 

267 Ibid., paras 51-65. 

268 Ibid, paras 59-64. On the developments in the practice of the Human Rights Committee, see above Chapter 2, 
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expressly recognised the right of conscientious objection to military service in Article 
10(2).269 
On the basis of these considerations the Grand Chamber concluded that the 
applicant's conviction constituted an interference which was not necessary in a democratic 
society within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention.270 
As for the debated question regarding the relevance of the exclusion clause in Article 
4(3)(b), the Grand Chamber looked at the travaux preparatoires of Article 4 ECHR and 
concluded that 'the clause relating to conscientious objection was intended to indicate that 
any national service required of them by law would not fall within the scope of forced or 
compulsory labour,.271 It explained that the sole purpose of Article 4(3)(b) was to provide a 
further elucidation of the notion of forced or compulsory labour; therefore, it neither 
recognised, nor excluded a right to conscientious objection and should not have had a 
delimiting effect on the rights guaranteed by Article 9?72 Although the drafters' intentions 
cannot be taken conclusively to determine the interpretation of a legal text/73 it was 
important for the Court to use the intentions of the drafters in conjunction with the 
incremental evolution of the Convention as a 'living instrument' to place the meaning of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion within a more contemporary setting. 
In a passage which undoubtedly constitutes a watershed in the Court's case-law on 
conscientious objection, the Grand Chamber concluded that: 
[ ... ] opposition to military service, where motivated by a serious and 
insunnountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the anny and a 
person's conscience or religious or other belief, constitutes a conviction of 
sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to attract the 
guarantees of Article 9.274 
It may be argued that the paragraph quoted above sets a high threshold for a claim of 
conscientious objection to attract the protection of Article 9, since the burden of proof lies 
269 Ibid, para 86. For discussion on the right of conscientious objection as protected by the ED Charter, see 

above text accompanying fn 176. 

270 Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 128. 
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272 Ibid, para 100. 

273 G. Letsas, 'Strasbourg's interpretive ethic: lessons for the intemationallawyer', European Journal of 
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with the applicant to demonstrate that he holds a genuine, cogent, serious and coherent 
conviction against performing military service. It is, however, an opportunity for the Court to 
reassure the Member States ofthe Council of Europe that the recognition of the right does not 
undermine the 'margin of appreciation' doctrine. The wording of the paragraph quoted above 
is arguably intended to denote that not all objections of conscience will be accepted, but only 
those of sufficient cogency, seriousness and importance. 
Having found that the right to conscientious objection attracted the protection of 
Article 9, the Grand Chamber proceeded to comment upon the limitations to the enjoyment of 
the right in question. In that regard, the Armenian Government had argued that, had the Court 
deemed that the applicant's complaint fell within the scope of Article 9, the applicant's 
conviction was in any case a legitimate limitation of his right to manifest his beliefs.275 
The Grand Chamber noted that the possibility of imposing limitations on the 
enjoyment of the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs is expressly provided in the 
second paragraph of Article 9 and that, as with any other so-called 'qualified right' under the 
ECHR, for any restriction to the right to manifest one's belief (including through 
conscientious objection to military service) to be compatible with the Convention, it must be 
prescribed by law,276 pursue one of the legitimate aims listed in the qualifying clause, and 
finally to be justified and necessary in a democratic society. 
In relation to the second requirement, the Grand Chamber noted that the aIms 
expressly recognised in the second paragraph of Article 9 are 'public safety, [ ... ] the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or [ ...] the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others' . 
275 Ibid, para 83. 
276 The jurisprudence of the Court on permissible limitations is clear in that any measure oflimitation be 
'prescribed by law'. In order to satisfy this test, a legal basis for the restriction in question must be defined and 
established in domestic law, the law in question must be 'accessible' to those affected by the restriction and 
finally the law must be fonnulated with sufficient certainty and clarity; firstly to enable those affected to 
understand it, and secondly to enable them to take measures in order to avoid breaking the law. See, e.g., Koppi 
v. Switzerland, App. no. 23224/94, Reports 1998-II, p. 540, decision of 25 March 1998, para 53 (legal basis in 
domestic law); Silver and others v. United Kingdom, App. nos. 5947/72; 6205173; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107175; 
7113/75; 7136/75) decision of23 March 1983 (accessibility of domestic laws and practice); Sunday Times v. 
The United Kingdom, App. no. 6538/74, 2 E.H.R.R. 245, decision of26 April 1979 (certainty oflegal rules). 
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It is notable in this regard that, by contrast to the list of legitimate aims contained in 
the limitation clauses of other rights under the Convention, the list of limitation grounds in 
Article 9(2) does not include 'national security' considerations.277 
Finally, the Grand Chamber reiterated that any restriction to the enjoyment of a right 
must be 'necessary in a democratic society' for the achievement of one of the legitimate 
aims.278 The Court went on to emphasise that the principle which entails that an interference 
must be 'necessary in a democratic society' is embedded in Article 9 ECHR protecting the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and that 'this freedom is one of the foundations 
of a 'democratic society' within the meaning of the Convention' .279 
The Grand Chamber then moved on to consider the Government's arguments 
concerning the compatibility of the limitation on the applicant's right with the Convention. 
Firstly, according to the Government, the interference was 'prescribed by law' in that the 
applicant had been convicted pursuant to Article 75 of the former Criminal Code which s 
= ~prescribed the penalty for draft evasion and that the provision in question had been both ~ 
accessible and sufficiently precise.28o The Government further acknowledged that the right to !~ 
conscientious objection was not recognised under Armenian law at the material time.281 On 
~' 
whether the interference was 'necessary in a democratic society', the Government argued that ,,~ 
~ exemption from compulsory military service would have been in breach of the principle of i~
'. 
j"equality and non-discrimination and that the Government had acted in compliance with the 
.!: 
l~requirements of the Convention by following the position of the Court up to the present date ~~ 
as established in its case-law, i.e. that Article 9 did not concern exemptions from compulsory '" 
'" 
military service on religious or political grounds.282 According to the respondent 
Government, non-discrimination on the basis of religion or belief was 'necessary in a 
democratic society' in order to avoid the unequal application of the law to people of different 
beliefs.283 According to the Armenian government 'it would inevitably result in very serious 
consequences for public order if the authorities allowed the above mentioned sixty-plus 
277 All other 'qualified rights' under the Convention, i.e. Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR, contain a limitation also 
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-religious organisation to interpret and comply with the law in force at the material time as 
, I" b I' f: 'd d' 284their respectIve re IglOus e Ie s provI e , 
In response to the government's claim that the interference was necessary to protect 
public order and the rights of others, the Grand Chamber held that it did not find 'he 
Government's reference to these aims to be convincing in the circumstances of the case, 
especially taking into account that at the time of the applicant's conviction the Armenian 
authorities had already pledged to introduce alternative civilian service and, implicitly, to 
refrain from convicting new conscientious objectors' .285 It however concluded that it was 
unnecessary to detennine conclusively whether the aims referred to by the Government were 
legitimate within the meaning of Article 9(2), since the interference was in any event 
incompatible with that provision on the basis that the interference with the applicant'S 
manifestation of his beliefs had not been 'necessary in a democratic society', Emphasising 
the importance of religious freedom, pluralism in a democratic society and the scope of the 
'margin of appreciation' in deciding upon the necessity of an interference with a Convention 
right, the Grand Chamber noted that, while the applicant had sought to be exempted from 
military service on the ground of his genuinely held religious convictions, the system in place 
in Armenia, i,e, forcing objectors to refuse to be drafted into the army and to risk criminal 
sanctions, failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of society as a whole and those 
of the applicant.286 
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber rejected the Government's claim that the restriction 
on the applicant's right to be exempted from military service was based on need to avoid 
discrimination between citizens of different beliefs, In this regard the Court expressed the 
view that the applicant had been 'prepared to share the societal burden equally with his 
compatriots by performing alternative civilian service' .287 It further held that: 
[ ... ] respect on the part of the State towards the beliefs of a minority religious 
group like the applicant's by providing them with the opportunity to serve 
society as dictated by their conscience might, far from creating unjust 
inequalities or discrimination as claimed by the Government, rather ensure 
284 Ibid, para 84. 
285 Ibid, para 58. 
285 Ibid, para 124. 
287 Ibid, para 125, 
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cohesive and stable pluralism and promote religious harmony and tolerance in 
society.288 
The Grand Chamber also emphasised that the applicant had not refused to comply 
with his civic obligations in general, but he requested that he shared the societal burden 
equally with other Armenian nationals, by expressing the will to perform alternative service 
of public interest and for the common good.289 The statement of the Grand Chamber reflects 
the position of some legal theorists that are in support of the view that conscientious objectors 
are not in breach of their legal obligations towards the State since their objection entails an 
intention to be assigned alternative duties in replacement ofmilitary service, thus undertaking 
the performance of an alternative civil obligation.29o 
The Grand Chamber focused on the meaning of 'democracy', stating that the true 
objective of a democratic society was to 'ensure the fair and proper treatment of people from 
minorities and avoid any abuse of a dominant position' .291 According to the Grand Chamber, 
in the applicant's case this would have been safeguarded by granting him an opportunity to 
serve society as dictated by his conscience.292 Therefore, the Grand Chamber concluded that 
the conviction of the applicant for draft evasion could not be said to have been prompted by a 
pressing social need,293 and that the Armenian government had failed to provide convincing 
and compelling arguments to justify any interference with the applicant's right to 
conscientious objection under Article 9 of the Convention. The majority voted by sixteen 
votes to one in favour of fmding a violation ofArticle 9 ECHR.294 
As indicated in the analysis of the Court's jurisprudence, prior to the Grand 
Chamber's judgment in Bayatyan it was commonly accepted by the Commission that Article 
288 Ibid, para 126. 
289 Ibid, para 125. 
290 See the brief discussion on the jurisprudential debate on conscientious objection in text accompanying fn. 44 
above. 
291 Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 126. 
292 Ibid, para 126. 
293 Ibid, para 127. 
294 In her dissenting opinion, the Annenian Judge Al vina Gyulumyan disagreed with the majority view of that 
there had been a violation of Article 9, on the basis that the right of conscientious objection was not guaranteed 
by the Convention and its Protocols. She referred to the unsuccessful attempt of the Parliamentary Assembly to 
incorporate the right of conscientious objection to the Convention by means of a Protocol following its rejection 
by the Committee of Ministers and criticised the Court of creating 'new rights' that were not envisaged by the 
drafters of the Convention. Regarding the aforementioned attempt to elaborate an additional protocol amending 
Article 4(3)(b) and Article 9 ECHR see PACE, Reply from the Committee of Ministers on Recommendation 
1518 (2001) (above n 168). 
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4(3)(b) of the Convention excluded the applicability of Article 9 to conscientious objection 
cases. In the words of Nicolas Bratza, in order to escape from their 'self-imposed 
straitjacket', for a long time the Court had no other option than to rely on provisions other 
than Article 9 ECHR to provide some degree of protection to conscientious objectors.295 
Since the ground-breaking decision of the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan, reliance upon other 
provisions of the Convention is no longer absolutely necessary, and the right to be exempted 
from military service on grounds of conscience is now regarded in itself as an autonomous 
right falling under the scope of Article 9 of the Convention. 
3.6. The impact of Bayatyan v. Armenia 
Bayatyan v. Armenia is a case where an evaluation of international human rights 
standards and their pan-European acceptance led the Court to finally provide a ruling that 
acknowledged conscientious objection to military service as a right attracting the protection 
of Article 9 ECHR. As the previous sectionpointed out, the Court acknowledged that 
Armenia was already under an obligation to enact legislation on alternative civilian service 
and to pardon all imprisoned conscientious objectors.296 This obligation had been agreed as 
one of the conditions for the country's accession to the Council of Europe and on that basis, 
the Court was of the opinion that even though a new law on alternative service was adopted, 
this did not have an impact upon the applicant; thus, it argued that 'the applicant's conviction 
for conscientious objection was in direct conflict with the official policy of reform and 
legislative changes being implemented in Armenia at the material time in pursuance of its 
international commitment and cannot be said, in such circumstances, to have been prompted 
by a pressing social need' ?97 
Further to the Bayatyan judgment, the duty to enact legislation that is practically 
accessible has been reaffirmed by the European Court in its recent case law demonstrating 
that States are not only under a duty to adopt measures with a view to enacting legislation on 
alternative service, but also to ensure that the legislation eventually adopted is effectively 
-

295N. Bratza, 'The 'precious asset': freedom ofreligion under the European Convention on Human Rights', 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal vol. 14 (2012) p.256 ~96 " • 
Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 127. 
297 Ibid. 
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protecting the rights of those lawfully exempted from the obligation to perfonn military 
service, including the right not to be discriminated on the basis of religious or other beliefs.298 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan marks a turning point in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which expressly abandoned the 
previous approach to the issue of conscientious obj ection to military service. This was an 
opportunity for the Grand Chamber to revisit its position by elaborating on the use of the 
'living instrument' doctrine to interpret the Convention, a doctrine used to enable the Court to 
creatively update the interpretation of a number of Convention Articles in varied 
situations.299 . The acknowledgment by the European Court of Human Rights that the right is 
finnly set within the scope of the Convention denotes that the development of legal standards 
and obligations on the right to conscientious objection under the Convention will continue to 
evolve rapidly. 
Legal obligations, either positive300 or negative30I , translate to both contextual and 
specific measures to be taken by a Member State to prevent similar violations from 
~ 
:1! 
<4 
~ 
reoccurring in the future. In a broader sense, these may include the duty to put in place a legal ilt .~ 
framework that provides effective protection for Convention rights; the duty to prevent 
breaches of Convention rights by private parties, including the duty to provide information 
and advice relevant to the breach of Convention rights; the duty to respond to breaches of 
Convention rights; and fmally the duty to provide resources to individuals to prevent 
298 Ercep v. Turkey, App. no. 43965/04, (EOHR, 22 November 2011); Bukharatyan v. Amzenia, App. no. 
37819/03 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012), Tsaturyan v. Amzenia, App. no. 37821/03 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012), 
Femi Demirtas v. Turkey, App. No. 5260/07, Chamber judgment of 17January 2012; Savda v. Turkey, App no. 
42730105, Chamber judgment of 12 June 2012; Tarhan v. Turkey, App. No. 9078/05, Chamber judgment of 17 
July 2012. 
299 A. Mowbray, 'The creativity of the European Court of Human Rights', Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5 
(2005), p. 57. 
300 Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights are obligations that a State has to 
adopt reasonable and suitable measures, or to take preventive and proactive action300 to prevent Convention 
violations and to safeguard Convention rights. Positive obligations have not been defined by the Court; however 
Judge Martens in Gul v. Switzerland held that 'the Court's case-law distinguishes between positive and negative 
obligations... Negative obligations require Member States to refrain from action, positive to take action'. See 
Gill v. Switzerland, App. no. 23218/94 (1996), reprinted in 22 E.H.R.R. 93. 
Some examples ofpositive obligations include the 'obligation to respect', i.e. requiring State organs to avoid the 
commitment ofviolations; the 'obligation to protect' i.e. requiring the State to protect right holders against 
interference by third parties and to punish the perpetrators; and lastly the 'obligation to implement' which calls 
for specific positive measures to give full realisation and full effect to a right. See J.F. Akandji-Kombe, Positive 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation ofthe ECHR, 
Human Rights Handbooks, No.7 (Council of Europe, 2007), p.5 <http://echr.coe.intlNRlrdonlyresIlB521F61­
A636-43F5-AD56-5F26D46A4F55/0IDG2ENHRHANDOn007.pdf.>accessed on 22-6-12. 
301 Negative obligations may be described as obligations under which the State is expected to refrain from 
certain actions that may give rise to Convention violations. See P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak, 
'Theory and Practice ofthe European Convention on Human Rights', (Intersentia, 2006), p. 293. 
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violations of their Convention rights. 302 As the next chapter discusses, the Bayatyan judgment 
provides a strong basis for the development of a framework of binding obligations that may 
now be said to have a concrete legal basis. 
30:' K. Starmer, European Human Rights Law: The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Legal Action Group, 1999), p. 193. 
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Chapter 4: International standards on conscientious objection and their implementation 
in Council of Europe Member States 
. Introduction 
The shift in the approach of human rights bodies to the question of conscientious 
objection to military service, leading to the recognition of the existence of a 'right' to 
conscientious objection under international human rights law implies not only that States are 
now legally required to provide for an exemption from military service for those individuals 
who hold genuine conviction against the use of military force, but also that the way in which 
that exemption is applied in practice may be subject to international scrutiny. Against this 
background, it is particularly important to delineate the exact contours of the 'right to 
conscientious objection to military service' and to identify the substantive and procedural 
obligations which States are now required to observe. (".c 
~r: 
1t!1 
Accordingly, the present chapter has a two-fold purpose. The first is to outline in clear i~'::IJ 
terms the international legal standards which emerge from both 'soft-law' instruments !~~ 
adopted by international human rights bodies and the treaty-based case law of the UN Human II:: 
""I~ 
Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights. In parallel to the discussion of II')l~\ 
the standards which regulate each specific aspect of the right to conscientious objection, the !1~» I~ ~, 
'·'1 
second pupose of this chapter is to examine how the current practice of the Member States of 
the Council of Europe compares with those standards. The analysis will address both 
l'~"1,,1 
":1 i~t J" ~~! 
situations concerning conscientious objections to mandatory national military service ::1 
r' 
('conscription'), and situations where the member states are operating with all voluntary­
based and professionally-led armed forces. 
The standards under examination include first and foremost the recognition of a right 
to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience under domestic legislation 
and the availability of alternative service for those refusing to undertake military service. 
Following this, issues which will be examined include: the range of accepted grounds 
regarding the validity of conscientious objection claims in domestic legislation; the nature 
and length of alternative civilian service; procedural issues (including the availability of 
information to those wishing to be recognised as conscientious objectors and the 
improvement of narrow timeframes restricting the process of submitting applications); the 
question of independence and impartiality of tribunals examining conscientious objection 
70 
applications; and the arrangements that need to be madefor the right to appeal to an 
independent and civil judicial body.303 
4.2. The duty to recognise the right to conscientious objection by law and the 
prohibition of criminalization of conscientious objectors 
4.2.1. International standards 
(a) Duty to adopt legislation 
In light of the recognition of the right to conscientious objection on the international 
plane, States are first and foremost required to recognise in their domestic law the right of 
those individuals who, on the basis of their religious, moral and ethical convictions, refuse to 
perform military service to be exempted from serving in the anned forces and be allowed to 
perform alternative civilian service. An obvious corollary of the obligation to recognise a 
right to conscientious objection to military service is the prohibition of criminalisation of 
individuals who refuse to perform military service on the basis of their religious, moral or 
ethical convictions. 
Under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee, further to the recognition of the 
right to conscientious objection to military service as a right protected under Article 18 of the 
Covenant, has repeatedly emphasised that the option to refuse to perform military service on 
grounds of conscience should be provided by law in the domestic legal system of each State 
Party to the ICCPR. For instance, in its latest decision on the issue, the Committee, having 
found that South Korea had breached the applicants' rights under Article 9 ICCPR by 
sentencing them to one and a half years of imprisonment for their refusal to bear arms, 
reiterated that 'the State party is under an obligation to avoid similar violations of the 
Covenant in the future, which includes the adoption of legislative measures guaranteeing the 
right to conscientious objection' .304 
In the European context, as discussed in Chapter 3, the obligation to adopt legislation 
concerning conscientious objection was already acknowledged by PACE in Resolution 
303 Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribeiro, Special Rapporteur 
appointed in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1986120, UN doc. E/CNAf1992/52, 18 
December 1991, para. 185. 
304 y;
eo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. Republic o/Korea (above n 140, para 10); Eu-Min Jung et at v. 

Republic a/Korea (above n 149, para 9); Min-Kyu Jeong et al v. Republic o/Korea (above n 152, para 9). 
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337(1967) in which PACE called the Member States of the Council of Europe to introduce, 
within a reasonable time into their domestic laws a provision to recognise the right to be 
exempted from military service on grounds of conscience and for alternative civilian service 
to be provided to those refusing to carry out military service on the basis of religious, moral 
or ethical convictions.30S The recommendation by PACE was subsequently endorsed by the 
Committee ofMinisters in 1987.306 
Following the developments in the practice of the European Court discussed in the 
preceding chapter, there is now little doubt that the obligation to recognise in the domestic 
legal system a right to conscientious objection and to provide the possibility of alternative 
civilian service is now a legally binding obligation for all Council of Europe Member States. 
The obligation in question has been clearly set out in the Bayatyan case, where the 
Grand Chamber emphasised Annenia's obligation to recognise the right to conscientious 
objection by law and the obligation to provide a genuinely civilian alternative service for 
those exempted from military service on grounds of conscience as a commitment undertaken 
by the Annenian authorities upon accession to the Council ofEurope.307 
(' 
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(b) The prohibition of crlmina.lization 
With regard to the corollary prohibition of criminalization of conscientious objectors, 
at the UN level, the Commission on Human Rights emphasised in many of its resolutions 
adopted since 1993 that States are required to abstain from subjecting conscientious objectors 
to imprisonment and repeated punishment for their failure to perfonn military service.308 
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Similarly, in relation to repeated convictions on the basis of a person's refusal to accept 
military service on conscientious grounds, the Human Rights Committee emphasised in 
General Comment No 32 that 'repeated punishment of conscientious objectors for not having 
305 PACE Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46). 
306 CoM Recommendation No.R (87) 8 (above n 194). 
307 Bayatyan v. Armenia (above n 238), para 115: 'It is true that there would appear to be an inconsistency 
between the above domestic provisions and the commitment undertaken by the Armenian authorities when 
joining the Council ofEurope to adopt a law on alternative service within three years of accession and, in the 
meantime, to pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms, allowing them instead, when the law 
had come into force, to perfonn alternative civilian service (see paragraph 50 above). The Court, however, does 
not find it necessary to resolve the apparent conflict between the domestic law and Armenia's international 
commitment. Nor does it find it necessary, in the present context, to rule on the alleged failure of the authorities 
to comply with the provisions ofthe ICCPR.' 
308 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/84, adopted on the 6ih meeting on10 March 1993, UN doc. 
E/CNAIRES/1993/84, para 5; reiterated in Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1995/83 on conscientious 
objection to military service, UN doc. E/CNA!RES11995/83, 8 March 1995, para 5. 
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obtained a reviewed order to serve in the military may amount to punishment for the same 
crime if such subsequent refusal is based on the same constant resolve grounded in reasons of 
conscience' ?09 This principle has more recently been reiterated by the Human Rights Council 
in its latest resolution on conscientious objection which calls upon States to consider 
releasing individuals imprisoned or detained solely on the basis of their conscientious 
objection to military service.310 The Council emphasised that: 
[ ... ] States should take the necessary measures to refrain from subjecting individuals 
to imprisonment solely on the basis of their conscientious objection to military service 
and to repeated punishment for refusing to perform military service.31! 
Within the Council of Europe, prior to the decision in Bayatyan, the European 
Commission had accepted that, since the Convention did not impose upon States a duty to 
recognise conscientious objection to military service, Contracting States were free to impose 
criminal sanctions on individuals who refused to undertake military service.312 In X v. 
Austria, a case concerning the imprisonment of a conscientious objector for his failure to 
undertake military service on the basis of his religious convictions against military service in 
the absence of a civilian alternative service at the time in Austria, the Commission held that: 
Art. 9, as qualified by Art. 4(3)(b) of the Convention, does not impose on a 
State the obligation to recognise conscientious objectors and, consequently, 
not to make special arrangements for the exercise of their right to freedom of 
conscience and religion as far as it affects their compulsory military service. It 
follows that these Articles do not prevent a State, which has not recognised 
conscientious objectors, from punishing those who refuse to do military 
service.313 
309 Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 32, Article 14, Right to equality before courts and tribunals 

and to fair trial, UN doc. CCPR/C/GC/3223, August 2007, para. 55. 

310 Human Rights Council, Resolution 2013/24 on conscientious objection to military service, adopted on 23 

September 2013 (twenty-fourth session), in particular, para. 10. 

311 Ibid. 
312 Autio v. Finland, App. no. 17086/90 (1991), DR 72 p. 245; Heudens v. Belgium, App no. 24630/94 
~~eported), EComHR, 22 May 1995, para 5; Xv. Austria, App. no. 5591172 (1973) 43 CD p. 161, para 1. 
o Ibid. para 1 
-
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It is important to note that, as discussed in more detail below,314 the reluctance of the 
Commission to fmd that criminalisation of the failure to undertake military service on 
grounds of conscience constituted, per se, a breach of the right to manifest one's religious or 
moral convictions, did not mean that any form of criminalisation of conscientious objection 
was deemed to be acceptable under the Convention. In this regard, the Court has found on a 
number of occasions in the past that criminalisation of conscientious objection could give rise 
to issues under different provisions of the Convention, particularly Article 6 protecting the 
right to a fair triae 15 and, in the most extreme cases of repeated punishment, Article 3 of the 
Convention which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment.316 
One crucial consequence of the long overdue recognition by the European Court of 
the fact that conscientious objection to military service attracts the protection of Article 9 
ECHR is the fact that the imposition of criminal sanctions for the refusal to perform military 
service on the ground of genuine conscientious objection is now to be regarded, in and of 
itself, as a violation of the individual's right to manifest his or her religious or moral beliefs. 
In particular, the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan v. Armenia pointed out that: '[ ...] the 
applicant's prosecution and conviction happened at a time when the Armenian authorities had 
already officially pledged, upon accession to the Council of Europe, to introduce alternative 
service within a specific period.'317 The Grand Chamber then went on to note that although 
the commitment not to convict conscientious objectors from 2000 when PACE adopted its 
Opinion No 221 on Armenia's application to join the Council of Europe until the new law on 
alternative service would come into force was not expressely set out in the Opinion of PACE; 
however such commitment had been implicit in the sentence' [ ... ] in the meantime, to pardon 
all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms [ ... ] allowing them instead [ ... ], when 
the law [ ... J had come into force [ ... ] to perform [ ... J alternative civilian service' contained 
in the Opinion in question.318 Therefore, according to the Grand Chamber, 
Such undertakings on the part of the Armenian authorities were indicative of a 
recognition that freedom of conscience can be expressed through opposition to 
military service and that it was necessary to deal with the issue by introducing 
alternative measures rather than penalising conscientious objectors. Hence, the 
314 See Section 4.2.1 (c) below. 

315 Savda v. Turkey (above n 298), para Ill, Ercep v. Turkey (above n 298), para 68. 

316 Olke v. Turkey, App no. 39437/98 (2006), reprinted in 48 E.H.R.R. 48; Tarhan v. Turkey, App. No. 9078/05, 

judgment of 17 July 2012; Femi Demirlas v. Turkey, App. No. 5260107, judgment of 17 January 2012. 

317 Bayatyan v. A/wenia [GC] (above n 238), para 127. 

318 Ibid, para. 127, citing PACE Opinion No. 221 (on which, see above ll. 241). 
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applicant's conviction for conscientious objection was in direct conflict with 
the official policy of reform and legislative changes being implemented in 
Armenia at the material time in pursuance of its international commitment and 
cannot be said, in such circumstances, to have been prompted by a pressing 
. 1 d 319SOCIa nee. 
Several judgments adopted by the Court in the years since the Bayatyan judgement 
further elucidate the scope of the prohibition of criminalization which may similarly attract 
the protection ofArticle 9 ECHR.320 
In Ercep v. Turkey, the Court has demonstrated in clear terms the link between the 
criminalisation of conscientious objection and the freedom to manifest one's belief under 
Article 9. In Ercep, which concerns the repeated imprisonment of a Jehovah's Witness 
conscientious objector in Turkey, the Court stated that it 
[ ... ] haCd] no doubt that the successive sentences that the applicant has been 
subject to and the perpetual risk of criminal prosecution to which he had been 
exposed for refusing to perform military service because of his convictions 
amounted to an interference with the exercise of his freedom to manifest his 
religion as guaranteed by Article 9. 321 
Similarly, in Demirtas v. Turkey, another case concerning the repeated imprisonment 
of a conscientious objector (Jehovah's Witness), the Court in finding a violation of Article 9 
ECHR, reiterated its position regarding the link between criminalisation and Article 9ECHR 
and emphasised that the imposition of heavy penalties to conscientious objectors in light of 
the absence of a legal framework regulating alternative service had resulted, inter alia, to a 
violation of Article 9 ECHR. 322 
Finally, in June 2012, the European Court delivered its judgment in Savda v 
Turkey.323 In this case, the applicant, a non religious pacifist and anti-militarist, had been 
imprisoned on many occasions due to his refusal to perform military service. After serving 
319 Ibid, para. 127. 

320 Bukharatyan v. Annenia (above n 298); Tsaturyan v. Armenia (above n 298). 
3~~ Ereep v. Turkey (above n 298), para 49. 

:~.: Femi Demirtas v. Turkey (above n 298), para 111. 
.,~l Savda v. Turkey (above n. 298). 
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his first prison sentence, he was released and subsequently taken to a regiment where he 
again refused to perform military service. Overall, he was tried for desertion on four 
occasions. Before the Court, the applicant argued, inter alia, that his repeated convictions on 
the basis of his conscientious objection had violated Article 9 of the Convention.324 Finding a 
violation of Article 9 ECHR, the Court reiterated its views in Ercep and Demirtas, and held 
that the State had failed to respect its positive obligation to provide an accessible and 
effective procedure for examining requests for conscientious objectors status, therefore in the 
absence of a system providing for exemptions from military service on grounds of 
conscience, the State could not be said to had struck a fair balance between the interests of 
society as a whole and those of conscientious objectors.325 As these cases demonstrate, the 
fact that the absence of a legal framework on alternative service and subsequently the 
criminalisation of acts related to objections to military service on grounds of conscience will 
result to a breach of Article 9 ECHR. 
c· 
..1 
....In addition, in cases concerning the refusal of the State to effectively recognise 	 .
0«<1 
, 
Ir' 
,..
conscientious objection to military service, the right to a fair trial may also be at stake. As far '~'rI:. 
as the right to a fair trial is concerned (after lodging an appeal to a decision of fITst instance), 
in 2006, PACE recognised that members of the armed forces must enjoy the right to legal 
protection in the event of violation of their rights, the right to freedom and safety, and the 
"" .~.right to a fair trial by independent tribunals, as well as the right to appeal. 326 ,~. 
~: 
:'II: 
',,",The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is quite clear that the right 	 of< 
:~' 
to a fair trial as protected by Article 6 of the Convention may be violated by a Contracting 	 .•,... . 
FState when a civilian is brought for trial before a military tribunal.327 It is also clear that a 

violation of Article 6 will result in cases where an applicant has been forcibly incorporated 

into a military regiment and then tried repeatedly by a military court for persistent 

disobedience, i.e. successive incidents resulting from re-issuing calls for incorporation into 

the armed forces despite the applicant's declared conscientious objections to military 

service.328 
As stated in other sections of this chapter, the consequences of the decision in 

Bayatyan v. Armenia have been far-reaching as it opened up the possibility of applying legal 

324 Ibid, para 86. 

325 Ibid, paras 98-100. 

326 Recommendation 1742 (2006) (above n 211) para 10.1.4. 

327 Savda v. Turkey (above n 298), para 104. 

328 Ibid. See also Femi Demirtas v. Turkey (above n 298). 
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principles in cases concerning conscientious objection to military service. Since 
conscientious objection to military service has been recognised as a right protected under 
Article 9 ECRR, States are now expected to provide an effective legal remedy under 
domestic law for alleged violations of the right to conscientious objection. The European 
Court of Ruman Rights in Savda v. Turkey found that a system which provided for no 
alternative service or any effective and accessible procedure by which the person concerned 
was able to have examined the question of whether he could benefit from the right to 
conscientious objection failed to strike the proper balance between the general interest of 
society and that of conscientious objectors.329 The right to an effective remedy entails that the 
Contracting State is under an obligation to provide an effective remedy to address the 
inflicted wrong.330 This includes, inter alia, that a judicial mechanism is in place to appeal a 
decision in cases, for example, where conscientious objectors' status is denied to an applicant 
at first instance by an administrative body mandated to determine whether a claim of 
conscientious objection is recognised as genuine. Depending on the circumstances of each 
case, Article 13 protecting the right to an effective remedy may be read in conjunction with 
Article 6(1) ECHR which guarantees the right to a fair trial or with other provisions. For 
example when a conscientious objector is tried for desertion or draft evasion before a tribunal 
comprising of military officers and is subject to military discipline, such treatment would be 
incompatible with the principle ofjudicial independence and therefore in violation of Article 
6(1) ECRR. The right to appeal a decision in criminal matters is further safeguarded by 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.331 
(c) Repeated convictions of conscientious objectors as violations of the ne his in idem 
principle an.d of the prohibition of ill-treatment 
Quite apart from the (now settled) question of whether prosecution and conviction of 
conscientious objectors for the mere fact of their refusal to serve in the armed forces amounts 
329 Savda v. Turkey (above n 298), para 100. 
330 See Article 13 ECRR. 'Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.' The right to an appeal is protected by Article 2 ofProtocol No.7 to the 

ECHR (ETS No. 117), entry into force 1 November 1988. 

331 Article 2 of Protocol No.7 to the ECHR provides: 'Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal 

shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise ofthis right, 

including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law. This right may be subject to 

exceptions in regard to offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the person 

concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against 

acquittal. ' 
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in and ofitselfto a breach of the right to manifest one's beliefs, the case law of the Court and 
of various UN hmnan rights bodies clearly indicates that the repeated conviction of 
conscientious objectors may amount to a violation of the principle of ne bis in idem332 and, in 
certain circmnstances, of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. 
In 1999, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, finding Turkey to be in 
violation of the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 14 (7) of the ICCPR due to the 
repeated imprisonment of Mr. Savda for his successive refusal to wear a military uniform, 
recommended that detention of conscientious objectors must be considered arbitrary if each 
subsequent refusal to obey a summons to perform military service is regarded as giving rise 
to a fresh conviction.333 In 2007, the Hmnan Rights Committee in General Comment No. 32 
on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, emphasised that 
'repeated punishment of conscientious objectors for not having obeyed a renewed order to 
serve in the military may amount to punishment for the same crime if such subsequent refusal 

..'" 
is based on the same constant resolve grounded in reasons of conscience' .334 This means that 'I 
If '••' '''ll'''~i;the repeated trial or punishment of conscientious objectors that have not been recognised by i;~r I~::I
:t .t~.~ 
law would breach Article 14(7) ICCPR which prohibits the repeated punishment of '. ""il~~.I~:~~ 
C:::ltindividuals for an offence for which they have been finally acquitted. 
'·1,'''''1 
'"'iI'''ll;tfil~:'!iThe Strasbourg case law on this pre-dates the Grand Chamber decision in Bayatyan. One ~:~::~! 
*'1'"111lj1~4~)j~~~of the most relevant cases in this regard is that of alke v. Turkey, concerning the repeated t.1~~~~'~
::;:::14 
"tbt1,lja~~ 
1"l!".II~" .conviction of the applicant for 'persistent disobedience' as a result of his refusal to perform :'. ~'::1~ ::l:~:~: 
I<!>~~ • .II~ pmilitary service on the basis of his pacifist convictions.335 As a result of the multiple ::11:::i 
r\I~'!li
sentences he received, eight of which concerned his refusal to wear a military uniform, he 
was forced to break all contact with the authorities and live in hiding. Before the Court, he 
332 The ne bis in idem principle is widely recognised in most domestic legal systems and in all human rights 

treaties ofa general scope: see, e.g., Article 14(7) ICCPR; Article 4 of Protocol No.7 to the European 

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), E.T.S No 117, entered into 

force 1 November 1988; Article 19(5) African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1982), 1520 V.N.T.S. 

217, entered into force 21 October 1986; Article 8(4) American Convention on Human Rights (1969),1144 

V.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 18 July 1978. See also Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 32, 

(above n 309), para IX: 'Repeated punishment of conscientious objectors for not having obeyed a renewed order 

to serve in the military may amount to punishment for the same crime if such subsequent refusal is based on the 

same constant resolve grounded in reasons of conscience'. The ne bis in idem principle is generally regarded as 

one of the most essential aspects of the right to a fair trial. For commentary, see G. Conway, 'Ne bis in idem in 

intemationallaw', International Criminal Law Review, vol. 3(2003), p. 217; M. Bohlander, 'Ne bis in idem', in 

C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 541. 

333 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 3611999 (Turkey), UN doc. 

E/CNAI2001114/Add.l , para 8. 

334 General Comment No. 32 (above n. 309), para 55. 

335 Ulke v. Turkey, App no. 39437/98 (2006), reprinted in 48 E.H.R.R. 48, para 60. 
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alleged that the series of actions against him and the failure of the authorities to recognise 
him as a pacifist conscientious objector had breached Articles 3, 5, 8 and 9 of the 
Convention. 
The Turkish Government argued that the right of conscientious objection was not 
recognised by the Convention and that domestic legislation in Turkey did not pennit any 
exception to the duty to perform military service on grounds of conscience. 336 The Court, 
deciding to examine the case under Article 3 ECHR, held that the applicant's successive 
convictions and the continuing liability to prosecution that he faced for refusing to wear 
uniform on account of his philosophical beliefs had certainly placed him in a situation of 
humiliation or debasement.337 The measures taken by the authorities were held to be 
disproportionate and illegitimate as they 'repressed the applicant's intellectual personality, 
subjecting him to feelings of fear, anguish and vulnerability capable of humiliating and 
debasing him and breaking his resistance and will'. 338 Further to this, the Court noted: 
[...Jthere is no specific provision in Turkish law governing penalties for those 
who refuse to wear uniform on grounds of conscience or religion. It seems that 
the relevant applicable rules are provisions of the Military Penal Code which 
classify as an offence any refusal to obey the orders of a superior officer. That 
legal framework is evidently not sufficient to provide an appropriate means of 
dealing with situations arising from the refusal to perform military service on 
account of one's beliefs. Because of the unsuitable nature of the general 
legislation applied to his situation the applicant ran, and still runs, the risk of an 
interminable series of prosecutions and criminal convictions. 339 
In Savda v. Turkey, already discussed above, the Court found a violation of Article 6(1) 
due to the fact that the applicant had been tried and convicted several times by a military 
tribunal. In this regard, the applicant had argued that the military court that sentenced him in 
all previous occasions could not have been regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal. 
The Court accepted that the applicant was still a civilian and not a soldier incorporated into a 
regiment, since he refused to perform military service and wear the military uniform. 34o It 
336 Ibid, para. 51. 

337 Ibid, para.59. 

338 Ibid.. para 62. 

339 Ibid, para 6l. 

340 Ibid, para 100. 
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recognized that the applicant must have been naturally concerned over his trial before a panel 
of military judges and remained concerned over the views of the judges,341 particularly in 
light of his alleged links to the PKK. The Court decided that the doubtful impartiality and 
lack of independence of the military tribunal which had sentenced the applicant gave rise to a 
violation of Article 6(1) ECHR.342 
Moving to the UN context, it is interesting to note that the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention had also previously considered the case of Mr Savda in 2008, finding 
that the second conviction imposed on Mr Savda had been 'arbitrary [ ... ] and incompatible 
with the principle of double jeopardy or ne bis in idem', thus violating Article 14(7) of the 
ICCPR.343 
The UN Human Rights Committee stated in General Comment No. 32 that the 
principle ne bis in idem, as enunciated in Article 14(7) ICCPR, applies to both civilian and 
t __1MtltlOIr 
military tribunals. Member States, therefore, need to ensure that their practice is consistent 	 ;'lI:~I:;:III I. It, " 
:9"'lijiL ;:
with standards of justice and should not be compromised because of the special (military or 	 "'U:"I'".,.... ,' ~;lIk~ I
other) character of a tribunal. 344 	 ,~.' .,1', 
... ""'1' ..~ 
'6iI'.1;:,"~
With specific regard to criminal prosecution of conscientious objectors, the UN r:::::2n 
'··W"i! 

Commission on Human Rights has emphasised in many of its resolutions that States are '""N""::II

:ti.!i:'11 

required to abstain from subjecting individuals who refuse to perform military service on ::::.::j.

....,I'm 
;::: !.:.'grounds of conscience to repeated punishment. 345 Similarly, in its latest resolution on ··;I=~:li!····w:.::t••,conscientious objection, the Human Rights Council emphasised that: I::"~ fllitl f :'l:::;~
.- ...."... 
:1I:·:1~ i[...] repeated punishment of conscientious objectors for refusing a renewed order to 1"'~~'11' 
serve in the military may amount to punishment in breach of the legal principle ne his 

in idem.346 

341 Ibid, para 102. 
342 Ibid, para Ill. 

343 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 16/2008 (Turkey), 9 May 2008, para 39. 

344 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 (above n 309), para 22. 

345 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/84, adopted on the 67th meeting onlO March 1993, UN doc. 

E/CN.4IRES/1993/84, para 5; reiterated in Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1995/83 (above n 308), 

paraS. 

346 Human Rights Council, Resolution 20l3/24 on conscientious objection to military service, adopted on 23 

September 2013 (twenty-fourth session), para. 11. See previously, along the same lines, UN Commission on 

Human Rights, resolutions 1993/84 and 1995/83 cited above. 
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In addition to the violation of Article 6(1), the Court in Savda v. Turkey also found a 
violation of the prohibition of degrading treatment or punishments contained in Article 3 
ECHR, on the basis that: 
[ ... ] taken as a whole, and given the severity and repetitive nature of 
punishment, the applicant's treatment resulted to severe pain and suffering, 
which exceeded the usual element of humiliation inherent in any criminal 
conviction or detention. 347 
(d) Additional implications and discriminatory treatment 
The denial of certain rights or access to employment in the public sector to persons that 
have failed to perform military service due to their conscientious objection to military service 
is an issue that has drawn the attention of the Human Rights Committee as seen in its early 
attempts to formulate some minimum guarantees protecting conscientious objectors from 
being treated unfairly. In General Comment No. 22 the Human Rights Committee noted that 
'there should be no discrimination against conscientious objectors because they have failed to 
perform military service' .348 This was elucidated by the Commission on Human Rights in 
2006, where the Special Rapporteur noted that there should be no discrimination in law or 
practice because this would be contrary to the Human Rights Committee's requirement of 
non-discrimmation against those who fail to undertake military service349 as reflected in 
paragraph 11 ofGeneral Comment No. 22.350 
If a conviction for draft evasion (in the absence of legislation providing for alternative 
civilian service for conscientious objectors) poses a barrier to the enjoyment of other 
substantive Convention rights (such as the prohibition of discrimination), then a valid claim 
for 'indirect discrimination' could be brought before the European Court to challenge 
whether a State has failed to take into account the material differences between significantly 
different and unrelated situations (such as a criminal conviction for an something that is no 
347 Savda v. Turkey (above n 298), paras 84-85. 
84. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour estime que, pris dans leur ensemble et compte tenu de leur gravite 
et de leur caractere repetitif, les traitements infliges au requerant ont provoque des douleurs et 
souffrances graves, qui depassaient l'element habitueI d'humiIiation inherent it une condamnation 
penale ou it une detention. Des lors, i1 y a lieu de considerer l'ensemble de ces actes comme des 
traitements degradants au sens de l'article 3 de la Convention. 
85. A la lumiere de ce qui precede, la Cour conclut qu'i1 y a eu violation de I'article 3 de la 
Convention. 

348 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1995/83 (above n 308), 

349 UN doc. E/CNA12006151 (above n 120) para 60. 

350 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (above n 137). 
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longer a criminal offence). The failure of domestic authorities to make a distinction between 
serious criminal convictions and draft evasion occurring as a result of the lack of legislation 
on alternative civilian service is a question that was considered by the European Court in the 
case of Thlimmenos v. Greece.351 In this case the Court was called to assess whether 
differential treatment had any detrimental effect to the applicant or to the enjoyment of the 
principle ofreligious freedom. 
The case, decided by the Grand Chamber in 2000, examines the failure of the 
authorities to distinguish the applicant's conviction for having evaded military service due to 
his religious convictions as a Jehovah's Witness from those criminally convicted for other 
serious criminal offences. Because of his pacifist beliefs the applicant refused to wear a 
military uniform and was therefore convicted of insubordination by a military tribunal and 
sentenced to four years imprisonment in 1983. In 1998, the claimant sat a public examination 
for entry to the profession of chartered accountancy but the board refused him admission due 
to his previous conviction under the applicable military legislation in Greece. He submitted 
an application arguing, inter alia, that he had been subject to discriminatory treatment due to 
his conviction as a conscientious objector, which had been regarded as a criminal offence at 
the time. On that basis, he complained that the Greek authorities had failed to distinguish 
between persons with convictions due to their religious beliefs and those with convictions for 
other offences and that this constituted a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 
of the Convention. 
The Commission had initially opined that the Convention did not give conscientious 
objectors the right to exemption from military service, but left each Contracting State to 
decide whether or not to grant such a right, as stipulated by the 'margin of appreciation' 
doctrine. The dissenting Commissioners recognised that the freedom to manifest the well­
known religious conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses by refraining from personal military 
service, is a freedom which attracts the guarantees of Article 9 (1), subject to the provisions 
ofArticle 9 (2).352 
The Grand Chamber did not find it necessary to examine whether the applicant's 
conviction was in violation of Article 9 taken alone.353 However, it unanimously held that 
351 Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC] (above n 235), para 44. 

352 Thlimmenos v. Greece, App. no. 34369197 (2000), report of the Commission, adopted on 4 December 1998, 

partially dissenting opinion of Mr. C.L. Rozakis, Mrs J. Liddy and !\11M B. Marxer, M.A. Nowicki, B. Conforti 

and N. Bratza, para 10. 

353 Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC] (above n 235). 
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there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, since the applicant's 
exclusion from the profession of chartered accountants did not pursue a 'legitimate aim' .354 
The need for an objective and reasonable justification for differential treatment was strongly 
emphasised by the COurt355 which noted that 'unlike other convictions for serious criminal 
offences, a conviction for refusing on religious or philosophical grounds to wear the military 
uniform cannot imply any dishonesty or moral turpitude likely to undermine the offender'S 
ability to exercise this profession' .356 
4.2.2. Practice 
With regard to the adoption of legislation providing for a right to conscientious 
objection and setting out the option of alternative service, there have been several phases in 
the recognition of conscientious objection in Europe. The United Kingdom was the first 
country to recognise the right to conscientious objection to military service in 1916 during 
World War 1.357 In March 1922, the Norwegian Parliament amended the national Military 
Penal Code to exempt from punishment those who refused conscription for serious religious 
convictions or other serious grounds of conscience.358 The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
amended its Constitution in 1922 to authorise the exemption of those who had serious 
conscientious objections to military service. In July 1923, the Dutch Parliament adopted the 
Law on Refusal of Military service which came into force on 1 June 1924.359 Finland adopted 
its Alternative Service Law on 4 June 1931.360 The Federal Republic of Gerrnany amended its 
Constitution in 1949, making the right to conscientious objection to military service a 
354 Ibid, para 47. 

355 Ibid. para 44 'The Court has so far considered that the right under Article 14 not to be discriminated against 

in the enjoyment ofthe rights guaranteed under the Convention is violated when States treat differently persons 

in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification. However, the Court 

considers that this is not the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14. The right not to be 

discrirninated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when 

States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 

significantly different'. 

356 Ibid, nara 48. 

35-Milit~ryServiceAct 1916 (5 GEO 5 c 104) and Military Service Act (2) 1916 (5 GEO 5 c 104). 

358 On the same day, the Norwegian Parliament adopted the Civilian Conscript Worker's Law, which created the 

legal framework for the regulation of alternative civilian service in the country. See N. P. Gleditsch and N. 1. 

Agoy. 'Norway: Toward Full Freedom of Choice?', in Ch. C. Moskos and J. Whiteclay Chambers II (eds), The 

Sew Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 116. 

359 J.G. van de Vijver, 'Appendix E: The Netherlands' in Ch. C. Moskos and J. Whiteclay Chambers II (eds.), 

!he New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 220. 

,6() War Resisters' International, Conscientious Objection in Finland, Newsletter of War Resisters' International 

No. 64, November 2004, <http://v.'Ii-irg.org/systemlfiles/public _files/pfp04-en.pdf> accessed on 22 April 2012. 
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fundamental right under the German Constitution.361 By the end of World War II, most 
European States had recognised the right in their domestic laws.362 
Armenia, Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro were the last Member States of the Council 
of Europe to effectively recognise the right to conscientious objection to military service in 
their domestic legal systems, by adopting relevant legislation on alternative service in 2002 
(Latvia), and 2003 (Armenia, Serbia and Montenegro).363 The universal recognition of the 
right to conscientious objection has been accompanied by a change in the nature of the armed 
forces, with the abolition of conscription in many States and the professionalisation and use 
of all-volunteer armies. 
As the following table demonstrates, national military service ('conscription') is 
currently in place in fifteen Member States of the Council of Europe/64 while twenty-seven 
361 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution], Art. 4(3) (Federal Republic of Germany) 
<http://www.servat.unibe.chlicl/gmOOOOO_.html>accessed on 22 April 2012. The direct legal effect ofthis 
constitutional amendment was that under German constitutional law, the right of conscientious objection 
immediately took priority over the principle of customary military service. See J. Kuhlmann and E. Lippert, 
'The Federal Republic of Germany: Conscientious Objection as Social Welfare', in Ch. C. Moskos and J. 
Whiteclay Chambers II (eds.), The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 98. 
362 See Table 1 below. 
363 Republic ofLatvia, Alternative Service Law of 2002, adopted on 30 May 2002, entered into force on 1 July 
2002; Republic of Armenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, amended in 2004, 
2006 and 2013 [in Armenian] English translation on file with the author; Serbia and Montenegro, Regulation on 
Civilian Service (3712003) adopted on 25 August 2003 and entered into force on 14 October 2003. 
364 Armenia, Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted on 5 July 1995, Article 47. Military service is 
regulated by the Military Liability Act, entered into force on 16 October 1998, section 11; Austria, Austrian 
Constitution, adopted on 1 October 1920, Article 9(a)(3). Military service is regulated by the 2001 Defence Act 
and Regulations (Wehrgesetz) available at 
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung. wxe? Abfrage= Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer= 10005603> 
accessed 7-9-13. On the 20 January 2013 Austrians voted, by popular vote (referendum), in favour ofretaining 
compulsory military service in the country. See. BBC News, 'Austrians vote to keep compulsory military 
service' <http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/world-europe-21110431>accessed on 23 January 2013; Azerbaijan, 
Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted on 12 November 1995, Article 18. Military service is 
regulated by the Law on Military Duty and Military Service, Law no. 274-IVQ of 23 December 2011; Cyprus, 
Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, adopted on 16 August 1960, Article 129. Military Service is regulated 
by the National Guard Law of 2011, Law No. 19(1)/2011, Official Gazette of the Republic No. 4271(1),25 
February 2011, Article 47(3)(c); Denmark, Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark, adopted on 5 June 1953, 
Section 81. Military Service regulated by the National Service Law of 2006, Order of the Conscription Act, 
Consolidation Act No. 225 of 13/03/2006; Estonia, Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, adopted on 28 June 
1992, Article 124. Military Service is regulated by the Defence Forces Service Act 2000 (RT I 2000,28, 167; 
consolidated text RT I 2003,31, 195), entered into force 16 April 2000; Georgia, Constitution of the Republic 
of Georgia, entered into force on 17 October 1995, Article 101. Military Service is regulated by the Law on 
Military Duty and Military Service, Law no 86011997, adopted on 17 September 1997; Greece, Constitution of 
the Hellenic Republic, adopted on 11 June 1975, Article 4(6). Military Service is regulated Law 3421/2005, 
Conscription of the Greeks and other provisions, Decision Folder No. 302/A'/J3.12.2005, published in the 
Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic No.302, 13 December 2005; Finland, Constitution ofthe Grand 
Duchy of Finland, adopted on 11 June 1999, Article 127. Military Service is regulated by the Military Service 
Act, Law no 1442, entered into force 28 December 2007; Moldova, Constitution ofthe Republic ofMoldova, 
adopted on 29 July 1994, Article 57. Military Service is regulated by Law No.1245-XV on the Preparation of 
Citizens for Homeland Defence, adopted on 18 July 2002; Norway, Constitution ofthe Kingdom ofNorway, 
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Member States are now operating fully professional armies. Out of the fifteen States which 
retain national military service; fourteen recognise a right of exemption from military service 
on ground of conscience.365 
adopted on 16 May 1814, Article 109. Military Service is regulated by the General Compulsory Service Act, 
Law no 29/1953; Russian Federation, Constitution ofthe Russian Federation, adopted on 12 December 1993, 
Article 59. Military Service is regulated by the 1998 Law on Conscription Obligation and Military Service, 
Federal Law No. 53 entered into force on 28 March 1998, lastly amended on 15 May 2013; Switzerland, 
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, adopted on 18 Apri11999, Article 59(1). Military Service is 
regulated by the 1995 Federal Law on the Armed Forces and Military Administration (MG) of3 February 1995 
last amended on 23 December 2011 (with effect from 1 November 2012) and the 2002 Ordinance on 
Recruitment of Conscripts (VREK) of 10 April20021ast amended by Ordinance No. 14.5 of9 November 2011 
(with effect from 1 January 2012); Turkey, Constitution of the Republic ofTurkey, adopted on 20 April 1924, 
Article 72. Military Service is regulated by Law No. 1111, Military Law [Turkey], adopted on 20 March 1927 
and amended by Law No.3802 entered into force on 21 May 1992; Ukraine, Constitution ofUkraine, adopted 
on 8 December 2004, amended by the Law no 2222-IV of 8 December 2004 and 2951-VI of 1 February 2011, 
Article 65. Military Service is regulated by the 1999 Law on Military Duty and Military Service, Law No. 2232­
XII, entered into force on 25 March 1992. 
365 The legal framework regulating the right to conscientious objection to military service in these Member 
States is discussed below in sections 4.3.2,4.4.2.2,4.4.3.2, 4.5.1.2,4.5.2.2 and 4.5.3.2. 
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Table 1 - Overview of the current situation In the Council of Europe 
1 
Council of Europe Member I Type of armed forces 
State 
Conscription 
Albania 
2 I Andorra 
3 Armenia 
Austria 
4 
5 Azerbaijan 
6 Belgium ~.. ~ 
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina ~I""" 
8 Bulgaria 
9 Croatia 
10 Cyprus 
11 Czech Republic 
12 Denmark 
Fully Professional 
' .. ~..:., It. - ...­ lII-S 
13 Estonia 
_ : .··1 
14 Finland 
~. 
National legislation recognising a right of conscientious objection: 
For conscripts Since For professional I Since 
members of the 
armed forces 
n/ a 1998 n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1995 iMP n/a 
n/ a 1962 'I!e n/a 
n/ a 1996 I n/a 
n/a n/a 
n/ a 1990 n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
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15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Council of Europe Member I Type of armed forces 
State 
Conscription 
Former Yugoslavian 
Republic of Macedonia 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
luxembourg 
Malta 
Moldova 
Monaco 
National legislation recognising a right of conscientious objection: 
Fully Professional For conscripts Since For professional I Since 
members of the 
armed forces 
nla 
n/a 
n/a 
1949 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
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Council of Europe Member I Type of armed forces 
State 
National legislation recognising a right of conscientious obJection: 
· _ ____ -'-~I_ _ I......I C.lnra 
130 1Monaco 
87 

31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Council of Europ.e Member I Type of armed forces 
state 
Conscription 
Montenegro 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
San Marino 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
National legislation recognising a right of conscient ious obJect ion: 
Fully Professional For conscripts Since For professional I Since 
members of the 
armed forces 
nfa 
1994 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
nfa 
1995 
nfa 
nfa 
1916 
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Despite the fonnal recognition of the right to conscientious objection to military 
service by almost in the totality of the Council of Europe Member States which retain 
conscription, in many cases effective legal and practical rights and guarantees have been 
introduced several years after the initial recognition of a right to exemption from military 
service in domestic law. 
A clear example in this regard is provided by Albania, where the possibility for 
conscientious objectors to be exempted from military service and be assigned to alternative 
service was first recognized in the 1998 Constitution.366 Despite the constitutional recognition 
of the right to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience, legislation 
regulating alternative service was only introduced in 2003 367 meaning that alternative service 
remained unregulated for five years, a substantially long period of uncertainty. Despite the 
introduction of legislation in 2003, the domestic legal framework concerning conscientious 
objection and alternative service in many aspects failed to comply with international 
standards,368 since it remained unclear, for instance, whether substitute service was available 
outside the armed forces or whether the work undertaken by conscientious objectors was of a 
civil character and served the wider community.369 None of these problems were resolved 
while conscription was in place, however in 2009 Albania was admitted into NATO, with the 
requirement that it abolishes mandatory military service; thus, on 13 August 2008 the 
Albanian Parliament had passed a law with effect from 1 January 2010 by which the anny 
had become fully-professiona1. 37o 
With regards to structural and systemic deficiencies in domestic legislation, the case 
of Azerbaijan, where military service is still compulsory, also raises some important issues. 
Article 76(2) of the 1995 Constitution states that' if the beliefs of citizens come into conflict 
366 Constitution of the Republic ofAlbania [Kushtetuta E RepubUkes Se Shqipeise], text adopted by popular 
referendum on 28 November 1998 and amended on 13 January 2007, translated by OSCE -Albania 
<http://www.osce.orgialbaniaJ41888> accessed on 14-12-12. Article 166(2) provides that 'the citizen, who for 
reasons of conscience refuses to serve with weapons in the armed forces, is obliged to perform an altemati ve 
service, as provided by law'. 
367 Law no. 9047 on the military service in the Republic of Albania, entered into force on 7 April 2003, cited in 
UN doc. CCPRJC/ALB!2004!l, para 58l. 
368 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Article 40 ofthe 
Covenant: Initial report Albania, UN doc. CCPRlC! ALB/2004/l, 16 February 2004, paras 580-581. 
369 For discussion, see M. Stolwijk, 'The Right to Conscientious Objection in Europe: A Review ofthe Current 
Situation' (Quaker Council ofEuropean Affairs, April 2005) available at <http://www.qcea.org/wp­
contentluploads!2011107!rprt-cocoe1-cover-en-apr-2005 .pdf> accessed on 16-9-12. 
370 International Fellowship for Reconciliation (IFOR) and Conscience and Peace Tax International (CPTI), 
Submission to the 108th Session of the Human Rights Committee on Albania (Military service, conscientious 
objection and related issues), revised on June 2013. 
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with service in the army, then in some cases alternative service may be designated instead of 
regular military service in accordance with domestic legislation,.371 This is also echoed in 
Article 3.3 the Law on Military Duty and Military Service according to which 'in accordance 
with Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, if the beliefs of citizens are 
in conflict with the obligation to perform military service, alternative service instead of 
regular military service is pennitted in accordance with legislation' .372 Further to this, the 
Law on Freedom of Religious Belief, as amended in 2011, stipulates in Article 4 that '[nJo 
one shall have the right to refuse or decline to fulfil obligations determined by the law for 
hislher religious beliefs' and that '[c ] hanging performing one duty by another for religious 
motives is permitted only in cases stipulated by the legislation of the Azerbaij an Republic' .373 
Commenting on the amendments to the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief, the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (hereinafter the 'Venice Commission'i14 
_''ilM'''''noted that, while Article 4 of that law opened up a possibility of alternative civilian service :1:"';;;:" .IDei! ~~ I~·~;;~I:~;:for conscientious objectors in Azerbaijan, the regulation of such alternative service was left to 	 UU.I!I6",,' 
" 
''''w·un: 
an unspecified law.375 It is worth noting that draft legislation on alternative service was put 
before the national Parliament in 1992, however this was never adopted.376 Since 2001, the 
"II{"'~.J~ 
Human Rights Committee has been noting that the domestic law did not contain a clear 	 :~~i~:~~ 

.•.~',..'.'.
«.,,1'provision regarding conscientious objection to military service and held that Azerbaijan 	 • ,,""il 
:~::::~~ 
"~'~;l'should ensure that persons liable for military service may claim the status of conscientious H.~tjtjJ~ 
:!t~~: j~ 
;'1!.I!~IIV
objector and perform alternative service without discrimination. 377 In 2009, the Committee 	
.:::!:1t:,.-:;1; 

again expressed its concerns over the lack of a legal provision regUlating the status of :l:::;­
II \Id 10M" " 
:lI:~:jj , 
ij ~trt~~~'conscientious objectors to military service and recommended the adoption of legislation 
371 Constitution ofthe Azerbaijan Republic, adopted on 12 November 1995, Article 76(2), available at 

<http://en.president.aziazerbaij an!constitutionl>accessed on 16-9-12. 

372 Republic of Azerbaijan, Law on Military Duty and Military Service, Law no 247 - IVQ, entered into force 

23 December 2011. 

373 Article 4(2) and (3), Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan 'On Freedom ofReligious Belief' (last amended 10 

October 1997), 20 August 1992, available at <http://www.refworld.orgldocid/47fdedc12.html> accessed on 7 

November 2013. 

374 The European Commission for Democracy throught Law, also referred to as 'Venice Commission', is an 

advisory body of the Council of Europe that advises the organisation on constitutional matters. It provides legal 

advice to the Council of Europe Member States and helps them to bring their legal and institutional standards in 

line with European and international standards in matters concerning democracy, the rule oflaw and human 

rights. For further discussion on the role and work of the Venice Commission see J. Jowell, 'The Venice 

Commission: disseminating democracy through law', Public Law, vol. 1 (2001), p.675. 

375 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Joint Opinion on the Law on Freedom ofReligious 

Beliefofthe Republic ofAzerbaijan, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 92nd Plenary Session (12-13 

October 2012), para 44. 

376 Alternative Service to the Citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Decree No 94 (Baku, 31 July 1992). 

377 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations ofthe Human Rights Committee: Azerbaijan, UN doc. 

CCPR/C0173!AZE, 12 November 2001, para 21. 
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exempting conscientious objectors from compulsory military service and providing for 
altemative civilian service of equivalent length.378 
It is therefore relatively clear that, despite the fonnal recognition of the possibility of 
exemption from military service for conscientious objectors in the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
the right to conscientious objection is still not practically accessible due to the lack of 
appropriate legislation on alternative service.379 Non-governmental organisations suggest that 
conscientious objectors are still persecuted in Azerbaijan, undennining any claim that the 
government respects the right to conscientious objection.38o 
In addition to the examples above, Armenia has been previously regarded as another 
problematic case in relation to the clarity of domestic legislation on conscientious objection 
and alternative service and the limited scope of the domestic legal provisions; in this regard, 
the Venice Commission in 2011 had made a number of recommendations to improve the 
domestic Law on alternative service, inter alia: 
To ensure that the majority of the Commission's members (the administrative 
body that determines the status of an application for exemption from military 
service on grounds of conscience) are civilians; 
To explicitly state that the military has no supervisory role in the day-to-day 
operational supervision of those who perform alternative service; 
To add a provision enabling transfer from military service to alternative 
servIce; 
[ ...].381 
378 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations ofthe Human Rights Committee: Azerbaijan, UN doc. 
CCPRIC/AZElCO/3, 13 August 2009, para 14. 
379 As of27 March 2013, no steps have been taken by the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan to 
implement legislation on alternative civilian service. See Human Rights Council, [Universal Periodic Review] 
Pre-briefing, Statement by International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IF OR, Mr. Derek Brett), 27 March 2013 
(16th Session) available at <http://www.upr-info.orgIIMG/pdflstatementjfor_azerbaijan.pdf.> accessed on 6 
September 2013. 
380 In September 2012, a district court sentenced a young Jehovah's Witness to one year in prison for his refusal 
to serve in the military on the basis of his beliefs. See. Amnesty International, Public Statement: Right to 
conscientious objection still not guaranteed in Europe, 14 May 2013 available at 
<http://www.amnesty.orglenllibrary/assetlEUR01/012/2013/enlba29d2d9-a6dO-48ff-af99­
b6ec0307bba7/eurOl0122013en.html> accessed on 6 September 2013. 
381 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Draft Law on 
Amendments and Additions to the Law on Alternative Service ofArmenia, Opinion no. 644/2011, Doc. No. 
CDL-AD(2011)051, 20 December 2011, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 89th Plenary Session 
(Venice, 16-17 December 2011), para 51. For further discussion on the problems noted by the Venice 
Commission on Armenian legislation see text below accompanying fn 491. 
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Most of the abovementioned issues were addressed in the latest amendment of the 
legislation which has been significantly improved.382 
Quite apart from the problems posed by sub-standard legislation, it is obvious that the 
absence of any legislation providing for exemptions from military service on grounds of 
conscience constitutes the most serious instance of violation of the obligation under Article 9 
ECHR to recognize conscientious objection by law. Turkey is currently the only Member 
State of the Council of Europe which has not adopted legislation on conscientious objection 
and alternative service. National military service is described in Article 72 of the Turkish 
Constitution as 'a right and duty for every Turkish citizen' .383 According to the same 
provision, 'the conditions in which such service shall be performed or deemed to have been 
performed in the armed forces or civil service shall be regulated by law'. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion held in 2000 that regional 
characteristics and tensions are not sufficient to justify, in Turkey or anywhere else, a 
categorical rejection of conscientious objections to military service.384 Despite these findings, 
the national authorities have persistently failed to initiate proceedings for the enactment of 
legislation on conscientious objection to military service up to the present date. 
Turkey has not yet enacted legislation on alternative service for conscientious 
objectors despite a plethora of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights finding 
such lack of legislation to constitute a violation of several provisions of the ECHR. 385 
In the 2006 case of Vlke v Turkey,386 the applicant was charged under Article 155 of 
the Turkish Criminal Code and Article 58 of the Military Penal Code for inciting conscripts 
to evade military service; he was also on several occasions, convicted under Article 87 of the 
Military Penal Code under the offence of 'persistent disobedience,387 as he continued to 
382 Republic of Armenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, last amended in May 2013 
(translation of the Law on file with the author). 
383 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, adopted in 7 November 1982. Provision translated by the European 
Court ofHuman Rights in Olke v. Turkey, App no. 39437/98 (2006), reprinted in 48 E.H.R.R. 48. 
384 UN General Assembly, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur ofthe Commission on Human Rights on the 
elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief (Addendum 1), UN doc. 
AJ551280/Add.l, 10 September 2000, para 139 (country visit to Turkey). 
385 Savda v. Turkey (above n 298); Ercep v. Turkey (above n 298). 
386 The case concerned a Turkish pacifist conscientious objector who had gone into hiding as a result of repeated 
prosecution and threat of imprisonment for his refusal to comply with military service. See Olke v. Turkey 
(above n 335). 
387 The criminalisation of acts described as 'persistent disobedience' has also been observed in other Member 
States ofthe Council of Europe in the past. In Albania, shortly before the adoption of the new Military Service 
Act, Jehovah's Witnesses were given prison sentences and then called again for military service which they 
again refused, resulting to an open-ended cycle ofprosecution. See PACE, 'Exercise ofthe right of 
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refuse to perfonn military service after his release from prison. The Court found that the legal 
framework in Turkey was not sufficiently construed as to prevent the continuing persecution 
of persons refusing to perfonn military service for reasons of conscience. Under those 
circumstances, the applicant was under the risk of indefinite and endless series of 
prosecutions. Given the severity and repetitive nature of the sanctions against the applicant, 
his treatment was said to have caused him severe pain and suffering which exceeded the 
common element ofhumiliation and degradation that is inherent in any criminal conviction or 
detention.388 
Due to the lack of a clear legal framework, conscientious objectors in Turkey are 
currently 'forced' to evade military service and put themselves at risk of criminal sanctions. 
As noted by the European Court in Vlke v. Turkey, their prosecution cycle amounts to 'civil 
death' because persons refusing military service are liable to prosecution for an unspecified 
I; period of time. In Ulke, the Court concluded that this measure was not compatible with the 
jj; 
character of a democratic society, the cycle of prosecution, sentence and imprisonment being 
never ending, unless the person decides to abandon their objection and perform military 
I" 
, ~ i' 
service. Emphasising the importance of the principle that a clear legal framework should have 
d;' been in place to prevent the repeated punishment of conscientious objectors, the Court held 
I'ii' that Ulke's detention since 28 January 1997 was arbitrary, since the non-observance of the 
Ii, 
principle of ne bis in idem was of such gravity to give rise to an arbitrary deprivation of !r 
liberty as spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.389 Nevertheless, having 
I:;: 
already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, it held that it was unnecessary to 
., 
1" examine separately the applicant's other compaints, inter alia, under Article 5. 
In addition to the European Court of Human Rights which has found similar 
violations in a number of recent cases,390 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has 
also repeatedly criticised the practice of Turkey to impose repeated detentive sentences on 
conscientious objection to military service in Council of Europe Member States' [Rapporteur: Mr. Marty 
(Switzerland)], Report Doc. 8809, 4 May 2001, p. 4. 
388 Olke v. Turkey (above n 335), para 83. 
389 Ibid, para. 11. 
390 In Femi Demirtas v. Turkey (17 January 2012) (above n 298), the Court found Turkey in violation of Articles 
3, 6 and 9 for forcibly incorporating the applicant into a regiment, repeatedly prosecuting and sentencing the 
applicant under the charge of 'persistent disobedience' without recognising him as conscientious objector and 
providing him with alternative service, while it also followed Ercep v Turkey (22 November 2011) (above n 
298) to find a violation of Article 6 for the applicant being prosecuted and convicted by a military tribunal. 
Furthermore, in Tarhan v. Turkey (17 July 2012) (above n 298), a case concerning a Turkish pacifist of Kurdish 
origin who refused to perform military service on grounds of conscience, the Court found violations of Articles 
3 and 9 of the Convention, as a result of Turkey's non recognition of the applicant's right to conscientious 
objection and the humiliating and degrading treatment the applicant had suffered while in custody after he 
openly declared his sexual orientation. 
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conscientious objectors. According to the Working Group, the repeated conviction of 
conscientious objectors for their refusal to perform military service, an offence according to 
Turkish law, constituted a violation of the principle of ne his in idem and, as a consequence, 
their detention was' arbitrary' as it was not based on a lawful sentence.391 
The repeated imprisonment of conscientious objectors in Turkey has further been 
investigated by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, while it has been identified as one of the most long­
standing issues in the execution of European Court of Human Rights judgments.392 Despite 
the indications given to the Committee of Ministers in March 2010 to provide concrete 
information on legislative amendments, it was noted by the Committee that no information 
had been forthcoming in response to the judgment of the Court in Ulke v. Turkey regarding 
the adoption of individual measures.393 
.,
The case of Ulke v Turkey demonstrates the failure of the State to implement a :1 
!! 
judgment that poses a duty to enact legislation on alternative service for conscientious II: 
objectors. The case is often quoted as a representative illustration of the non-implementation 
,~
., 
" 
of the Court's judgments by ECHR Contracting States and is regarded, in conjunction with 
the non-implementation of other Court rulings, as an important barrier to the country's 
~ I
accessions plans for EU membership.394 Turkey is one of the countries where problems with 
the execution of judgments of the ECtHR and persistent non-compliance are more usually 
" 
"experienced as a result of systemic deficiencies in domestic legislation, giving rise to ." 
Convention violations.395 The case has been on an enhanced supervision track by the 
Committee of Ministers, and up to this date, no concrete 'plan of action' has been received by 
the Committee despite a number of interim resolutions used in this process to track whether 
vital measures were adopted, including legislative amendments recognising the right of 
conscientious objection and ensuring that a genuine civilian alternative service is in place. 
391 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 3611999, Communication addressed to the Government 
on 24 July 1998 concerning Osman Murat Olke, para 10; UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
16/2008, Communication addressed to the Government on 20 Ju~v 2007 concerning Mr. Ha fiZ Savda, para 39. 
392 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
Implementation ofjudgments of the European Court ofHuman Rights (addendum), Doc. 12455, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Christos Pourgourides (EPP, Cyprus), 25 January 2011. 
393 Ibid, para 7.8. 
394 European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey, Doc. No. 
2011/2889 (RSP). 
395 PACE, Resolution 1787 (2011) on the implementation ofjudgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2011 (6th Sitting). In para 7.8 there is an explicit reference to the 
repeated imprisonment of Mr. O!ke and an acknowledgment that despite the efforts ofthe Committee of 
Ministers to put pressure on Turkey 'including three interim resolutions', the State party has not yet complied 
with the judgment of the ECtHR. 
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In 2007, the Committee of Ministers urged the Turkish authorities to take without 
further delay all necessary measures to put an end to the violation of the applicant's rights 
under the Convention and to adopt rapidly the legislative reform necessary to prevent similar 
violations of the Convention.396 More importantly, the Committee stressed the obligation of 
States under Article 46(1) of the Convention to abide by the judgments of the Court, 
including the adoption of individual measures putting an end to violations found well as 
general measures to prevent similar violations. It further noted that the Turkish authorities 
had declared the preparation of a draft law in 2007397 to be submitted to the Prime Minister's 
Office to prevent further violations of Article 3 as well as repetitive prosecutions and 
convictions for conscientious objectors on grounds of 'persistent disobedience' or military 
orders. The legislation if enacted, would have prevented the repeated prosecution of 
individuals convicted ofpersistent disobedience and would remedy all negative consequences 
for the applicant.398 Nevertheless, the applicant continued to be prosecuted and at the time the 
Ii' 
" 
" 
'" resolution was issued, he was facing a real threat of imprisonment of the basis of a previous 'iH 
conviction. The Committee took a pledge to examine the implementation of the judgment at 
each human rights meeting until the necessary measures were adopted. 
1(: In 2009, the Committee ofMinisters noted that the Turkish authorities had ignored the 
Ii:: 
P' earlier interim resolution of the Committee ofMinisters and instead of taking measures to put1::: 
an end to the violation of the applicant's right and to adopt the legislative reform necessary to 
!~;; 
;1: 
Ii, prevent similar violations, they summoned the applicant in July 2007 to serve his outstanding 
'" 

,::: 
sentence from a previous conviction.399 The Committee noted that, understandably, due to the
::: 
"" 
II 
,III situation, the applicant has been in hiding ever since. The Committee noted the obligation of 
member states to abide by the judgments of the Court and urged the Turkish authorities to 
provide the Conunittee with information concerning the adoption of the measures required by 
the judgment. 
A 2011 resolution invited Turkish authorities to give priority to the adoption of the 
necessary legislative measures without any further delay after the general elections of June 
396 CoM, Resolution CMlResDH(2007) 1 09 concerning the execution ofthejudgment ofthe European Court of 
Human Rights DIke against Turkey, adopted by the Committee ofMinisters on 17 October 2007. 
397 667th Meeting ofthe Committee ofMinisters (Human Rights) Session of 6 June 2007. 
398 Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers, Communication from the applicant's representative in the case of 
Olke against Turkey (Application No. 39437/98), DH-DD (2011) 600, 1120th DH meeting (13-14 September 
2011). 
399 CoM, Resolution CMlResDH(2009)45 concerning the execution of the judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights in 145 cases against the Russian Federation relative to the failure or serious delay in abiding by 
final domestic judicial decisions delivered against the State and its entities as well as the absence of an effective 
remedy, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 March 2009. 
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2011.400 Since then, the Committee of Ministers issued numerous interim resolutions in 
relation to the execution of the judgment in Ollce v Turkey. However, the Committee noted 
that the Turkish authorities had not demonstrated that the applicant was no longer sought by 
the authorities, nor it had provided any information on the content of the legislative measures 
envisaged.40J On the 3rd March 2011, the Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers was 
informed by the applicant's representative that an arrest warrant was pending against Murat 
Olke on account of his desertion and that in July of the same year the police had visited the 
applicant's home to enforce the arrest warrant. 402 
In June 2012, the authorities informed the Committee of Ministers that the arrest 
warrant for DIke had been lifted and consultations were ongoing among relevant authorities 
with the aim of identifying the general measures to execute the Olke judgment. The 
authorities provided a copy of the decision of the Eskiserur Military Court which lifted the 
arrest warrant and removed the applicant's name from the list of persons wanted by the 
:1: 
IU: 
police. Nonetheless, no measures had been taken to instigate legislative amendments 
"' '" 
preventing future violations of the Convention. The applicant's representative had submitted '·1 :~4 
"I
'" that the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defence made it clear that it was not on the ,r,1 
government's agenda to legalise conscientious objection, therefore resolving the case of DIke 
":1individually was a more preferable outcome.403 ::1 
,., 
'" ::1After several years of inaction from the Turkish authorities in implementing the 
• ~I 
'Ui
,, 
judgment, the domestic military court had lifted the arrest warrant against the applicant who Ok 
'" 
:~ 
was charged for desertion; nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers noted in June 2012 that :i
,, 
'whether the applicant is still subject to further prosecution or conviction and whether he can 
exercise rus civil rights without hindrance' was a question that remained unc1ear.404 No 
further information has been made available by the Committee of Ministers as to the 
implementation of the decisions in Ercep and Savda up to the present date, whereas the 
Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers pointed out that no concrete development took 
place until June 2012, noting that even though the arrest warrant for Oike was cancelled, he 
400 Resolution CMlDellDec(2011) 115 Deputies decision of 8th June 2011. 

401 CoM, Supervision ofthe execution ofjudgments and decisions ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights, 

Annual Report (2011), p.57. 

402 Secretariat ofthe Committee of Ministers, Communication from the applicant's representative in the case of 

alke against Turkey (Application No. 39437/98), DH-DD(2011) 600, 1120th DH meeting (13-14 September 

2011). 

403 CoM Secretariat, Communication/rom the applicant's representative in the case ofUlke against Turkey 

(Application No. 39437/98), DH-DD(2011)10n, 1128th DH meeting (November-December 2011). 

404 Decisions of the CoM concerning execution of the Olke v. Turkey judgment, 1144th (DH) meeting, 4-6 June 

2012, CMlDellDec(2012)1l44, 6 June 2012. 
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would still be liable for military service as his status as a deserter would remain 
unchanged.405 
The above issues have also been raised at ED leveL In a written question to the 
European Commission in 2007 concerning the renewal of sentences of conscientious 
objectors and their repeated prosecution, the European Commission responded that 
developments related to conscientious objection are reviewed as part of the accession 
negotiations with Turkey and with the Turkish government in the framework of the regular 
political dialogue.406 It was also argued emphatically that the European Commission monitors 
the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as part of the annual 
Commission progress reports, in line with the principles, priorities and conditions contained 
in the accession partnership with Turkey. 407 
Since 2012, two interesting developments took place in Turkey. In two recent 
decisions, domestic military courts ruled on the cases of two conscientious objectors, taking 
~ :1 
~ :1 into account the changing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights with regards !C1 
"" I;): to the right of conscientious objection as protected by Article 9 ECHR and placing emphasis 
Ill, 
on the superseding effect of international agreements (ECHR) over domestic laws.408 
!::; 
Although the decisions are not setting a legal precedent, they are useful in observing the 
I'" 
I": 
I'"~
't,. views of prosecutors with regards to different forms of religious conscientious objections to 
'11\ 
111\ 
\ ~h military service. 
'" :;:\ 
;:: The first decision concerns Muhammad Serdar Delice, an Islamist with nationalist 
in 
LII~ beliefs who had gone absent without leave and declared his conscientious objection after dl~ 
performing part of his military service. Although the case is currently pending before the 
High Court of Appeals, the recent decision of the Military Court provides an interesting 
insight into the scope of the right to conscientious objection in Turkey as it now begins to be 
conceptualised by domestic tribunals. Delice refused to join the armed forces on the basis that 
he had objections to joining a secular (non-Muslim) army. The Malatya Military Court 
decided that he was a not genuine conscientious objector. In adopting a rather theological 
assessment, the Court held that Delice belonged to 'Islam which is not a belief or ideological 
movement that rejects the performance of military service'; it thus assessed the case based on 
405 CoM Secretariat, Communication from the applicant's representative in the case ofGUre against Turkey 
(Application No. 39437/98), DH-DD(2012)545E, 1144th meeting DR (June 2012). 
406 Written question by Erik Meijer (GUEINGL) to the Commission, 1st August 2007. 
407 Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission, 6 September 2007. 
408 M. Yildirim, 'Turkey: Selective progress on conscientious objection' (Foruml8 News Service, 1 May 2012) 
<http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?artic1e_id=1696> accessed on 10 July 20l3. 
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the absence of a general religious convictionexpressed collectively by the religious society 
that the claimant was affiliated to (Islam), rather than his personal religious convictions. In 
providing an analysis of the decision, the lawyer HUlya O~pmar explained that according to 
the decision 'a person announcing to be a conscientious objector should be member of a 
group which is active in the field of conscientious objection' .409 Therefore, it is clear that the 
Military Court in its decision has restricted the applicability of the right only in cases 
concerning religious objections to military service to particular religious groups. In this 
regard, the Court held that 'persons who are members of the Jehovah's Witnesses reject 
military service, because they are part ofthis group or institution which fundamentally rejects 
military service' .410 Although the Military Court observed that a genuine conscientious 
objection on religious grounds may justify an exemption from military service, it is important 
to remember that the Court adopted this approach in the absence of legislation setting the 
scope of the right to conscientious objection. 
In the second decision, the Military Court of Isparta decided to acquit Jehovah's 
Witness conscientious objector Baris Gormez who had been charged thirteen times for 
disobeying orders with regards to his conscription into the armed forces and served four years 
in prison.41l According to the U.S. Department of State, Gormez had a case pending before 
the European Court of Human Rights regarding the State's refusal to recognise him as a 
conscientious objector.412 Reportedly, the European Court of Human Rights directed the 
Turkish government in July 2010, to 'suspend all penal actions' against Gormez and 'not to 
execute any sentence issued' against him until the Grand Chamber of the ECHR rendered its 
judgment in Bayatyan v. Armenia.413 According to the same source, in January 2011, the 
military court in Isparta ignored the ECHR interim directive and sentenced the applicant to 
military imprisonment from November 2007 until late 2011. In its decision of 12 March 
2012, the Military Court re-examined Gormez's case and relied on the changing 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to acquit him by recognising that he 
was a genuine conscientious objector due to his religious convictions as a Jehovah's Witness. 
This recognition is certainly a positive step but it is not yet certain whether further legal 
409 War Resisters International (WRI), 'Turkey: Military Courts recognise right to conscientious objection', 1 

May 2012 <http://www.wri-irg.org/nodeI15115>accessedon 13 July 2013. 

410 Yildirim (above n 408). 

411 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Case report: Turkey, 20 May 

2013<http://www.state.gov/jJdrl/rls/irfI2012/eurI208376.htm> accessed on 11 July 2013. 

412 Ibid. 

413 JW Official Media Website, Turkish court ignores directive from ECHR: Conscientious objector sentenced 

to ninth consecutive prison term, 16 February 2011 <http://www.jw-media.org/tur/20110216.htm> accessed on 

15 July 2013. 
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remedies will be pursued by the claimant as it has been reported that he had previously been 
subject to torture and serious forms of ill-treatment while in custody from 2007 until 2011.414 
Although the two decisions of the military tribunals in Turkey come as a direct 
reaction to the recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey, it 
should be kept in mind that those domestic decisions reflect the views of a small minority of 
military judges. On that basis, they are adding very little to the development of consistent 
legal principles recognising the right to conscientious objection in Turkey, since no 
legislation has yet been adopted to legally recognise conscientious objection and the right to 
be exempted from military service (and assigned alternative civilian duties). Another 
important consideration is that the views of the military judges are limited to recognising the 
right of individuals to be released from military service solely on religious grounds and on 
the basis that conscientious objectors have a genuine objection to military service when they 
belong to a religious group (most notably Jehovah's Witnesses). The decisions may be ~ , ~ 
~ ~ ~ 
considered as important reflections of the European Court's recent jurisprudence; however, 
i" 
I 
,,, these are still inconsistent with international human rights standards on conscientious 
\,.
,.. 
objection. 
,;: 
It may be concluded that, even though the vast majority of Member States of the 
I ~: ~ 
1 ' Council of Europe have recognised the right to be exempted from military service on grounds 
f ~:~ 
1 ':'J~ of conscience, the lack of clear, accessible and foreseeable legislation providing for the rightI", 
"I" 
i ~:; to perform alternative civilian service instead of military service amounts to a denial of the 
I" 
exercise of the right to conscientious objection to military service in practice.415 
H'· 
4.3. Recognised grounds for conscientious objection 
4.3.1. International standards 
Conscience may be defined in different ways as it is an ambiguous term having an 
extraordinarily broad range of meanings that can be manifested in different ways. For the 
purposes of this study, the term is described as a sense of moral correctness that governs or 
414 Yildirim (above n 408). 
415 In addition to this, the impartiality ofjudicial bodies examining requests for exemptions from military service 
on grounds of conscience is another major element to ensure that the recognition ofthe right to conscientious 
objection is practical and effective. With regard to allegations of corruption within the judiciary and lack of 
independence of the judiciary from the executive branch or from political pressure have been expressed by the 
Human Rights Committee see Concluding observations ofthe Human Rights Committee: Azerbaijan (above n 
377), para 12. For further discussion on this point see section 4.5.2.1 ofthe present chapter. 
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influences a person's actions or thoughts.416 According to a commentator, the absolute 
protection of freedom of conscience should be respected as long as the actions of those 
evoking the protections of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion do not 
affect the rights and freedoms ofothers. Nowak is of the opinion that, once their actions leave 
this sphere of privacy, those refusing to performing legal duties (such as the duty to serve in 
the military), 'should be protected by Article 18 of the ICCPR [identical to the provision 
found in Article 9 of the ECHR] when they represent a practice or some other form of public 
manifestation of religion or belief' .417 A similar distinction is made by Taylor, according to 
which the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion has an internal and external 
aspect, the so-called forum internurn andfarum externum418 that deserve equal attention. The 
term forum internum is used to place objections of conscience within an internal and private 
sphere of the individual against which no State interference is justified,419 whereas the term 
forum extern urn is used to denote the external manifestation of a religion or a belief that is 
subject to certain permissible limitations.42o 
As indicated in Chapter 2 above, a report commissioned by the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1985 identified religious, 
ethical, moral, humanitarian or similar motives as some of the grounds to be accepted in 
justifying a conscientious conviction.421 As this section will further discuss, the fundamental 
principles enshrined in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion include 
theistic, atheistic or non-theistic beliefs. It is also consequential to the recent affirmation by 
the European Court of Human Rights of conscientious objection as a protected right under 
Article 9 ECHR that religious and non-religious convictions should be equally accepted from 
persons applying for exemptions to military service. 
Distinguishing the various grounds upon which conscientious objections may be justified 
is important on the basis of the following considerations. It is commonly acknowledged that 
manifestations of belief need to be examined closely in order to determine whether they are 
deserving of protection under the provisions guaranteeing freedom of thought, conscience 
416 Chambers dictionary (9th edition), p.92. 

417 M. Nowak, UN. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (P. N. Engel, 2005), p.315. 

418 P. M. Taylor, Freedom ofReligion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge 

University Press, 2005). 

419 Ibid, p. 117. 

420 Ibid, p. 219. In relation to the position of the European Court of Human Rights on the matter, even though 

religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience falling under the forum internum of Article 9, 

an applicant's failure to report for military service is considered a manifestation of their religion or belief. See 

Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238), para 119. 

421 See above Ch. 2, section 2.3, in particular text accompanying n.98. 
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I 
and religion, even before assessing whether a State's interference with such manifestations is 
justified.422 
In this regard, the European Court in Campbell had emphasised that: 
[ ... ] In its ordinary meaning the word 'convictions' [ ...] is more akin to the term 'beliefs' 
[ ... ] appearing in Article 9 - which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion ­
and denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance.423 
Thus, a restrictive definition of conscientious objection and the grounds justifying such an 
objection, for example restricting the definition of conscientious objection to religious 
grounds alone, could still give rise to Convention violations on the basis that the Convention 
protects both religious and non-religious beliefs and convictions. Whilst States enjoy a ~! i; 
~ ,: ~ certain margin of discretion in deciding which kind of convictions may be taken into account 
'" 
L: when granting exemptions from military service, the guidelines of international human rights 
j .~ 
~h 
bodies provide some important indications as to the range of grounds which should fonn an 
j .I'~ 
acceptable basis for claims of conscientious objection to military service. 
I'"I:',; 
I"" 	
A first important point is that the right to conscientious objection to military service 
~0I'1 
I::: 	 should not be limited to those who object to involvement in military activities on religious 
'II~ 
~ t,I 
I, ,~ 
RI,t 	
grounds. For instance, in 1995, the UN Commission on Human Rights in Resolution 1995/83 
.~ :~ 
emphasised that conscientious objection to military service derives from principles and 
~ \ II 
'I,! 
~I~ 	
reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from religious, ethical, 
humanitarian or similar motives.424 The Resolution therefore accepted and adopted the 
recommendations emerging from the findings of the report of the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities with regards to the wider range of 
accepted grounds that ought to be accepted in domestic legislation, including humanitarian 
motives.425 As discussed in Chapter 5, the inclusion of humanitarian motives into the range of 
422 This means that it needs to be clear that a conscientious objection is of sufficient cogency, seriousness and 
cohesion to attract the protection of Article 9 ECHR. See Bayatyan v. Armenia (above n 238), para 110. 
423 Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, App nos. 7819177 and 7878177, Series A no. 80, p. 36, Judgment of 
28 June 1984. 
424 UN doc. E/CN.4IRES11993/84 (above n 308); reiterated in Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 
1998177 (above n 117). 
425 Eide and Chipoya Mubanga in their earlier report discussed above, appear to have no hesitation in including 
'humanitarian motives' within the list of accepted grounds justifying refusal to performing military service. 
However, the relevance of such motives is expressly limited, according to the Special Rapporteurs, to cases in 
which the person invoking those grounds believes that their adherence into the armed forces may lead to the 
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accepted grounds is particularly relevant when examining the extension of the right to 
conscientious objection to professional members of the armed forces that refuse to be 
involved in specific military operations or seek discharge from the military profession on 
grounds of conscience. It may be argued that humanitarian motives are more closely linked to 
the notion of selective conscientious objection as well as the means and ethics of war, where 
an individual refuses to be involved in a particular military operation by referring to the 
contested legality ofmilitary action against other nation-states or entities.426 
At the European level, Resolution 337 (1967) was the first resolution of PACE which 
proposed a wide range of grounds to be accepted from persons applying to be recognised as 
conscientious objectors. Acknowledging the variety of circumstances and moral 
considerations affecting the decision of individuals to be engaged in military activities, it was 
necessary for PACE to place emphasis on extending the grounds accepted as valid 
justifications of a conscientious objection to military service to situations other than those 
that had so far been traditionally accepted by member states. Resolution 337 (1967) 
emphasises that 'persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of 
conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, 
philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right 
to be released from the obligation to perfonn such service' .427 This basic principle was 
restated by the Parliamentary Assembly in 1977428and later in 1987 by the CoM which 
welcomed the adoption of laws related to the release of conscientious objectors from military 
duties but emphasised that the service offered should be compatible with the person's 
conscientious beliefs.429 It thus recommended that Member States needed to provide not only 
purely civilian service, but also unarmed military service to those conscientious objectors 
whose objections were restricted to the personal use of arms.430 
As to the position of the European Court of Human Rights on the matter, religious 
grounds for conscientious objection have been recognised by the Court as a manifestation of 
commitment of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Special Rapporteurs added emphasis on instances 

where the applicant sincerely believes that he might be used in action amounting to illegal occupation of foreign 

territory and the use of weapons of mass destruction or weapons causing unnecessary suffering and other 

violations of intemationallaw such as in jus ad bellum (aggression), jus in bellum, the perpetration of acts of 

genocide, apartheid and other human rights violations as a result ofthe use of military force. See Eide and 

Mubanga-Chipoya Report (above n 98) paras 48-56. 

426 UN doc. E/CNA12004155 (above n 45), para 93. 

427 PACE Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46), 

428 PACE Recommendation 816 (1977) (above n 191). 

429 CoM Recommendation No. R (87) 8 (above n 194). 

430 Ibid, para. 9. 
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-a belief for the purposes of Article 9 ECHR as far as conscientious objection to military 
service is concerned, particularly in relation to Jehovah's Witnesses.431 Nevertheless, it has 
been accepted that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief protects equally any 
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.432 Among other fonns of belief that have been 
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights, are pacifism433 and atheism.434 Individual 
acts stemming from certain political ideologies such as Communism have also been accepted 
by the European Court of Human Rights435 and the UN Human Rights Committee436 as 
manifestations of a belief that may attract the protections of Article 9 ECHR or Article 18 
ICCPR respectively. 
A particularly controversial category of non-religious objections are those on so-called 
'humanitarian grounds' .437 In practice, the right to object to be involved in a particular 
military conflict, which the objector regards as a violation of the rules of international law 
(for instance, because armed force is used in the absence of an authorization by the UN 
Security Council), may be contested due to the perception that such convictions would be 
politically influenced. In practice therefore, the inclusion of humanitarian grounds into the 
range of accepted grounds for conscientious objection to military service is open to debate, 
due to the fact that governments are not particularly keen on acknowledging that their 
participation in a specific armed conflict may be unlawful under the principles of 
international law or that certain military activities are violating principles of international 
humanitarian law. For example, the fight against the South-African apartheid had influenced 
the UN to recognise that conscientious objections to participating in actions that supported 
the apartheid regime should provide a genuine legal basis for exemption from the armed or 
police forces of a State. Such an example of a discriminatory practice that stemmed from 
apartheid policies was the acceptance of white-males only in the South-African military in 
the 1970s which was the principal supporter of the apartheid regime at the time.438 In this 
regard, the UN General Assembly has previously recognised 'the right of all persons to refuse 
service in military or police forces which are used to enforce apartheid' as deriving from 
431 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. no. 14307/88 (1993), Series A no 260-A, reprinted in 17 E.H.R.R. 397. 

432 General Comment No. 22 (above n 137), para 2. 

433 Arrowsmith v.The United Kingdom, App. no. 7050175 (1978), 19 DR 5. 

434 Angelini v. Sweden, App. no.l0491183 (1986), 51 DR 41. 

43'
, Hazar and others v. Turkey, App. nos. 16311/90, 16312/90 and 16313/90 (1992),72 DR 200, para 213. 

436 In Kang v, Republic ofKorea the distribution of communist leaflets was recognised by the Human Rights 

Committee as the manifestation of a beliefprotected by Article 18(1) ICCPR. See Kang v. Republic ofKorea, 

Comm. No. 87811999, UN doc. CCPRlC178/D/878/1999, 23 July 2003. 

437 PACE, Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46), para 1. 

438 Cinar and Usterci (above n 23) p.12l. 
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Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which protects the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.439 
A second important limit to the discretion of States in recognizing objections to 
military service is the prohibition of discrimination amongst objectors belonging to different 
religious groups. In relation to religious conscientious objections, the enjoyment of the right 
cannot be restricted to ministers of a particular religion. This principle is expressly 
recognized, inter alia, in Resolution 1998/77 of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which 
notes that the right to be exempted from military service should not be limited to clerics and 
students of religious schools.44o Already in 1985, the Special Rapporteurs of the Sub­
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities expressed concerns 
in relation to the fact that the practice of restricting the right to be released from military 
service to those belonging to particular religious groups recognized by the State was still 
widespread.441 In the intervening years, various UN human rights bodies have adopted 
resolutions which not only encourage the legal recognition of the right of conscientious 
objection, but, with regard to those States which accept only a limited range of grounds for 
conscientious objection, to widen the accepted grounds.442 
Discrimination on the basis of religious practices has been thoroughly addressed by 
international human rights bodies both at international and regional level. The right to 
conscientious objection was early placed within the context of non-discrimination on the 
basis of religious rights and practices.443 The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
religious practices concerns firstly, discrimination against different religious groups444 and 
439 UN General Assembly, Resolution 33/165, Status of persons refusing service in military or police forces 
used to enforce apartheid, adopted on 20 December 1978 (90th plenary meeting), UN doc. Al33/45, para 1, 
available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/33/ares33r165.pdf> accessed on 21 August 2013. 
440 Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights Including the Question ofReligious Intolerance 
(Addendum), Summary ofcases transmitted to Governments and replies received, UN doc. 
E/CNAI2006/5/Add.l, para 25. 
441 This is indicated by the findings of the survey conducted by the two Special Rapporteurs of the Sub­
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1985. See Eide and Mubanga­
Chipoya (above n 98). 
442 This is indicated by the findings of the survey conducted by the two Special Rapporteurs of the Sub­
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection ofMinorities in 1985. See Eide and Mubanga­
Chipoya (above n 98). 
443 UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report of 
Special Rapporteur Arcot Krishnaswami, Study ofDiscrimination in the Matter of Religious 
Rights and Practices, UN doc. E/CNA/Sub.2/200/Rev.l, 14 October 1959. Reiterated in UN doc. 
E/CNAI2004/55 (2004) (above n 45). 
444 Such groups include those with a historically pacifist ideology, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, and members of 
'peace churches' such as Nazarenes in Hungary and Yugoslavia, Tolstoyans in Poland and Bulgaria, Baptists, 
members of the Pentecostal Church and other Evangelical Christians and Jews in the former USSR, Adventists 
and Mennonites. See Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya (above n 98), p. 25-26. 
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secondly, against individuals with no religious affiliation or beliefs. A UN report showed that 
by 1985, no official statistics were available in the majority of the countries listed in the 
report with regards to information on applications and procedures available for the exercise 
of the right of conscientious objection, while the prosecution and imprisonment of 
conscientious objectors was widespread, particularly in Yugoslavia.445 In relation to other 
jurisdictions, for example in the United Kingdom, where professional servicemen could opt 
for discharge on grounds of conscience through administrative arrangements, the report found 
that the grounds of exemption were not specified in these procedures, therefore applicants 
were only required to provide compelling evidence that their conscientious objection was 
. d . 446senous an genume. 
In 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief reported on the 
status of religious conscientious objectors, pointing out that the issue was one of 
discriminatory or intolerant policies, legislation and State practice, as a result of the 
prejudicial treatment of specific minorities by state institutions perceived as 'major 
religions' .447 Further to this, according to the same survey, ethical or humanist grounds not 
associated with any religion were accepted only in a few countries at that time, particularly in 
countries ofNorth em and Western Europe.448 
Regarding permissible exemptions from military and alternative service for members 
of religious societies, the former European Commission on Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights have dealt with a number of cases where the matter under 
examination was whether applicants objecting to military service on the basis of different 
beliefs had not been treated equally under national legislation. Such an example may arise 
when members of particular religious societies are entitled to full exemption from both 
military and civilian service, while others are required to perform alternative service in its 
entire length without any exemptions permitted to members of their religious societies. The 
cases discussed below concern alleged violations of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, 
where differential treatment resulted in an uneven application of the law regarding total 
exemptions from military and civilian service. 
445 Ibid, p. 26. 
446 Those administrative procedures remain unchanged until the present date; consequently, no specific grounds 
are expressly stated in the British administrative procedures for applications concerning discharge on grounds of 
conscience. See ibid, p. 25. 
447 UN Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, Report 
submitted by Special Rapporteur Mr.Abdelfattah Amor, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 2000/33, UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/63, l3 February 2001, para. 182. 
448 Ibid, para 90. 
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The Commission in N v Sweden449 in 1984 emphasised that a person cannot refuse to 
undertake substitute service where a requirement to undertaking substitute service replacing 
military service is available under domestic legislation. The case concerned an applicant 
alleging a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention. The 
applicant was a non-religious pacifist that requested the Government to exempt him from 
military service and to treat him the same way as a Jehovah's Witness. The Government 
refused to take actions to accommodate his request and he was subsequently convicted of 
draft evasion and sentenced to two months imprisonment that was later reduced to one month 
by the Swedish Court of Appeal. 
The applicant argued that he was not exempted from military service because his 
personal convictions were not of a religious character but of a different origin. He further 
submitted that total resisters could only be exempted from military service according to 
domestic legislation for religious reasons. The Commission upheld that the Convention does 
not guarantee a right to conscientious objection and considered that there were reasonable 
grounds for the distinctions made in Swedish law and practice. In finding no violation of 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention, it was held that: 
[... ] membership of such a religious sect as Jehovah's Witnesses IS an 
objective fact creating a high degree of probability that exemption is not 
granted to persons who simply wish to escape service, since it is unlikely that 
a person would join such a sect only for the purpose of not having to perform 
military or substitute service. The same high probability would not exist if 
exemption was also granted to individuals claiming to have objections of 
conscience to such service or to members of various pacifist groups or 
organisations.45o 
In Suter v. Switzerland in 1986 a Swiss national had failed to report for a military 
course on the basis of what he described as a 'serious moral dilemma,.451 Failing to report for 
service was a criminal offence under Article 18 of the 1983 Military Criminal Code of 
Switzerland. Article 8(2) of the aforementioned law stated that the term of imprisonment 
should not exceed six months on account of a person's religious or moral convictions. The 
449 N v Sweden, App. no. 10410/83 (1984) 40 DR 203. 
450 Ibid, p. 208. 

451 Suter v. Switzerland, App. no. 11595/85 (1986), 51 DR 160 [translated] available at 

<http://strasbourgconsortium.orgidocument.php?DocumentID=47 57>accessed on 18 May 2012. 
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applicant was convicted to six months imprisonment. He complained that his conviction r,
constituted a violation of Article 4 taken in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention on 
i
the basis of the distinction made by the legislature between those who did not refuse on ~ 
account of religious or moral beliefs (receiving less severe sentences, between 3 days to 3 
years of imprisonment) and those who refused on the basis of their religious or moral beliefs 
(receiving more severe sentences, i.e. up to 6 months imprisonment). In dismissing the 
applicant's claim, the Commission held that the requirement of proportionality between the 
two categories of objectors was reasonable and his sentence was not severe.452 
It may be noted that in a 1989 case concerning the preparation and distribution of 
publications encouraging soldiers to disobey orders by a group of pacifists, the Commission, 
although accepting that the pacifist ideology is a 'belief that may fall within the scope of 
Article 9,453 it held that an act motivated by this belief, i.e. a manifestation in the 
\ ,. . circumstances it arose did not fall within Article 9 ECHR due to the negative implications it 
1111 
~ '4 l 
_1 I 'I ~ 
/101'.'1 had on the security forces of the State.454 'Hil 
I" •• 
..,
.. 
'" 
, In 1993, the Human Rights Committee was requested to examine an application 
\ .. , 
concerning the imprisonment of a total objector who refused to undertake both military and 
:F,;; 
alternative service. In Brinkhof v. The Netherlands, the applicant was imprisoned under the 
I" ,,. 
~, , . 
I"" Dutch Military Penal Code for his total objection to both military and alternative service, but1 11 ... 
1\".1 
, ·11,," 
argued that his conviction constituted discrimination under Article 26 of the Covenant on the ~:,~ ~ 
~, j 1 

1\'1, 

II", basis that national law discriminated between Jehovah's Witnesses and conscientious~; I 
"t" 
~, ., ~ 
objectors belonging to other religious or non-religious groupS.455 The government had argued 
tl,1 
~',~ . 
that differentiations in the treatment of different categories of conscientious objectors were 
based on reasonable and objective criteria, since 'Jehovah's Witnesses form a closely-knit 
social group with strict rules of behaviour, membership of which is said to constitute strong 
452 Another example demonstrating the unequal application of the law on conscientious objection between 

religious and non-religious conscientious objectors is the case of Peters v. the Netherlands App. no. 22793/93, 

30 November 1994, where the Commission took the view that the differential treatment between theology and 

philosophy students -theology students being exempted from both military and altemati ve civilian service - was 

not discriminatory. 

453 Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, Commission report of 12 October 1978, DR 10, p. 19, para 69. 

454 The distribution of leaflets incited French conscripts in Germany to commit acts contrary to their duty and to 

military discipline. See. Le CourGrandmaison and Fritz v. France, App. nos. 11567/85 and 1568185 (1989), 
reprinted in 11 E.H.R.R. 46. 

455 Brinkhofv. Netherlands, Comm. No. 402/1990, UN doc. CCPRlC/48/D/402/1990 (views adopted by the 

Committee on 27 July 1993), para 3.1. 
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evidence that the objections to military and substitute service are based on genuine religious 
convictions' .456 
The applicant argued, citing the applicable domestic legislation, that this exemption 
was available only to one religious group, namely Jehovah's Witnesses. The application was 
declared inadmissible due to the fact that the applicant had failed to show that he was a 
'victim' of discrimination under Article 26 ICCPR, while he also failed to show that that his 
convictions as a pacifist were as strong as those of Jehovah's Witnesses; nevertheless the 
Committee was clear in pointing out that the exemption of only one group of conscientious 
objectors [Jehovah's Witnesses] and the inapplicability of exemption for all others could not 
be considered reasonable.457 What emerges from the case is that even though there might be a 
potential breach of the Covenant, the application will not succeed if the applicant fails to 
show that they have been a 'victim' of discrimination. 
In a case against Greece in 1997, the Commission was presented with a situation 
concerning the discriminatory treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses that refused to perform 
military service and were subject to lengthy detentions. In Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v Greece 
the applicants, both Jehovah's Witness ministers, had been detained in connection with their 
refusal to perform military service. They complained of violations of their rights under 
Articles 3, 5, 6, 9, 13 and 14 of the Convention, alleging, inter alia, that their detention was 
unlawful and constituted discrimination on account of their religious beliefs.458 The 
Commission reiterated the principle set out in Grandrath, namely that the Convention does 
not guarantee a right for religious ministers to be exempted from military service. 459 
However, it noted that Greek law provided for such an exemption for ministers of 'known 
religions'. Although the applicants were eventually exempted from military service, the 
problem identified by the Commission was that they were subjected to lengthy periods of 
detention because the military authorities and first instance military courts had refused to 
recognise that Jehovah's Witness was a 'known religion' .460 The Commission held that there 
had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 as a result of the 
456 Ibid, para 9.2. 

457 Ibid, para 9.3. 

458 Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, Apps nos. 19233/91, 19234/91 (1997), Reports 1997-11I 909, reprinted in 

21 E.H.R.R. CD 30. 

459 Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, Report of the Commission, 7 March 1996. 

460 Ibid, para 67. 
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discriminatory treatment received by the applicants while in custody, due to their religious 
beliefs.461 
In the 2009 case of Koppi v Austria the applicant, a member of religious community 
registered in Austria, was recognised as a conscientious objector and was held liable to 
perfonn alternative civilian service which he refused.462 He complained under Article 14 
ECHR in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention claiming that the failure of the 
domestic authorities to exempt him from civilian service was discriminatory.463 The 
government submitted that the applicant had failed to prove that he complied with the criteria 
established in the domestic provisions regarding exemptions from alternative service. 
Before the Court, the Austrian government noted that since the contracting States 
were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, 
non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any 
concerns under Article 9 of the Convention.464 The Court sought to establish whether the 
applicant's treatment amounted to a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 on 
the basis that differential treatment must have an objective and reasonable justification. At 
present, there is significant uncertainty as to the closeness of the link that needs to be 
established between Article 14 and the convention rights a claimant is relying on.465 
According to Pieter van Dijk et. al., the applicability of Article 9 in such cases, raises the 
issue of whether differential treatment between those who undertake to complete their 
military service and those who have opted for substitute service fulfils the requirements of the 
'comparator test' that has to be justified to the extent that the aforementioned categories of 
individuals are in a comparable position.466 
The government in Koppi submitted that the applicant had failed to fulfil the 
conditions that would allow him an exemption from alternative service, having not reached a 
461 Ibid, para 119. 
462 Koppi v. Austria, App no. 33001103 (2009), reprinted in 52 E.H.R.R. 10. 
463 Alleging that the failure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to exempt him from alternative civilian sen~ce by 
application of section 13(a)(1) of the 1986 Civilian Service Act, in conjunction with the Austrian Constitution 
was in breach of the ECHR. See Civil Service Agency of the Republic of Austria, Federal Law on Civil Service 
(Civil Service Act 1986 - ZDG), BGBI. No. 679 idFBGBl. I No. 111/2010, Section 13a § 1 of the Civilian 
Service Act, States that: 'An exemption from the obligation to perform civilian service shall apply to the 
following members of recognised religious societies: (1) ordained priests; (2) persons involved in spiritual 
welfare or in clerical teaching after graduating in theological studies; (3) members of a religious order who have 
made a solemn vow, and (4) students of theology who are preparing to assume a clerical function.' 
464 Koppi v. Austria (above n 462) para. 22. 
465 R.o' Connell, 'Cinderella comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the right to non-discrimination in the ECHR', The 
Journal ofthe Society ofLegal Scholars, vol. 29 (2009), p. 211. 
466 P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak, 'Theory and Practice ofthe European Convention on 
Human Rights " (Intersentia, 2006), pp. 755-758. 
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comparable level of education to graduates of theological studies, but pointed out that the 
criterion of belonging to a recognised religious society, on which the Austrian authorities had 
relied in refusing the applicant's request for exemption from civilian service was not 
discriminatory.467 The Court was not persuaded by this argument since the Austrian 
authorities had based their refusal on the basis that the applicant did not belong to a religious 
society.468 The Court, in fmding no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 
ECHR, held that it did so on the basis that the applicant's religious community was not 
officially registered in order to fall within the meaning of the prescribed law, the 1874 
Recognition Act.469 
In Gutf v. Austria, decided in 2009, the Court considering the facts of this case arrived 
at a different conclusion.47o In a case with similar facts as Koppi v. Austria, the applicant 
complained that the failure of the authorities to exempt him from alternative service was in 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9. Being a Jehovah's Witness, he 
was recognised as a conscientious objector but he refused to perform alternative service. He 
argued that, as a member of a recognised religious community he should have been exempted 
from civilian service as recognised religious societies holding religious functions comparable 
to his functions were also exempted under similar circumstances. The Administrative Court 
dismissed his complaint claiming that the refusal to exempt the claimant from civilian service 
was based on the fact that Jehovah's Witnesses were not a religious society, but a religious 
community. Therefore, the domestic legislation, namely section 13a(1) of the Civilian 
Service Act did not apply in this case.471 
The Government further argued that the applicant had not demonstrated that his 
function as a preacher was comparable to the function of other members of religious societies 
who were exempted from the obligation of alternative service. The Court relied on 
ReligionsgemeinschaJt der ZeugenJehovas and Others v Austria472 to conclude whether 
discrimination arose due to the non-recognition of the applicant's religious group by the 1874 
Recognition Act. As in ReligionsgemeinschaJt, the Court found that with regards to Jehovah's 
Witnesses, one of the criteria for acceding to the privileged status of a 'religious society' ­
within the meaning of the 1874 Recognition Act - had been applied in an arbitrary manner 
467 Koppi v. Austria (above n 462) para 29. 

468 Ibid, para 31. 

469 Ibid, paras 34-35. 

470 Gilt! v. Austria, App. no. 49686/99, judgment of 12 March 2009. 

471 Ibid, para 20. 

472 Religionsgemeinschaft der ZeugenJehovas and Others v. Austria, App. no. 40825/98, 31 July 2008. 
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and concluded that the difference in treatment was not based on an objective and reasonable 
justification.473 In finding a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, the Court 
held that section 13a(l) of the Civilian Service Act, which provided for exemptions from the 
obligation to perfonn civilian service exclusively for members of recognised religious 
societies was discriminatory and the applicant had been discriminated against on the ground 
ofhis religion as a result of the unequal application of this provision.474 
As seen in the aforementioned cases, the Court has well-established that differential 
treatment on the basis of an applicant's beliefs (or religious affiliation) is sufficient to attract 
the protections of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. In a more recent case 
(Demirtas v. Turkey), although the applicant had not alleged a violation of Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination), the concurring judges expressed the view that the volume of 
complaints arising before the Court from Jehovah's Witnesses and the severity of the 
1:::' measures against them due to the failure of the State to enact legislation on alternative 
" 
civilian service demonstrated that the discriminatory detention of the applicant because of his 
religious beliefs was to be regarded not only as discriminatory treatment but also as inhuman 
and degrading treatment in itself.475Concurring judges Andras Sajo and Dragoljub Popovic 
:C 
! I~ ~ 
argued that: 
I:""Ij ·: [...] the Court has not yet had the opportunity to examine the refusal to establish an1'"''
'I,,, 
• ft" 

~ ~;:; r alternative civilian service under Article 14, but the situation in this case indicates that the 

:~:I:I;i,,,, followers of Jehovah's Witnesses, a minority religious group, are treated disadvantageously lilill 
:;::::1 
and discriminatorily because of their religion. [ ... ] There is no reason to believe that 
I ~l ~ I 
discrimination based on religion is less despicable or less harmful in its consequences that 
discrimination based on race. Moreover, very often, the two forms of discrimination 
sometimes are a camouflage to each other.476Cases concerning conscientious objection to 
473 Gut! v. Austria (above n 470), para 38. 
474 Ibid, para 40. 
475 Femi Dermitas v. Turkey (above n 298), concurring opinions of Judges Sajo and Popovic. 
476 Ibid, concurring opinion of Judges Andras Sajo and Dragoljub Popovic: 'Si la Cour n'a pas encore eu 
l'occasion d'examiner sous I'angle de I'article 14 Ie refus d'instaurer un service civil de remplacement, la 
situation en I'espece indique que les adeptes des Temoins de Jehovah, un groupe religieux minoritaire, sont 
traites de maniere desavantageuse et discriminatoire, en raison de leur religion. En dehors de toute consideration 
de l'article 14, la discrimination fondee sur la race peut, dans certaines circonstances, representer par elle-meme 
un 'traitement degradant' au sens de l'article 3 (Asiatiques d'Afrique orientale (25 requetes) c. Royaume-Uni, 
decision de la Commission du 10 Octobre 1970, Annuaire 13, pp. 928, 994, et Horwith et Vadaszi c. Hongrie 
(dec.) no 2351/06, 9 Novembre 2010). Rien ne justifie d'estimer que la discrimination fondee sur Ia religion soit 
moins ignoble ou moins prejudiciable dans ses consequences que la discrimination fondee sur la race. Du reste, 
tres souvent, les deux formes de discrimination se servent de camouflage rune it l'autre. 
II s'ensuit que l'incarceration discriminatoire du requerant en raison de ses croyances religieuses, 
independamment du cumul de ses peines, s'analyse en soi en un traitement inhumain et degradant.' 
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military service on the basis ofpolitical ideology have not arisen in the recent case law of the 
Court. However, the principal reason for this is the fact that conscientious objections to 
military service, until Bayatyan, were not regarded as falling within the scope of Article 9 
ECHR. Purely political grounds for conscientious objection are up to the present date a 
contested group of grounds. As seen in the analysis above, none of the recommendations or 
resolutions of international human rights bodies are expressly referring to the possibility of 
recognising politically-motivated conscientious objections in domestic legislation. While the 
Court has not yet considered whether politically-influenced conscientious objections may 
attract the protections of Article 9, the recent jurisprudence of the Court indicates that 
objections of conscience must be of sufficient cogency and seriousness as to amount to a 
genuine conscientious objection. Thus, as conscientious objection is now recognised as a 
right protected under the Convention, it will be interesting to note whether the Court accepts 
an objection as one of 'sufficient cogency and seriousness' if this is expressed on 
humanitarian grounds that may not fall under the traditional scope of conscientious objection 
'qthat has a religious or non-religious pacifist basis but may be invoked by the individual if )1 
1:1 
"I
,iithere is a fixed opposition to a particular military conflict as a result of the speculation that 
.'1 
the military conflict in question may violate customary norms of intemationallaw. 
II 
til 
!:: 
f4.3.2. Practice 
In practice, two large domains of protected grounds are identified. First, those falling I' 
I 
within the religious domain and second, those that do not have any religious affiliation but I 
i 
refuse to undertake military service on non-religious grounds. A third category concerns 
political grounds of objection. As shown on the table below, all Council of Europe Member 
States where exemptions from military service on the basis of conscience are guaranteed by 
law recognise religious grounds as valid grounds of objection.477 
477 Republic of Armenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, provisions ofthe law 
translated by the European Court of Human Rights in Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC] (above n 238); Civil Service 
Agency of the Republic of Austria, Federal Law on Civil Service (Civil Service Act 1986 - ZDG), BGBI. No. 
679 idFBGBl. I No. 11112010, para 1 <http://www.sicherheit.ictn.gv.atJ31357_DE-Ziviidienst­
Zivildienstgesetz1986.pdf.pdf.> accessed on 25 February 2013; Cyprus, National Guard Law of 2011, Law No. 
19(1)/2011, Official Gazette o/the Republic No. 4271 (I), 25 February 2011, Article 47(1); Information obtained 
by the author, provided by the Kingdom of Denmark, Danish Defence Personnel Organisation,15 December 
2011 [correspondence on file with the author]; Estonia, War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and 
updates: Estonia, <www.wri-irg.orgiprogrammes/world_survey/country_reportJen/estonia> accessed on 18-3­
13; European Bureau for Conscientious Objection, Country report: Georgia <www.ebco-beoc.orglgeorgia> 
accessed on 21 January 2013; Information obtained by the author, provided by thePublic Affairs Officer, 
Defence Command Finland - Public Information Division, 9 December 2011 [correspondence on file with the 
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author]; Law No. 342112005, Military order of the Greeks and other provisions, published in the Official 
Gazette of the Hellenic Republic, No. 302,13 December 2005, Article 59(1); Information obtained by the 
author, provided by the Republic ofMoldova, Military Cooperation Section - General Staff ofNational Army, 
15 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]; Information obtained by the author, provided by the 
Kingdom ofNorway, Ministry of Justice and Public Security,16-12-12 [correspondence on file with the author]; 
Russian Federation, War Resisters' International (WRl), Country report and updates: Russia, <www.wri­
irg.org/programmes/world _survey/country_reportJenJRussia> accessed on 10-2-13; Switzerland, Article 1, Law 
on Civilian Service (Bundesgesetzliber den zivilenErsatzdienst), available at 
<http://www.admin.ch/ch/dlsr/824 _ O/al.html> accessed on 18-6-13; Constitution ofUkraine, adopted at the 
Fifth Session of the VerkhovnaRada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996 and amended on 8 December 2004 by Law No. 
2222-1V available at <http://www.president.gov.ualen/content/constitution.html> accessed on 21 January 2013. 
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Table 2 - Range of accepted grounds for exemptions from military service 
CoE Member State 
, 
, 
, "'" '".,,;C', ," r", ' ,,'I' 
RJ.,ge Jcceptedgrountfs'ln nJtlonalleglslJtlon' 
~ :~~ S' ", '~;, ,~, ,.," "ti:',' ' . , ,,', , 
, I 
Religious ' Non-religious 
;' ",~" .i:"" "'':'", ",,"",I,. 
" 
".f '., "'. " .'
", 
", 
Political 
c,~ 
-", 
1 
2 
" 
Armenia 
Austria 
./ 
./ 
~ 
./ 
· 
Expressly rejected 
3 Azerbaijan ./ Unclear 
-
4 Cyprus ./ ./ -
5 ','" 
'" 
Denmark ./ ./ Expressly rejected 
I> Estonia ./ ./ 
· 
7 Georgia ./ ./ 
· 
8 Finland ./ ./ 
· 
9 Greece ./ ./ 
· 
10 Moldova ./ ./ 
· 
11 Norway ./ ./ ./ 
12 Russian Federation ./ ./ 
· 
13 
,'" 
14 
'--- -----" 
Switzerland 
Ukraine 
_ .. -
-
./ 
./ 
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In most Member States, individuals applying for exemption on religious grounds are 
required to provide proof that they belong to a known religious organisation or society. In 
most member states, ministers of 'known religions' are automatically exempted from military 
and alternative service.478 This is, for instance, the case in Greece and the Republic of 
Cyprus, with priests, religious ministers and monks of a recognised religion, dogma or body 
(most notably those attached to the Greek Orthodox Church)479 and in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, while national military service was in place (notably Roman Catholic and 
Protestant Ministers).48o This automatic exemption from both types of service for particular 
religions has been previously examined by the European Commission on Human Rights in 
Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v Greece, which found that the relevant authorities' persistence not 
to recognise Jehovah's Witnesses as a 'known religion' and the disregard of the applicants' 
(.( right to religious liberty were of a discriminatory nature when contrasted with the way in 
1L! 
which ministers of the Greek Orthodox Church obtain exemption.481 
,1 
Nevertheless, those who do not hold any of these ministerial positions but are mere 
followers of a particular religion are able to opt for an exemption from military service if 
; 
" 
~' their religion forbids the individual use of arms but are liable to perform alternative civilian 
'0 
", 
I i , , 
service. 
I' '_ 
(.II,. , 
The second broad domain of grounds, the non-religiOUS domain, includes all other 
reasons associated with moral beliefs which cannot be restricted in a religious context. These 
1,1", 
"II" 
'0, 
", 
are described in different, but practically homonymous terms, such as philosophical, 
I, 
ideological, ethical, moral, conscientious, humanistic, or humanitarian beliefs, with the 
common characteristic that they are grounds of a non-religious character. At present, nine out 
of the fourteen Member States providing for exemptions from military service on grounds of 
conscience are accepting non-religious grounds as valid for the purposes of exemption.482 
Ukraine, which retains mandatory military service, is the only Member State of the 
Council of Europe that does not accept non-religious (Philosophical) grounds to justify 
exemptions from military service. According to Article 65 of the Constitution of Ukraine 'the 
478 H. Cullen, 'The emerging scope of freedom of conscience' , European Law Review, Vol. 22 (1997), p. 35. 
479 See for example, Republic of Cyprus, National Guard Law No. 20 of 1964 (as amended in 2008 and 2011), 
Article 24(1)(9). 
480 Grandrath v Gennany(1966) (above n214) 
481 Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v Greece (above n 458), para 60. 
482 Russian Federation, War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: Russia available at 
<www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world_survey/country_report/en/Russia> accessed on 10 February 2013. 
115 

defence of the Motherland, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and respect for 
its symbols shall be the duty of the citizens of Ukraine. Citizens shall perfonn military 
service in accordance with the law' .483 
Article 35 of the Constitution sets out the principle that 'No person shall be relieved 
of his duties to the State or refuse to obey laws based on religious beliefs', but then makes an 
exception in relation to military duties, providing that 'If the perfonnance of military duty is 
contrary to religious beliefs, the perfonnance of this duty shall be replaced by alternative 
(non-military) service. ,484 
The exception contained in Article 35(2) of the Constitution is further elaborated upon 
in Article 2 of the 1999 Law on Alternative Service, according to which 
[ ... ] those Ukrainian citizens who have genuine religious beliefs, are members 

of religious organisations conforming to the legislation and whose 

~t "I 
~I tI ' 
confessional beliefs do not allow them to use anns and serve in the military !lr 
'":;iforces shall be accorded the right to alternative service.485 :II 
'11,'11The provision cited above considerably narrows down the scope of the right to 
" 
, ~ 
conscientious objection, in that not only limits it to objections motivated by religious beliefs, H 
Iiibut it further restricts the application of the law to specific religious organisations that are i' 
recognised by the legislature. ~~ 
"'
'" The narrow fonnulation of the right to conscientious obj ection contained in Ukrainian ".I,'.,~ 
i:law was criticized by the Human Rights Committee in 2001; in particular, the Committee i: 
I:noted that Ukraine should 'widen the grounds for conscientious objection in law so that they 
apply, without discrimination, to all religious beliefs and other convictions, and that any 
alternative service required for conscientious objectors be performed in a non-discriminatory 
manner' .486 The request was subsequently reiterated by the Committee in 2006, when the 
Committee recommended that Ukraine extend the right of conscientious objection to 
mandatory military service to persons who hold non-religious beliefs grounded in conscience, 
483 Constitution of Ukraine, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996 and 
amended on 8 December 2004 by Law No. 2222-IV, available at 
<http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html> accessed on 21 January 2013. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Conscience and Peace Tax International, 'Conscientious Objection to Military Service', submission to the 
87th Session of the Human Rights Committee, issues for the Task Forces on State Reports: Ukraine, July 2006 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/englishibodieslHuman Rights Committee/docs/ngos/CPTI.pdt>accessed on 21 January 
2013. 
486 Human Rights Commi1tee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations on Ukraine, UN doc. CCPRlC01731UKR, November 2001, para 20. 
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as well as beliefs grounded in all religions.487 In its 2011 report to the Committee, the 
government of Ukraine responded to the observations of the Committee with regards to 
extending the right of conscientious objection to additional categories of persons, by 
acknowledging that the right is restricted only to religious organisations whose doctrine 
prohibits the use of weapons.488 Non-governmental organisations have called on various 
occasions for the government of Ukraine to bring legislation in line with international 
standards and to widen the grounds accepted for conscientious objection claims; nevertheless 
as of June 2013 no steps have been taken by the government to amend its legislation in order 
to pennit the acceptance ofnon-religious grounds for objections of conscience.489 
The case of Armenia shows some similarities. The Armenian Constitution of 1995490 
and the 2003 Law on Alternative Service491 require all male citizens aged between 18 and 27 
years, unless found to be physically unfit, to perform military service. The obligation to 
perform alternative service for those refusing to perform military service on grounds of 
conscience is found under Article 3 of the 2003 Law on Alternative Service, which stipulates 
that 
1. 	 Any citizen of the Republic of Armenia may perform alternative service, 
if military service, as well as carrying, keeping, maintaining and using 
weapons are contrary to his religious beliefs or convictions. 
2. 	 The citizens of the Republic of Armeniathat have already joined the armed 
forces may not refuse the service and choose alternative service. 492 
Accordingly, Armenian legislation only recognises religious convictions as a ground 
for conscientious objection from persons called for national military service before joining 
the armed forces, while it excludes the possibility of accepting applications from serving 
487 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations (Ukraine), UN doc. CCPRICIUKRJCO/6, 28 November 2006, para 12. 

488 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the 

Covenant, Seventh Periodic Report (Ukraine), 16 September 2011, para 187. 

489 International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Conscience and Peace Tax International and Centre for Civil 

Liberties (Kiev), Ukraine: Military service, conscientious objection and related issues, Submission to the lOS th 

Session ofthe Human Rights Committee, June 2013. 

490 Article 47, 'Every citizen shall participate in the defence of the RepUblic ofArmenia in accordance with the 

procedure prescribed by law'. See Constitution of the Republic ofArmenia, adopted on 5 July 1995. 

491Republic ofArmenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, last amended in May 2013. 

Provisions of the law translated by the European Court of Human Rights in Bayatyan v. Armenia [OC] (above n 

238). 

492 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Draft Law on Amendments and 

Additions to the Law on Alternative Service (Including the Law in Force) ofArmenia, Opinion No. 644/2001 , 

Doc. No. CDL-REF(2011)050rev, 6 December 2011. 
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conscripts and reservists. In 2011, the Venice Commission criticised the restrictive wording 
of Article 3 of the Law on Alternative Service and recommended that it should be amended in 
order to match more closely the wording of Article 9 ECHR, which covers non-religious 
beliefs, in addition to religious freedom. 493 Although the Law was recently amended in May 
2013, the wording of the provision concerning permitted grounds for conscientious refusals 
has remained restricted to religious beliefs. 
Lastly, with regard to political grounds for conscientious objection, this category is 
not receiving the same levels of acceptance in the various Member States of the Council of 
Europe, owing to the fact that political objections are related to the less protected concept of 
selective conscientious objection. Some Member States explicitly exclude political reasons in 
their legislation, whereas others are indirectly rejecting them as valid grounds for objection in 
the practical application of the Law. Denmark was the first country in continental Europe to 
recognise the right of conscientious obj ection by law on the basis of religion and ethical 
pacifism in 1917, after the passage of an alternative service law.494 In Denmark, Article 2 of 
the National Service Law (1980), as amended in 1992 and 1998, explicitly provides that 
'status as a conscientious objector is granted to any person who objects to military service for 
reasons of conscience. Objection may be based on religious or ethical reasons although 
objection for political reasons is not accepted' .495 Similarly in Austria, Article Sea) of the 
Civilian Service Act prohibits politically-motivated objections in the use of military force. 496 
On the other hand, only one member state in the Council of Europe, Norway, allows political 
conscientious objections. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence confirmed that legislation 
regarding conscientious objection to military service accepts pacifism based on religious, 
human-ethical and political conviction.497 
493 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 644/2011 (above n 381). 
494 I(jngdom of Denmark, Alternative Service Act ('Militremregtertjeneste'), entered into force on 13th 
December 1917. Information obtained by the author, provided by the Danish Defence Personnel Organisation, 
Head ofNational Service Management Element, 15 December 2011 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
495 UN Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights Including the Right ofConscientious Objection 
to Military Service: Report ofthe Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1998/77, UN 
doc. No. ElCNA12000155, 17 December 1999. 
496 Civil Service Agency ofthe Republic of Austria, Federal Law on Civil Service (Civil Service Act 1986 ­
ZDG), BGBJ. No. 679 idFBGBl. I No. 11112010 available at <http://www.sicherheit.ktn.gv.at/31357_DE­
Zivildienst-Zivildienstgesetz1986.pdf.pdf> accessed on 25 February 2013. 
497 Norway, Act no 13 of 19 March 1965 relating to Exemption of Military Service for Reasons of Personal 
Conviction, available in English at <http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdatallov-19650319-003-eng.pdf> accessed 
on 12 October 2013, Article 1: "If there is any reason to suppose that a conscript is unable to perform military 
service of any kind without coming into conflict with his serious conviction, he shall be exempted from such 
service by the competent Ministry or by judgement pronounced pursuant to the provisions of this Act". The 
Mimstry of Defence has stated in a written response that it also accepts political grounds as valid grounds for 
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To sum up, as State practice indicates, there are considerable differences across the 
Member States of the Council of Europe with regard to grounds of exemption from military 
service, mostly with regard to non-religious grounds. Religious grounds are readily accepted 
in all Member States, whereas non-religious grounds are accepted in 12 States except 
Ukraine, Annenia and Azerbaijan with the latter recognising the right to conscientious 
objection in the national Constitution but without adopting legislation on alternative service. 
4.4. Characteristics of alternative service 
Having discussed the need to adopt legislation allowing for exemptions from military 
service on grounds of conscience and provide for the availability of alternative service, it is 
now important to outline the minimum standards with regards to the characteristics of 
alternative service, in particular in relation to its length, nature and administration. 
4.4.1. Length of alternative service 
4.4.1.1. International sta.ndards 
As far as the length of alternative service is concerned, PACE in one of its first 
recommendations in 1977 had recommended that the period to be served in alternative 
service shall be at least as long as the period of standard military service, while it also noted 
I 
I,,, that the social and financial equality of recognised conscientious objectors and ordinary 
!I"", 
, It""1 
conscripts shall be guaranteed.498 Further to this, it was later emphasised by the Committee of 
H" .• 
1111 
Ministers that the duration of alternative service shall, in comparison to that of military 
or"JI
'Jl'·'!.i 
,.OJ,. service, remain within reasonable limits.499
"Ii 
At international level, cases concerning the length of alternative civilian service began 
to emerge from 1988, when the Human Rights Committee held in the case of Jarvinen v. 
Finland that the lengthier period of alternative service to be served by conscientious objectors 
in Finland which was twelve months long, one and a half times the eight months required in 
military service was neither unreasonable, nor punitive.50o The Committee came to a different 
conclusion in the 1997 case of Fain v France, where it was called to examined the double 
length of alternative service that was imposed on conscientious objectors in France and 
exemption from military service. Information obtained by the author, provided by the Norwegian Ministry of 

Justice and Public Security, 16 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 

498 Recommendation 816 (1977) (above n 191). 

499 Recommendation No.R (87) 8 (above n 194) para 10; Recommendation 1518 (2001) (above n 168, para 

5(iv). 

500 Aapo Jarvinen v. Finland, Comm. no. 295/1988, UN doc. CCPRlCl39/D/29511988, 15 August 1990, para 

6.6. 
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consider whether this was in violation of Article 26 of the ICCPR, on the basis that the 
differential treatment in question constituted discriminatory treatment of the basis of 
conscientious convictions.50l The Committee found that the significant difference in the 
length of alternative service was not based on reasonable and objective criteria, such as the 
nature of the specific service concerned or the need for a special training in order to 
accomplish that service.502 
The same view was reiterated by the Committee in Maille v France in 2000. In 
dismissing the French government's argument that doubling the length of alternative civilian 
service was to test the sincerity of an individual's convictions, the Committee maintained that 
the length of alternative service being twice the length of military service in France, 
constituted a difference in treatment that was not based on reasonable and objective criteria, 
therefore it was contrary to Article 26 of the ICCPR.503 As held in Broeks v The Netherlands 
earlier, 'although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does 
not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by 
legislation; thus it does not, for example, require any State to enact legislation to provide for 
social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's 
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant' .504 It 
may, therefore, be concluded that the Committee in Maille v France found a violation of 
Article 26, not only because of the disproportionate length of service but also because the 
reasons for the additional service required by those performing in alternative service were not 
properly reflected in domestic legislation. 
The European Commission on Human Rights had received a similar complaint in 
Autio v Finland where the applicant's request to be exempted from military service because 
of his serious ethical convictions had been accepted by domestic authorities; consequently he 
was recognised as a conscientious objector liable to perform alternative civilian service. 505 He 
brought a complaint alleging that the length of the substitute service he had to perform was 
501 It is ought to be emphasised that Article 26 of the ICCPR is a free-standing right, as opposed to Article 14 
ECHR which requires discrimination to have occurred in conjunction with other Convention rights. See Council 
of Europe, 'Non-discrimination: A human right', Seminar to mark the entry into force of Protocol 12 (Council 
of Europe Publishing 2006) available at 
<http://www.coe.intit/dghl/standardsetting/cddhIPublicationsIEN]roceedings.pdf.> accessed on 22 November 
2012, p.24. 
502 Frederic Foin v. France, Comm. no. 66611995, UN doc. CCPRlC/671D166611995, 9 November 1999, para. 
10.3. 

503Maille v. France, Comm. No. 68911996, UN doc. CCPRlC/691D168911996, 31 July 2000, para. 10.4. 

504 S. W. M. Broeks v.The Netherlands, Comm. No. 17211984, UN doc. CCPRIC/OP/2 at 196 (1990), para 12.4. 

505 Autio v. Finland, App. no. 17086/90 (1991) 72 DR 245, Commission decision of6 December 1991. 

120 
discriminatory and that this gave rise to a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 
ECHR. The Commission having reiterated that the Convention does not guarantee a right to 
conscientious objection, held that the differential treatment in question pursued a 'legitimate 
aim' that was to discourage conscripts for seeking an exemption from armed service 'purely 
for reasons of personal benefit or convenience'. It concluded that 'although the duration of 
substitute service is considerably longer than that of military service [ ... ], taking into account 
the State's margin of appreciation[...] the differential treatment in question does not amount to 
a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9'. Therefore, a lengthier period of 
service prescribed for civilian service as opposed to military service was taken as falling 
within the State's margin of appreciation. 
Other human rights bodies of the Council of Europe have arrived at similar 
conclusions in more recent cases. In a complaint brought by the Quaker Council for European 
Affairs against Greece in 2000, the European Committee of Social Rights decided that an 
additional 18 months for alternative service was contrary to Article 1 (2) of the European 
Social Charter which stipulates that 'the Contracting Parties undertake to protect effectively 
the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon.' The 
disproportionate length of alternative service was deemed to have amounted to a 
disproportionate restriction on the right of a worker to earn his living in an occupation freely 
entered upon.506 The European Committee of Social Rights has also declared in its 
conclusions on Estonia in 2008 that under Article 1 (2) of the Charter, the length of alternative 
civilian service was excessive and interfered with a person's right to earn his living in an 
occupation freely entered upon. It finally clarified the position by stating that alternative 
service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service. 507 
The European Parliament has also acknowledged that conscripts must be entitled to 
refuse military service, whether armed or unarmed, on grounds of conscience, with full 
respect for the principles of freedom and equal treatment of members of society. According 
to the Schmidbauer Resolution, adopted by the European Parliament in 1989, it should be 
possible for alternative service to exceed the duration of ordinary service only by half as 
much to compensate for periods of reserve training performed by those undertaking military 
506 European Committee on Social Rights, Complaint No.8/2000, Quaker Councilfor European Affairs against 

Greece, available at <http://www.coe.int/t/ dghl/monitoringl socialcharterl compiaints/CC8Merits _en.pdf> 

accessed on 20 November 2012. 

507 European Committee on Social Rights, Conclusions (Estonia), November 2008 available at 

<http://www.coe.int/t/dgh1/monitoring/socialcharter/concl usions/StatelEstonia2008 _ en.pdt> accessed on 20 

November 2012. 
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service.508 However in 1993, the European Parliament adopted a new resolution regarding the 
protection of human rights in the European Community, following a report of the newly 
established - under the Maastricht treaty - Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, 
stating that an alternative civilian service should be provided for, and should be of the same 
length as military service, so that it is not seen as a sanction or deterrent.509 Although these 
resolutions are non-binding, they demonstrate a political desire from the European 
Community to ensure that the length of alternative service is not a deterrent to persons liable 
for national military service who wish to perform alternative service due to their 
conscientious beliefs and is limited to duration of one and a half times that of military 
service. 
4.4.1.2. Practice 
The succeeding table shows how the length of alternative service is compared to 
military service in the Member States of the Council of Europe that retain conscription. m 
1111 ~
,.f
Although some States have equalised the duration of the two types of service, some retain a ...r' 
1,::: 
,~:considerably lengthier alternative service. Alternative service may either be carried out in the 
",
f"1(1 
~,~! :military without the obligation to bear arms, or it may be carried out outside the military 

(civilian service) for an additional duration. Although the principle is to offer service that is r:: 

compatible with the individual's convictions that may be against the use and bearing of anns 
'.', 

."
."
.' 
or against military service in general, it is observed that civilian alternative service, in some f,~ 
.".. 
cases, IS considerably longer than unarmed military servIce. 
" ~, c
.' 
" 
" 
508 European Parliament, Resolution of 20 November 1989 on conscientious objection and alternative service 

civilian service (Schrnidbauer Resolution), OJ C 291, p. 124. 

509European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 1993 on respect for human rights in the European Community. 
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Table 3 - Duration of military service and alternative service 
CoE Member State 
1 Armenia 
2 Austria 
3 Azerbaijan 
4 Cyprus 
5 Denmark 
," 
6 Estonia 
7 Georgia 
3 Finland 
9 . Greece 
; 
10 Moldova 
11 Norway 
12 Russian Federation 
13 Switzerland 
14 Ukraine 
", 
" 
Military service 
24 months 
6 months 
Normally 18 months (12 months for university graduates) 
20 months 
4 months 
12 months 
15 months 
180,270, or 362 days 
12 months (Air Forces and Navy); 9 months (Infantry 
Land Forces) 
Normally 12 months or 3 months for university graduates 
12 months 
21 months 
260 days 
18 months for Navy, 12 months for Army and Air Forces, 
12 months for those who have completed higher 
education 
Alternative service 
Unarmed military service: 30 months 
Alternative civilian service: 36 months 
9 months 
Undefined 
Unarmed military service: 9 months 
Alternative civilian service: 39 months 
i 
I 
I 
4 months 
12 months 
24 months 
362 days 
18 months 
Normally 12 months or 6 months for university graduates 
No requirement for alternative service 
12 months 
390 days 
27 months or 18 months for those who have completed higher education 
I 
I 
------­
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As indicated in Table 3 above, at present, three Member States of the Council of 
Europe (Denmark,510 Estonia,511 and Moldova512) provide for military and alternative civilian 
service of an equal duration. It is likewise important to emphasise that in Norway, 
conscientious objectors are presently released from military service without the obligation to 
perform alternative service of any kind. Even though domestic legislation provides that 
military service lasts for twelve months and alternative civilian service for thirteen months,S13 
information received from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence indicates that alternative 
service for conscientious objectors is not required at the present time.514 
In other Member States of the Council of Europe, alternative service is longer than 
military service, up to one and a half times the length of military service. In Armenia, 
according to the 2003 Law on Alternative Service, military service lasts for twenty-four 
months, while there is also an option for unarmed military service for thirty months.The 
length of alternative labour service is thirty-six months.SIS This discrepancy between different 
forms of alternative service in Armenia has been heavily criticized by the Venice 
Commission which was of the opinion that the length of alternative service is too long and 
therefore punitive, contrary to the Committee of Ministers' Recommendation No. R(87)8. It 
has also been argued by the Venice Commission that the disproportionately unequal length of 
two types of alternative service (unarmed and labour) may constitute discriminatory 
treatment between different categories of conscientious objectors, firstly due to the length of 
the two services and secondly due to the fact that unarmed military service is not of a civilian 
510 Infonnation obtained by the author, provided by the Danish Defence Personnel Organisation, 15 December 
2011 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
511 Alternative service in Estonia was not always of an equal length. According to Regulation No. 241 of the 
Government ofthe Republic of 25 January 2000, military service was 8 or 11 months and alternative civilian 
service was 16 months long, which meant that alternative service could be twice the length of military service. 
This law has now been amended. See 
<https://www.eesti.ee/eng/teemadlriigikaitse/eesti _ kaitsej oudlajateenistus> accessed on 26 February 2013. 
512 In Moldova, the length of alternative service is twelve months, while for those with a university degree 
alternative service lasts for six months. The length of ordinary military service is twelve months, while for those 
with a university degree military service is three months long. See Law on Preparation for Defence, No.1 245, 
adopted on 18 July 2002; Law on the Organization ofCivilian (Alternative) Service, No.1 56-XVI, adopted on 6 
July 2007; Information obtained by the author, provided by the ChiefInternational Treaties Implementation 
Service - Military Cooperation Section, General Staff ofNational Army, Republic of Moldova, 15 March 2012 
[correspondence on file with the author]. 
513 Norway, Act no 13 of 19 March 1965 relating to Exemption of Military Service for Reasons of Personal 
Conviction, available at <http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdatallov-19650319-003-eng.pdf> accessed on 7 
September 2013, Article 2. 
514 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Public Security, 
16 March 2012. [correspondence on file with the author]. 

515 Republic ofArmenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, amended in 2004,2006 

and 2013 [in Armenian], Article 5. 

.. 
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nature, since it is required that it is perfonned in military units and under military 
supervision.516 These criticisms led to an amendment of the law that significantly shortened 
the length ofunarmed military service and alternative labour service in the country.517 
In Azerbaijan the situation with regard to the length of alternative service has 
remained static for years; while military service is ordinary set at 18 months and 12 months 
for University graduates, the length of alternative civilian service remains undefined since no 
law on alternative service has been adopted up to the present date.518 
In Finland, the length of alternative civilian service is 362 days, compared to 180, 270 
or 362 days depending on the rank and duties of the conscript.519 In Austria, military service 
lasts for six months, while alternative civilian service is nine months long; there is also an 
option for voluntary service abroad for twelve months. 52o In Switzerland, military service 
lasts for 260 days (nineteen weeks of mandatory training and seven three-week intermittent 
" " recalls for training for a period of ten years),5il while alternative civilian service is 3901III 
~: ,; ~ : 
"'il Ii: days.522 In the Republic of Cyprus, national military service is twenty months long, while 
, ~" ., 1 
1(::::1 there is an option for unarmed military service for twenty-nine months and alternative 
, 1" '1 '~ 
, ,.0,/ 
civilian service for thirty-three months.523 In Ukraine, military service has a length of 
I"','"I,,,,, 
eighteen months if joining the Navy and twelve months if joining the Territorial Army or the 
i;::.i'I' ,,' 
!1""110 
I", •• 
! ,~: ~ ': ~ 
I ii, " ,I ~ 516 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 644/2011 (above n 493), paras 13-19. 
, .", , ~ 517 Before the amendments unarmed military service was 36 months and alternative labour service was 42 
months. See F. Corley, Armenia: New legal amendments to end conscientious objector jailings? (Forum 18 
, ',: ~ News Service, 6 June 2013) available at <http://www.forum18.orglarchive.php?article_id=1844> accessed on 12 
, _~ I 
1"1 September 2013. 
, " 
, I, 
Iii 518 CIA Factbook, Middle East: Azerbaijan, available at <https:/lwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­
factbook/geos/aj.html> accessed on 12 June 2013. According to the 1992 Law on the Armed Forces, alternative 
service was set to 24 months; however, in 2004 the new Law on Alternative Civilian Service was introduced 
without being fully adopted. The legal situation of conscientious objectors in Azerbaijan remains unclear. 
519 Military service has a duration of362 days for officers/non-commissioned officers, 270 days for conscripts 
trained for work requiring professional skills and 180 days for all other ranks. (Source: www.mil.fi). Alternative 
civilian service lasts for 362 days. The first 28 days are spent on basic training, while service work lasts for 11 
months. The latter information was obtained by the author and was provided by thePublic Affairs Officer, 
Defence Command Finland - Public Information Division, 9 December 2011 [correspondence on file with the 
author]. 
520 War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: Austria, <www.wri­
irg.org/programmes/world _survey/country Jeport/eniAustria>accessed on 13 February 2013. 
521 CIA, World Factbook, Europe: Switzerland <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­
factbook/geos/sz.html>accessed on 22 February 2013. 
5220fficial government website, Vollzugsstelle fur den Zivildienst ZIVI <http://www.zivi.admin.chl> accessed on 
22 February 2013. 
523 In the Republic ofCyprus, national military service is 24 months, while there is an option for unarmed 
military service lasting 29 months. Alternative civilian servicelasts for 33 months.Reservists recognised as a 
conscientious objector after military service, are required to perform alternative civilian service or alternative 
civilian emergency service, as appropriate. Information obtained by the author, provided by the Cyprus Ministry 
of Defence - Department for the Application of Military Legislation, 4 July 2012 [correspondence on file with 
the author]). 
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Air Forces, whereas those who have completed higher education are required to serve for 
twelve months. On the other hand, alternative civilian service in Ukraine lasts for twenty­
seven months or eighteen months for those who have completed higher education.524 In 
Georgia, the duration of military service has recently been increased from twelve to fifteen 
months, while alternative civilian service was reduced from thirty-six to twenty-four 
months.525 These discrepancies regarding the length between alternative service and military 
service have been criticised by the Human Rights Council. Georgia, for example, has 
endorsed a recommendation initiated by Slovenia in the Universal Periodic Review that the 
duration of alternative service should be equalized with the duration of military service.526 
Considering whether this arguably excessive difference is compatible with minimum human 
rights standards, it is worth bearing in mind that the length of alternative service may not be 
longer one-and-a-half times that of military service, since this would be incompatible with 
Article 1(2) of the European Charter of Social Rights and other international treaties.527 It 
hilttherefore appears that the considerable difference between the two types of service in some " 
'" 
" 
~, piMember States of the Council of Europe seems to be within the limits suggested by 1~ ;t 
international human rights bodies. ,.r· 
.,In Greece, according to Law 342112005 as amended in 2010, military servIce IS 
"I 
twenty-four months.528 However, this has been reduced by a Ministerial Decision to twelve 
months for service in the Air Forces and the Navy, and nine months for service in the Infantry 
land forces. 529 According to the same Ministerial Decision, alternative civilian service has a 
length of eighteen months for those who would perform full military service. 
Until 2010 there was no option for unarmed military service.53o Before the aforesaid 

amendments, the Human Rights Committee had expressed its concerns over the length of 

524 CIA World Factbook, Europe: Ukraine, available at < https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­

factbook/geos/up.html> accessed on 13 June 2013. See also. War Resisters' International (WRJ), Country report 

and updates: Ukraine, http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world _survey!country _report/enlUkraineaccessed on 

11 June 2013. 

525 CCPRJC/GEO/3,7~ovember2006, para138. See also Democracy and Freedom Watch, 'Georgia to end the 

draft by 2016',9 January 2013 <http://dfwatch.net/georgia-to-end-the-draft-by-2016-2016>accessed on 26 

February 2013. 

526 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Georgia, 

Seventeenth session, 16 March 2011, para 63. 

527 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), E.T.S. 163,3 May 1996, available at 

<http://www.refworld.org/docidJ3ae6b3678.html> accessed on 7 September 2013. 

528 HeIIenic Republic, Law no. 3883/2010, 'Service Development and Hierarchy of Officers of the Armed 

Forces - Management Issues of the Armed forces and Related Military Provisions', Official Gazette Paper No. 

167,24 September 2010, Article 78. 

529 Minister of Defence Decision Folder No.F.421.4/1/280115, published in the Official Gazzette of the Hellenic 

Republic, No.lll, 7 February 2011. 

530 Law 3883/2010 amended Greek legislation providing for alternative civilian service. 
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alternative service for conscientious objectors in Greece; it therefore recommended that 
Greece should ensure that the length of alternative service did not have a punitive 
character.53 ! Similar concerns were raised by the European Committee of Social Rights in 
2000 which noted that the punitive length of alternative civilian service in Greece amounted 
to forced labour and was therefore contrary to Article 1 (2) of the European Social Charter 
which protects the effective exercise of the right of a worker to earn his living in an 
occupation freely entered upon.532 It may be noted that at the time, alternative service was 
exceeding normal military service by eighteen months and included long working hours and 
denial ofweekly rest period or holidays.533 
The duration of alternative civilian service in the Russian Federation is currently set at 
twenty-one months, whereas military service is twelve months long.534 In the 6th Periodic 
Report of the Russian Federation to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government 
.'" attempted to justify the considerable difference in the duration of the two types of service by~ : 
'i 
11: 
stating that 'these rules cannot be considered as being of a punitive nature but are due to the 
,ll ,I, preferential treatment and special conditions enjoyed by those performing alternative civilian ll: j 
d, 
service as compared with those performing compUlsory military service,.535 The Human 
Rights Committee called upon the Russian Federation to reduce the length of civilian service 
"'j 
" ",'
,jr ~. " to that of military service and ensure that its terms are compatible with Articles 18 and 26I' 
I,· 
'" ICCPR.536 q:
," 
" 
';': 
:~I 
I"1::,)
'.II 

"Ii 4.4.2. Nature and character of alternative service 

ii"'! 
4.4.2.1. International standards 
As the previous section has indicated, the length of alternative civilian service is a 
critical element in ensuring that alternative service offered to those exempted from military 
service on the basis of conscience is non-punitive. The second consideration to ensure the 
non-punitive nature of alternative service is that this should be non-military in order to 
531 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports submitted by States parties under article 40 ofthe 
Covenant, Concluding observations (Greece), UN doc. CCPRlCO/83/GRC, 25 April 2005, para.15. 
532 Council ofEurope, European Committee of Social Rights, Complaint No.8 (2000) by the Quaker Council 
for European Affairs (QCEA) against Greece. 
533 Ibid, para 12. 

534 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee (Russian Federation), 

UN doc. CCPRlC0179IRUS, 11 June 2006. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Ibid, para 17. 
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comply with the conscientious convictions of the person seeking exemption from military 
service. Followers of pacifism have historically been lobbying for alternative civilian service 
to remain civilian in nature and away from military control. In Great Britain for example, the 
Non-Conscription Movement, a group of peace activists, was formed shortly before the 
introduction of conscription to protect those who refused to be enlisted in the draft.537 Their 
continuous negotiations with the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain until the end of 
the Second World War had in effect resulted, inter alia, in the removal of the condition that 
placed conscientious objectors in non-combatant posts in military units538 . 
The total discharge of those objecting military service on grounds of conscience from 
any military duties or military control has been addressed in several regional instruments in 
the Council of Europe. In Recommendation No. R (87) 8 the Committee of Ministers it was 
emphasised that 'legislative provisions or regulations which relate to the taking into account 
of military service for employment, career or pension purposes shall apply to alternative 
service' .539 This stipulates that individuals cannot be denied equal employment opportunities 
or other financial benefits because they opted for alternative civilian service. PACE in 
Resolution 337 of 1967 finally recommended that Member States shall ensure that 
conscientious objectors are employed in social work or other work of national importance 
which should be in the public interest.540 Therefore conscientious objectors should not be 
used, for example, as low-cost labour in the private sector. 
In Recommendation No. R (87) 8, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe placed emphasis on the civilian nature of alternative service, maintaining the view 
that alternative service shall be in principle civilian and in the public interest. 541 More 
interestingly however, it referred to the possibility of allowing unarmed military service for 
those willing to undertake alternative service, clarifying that this should be assigned only to 
those conscientious objectors whose objections are restricted to the personal use of arms and 
as an additional alternative to a purely civilian alternative service dissociated from the 
military.542 
537 Manifesto issued by the No-Conscription Fellowship dated September 1915, signed by Clifford Allen 

(Chairman) et al., in No-conscription Fellowship, 'Miscellaneous Publications' (British Library Archives, 1915­
1918). 

538 Letter drafted by the No-Conscription Fellowship dated January 19, 1916, in No-conscription Fellowship, 

'Miscellaneous Publications' (British Library Archives, 1915-1918). 

539 Ibid, para 11. 

540 Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46). 

54! CoM Recommendation No.R (87) 8 (above n 194). 

542 Ibid, para 9. 
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In 1991, the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance543 emphasised that 
conscientious objectors should be exempted from combat but could be required to perform 
comparable alternative service of various kinds, which should be compatible with their 
reasons for conscientious objection should such service exist in their country.544 In 1996, the 
Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance made a similar remark upon his visit to Greece 
recommending that member states with a system of compulsory military service, where such 
provision has not already been made, should introduce various fonns of alternative service 
for conscientious objection which should in principle be of a non-combatant or civilian 
character, in the public interest and not of a punitive nature.545 The meaning of the tenn 
punitive has been explored by the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance who stressed 
that alternative service must not be so onerous as to constitute a punishment for the objector 
and that it should be useful to the public interest, which may be aimed at social improvement, 
development or promotion of international peace and understanding. 546
,,111 'I, 
1:1;; "'11 
~:\iI Finally, within the context of the European Union, the European Parliament has 
, I " 
~ ~ j r expressed, through the Schmidbauer Resolution of 1989, the view that conscientious 
,,~ a ' I\. 
objectors who are recognised as such in the Member State of which are nationals should be 
given the opportunity where appropriate, to participate in programmes of alternative service 
P' ,: ~ ~! 
1 ~, in other member states and, provided that they make the relevant request, for their release 
I"

",
," ::r from alternative service in their own country as a result of such participation.547 Currently,

,!' 
",IH
'" : ~ i 
" ~ j i ~ Austria is the only Member State that allows alternative service to be performed abroad, even 
" !:';;:
" 
'1;11 
j ~ I though the length of alternative service for those opting for alternative service abroad is
,.li 
I' "!)I" 1/: 
543 The Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance was appointed by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights in 1986, further to resolution 1986/20. The mandate title was later changed in 2000 by the 
Commission on Human Rights to "Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief' which was endorsed 
by ECOSOC decision 2000/261 and welcomed by General Assembly resolution 55/97.See. Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, available at 
<http://www .ohchr .0rgfEN/lssuesiFreedomReligi on/PageslFreedomReJigionlndex .aspx> accessed on 19 
January 2013. 
544 Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribeiro (above n 303), para 
185. 

545 UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 

and ofDiscrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Addendum), UN doc. Al51/542/Add.l, (country visit to 

Greece), 7 November 1996, para 40; Restated in Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights 

including religious intolerance: Report submitted by Mr.Abdelfattah Amor (2000) (above n 447). 

546 E/CNAI1992/52 (above n 303), para. 185; UN doc. E/CNA12006/51 (above nI20), para 42; Council of 

Europe - Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 'Conscientious Objection to Compulsory 

Military Service' (2002) available at 

<http://www.coe.intit/elhuman _rightsl cddhl2._ activities/ConscientiousObj ection _ en. pdf> accessed on 18 April 

2012, para 16. 

547 European Parliament, Resolution of 20 November 1989 on conscientious objection and alternative service 

civilian service (Schmidbauer Resolution), OJ C 291, p. 122. 
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double the length of military service in the country.548 Although the resolution does not 
provide more guidelines regarding this proposition, it is envisaged that this suggestion could 
enhance the freedom of movement of persons, one of the four fundamental freedoms on 
which the notion ofEuropean integration is based and could therefore fonn the basis of future 
debate. 
4.4.2.2. Practice 
While the overall situation in the Council of Europe with regards to the nature of 
alternative service seems to be satisfactory,549 this section focuses on the three most 
problematic cases (Armenia, Greece and the Russian Federation) as these have been 
documented by international human rights bodies at UN and Council of Europe level. 
In Annenia, the Venice Commission raised concerns over the nature of the alternative 
service in place, arguing that it might not be purely civilian according to the wording of the 
relevant Law on Alternative Service.550 Article 17(4) of the Armenian Law on Alternative 
Service states that the alternative labour serviceman must be 'at the place of his service on a 
24 hour basis' .551 The Venice Commission proposed that the amendment of the law should 
explicitly state that the military has no supervisory role in the day-to-day operational 
supervision of those who perfonn alternative service.552 According to infonnation obtained 
by War Resisters International, Decree No. 940 adopted in October 2004 provides that 
substitute service may be perfonned in psychiatric hospitals, orphanages and clinics in the 
regions of Syunik, Gergharkunik and Tavush.553 
In Greece, according to Article 61(2) of Law 342112005, the alternative service is 
fulfilled in public sector bodies and is proposed in 'public services of general-interest', except 
in Attica, Thessaloniki, areas of birth, origin or residence of the applicants, and outside areas 
548 War resisters International, World survey on conscription and conscientious objection to military service, 

Country Report: Austria, <http://www. wri-irg.orglprogrammes/world _survey/country Jeport/en/Austria> 

accessed on 19 April 2012. 

549 European Bureau of Conscientious Objection, Report to the Council ofEurope: The Right to Conscientious 

Objection in the Council of Europe Member States, 18 July 2011, available at <http://ebco-beoc.orglfiles/2011­
EBCO-REPORT-CoE.pdf> accessed on 10 August 2013. 

550 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 644/2011 (above n 493). 

551 Ibid. 

552 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 64412011 (above n 611), para 38. 

553 War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: Armenia <www.wri­

irg.orglprogrammes/world _survey/country Jeport/eniArmenia>accessed on 13 March 2013. 
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of major population density, as determined by the Minister of National Defence.554 According 
to Article 64(2), those recognised as conscientious objectors to perform alternative service 
shall make themselves available for commencement of their service within the period 
specified in the invitation sent to them by the competent military service within the Ministry 
of Defence. This alternative civilian service is carried out in public sector bodies including 
hospitals, post offices, public financial services and Municipalities555 and, as clarified in 
paragraph 3, those performing alternative service do not have military status and therefore are 
not under the jurisdiction of military courtS.556 A Ministerial decision of 2011 allows 
conscientious objectors who are over the age of 35 to be released from their civil obligations 
by paying a fee at the rate of 810 Euros per month of the remaining service. 557 To be able to 
'buy-off' the remainder of their service, conscientious objectors must have served at least 3 
months of their alternative service.558 Considering the current economic recession and the 
high fees, it seems unlikely that many serving conscientious objectors would have used this 
provision to be exempted from their duties. 
In the Russian Federation, according to Article 4 of the Law of Civilian Service Act, 
substitute service consists of civilian work outside of the armed forces. However, the Act 
does not specify the places where alternative service can be employed. Regulation No. 27 of 
2004, stipulates that the Federal Service for Labour and Employment and the Ministry of 
Defence are responsible for providing a list of vacancies and places for the performance of 
alternative civilian service.559 In 2006, the Human Rights Committee noted that the Russian 
legislation did not appear to guarantee that the tasks to be performed by conscientious 
objectors were compatible with their convictions.56o The Quaker Council for European 
Affairs had also emphasised that up to 2004 most conscientious objectors were being 
assigned to perform substitute service with organisations in federal military departments, in 
particular with the Federal Service for Special Construction and other defence related 
554 Hellenic Republic, Law 3421/2005, Conscription of the Greeks and other provisions, Decision Folder No. 
302/A'113.12.2005, published in the Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic, No.302, 13 December 2005, 
Article 61. 
555 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Defence - Department of 
Military Legal Counselors, Athens, 6 February 2012 [correspondence on file with the author). 
556 Ibid, Article 64. 
557 Hellenic Republic, Minister of Defence, Decision Folder No.F.429.l/191281812, published in the Official 
Gazzette ofthe Hellenic Republic, No.517, 5 April 2011. 
558 Hellenic Republic, Law no. 3883/2010 (above n 528). 
559 War Resisters International, World Survey on Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service: 
Russian Federation<hrtp:/lwww.wri­
irg.org/programmes/world survey/country report/eniRussian%20Federation>accessed on 15 March 2013. 
560 Human Rights Committee, Concluding 'Observations of the Human Rights Committee (Russian Federation), 
UN doc. CCPRlC0I79IRUS, 11 June 2006, para 17. 
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institutions.561 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was also of the opinion 
that the law in practice was punitive and not up to European standards, particularly in light of 
the fact that persons performing alternative civilian service were placed in industrial or other 
units rather than occupations in the wider public interest. 562 It emphasised that the aim of 
alternative service should not be to provide companies (even public ones) with cheap 
workforces but to give those serving alternative service the possibility to serve society 
holistically, in compliance with their beliefs. 
In the sixth periodic report submitted by the Russian Federation to the Human Rights 
Committee in 2008, the Russian government emphasised that alternative civilian service may 
be undertaken with organisations of the armed forces or other troops or military formations or 
bodies, or otherwise in civilian organizations attached to the federal authorities, authorities of 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation, or local government bodies.563 It added that 
'under Article 4(4) of the Act and Government Decision No. 750 on the organisation of 
alternative civilian service of 11 December 2003, the authorities draw up, and review on an 
annual basis, lists of jobs, occupations or duties to which those undergoing alternative 
civilian service may be assigned and organizations where such service may be undertaken. 
The criteria and priorities for compiling such lists are established with the assistance of the 
Ministry of Defence, on the basis of the interests of society and the State. In those 
circumstances, and in view of the information available, there are currently no plans to 
review existing legislation. ,564 
In 2009, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that the conditions of service for 
alternative service in Russia remained punitive in nature, including the requirement to 
perform such services outside places of permanent residence, the receipt of low salaries, 
which were below the subsistence level for those who are assigned to work in social 
organisations, and the restriction of freedom of movement for the persons concerned. 565 The 
561 Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) of Australia, response no. RUS17614, 17 October 2005. 
562 Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe 
(Monitoring Committee), Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation, Co­
rapporteurs: Mr. David Atkinson (UK, EDG) AND Mr. RudolfBindig (Germany, Socialist Group), Doc. 10568, 
3 June 2005. 
563 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the 
Covenant, Sixth periodic reports of States parties (Russian Federation), UN doc. CCPRIC/RUS/6, 19 November 
2008, para 153. 
564 Ibid, para 154. 
565 The Committee was also concerned that the assessment of applications, carried out by a draft panel for such 
service, was under the control of the Ministry of Defence. See. UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of 
reports submitted by State parties under article 40 ofthe Covenant, Concluding observations ofthe Human 
Rights Committee (Russian Federation), UN doc. CCPRICIRUS/CO/6, 29 October 2009, para 23. 
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Committee thus called Russia to fully recognise the right to conscientious objection and to 
ensure that the length and the nature of this alternative to military service were not of a 
punitive character. It was also emphasised that 'the State Party should also consider placing 
ser 
the assessment of applications for conscientious objector status entirely under the control of Cor 
civilian authorities' . The government did not make any comments in its response to the l\.1i: 
Committee's concluding observations.566 
OV( 
eve 
alt(4.4.3 	 Administration and control of alternative service 
Sin 
4.4.3.1 International standards 
Int< 
Although the various resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations and the of 
Council of Europe are not referring to the issue of which governmental department should be No: 
administrating alternative service, according to the guidelines of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) alternative service should be performed under a 
civ: 
purely civilian administration with no involvement by the military authority.567 
In a friendly settlement reached in 2001 in the case ofStefanov v. Bulgaria, it was agreed 
Mil 
between the applicant and the Bulgarian government that, in addition to the introduction of 
the 
draft legislation allowing for a total amnesty for all conscientious objectors who had been 
per
imprisoned on account of their refusal to perform military service, new legislation would 
aut 
secure that 'the alternative civilian service in Bulgaria is performed under a purely civilian 
administration and the military authority is not involved in civilian service' .568 The principle 
570 I 
under consideration appears to have been recognized also by the Human Rights Committee, 	 Cha 
Prel 
571 ,which, in its 2011 decision in Jeong et al v the Republic ofKorea, held that 'a State may, ifit 
irg.'
wishes, compel the objector to undertake acivilian alternative to military service, outside the Inte 
irg. 1military sphere and not under military command' .569 
obt. 
Nat 
The administration of alternative service is a decisive factor in ensuring that the service 	 572, 
irg.
undertaken by conscientious objectors is in accordance with their conscientious beliefs and 	 573, 
that there will be no military interference in their daily functions. 	 Ser 
Alt 
574· 
Sec 
575· 
566 Human Rights Committee, State Comments on the Concluding Observations (Russian Federation), l.}N doc. irg. 
CCPRIC/RUS/CO/6/Add.l, 19 February 2010. Re] 
567 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook on Human Rights and Re] 
Fundamental Freedoms ofAnned Forces Personnel (OSCE/ODIHR 2008), p. 86. [co 
568 Stefanow. Bulgaria App no 32438/96 (friendly settlement) 3 May 200t. Ru 
569 Jeong et al v.The Republic ofKorea (above n 152), para 7.3 (emphasis added). Fel 
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4.4.3.2. Practice 
In the majority of the Council of Europe Member States where national military 
service is still in place, the obligation to perform alternative service is administered and 
controlled by governmental ministries that are not related to the Armed Forces or the 
Ministry of Defence. Denmark was the first country in continental Europe to shift jurisdiction 
over conscientious objectors from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Interior in 1933, 
even though conscientious objectors were not subject to the military code of discipline while 
alternative service was controlled and administered by the Danish Ministry of Defence.57o 
Similarly, in Austria, Estonia and Moldova, the administering body is the Ministry of 
Interior;571 in Finland, the Ministry of Employment and Economy;572 in Georgia the Ministry 
of Health and Social Affairs/Department of Alternative Labour Service,573 and finally in 
Norway, the Ministry of Justice.574 
In four Member States, namely Armenia, Greece, Cyprus, and Russia, alternative 
civilian service is still administered and controlled by the Ministry of Defence. 575 
In Greece, the administration and control of alternative civilian service by the 
Ministry of Defence causes a considerable number of problems, such as the inconsistency in 
the practice of different employing bodies regarding holidays and hours of service for persons 
perfonning civilian service, due to wrong information being disseminated by military 
authorities with insufficient knowledge of civilian service. These inconsistencies have been 
570 H. Sorensen, 'Denmark: The Vanguard of Conscientious Objection" in Ch. C. Moskos and J. Whiteclay 

Chambers II (eds), The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (Oxford University 

Press, 1993), p. 107. 

571 War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: Austria <www.wri­

irg.org/prograrnmes/world _survey/country _report/en! Austria>accessed on 13 February 20 l3; War Resisters' 

International (WRl), Country report and updates: Estonia <www.wri­

irg.org/programmes/world_survey/countryJeport/eniEstonia>accessedon 13 February 2013; Information 

obtained by the author, provided by the Republic of Moldova, Military Cooperation Section - General Staff of 

National Army, 15 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 

572 War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: Finland <www.wri­

ir~.org/prograrnmes/wor1d_survey/country Jeport/enlFinland>accessed on 13 February 2013. 

57 DFAC (Centre for Security, Development and the Rule of Law), Laws on Non-Military Alternative Labour 

Service, Security Sector - Laws of Georgia <http://www.dcaf.chlChapter-SectioniLaw-on-Non-Military­

Alternative-Labom-Service> accessed on 14 February 2013. 

574 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Kingdom ofNorway, Ministry of Justice and Public 

Security,16 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 

575 War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: Armenia <www.wri­

irg.org/programmes/world_survey/country_report/en!Armenia> accessed on 10 February 2013; Hellenic 

Republic Law no. 3883/2010 (above n 528), Article 78; Information obtained by the author, provided by the 

Republic of Cyprus, Ministry ofDefence - Department for the Application ofMiIitary Legislation, 4 July 2012 

[correspondence on file with the author]; War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: 

Russia, available at <www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world_survey/country _reportJenJRussia> accessed on 10 

February 2013. 
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giverwell-documented by the Office of the Greek Ombudsman, a constitutionally sanctioned and 
(~()ndindependent authority which investigates individual complaints related to material actions or 
instalomissions taken by governmental bodies and authorities.576 
mini~In February 2008, the Greek Ombudsman, which is a mediator and therefore has the 
resull 
power to make recommendations to the public administration but without having a legal 
the re 
effect (i.e. to annul actions) gave its views in a complaint where a conscientious objector 
emp}.
employed by the registry of the Court of First Instance in Messolonghi (Greece) alleged that 
their
while performing his alternative civilian service his bank holidays were being taken out of his 
annualleave.577 The Ombudsman found that in the absence of any information circulated to 
public bodies employing conscientious objectors for alternative service, the objector's contrl 
employer requested information from a local military unit, since alternative civilian service objec 
was under the administration of the Ministry of Defence. The applicant's employer had servic 
therefore requested information from a body not having any experience with persons carrying 20 of 
out alternative service. The military unit had mistakenly advised the objector's employer that fulfih 
for alternative civilian service, the rules regarding holidays were exactly the same as to what office 
I' 
1'1" 
applied to soldiers, namely that bank holidays were counted as annual leave. 	 conse 
Aceo]The Ombudsman used this occasion to highlight to the Office of General Staff for 
:i 
moni1 
,I National Defence as the agency responsible for those liable to perform alternative civilian i: 	 sameservice, that the general problem caused by the dispersion of employment agencies was not 
concecaused merely because of the multiplicity of supervising ministries and the resulting 
stand.weakness of effective coordination (resulting to the practice of requesting military regiments 
to provide guidance in matters concerning alternative civilian service), but it was caused 
pruiicularly because conscientious objectors were placed in organizations with highly Ombl 
different operating regimes, which were significantly different to the operational regime of objec 
military units. 578 discri 
certifThe Ombudsman Office highlighted its opposition to the involvement of the Ministry 
advetof National Defence in the administration and other issues related to alternative civilian 
service for conscientious objectors.579 It also emphasised that the military control and 
'monitoring' of those performing alternative service must be suspended as soon as they are 
576 The Greek Ombudsman (Independent authority), available at <http://www.synigoros.gr> accessed on 14 580 Tbi 
March 2013. 
empJo 
577 Hellenic Republic, Ministerial Decision File. No. 17312.06.2.4 of 19 February 2008, availablet at rights. 
<http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/200136.pdf> accessed on 13 March 2013 581 Na 
578 Ibid, para 3. 582 Re 
579 Ibid, para 4. belief: 
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given duties in their workplace, where those responsible for the assignment of duties, 
conditions of service and timeframes are the relevant civilian bodies and their Ministries. For 
instance, if a person is employed in a hospital for alternative service, then the relevant 
ministry responsible to monitor their perfonnance should be the Ministry of Health. As a 
result ofpressure by the Ombudsman for the Ministry of Defence to reconsider its policies on 
the regulation of alternative civilian service, the Ministry agreed in May 2008 that the bodies 
employing conscientious objectors for alternative service have exclusive competence over 
their employees. 580 
In the Republic of Cyprus, the Ministry of Defence is liable for the administration and 
control of alternative civilian service, while public sector bodies employing conscientious 
objectors are also determined by the Minister of Defence, therefore alternative civilian 
service is fully under military control. According to Article 55(3) ofNational Guard Law No. 
20 of 1964,581 each public sector body to which a conscientious objector is assigned for the 
fulfilment of alternative civilian service is required to immediately notify the appropriate 
office of the Recruiting Forces, regarding the availability and undertaking of service by the 
conscientious objector concerned, and all changes affecting their conscription status. 
According to paragraph 4, conscientious objectors performing alternative civilian service, are 
monitored and controlled militarily by the appropriate services of the Armed Force, in the 
same way of monitoring as those performing compulsory military service. This raises 
concerns over the 'civilian' nature of alternative service which according to international 
standards should not be associated with the military. 
It is equally important to highlight that according to a complaint investigated by the 
Ombudsman's Office for Human Rights, an applicant was recognised as a conscientious 
objector but was not called for alternative service.582 As a result the applicant was 
discriminated against while seeking access to employment, since he never received a 
certificate verifying his exemption from military obligations and this had placed him in an 
adverse position in comparison to other applicants. The Ombudsman investigating the claim, 
580 The Greek Ombudsman (Independent authority), Alternative Civil-Social Service: Supervisory powers, 

employment times and holiday regime, May 2008 available at <http://www.synigoros.gri?i=human­

ri~ts.el.enallaktiki_upiresia.29009> accessed on 13.March 2013. 

58 National Guard Law No. 20 of 1964 as amended In 2008 and 201l. 

582 Report of the Equality Authority with regards to a complaint for discrimination on the basis of religious 

beliefs in access to employment, File No. A.K.! 56/2008 (Nicosia, 7 July 2009). 
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noted some discrepancies in her communications with the Ministry of Defence583 and 
emphasised that part of the problem was due to the fact that the claimant's application was 
rejected on the basis of information received by the Ministry of Defence, which included his 
Military Status Certificate and a letter from the Minister of Defence that granted the applicant 
a two-months exemption from alternative service until further notice. It is therefore suggested 
that the decision-making process being left entirely within the Ministry of Defence and the 
military control of conscientious objectors while in civilian service is in conflict with the 
principle of impartiality and the civilian character of alternative service. 
4.5. 	 Procedural guarantees 
4.5.1. 	 Time limits for tbe submission of applications and availability of 
the right at various stages of military service 
4.5.1.1. International standards 
It is acknowledged in most domestic legal systems and confirmed by various 
international and regional human rights bodies that an application for the status of 
conscientious objector has to be made within a specific time frame. 584 Nevertheless, as it will 
be discussed in the next chapter, in many jurisdictions the time limits for submitting an 
application for exemption on grounds of conscience are often restrictive. In Resolution 
1995/83 	 the Commission on Human Rights recognised that persons performing military 
service may develop conscientious objections and affmned that 'persons perfonning military 
service should not be excluded from the right to have conscientious objections to military 
service' .585 This was again restated by the Commission in 2004, where it confirmed that 
conscientious objection claims should be accepted without further inquiry and must be 
accompanied by a simple statement explaining the reasons of the applicant's conscientious 
objection.586 
583 Information obtained by the author, provided upon communication with the Office of the Ombudsman for the 

Protection of Human Rights, Authority against Racism and Discrimination, 6 September 2012. [information on 

file with the author]. 

584 Commission on Human Rights, Implementation ofthe Declaration on the Elimination ofall forms of 

intolerance and ofdiscrimination based on religion or belief, Report Submitted Angelo Vidal d' Almeida 

Ribeiro (1991), (supra note 303), para 185. 

585 Resolution 1995/83 (above n 308), para 2. 

586 E/CNA12004!55 (above n 45) para 38(a). 
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In its 2001 report on conscientious objection, the Directorate General of Human 
Rights587 proposed that the law may also provide for the possibility of applying for and 
obtaining conscientious objector status in cases where the requisite conditions for 
conscientious objection appeared during military service or periods of military training after 
initial service.588 In 2006, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
drew attention to the strict time limits for applying for conscientious objectors status in 
Greece, as well as the unavailability of the right to those who have previously served in the 
armed forces and have consequently claimed conscientious objection, thus receiving harsh 
and unfair sentences for insubordination and disobedience. 589 The Special Rapporteur 
referred to Recommendation 1518(2001) which invites member states to introduce into their 
legislation 'the right to be registered as a conscientious objector at any time before, during or 
after conscription, or performance of military service' and stated that this acknowledges that 
conscientious objection may develop over time, and even after a person has already 
participated in military training or activities.59o 
Serving conscripts, i.e. those individuals who have already started their national 
military service, must also be granted the opportunity to be released from military duties and 
be assigned civilian duties if their beliefs have been altered while performing their military 
service. The mere act of accepting (as opposed to protesting) conscription does not imply an 
automatic waiver by the individual of his or her right to conscientious objection.59 ! The right 
to conscientious objection for serving conscripts meets more resistance from Member States 
in practice, even though the Committee of Ministers in Recommendation No. R (87) 8 is 
clear in that 'the law may also provide for the possibility of applying for and obtaining 
conscientious objector status in cases where the requisite conditions for conscientious 
objection appear during military service or periods of military training after initial service'. 
Furthermore, in Recommendation 1518 (2001) PACE recommended that the Committee of 
Ministers invites those member states that have not yet done so, to introduce into their 
legislation the right to be registered as a conscientious objector at any time, i.e. before, during 
or after conscription or performance of military service.592 This was a direct call on Member 
States that the right should be available to conscripts liable for military service, servmg 
587 Council of Europe, Directorate General Human Rights and the Rule of Law - Overall mandate, 

<http://www.coe.intltldgi/mandat_en.asp> accessed on 18 May 2012. 

588 Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs (2002) (above n 546), para 18. 

589 E/CNA12006/5/Add.l, (above n 440) para 136. 

590 Ibid, para 138. 

591 P. Rowe, The Impact ofHuman Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 20. 

592 Recommendation 1518 (2001) (above n 168), para 5. 
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conscripts and persons liable for reservist duties alike. This principle was repeated in 
Recommendation 1742 (2006) of the Parliamentary Assembly, which called member states to 
ensure the genuine and effective protection of the human rights of members of the armed 
forces, and in particular to introduce into their legislation the right to be registered as a 
conscientious objector at any time, namely before, during or after military service, as well as 
the right of career servicemen to be granted the status of conscientious objector.593 
4.5.1.2. Practice 
The situation in the fifteen Member States of the Council of Europe which retain 
mandatory military service is discussed in the next paragraphs. The analysis is divided into 
three sections; the first discussing the situation with regard to conscientious objection being 
expressed prior to conscription within a specific time frame from the call of incorporation; 
the second concerns the availability of the aforesaid procedure to serving conscripts that are 
already performing military service; and the third, the availability of the right through a 
similar procedure for those who have completed their military service and are automatically 
enlisted to the reserve armed forces of a State. 
As shown in Table 4, the practice in Council of Europe Member States where national 
military service exists up to the present date varies significantly as to the timeframes imposed 
by domestic legislation in the submission of applications. The presence of strict time limits 
may lead to the exclusion of particular categories of individuals, most notably those who 
have commenced their military service and those who have completed their military service 
and may be called for reservist duties. 
593 Recommendation 1742 (2006) (above n 211), para 9. 
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Table 4 - Time limits for the submission of applications 
ICoE Member State 
1 Armenia 
2 Austria 
3 Azerbaijan 
4 Cyprus 
5 Denmark 
6 Estonia 
n Georgia 
8 I Finland 
9 Greece 
10 Moldova 
11 Norway 
12 Russian Federation 
13 Switzerland 
.. 
14 Ukraine 
..... 
Right to"tUbtt\itahappllc~lionforconsclentio~s objictorssfatusat vitrious stages(~fmilita,ysewice\·c; 
- ~~ --¥'~ 
_.A,--!: . ___ ~ 
Prior to conscription During conscription After conscription ~: 
-/ x JC 
-/ x -/ 
Undefined Undefined Undefined 
-/ x -/ 
-/ -/ -/ 
-/ x JC 
-/ JC JC 
-/ -/ -/ 
-/ JC -/ 
-/ JC x 
-/ -/ -/ 
-/ x x 
-/ -/ -/ 
y' x x 
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As illustrated above, the majority of Council of Europe Member States retaining 
national military service requires applications for exemption from military service on grounds 
of conscience to be submitted prior to joining the armed forces. 594 It is noted thatAzerbaijan 
has not yet adopted legisla60n on alternative service, and therefore the procedures with 
regard to the submission of applications for conscientious objector status are presently 
undefmed.595 
At present, only Denmark, Finland, Norway and Switzerland permit applications for 
exemption on grounds of conscience to be submitted by serving conscripts.596 In Austria, 
594 Republic of Armenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, amended in 2004,2006 
and 2013 [in Armenian] English translation on file with the author, Article 4; Austria, Law on Civilian Service -
Bundesgesetziiber den Zivildienst (Zivildienstgesetz 1986 - ZDG) (BGBl. Nr. 496/1980, Art. II Z 1) StF: BGBl. 
Nr. 679/1986 (WV) available at 
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005603>, 
Article 2(2); Republic of Cyprus, National Guard Law of2011, Law No. 19(1)12011, Official Gazette of the 
Republic No. 4271 (I), 25 February 2011, Article 47(3)(c); Denmark, 2006 Civil Service Act 
(MiJitrernregterioven, Law No. 22612006) entered into force 13 March 2006, available at < 
https:llwww.retsinformation.dkIForms/r0710.aspx?id=6464 > accessed 8-9-13, Article 3(3); Estonia, Defence 
Forces Service Act 2000 CRT I 2000, 28, 167; consolidated text RT I 2003,31, 195), entered into force 16 April 
2000 available at <http://www.legaltext.ee/text/enlX40039KlO.htm> accessed on 7 September 2013, Article 76; 
Georgia, 1997 Law on Alternative Service, Law No. 1012 (Tbilisi 28 October 1997) Article 7; Hellenic 
Republic, Law 342112005, Conscription of the Greeks and other provisions, Decision Folder No. 
302/A'113.12.2005, published in the Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic No.302, 13 December 2005, 
available at <http://www.dsanet.grlEpikairothtaINomothesialn3421_05.htm> accessed on 7 September 2013, 
Article 59(3)(a); Finland, Military Service Act, Law no 1442, entered into force 28 December 2007 available at 
<www.finlex.filfi/laki/ajantasal2007/20071446> accessed on 16 March 2013, Article 6; Republic ofMoldova, 
Alternative Service Act, Law no. 633-VII, 9 July 1991, available at 
<http://lex.justice.mdlviewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=312857 &lang=l> accessed on 7 September 
2013, Article 5; Norway, Act no 13 of 19 March 1965 relating to Exemption ofMilitary Service for Reasons of 
Personal Conviction, available at <http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdatallov-19650319-003-eng.pdf> accessed on 
7 September 2013, Article 2; Russian Federation, Federal Law on Alternative Civilian Service, Law no 113-FZ 
as amended on 22 August 2004 No 122-FZ, 31 December 2005 No 211-FZ, 06 July 2006 No 104-FZ, entered 
into force on 25 July 2002 available at <http://antiprizyv.narod.ru/zakon/zoags.htm> accessed 7 September 
2013, Article 3(2); Switzerland, 1995 Federal Law on Civilian Service (Civilian Servie Law, ZDG­
Zivildienstgesetz) as amended in October 2008 available at <http://www.admin.chlopc/de/classified­
compilation/19950281/index.html#al accessed 8-9-13>, Article 1; Ukraine, Law on Alternative (non-military) 
service, VerkhovnaRada ofUkraine (BVR), 1992, No 15, st. 188, enacted by Parliament Decree No 1976-XII of 
12 December 1991, available at <http://zakon4.rada.gov.uallaws/showI766-14/print1378136663292880> 
accessed on 7 September 2013, Article 4. 
595 For further discussion on the case of Azerbaijan see above text accompanying n 371, p. 90. 
596 In Denmark, applying for civilian service is at least two months ahead of the actual start of the service. It is 
also possible to apply for civilian services after starting the compulsory military service. Information obtained 
by the author, provided by the Danish Defence Personnel Organisation, Head ofNational Service Management 
Element, 15 December 2011 [correspondence on file with the author]); Finland, Military Service Act, Law no 
1442, entered into force 28 December 2007 available at <www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasal2007/20071446> 
accessed on 16 March 2013; In Norway, the earliest opportunity for presenting an application for exemption is 
at the enrolment session. After this moment a person may submit an application at any time, even after he has 
finished initial military service. See Act no 13 of 19 March1965 relating to Exemption of Military Service for 
Reasons of Personal Conviction, Article 2. No amendments have been made to this Law as confirmed by the 
Norwegian 1£nistry of Justice and Public Security, 16 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]; 
Switzerland, 1995 Federal Law on Civilian Service, Article 1. 
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Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia,597 domestic legislation does 
not permit serving conscripts to apply for recognition as conscientious objectors. Regarding 
members of the reserve forces (after the completion of military service) Austria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Georgia, Greece, Finland and Norway allow reservists to be recognised as 
conscientious objectors and make themselves liable for civilian, rather than military duties.598 
On the other hand, Armenia, Estonia, Ukraine and the Russian Federation do not permit 
reservists to apply for recognition as conscientious objectors.599 
The guidelines of the United Nations and Council of Europe demonstrate clearly that 
the right of individuals to change their religious and non-religious beliefs means that the 
availability of the right to conscientious objection should be expanded to all stages of military 
service, particularly since the right is now firmly recognised as falling within the scope of 
Article 9 ECHR. Not allowing serving conscripts and reservists to be recognised as 
conscientious objectors is in conflict with the principle that freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion includes the freedom to change religious and non-religious beliefs while in 
military service,60o thus disregarding the fact that serving conscripts may as well develop 
conscientious objections while in military service. Various human rights and non­
597 Austria, 1986 Law on Civilian Service, Article 2(2); Republic of Cyprus, 2011 National Guard Law, Article 
47(3)(c); Estonia, 2000 Defence Forces Service Act, Article 76; Georgia, 1997 Law on Alternative Service, 
Article 7; Hellenic Republic, Law 3421/2005, Article 59(3)(a); Republic of Moldova, 1991 Alternative Service 
Act, Article 5; Ukraine, 1992 Law on Alternati ve (non-military) Service, Article 4; Russian Federation, 2002 
Federal Law on Alternative Civilian Service, Article 3(2). 
598 In Austria applications for reservists are allowed after completion of military service, however the 
application needs to be made within three years of the first day of military service. There is no right to submit a 
conscientious objection application after this date. See Law on Civilian Service (ibid, section 2(2); For Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland and Norway see same legal provisions as above note; Georgia has recently replied to the 
request for information for a UN report that in Georgia persons serving in the reserves can apply for 
conscientious objection to military service. Information was submitted to the European Organisation of Military 
Associations. See Human Rights Council, Analytical report on conscientious objection to military service, 
Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN doc. AIHRC/23/22, 3 June 2013, para 46 
available at <http://www.ohchr.orgiDocuments/HRBodiesIHRCouncillRegularSessioniSessi on23 1A -HRC-23­
22_en.pdf.> accessed on 7 September 2013; In the case of Greece, it is useful to note that until recently, 
reservists did not have the right of conscientious objection, pursuant to Article 59(3)(a) ofLaw 3451/2005, as 
amended by Law 3883/2010, according to which 'those who have carried out military service on any length in 
the Greek or foreign armed forces, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors'. This practice was 
condemned by the Greek Council of State in 2010, when it found in the case of Evangelos Delis, that the 

applicant, who had already served in the armed forces, had the right to object to reservist duties since his 

religious beliefs changed after completing his military service. 

599 The 2003 Law on Alternative Service contains no information as to whether the right is applicable to 

reservists. See. Venice Commission, CDL-REF(2011)050 (above n 492); For Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine and the 

Russian Federation see provisions laid out above in text accompanying fn 597. 

600 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights also provides that 'the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience and religion ... includes freedom to change his religion or belief. See General Comment No. 

22(above n 137), para 5. 
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governmental organisations have criticised this practice and pressed for extending the right of 
conscientious objections to individuals at all stages of military service. 601 
45.2. Independence and impartiality of bodies examining applications 
4.5.2.1. International standards 
The independence, competence and impartiality of tribunals established by law are 
important elements of any judicial system aiming to deliver a fair hearing and an unbiased 
decision to an individua1.602 The present section outlines what has been recommended by 
international human rights bodies with regard to bodies examining applications for 
conscientious objectors status at first instance, i.e. a decision that is determined, for example, 
by an administrative authority that makes an informed decision on the application that may be 
appealed by the applicant. 
Firstly, with regard to first instance decisions delivered by administrative authorities, 
various guidelines on UN human rights bodies indicate that applications submitted by 
individuals for recognition as conscientious objectors must be examined by independent and 
impartial decision-making bodies603 with the task of determining whether a conscientious 
objection is genuine in a specific case.604 This important principle was also restated in 
Resolution 1995/83605 and Resolution 1998177 which further called upon States that do not 
recognise conscientious objection within their domestic legislation, to take into account the 
requirement not to discriminate between conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of 
their particular beliefs' .606 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has also accepted this principle 
in Resolution 337 (1967) which states that 'where the decision regarding the recognition of 
the right of conscientious objection is taken in the first instance by an administrative 
authority, the decision-taking body shall be entirely separate from the military authorities and 
60] Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Spain, CCPRlC!791Add 61, paras 15 and 
20. 

602 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a 

fair trial (Article 14), UN doc. CCPRlC/GC/32, 23 August 2007, para 19. 

603 On this point, see, e.g., Commission on Human Rights,Resolution 1998/77 on conscientious objection to 

military service, UN doc. E/CNAIRES/1998/77, 22 April 1998, para 3. 

604 Commission on Human Rights, Conscientious objection to military service, UN doc. E/CNAIRES/1989/59, 8 

March 1989, para 5. 

605 Resolution 1995/83 (above n 308), para 17. 

606 Resolution 1998/77 (above n 603); Resolution 2006/51 (above n 120), para 37. 
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its composition shall guarantee maximum independence and impartiality' .607 The resolution 
further requires that the decision shall be subject to control by at least one other 
administrative body and subsequently to the control of at least one independent judicial 
body.608 According to Recommendation R (87)8 of the Committee of Ministers, the appeal 
authority shall be separate from the military administration and composed so as to ensure its 
independence.609 The application of this principle to professional members of the armed 
forces is stipulated in Recommendation (2010) 4 of the Committee of Ministers which 
focuses on the human rights of the members of the armed forces. This Recommendation 
emphasises that 'any request to leave the armed forces for reasons of conscience should 
ultimately, where denied, be examined by an independent and impartial body' .610 It is 
therefore clear that consensus among various international and regional human rights bodies 
suggests that the assessment of applications for alternative service based on conscientious 
objection should be under the control of civilian authorities, rather than under the control of 
the military.611 
4.5.2.2. Practice 
As indicated by Table 5 below, the determination of applications for conscientious objectors 
status' in the Member States of the Council of Europe falls within the competence of the 
Ministry of Defence in the majority of the States retaining mandatory military service.This is 
the case in Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Moldova and the Russian 
Federation.612 
607 Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46), para 2. 
608 Ibid, para 3. 
609 CoM Recommendation No. R (87) 8 (above n 194) para 7. 
610 CoM Recommendation CMlRec (2010) 4 (above n 37). 
611 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 644/2011 on the Draft Law on Amendments and Additions to the Law on 
Alternative Service ofArmenia CDL-AD(2011)051). 
612 Republic ofCyprus, National Guard Law of 2011, Law No. 19(1)/2011, Official Gazette ofthe Republic No. 
4271(1),25 February 2011, Article 53. Applications are examined by a Special Committee, which is established 
by the Ministry ofDefence. It is composed offive members in total, including the Chairperson. The Committee 
includes two professors in higher education institutes, specialised in philosophy or social-political sciences or 
psychology, a legal expert from the Law Office of the Republic of Cyprus, and two officers of the Forces, one 
from the Recruitment Department and another from the Sanitary Corps. For every application examined by the 
Special Committee, minutes are kept, which include the opinion regarding the recognition or non-recognition of 
the applicant as a conscientious objector with the purpose of fulfilling alternative military or alternative civilian 
service. The relevant correspondence is submitted to the Minister ofDefence for a final decision, within a month 
from the submission of the relevant file. The opinion of the Committee is, therefore, only provisional and is 
subject to the decision of the Minister of Defence; Estonia, Defence Forces Service Act 2000 (above n 597), 
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Article 41; Conscription Act (Finland - Asevelvollisuuslaki), Law No. 1438,28 December 2007, Article 73, 
available at <http://www.finlex.fi/enllakiikaannoksetl2007/en20071438.pdf.> accessed on 12 February 2013. 
[unofficial English translation]. See also. War Resisters' International (WRI), Country report and updates: 
Finland, available at <www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world _survey/country Jeport/enIFinland> accessed on 11 
February 2013; Republic of Georgia, Laws on Non-Military Alternative Labour Service (above n 597), Article 
8; Hellenic Republic, Law no. 3883/2010 (above n 597), Article 78. According to the Greek Ministry of 
Defence, "'the recognition ofthose wishing to be recognised as conscientious objectors in order to fulfil 
alternative service, is permitted after the decision of the Minister ofDefence, following the opinion of a Special 
Committee, which examines the conditions for recognition of the interested individuals as conscientious 
objectors". Information obtained by the author, provided by the Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Defence­
Department of Military Legal Counselors, Athens, 6 February 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]; 
Republic of Moldova, Alternative Service Act, Law no. 633-VII (above n 597). According to the Ministry of 
Defence, there is a right to appeal the decision of the Ministry ofDefence, to the Court of Justice. Information 
obtained by the author, provided by the Republic of Moldova, Military Cooperation Section - General Staff of 
National Army, 15 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]; Russian Federation, 2002 Federal Law 
on Alternative Civilian Service (above n 597), Article 11. 
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Table 5 - Determination of applications 
~--- --.----~--
CbE MemberSfate DeterminatiOll-ofap(lliJ~tiO~~ fOl"CO status 
;:1~.j-:~-f ~)5:- 'oJ:;:!;, 
Ministry of Defence 
Judldlll control and right of appeal to a.JudiJiil b'O'lJ'y:,~ 
- ~~...-­ ~ -~~ ~~ 
Yes 
2 Austria Ministry ofInterior Yes 
3 Azerbaijan Undefined Undefined 
4 Cyprus Ministry ofDefence Yes 
5 Denmark Ministry ofInterior Yes 
6 
I 
7 
Estonia 
I Georgia 
Ministry of Defence 
Ministry ofDetence 
Yes 
Yes 
8 Finland Ministry ofDefence Yes 
9 Greece Ministry ofDefence Yes 
10 Moldova Ministry ofDefence Yes 
11 Norway Ministry of Justice Yes 
12 Russian Federation Ministry of Defence Yes 
13 
14 
Switzerland 
Ukraine 
Ministry ofEconomic Affairs 
Ministry of Lahour and Social Policy 
Yes 
Yes 
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As far as national military service is concerned, the relationship between the 
individual and the State becomes complicated when an individual refuses to perform military 
service and is subsequently convicted for a violation ofmilitary laws, which then shifts a case 
of evasion to military courts. The nature of this relationship that is created due to military 
law, gives rise to a number of questions: first, can civilians claiming to have a conscientious 
objection to military service be placed under the jurisdiction of a military court to examine 
whether their motives are genuine?; and second, is their right to an impartial tribunal and a 
fair trial under attack when they are placed on trial before a military court? 
As discussed in the previous subsection, there is a wide consensus among 
international human rights bodies suggesting that the applications for discharge on grounds of 
conscience submitted by individuals liable for conscription or those who are already serving 
their military service need be examined by independent and impartial tribunals or bodies 
acting entirely separately from military control, while States should also ensure the 
availability of a right of appeal to an independent civilian judicial body. The European Court 
of Human Rights has stated in a number of cases that Martial Law Courts trying civilians 
cannot be regarded as 'impartial and independent tribunals' .613 This was reiterated 
emphatically by the Court in the 2012 case of conscientious objector Yunus Ercep in a case 
against Turkey, where the Court, finding a violation of Article 6 ECHR held that a trial 
before a military court composed exclusively of military officers had created a legitimate fear 
to the applicant that the tribunal would be unduly influenced and biased.614 
In other Member States, the institutional framework concerning conscientious 
objection applications appears to be in line with the principle of impartiality and 
independence of the administrative bodies which assess those applications. In Norway 
applications are examined by the Ministry of Justice;615 in Austria and Denmark by the 
613 Sahinen v. Turkey (Unreported, 25 September 2001), Ergin v. Turkey (no.6) App no. 47533/99, ECHR 2006­
IV, para 54; Duzgoren v. Turkey, App no. 56827/00,9 November 2006, para 20. 
6J4 Ercep v. Turkey (above n 298) para 68. 
615 In Norway, applications of a standard form are available from the Ministry of Justice. Even though the 
military body ('vernepliktsverket') handles the application, the final decision is taken by the Ministry ofJustice 
and can be challenged in a Court if the applicant wishes to appeal the decision though the Ministry of Justice 
and Social Security. Even though in some cases an applicant may be called to submit further information in 
relation to their application for exemption on conscientious objection grounds, according to NGOs, since 2001 
no personal interview takes place during the application procedure, therefore applications are almost granted 
automatically.lnformation obtained by the author, provided by the Kingdom ofNorway, Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security,16 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. See also M. Stolwijk (above n 25), 
p.52. 
147 
Ministry of Interior;616 and in Switzerland by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Central 
Civilian Service Authorities).617 In Ukraine, applications are examined by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy which, as noted above, only accepts applications from objectors 
based on religious grounds.618 In Armenia, according to the national law on alternative 
service, applications are considered by a 'Republican Commission' .619 According to Article 
11 of the 2003 Law on Alternative Service, 'if the Republican Commission rejects the 
application of a citizen for replacing compulsory military service by alternative service, the 
draftee shall have the right to appeal against the decision to the court, in a manner prescribed 
by law, within a period of one month from the day of adopting it.'62o With regard to Armenia, 
it is worth noting that the previous criticism of the domestic laws on alternative service by the 
Venice Commission has resulted in positive amendments of the law so as it now stands.621 
In the Republic of Greece, the Minister of Defence has the [mal say in the 
determination of granting conscientious objector status to an applicant, following the opinion 
of a Special Committee which examines the conditions for recognition of persons as 
conscientious objectors either through documentation submitted or by interview if this is 
required. According to Article 61 of Law 342112005, the Special Committee comprises of 
two professors of higher education institutions specialising in philosophy or social-political 
616 War Resisters' International (WRl), Country report and updates: Austria, available at <www.wri­
irg.org/programmes/world _survey/country Jeport/enlAustria> accessed on 11 February 2013; Information 
obtained by the author, provided by the Kingdom of Denrnark, Danish Defence Personnel Organisation,15 
December 2011 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
617 WRI, Country report and updates: Switzerland, available at <www.wri­
irf.org/programmes/world_survey/countryJeport/eniSwitzerland> accessed on 14 May 2013. 
61 WRI, Country report and updates: Ukraine, available at <www.wri­
irg.org/programmes/world_survey/countryJeport/enlUkraine> accessed on 14 May 2013. 
619 Article 6 states that a 'local call-up commission' is set up locally to handle the application at first instance. 
According to Article 4 this is a standing committee made up of one representative each from: the Territorial 
Administration Ministry; the Healthcare Ministry; the Labour and Social Affairs Ministry; the Education and 
Science Ministry; the Police; the Defence Ministry; and the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious 
Affairs. See Republic of Armenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, amended in 
2004,2006 and 2013 [in Armenian]. 
620 Venice Commission, Draft law on amendments and additions to the law on altemati ve service (including the 
law in force) of Armenia, CDL-REF(2011)050rev (above n 492). 
621 The Commission was of the view that the failure to define the term 'Republican Commission' was in 
violation of Article 9 ECHR because any interference with the right must be 'prescribed by law'. The principle 
involves an obligation for a legal requirement to have some basis in domestic law, therefore, what the Venice 
Commission argues is that any decision taken by the 'Republican Commission' may be chaUanged as not being 
'prescribed by law'. See Venice Commission, Opinion no. 644/2011 on the Draft Law on Amendments and 
Additions to the Law on Alternative Service ofAnnenia CDL-AD(2011)051). 
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science or psychology, a legal counselor assistant legal counsel and two military officers, 
one from Recruiting Department and one from the Sanitary Corps ofthe Armed Forces.622 
In 13 Member States retaining conscription, with the exception of Azerbaijan where 
the law remains undefined, the decision of the said administrative authorities with regard to 
granting conscientious objection status to an applicant is subject to judicial control, as the 
applicant has the right to appeal the decision to a judicial body. 
4.5.3. Availability of information 
4.5.3.1. International standards 
The Commission on Human Rights has been placing emphasis on the availability of 
information to all persons affected by military service, including the procedures for applying 
to be exempted from military service for reasons of conscience and the means of acquiring 
conscientious objector status, both prior and during the conscription process. 
In 1992, the UN Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance stated that individuals 
should be given full information about their rights and responsibilities and about the 
procedures to be followed when seeking recognition as conscientious objectors.623 In 1995, 
the Commission on Human Rights affmned the importance of the availability of infozmation 
about the right to conscientious objection to military service, and the means of acquiring 
conscientious objector status to all persons affected by military service. 624 This has been 
further restated in other United Nations documents625 and more recently in the 2006 report of 
the Commission.626 
The Council of Europe had also acknowledged this requirement in Resolution 337 
(1967) where it is stated that 'persons liable for military service should be informed, when 
notified of their call-up or prospective call-up, of the rights they are entitled to exercise,.627 
According to Recommendation No. R (87) 8, persons liable to conscription shall be infozmed 
in advance of their rights. This is reiterated further in PACE Recommendation 1518 
622 Law no. 251011997, 'Law Regulating the Military Obligations of Certain Categories of Conscripts, 
Insubordinates and Soldiers, Amending Provisions of the Military Legislation and Establishing Alternative 
Service and Other Provisions', Official Gazette Paper No.1, 27 June 1997, Article 6l. 
623 Resolution 1992/52 (above n 303), para 185. 
624 Resolution 1995/83 (above n 308), para 8; E/CNAI2004/55 (above n 45), para 38(i). 
625 Resolution 1998177 (above n 117), para 8. 
626 E/CNAI2006/51 (above n120), paras 32-33. 
627 PACE Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46).The duty to inform potential conscripts of their rights is also 
reiterated in PACE Recommendation 816 (1977) (above n 191). 
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(2001).628 The text of the recommendation goes further to suggest that the State shall provide 
individuals affected by military service with all relevant information directly or allow private 
organisations concerned to furnish that information.629 
In 2001, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights reported that information 
on the means of obtaining conscientious objector status was not sufficiently available to 
interested parties in the Council of Europe.63o On that basis, the Directorate General of 
Human Rights repeated in its report that persons liable to conscription must be informed in 
advance by the Ministry of Labour and other bodies concerned, about their rights including 
options to perform alternative civilian service in public and private organisations.631 
Recommendation 1742 (2006) further emphasises that members of the armed forces must be 
informed of their rights and receive training to heighten their awareness of human rights. 632 
This principle extends to professional members of the armed forces. 633 
4.5.3.2. Practice 
The principle that information on the procedures available for opting out of military 
service on grounds of conscience should be available to individuals liable to perform military 
service is grounded to the procedural rules and guidelines that are in place in the Member 
States of the Council of Europe. National legislation in most cases does not contain any 
reference to the process of bringing these procedures to the attention of persons affected by 
military service. However most of the necessary information is publicly available on the 
Internet, via websites of the departments handling alternative civilian service. 
In Council of Europe Member States retaining national military service, the situation 
is as described below. In Moldova, according to information provided by the Ministry of 
Defence, recruits are informed about the legislation in Territorial Army recruitment 
628 PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) (above n 168), para 5(iii). 

629 Recommendation No.R (87) 8 (above n 194) para. 3. 

630 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on the Exercise ofthe right ofconscientious 

objection to military service in Council o/Europe Member States, Rapporteur: Dick Marty, doc. 8809 (revised), 

4 May 2001. 

631 DG-HL(2002) (above n 546), para 16. 

632 See CoM Recommendation 1742 (2006) (above n 211) para 10.5 'members of the armed forces should be 

informed of their rights, and in particular the right to leave the armed forces for reasons of conscience and the 

r:rocedures available to exercise them' . 

33 CMlRec (2010) 4 (above n 37). 
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centres,634 and infonnation regarding the right of conscientious objection and a full database 
of the Moldovan legislation on military service is publicly available online.635 In Norway, 
infoooation on the right to refuse military service is provided during the enrolment session, 
while specific infonnation on the legal framework and procedures available to exercise the 
right to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience is also available on the 
online databases of military bodies. 636 In Cyprus, general infonnation on applying for 
conscientious objector's status may be sought from local Recruitment Offices of the National 
Guard.637 In Finland, potential conscripts are informed of their rights upon their call-up, 
including the right to be exempted from military service and the available procedures, while 
more detailed information regarding the right to conscientious objection is found in the 
annual brochure distributed to new conscripts which is also publicly available on the website 
of the Finnish Ministry of Defence.638 Infonnation regarding the right to conscientious 
objection in Greece is available online and can be easily found in the official website of the 
Hellenic Recruitment Directorate; the document comprehensively outlines the legal 
framework, the length of military service, the necessary documents that need to be produced 
by an applicant, the deadlines for submission and the established procedures related to the 
admissibility and consideration of a claim for exemption on grounds of conscience.639 
In Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Switzerland and the Russian Federation, 
information on the procedures available for exercising the right to exemption from military 
service on grounds of conscience is available from official governmental websites. 64o In 
634 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Republic of Moldova, Ministry of Defence, Chief 
International Treaties Implementation Service - Military Cooperation Section (General Staff ofNational Army), 
15 March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
635 Ministry ofJustice ofthe Republic of Moldova <wwwJustice.md>accessed on 22 November 2012. 
636 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 16 
March 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
637 Information obtained by the author, provided by theCypriot Ministry of Defence, Recruitment Division­
Department for the Application of Military Legislation, 4 July 2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
633 The Ministry of Defence (Finland), Conscript 2011: A guidefor you who are preparing to cany out your 
military service (Edita Prima Oy, Helsinki, 2010) available at 
<http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcml9791 bc80458b5dd8bObbba49521 bfd22IV arusmies _2011_ sisus+eng.pdf? 
MOD=AJPERES> accessed on 13 March 2013, p.17, 
639 Ministry of Defence (Greece) - Department of Military Legal Advisors, Informational document for those 
wishing to be recognised as conscientious objectors availablet at 
<http://www.stratologia.gr/pdf/%CE%AO%CE%9B%CE%97%CE%Al %CE%9F%CE%A6%CE%9F%CE%A 
1 %CE%99%CE%91 %CE%9A %CE%9F%20%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%A4%CE%A5%CE%AO%CE%9F%20 
26.pdf>accessed on 13 March 2013. 
640 Austria, Vollzugsstellefur den Zivildienst (Civil Service Agency of the Republic of Austria) available at 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cmslzivildienst/platzangebot/accessedon7September2013;Denmark.Military 
Personnel Service available at <http://forsvaret.dklfptlPages/default.aspx> accessed on 7 September 2013; 
Estonia, Estonian Information Services Authority, available at 
<https:l/www.eesti.ee/engitopics/riigikaitse!ajateenistus _l/asendusteenistus> accessed 7 September 2013; 
Georgia - Law on non-military (labour) service available on the website of the Ministry of Justice, available at 
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Ukraine no information is available through the Ministry of Defence or any other 
governmental bodies responsible for the administration of alternative service. However the 
applicable legislation on alternative service is available from the website of the Institute of 
Religious Freedom, a non-governmental organisation based in KyiV. 641 In Armenia which has 
recently amended its national legislation on alternative service, information on the application 
procedure is not available from the official website of the Armenian Ministry of Defence. 
However, general information regarding applying for conscientious objectors status is 
provided by non-governmental organisations.642 Lastly, in Azerbaijan no infonnation exists 
since a law on alternative civilian service has not yet been adopted. 643 
4.6. Current issues, best practices and future challenges 
An assessment of standards and practice shows that developing norms of the right to 
conscientious objection are now becoming more readily accepted in the domestic legal order 
of Council of Europe Member States. In States where domestic legislation is lacking due to 
unclear provisions or the absence of a legal framework conforming to international standards, 
regional human rights bodies provide valuable assistance. In Armenia for example, the work 
of the Venice Commission has enabled the considerable improvement of domestic legislation 
which has seen a number of important amendments within the last years. 
In countries where legislation on alternative service has been in place, the 
implementation of minimum international standards on conscientious objection to military 
service shows significant variations across the Member States of the organisation. These 
differences do not simply exist as a result of the variable socio-political climate and the vast 
geographical spectrum of the 47 member states of the organisation, but also due to the 
miscellaneous methods of constructing the national armed forces of a State, such as national 
military service, all-voluntary systems of conscription or the employment and training of 
fully-professional military personnel on a contractual basis. Despite these variations in 
<https:llmatsne.gov .ge/index.php?option=corn_ldmssearch&view=doc View&id= 114898> accessed 7 
September 2013; Switzerland, Swiss Confederation Central Office for Civilian Service (zivi) available at 
<http://www.zivi.admin.ch/accessed 7-9-13>; Russia, Ministry of Defence oftbe Russian Federation, available 
at <http://recrut.mil.ruIcareer/altemative.htm> accessed 7 September 2013. 
641 Institute for Religious Freedom, Kyiv, Legislation available at 
<http://www.irs.in.ualindex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=164:1&catid=39:1u&Itemid=66&lang= 
ru> accessed 7 September 2013. 
642 Forum 18 News Service, available at <http://www.forum18.org/archive.pbp?artic1ejd=1844> accessed on 7 
September 2013. 
643 See discussion in above section 4.2.2. 
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observing minimum standards, the majority of the organisation's Member States have been 
amending their domestic legislation to comply with international human rights norms. 
In most Member States both religious and non-religious grounds are accepted as valid 
grounds of conscientious objection, with the exception of Ukraine and Azerbaijan which 
seem to allow exceptions only on religious grounds. Those States have been criticised by 
international human rights bodies for discriminatory legislation on the basis of different 
beliefs. The unequal application of the law to religious and non-religious manifestations of 
conscience is, by reference to the treaty provisions protecting the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and the principle of non-discrimination, not in conformity to 
international standards. It has also been demonstrated that, political grounds are rarely 
accepted as valid justifications for a genuine conscientious objection, with Norway being the 
only Member State in the Council of Europe accepting political grounds for objection. 
Regarding the length of military service in relation to civilian service, there is a 
minimum requirement that alternative civilian service must not be punitive, meaning that its 
duration cannot exceed the duration of military service to the extent to which it is viewed as a 
deterrent or a punishment to the objector. 644 Even though different views are given as to what 
can be reasonably expected as a non-punitive duration for such service, the Human Rights 
Committee had found in two instances that the double length of alternative civilian service in 
France before the suspension of national military service in the country had been 
discriminatory.645 The European Committee of Social Rights has come to similar conclusions 
in 2000 with regard to the length of alternative civilian service in Greece. 646 As an indication 
of good practice, a number of Council of Europe Member States have equalised the length of 
military and civilian alternative service, while on the other hand, only five Member States are 
requesting a considerably longer alternative civilian service from conscientious objectors.647 
As to the nature and character of military service, it has been recommended that any 
alternative civilian duties undertaken by conscientious objectors must be work of national 
importance, purely civilian in nature and in the public interest.648 While in the majority of the 
Member States of the Council of Europe this principle is endorsed by national legislation, it 
has been observed that the use of conscientious objectors as labour for private companies in 
644 European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 1993 on respect for human rights in the European Community. 

645 Foin v. France (1999) (above n 502), para 10.3; Maille v France (2000) (above n 503), para lOA. 

646 ECSR, Complaint No. 8/2000 against Greece (above n 506). 

647 See Chapter 5.1. 
648 PACE Resolution 337 (1967) (above n 46); eM Recommendation No.R (87) 8 (above n 194). 
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the Russian Federation is in direct conflict with this principle, and also the principle 
stipulating that alternative service must comply with the personal convictions of the 
individual concerned.649 Despite the maintenance and administration of alternative civilian 
service being under non-military control in the majority of the Member States of the Council 
of Europe, in Armenia, Cyprus, Greece and the Russian Federation the sole responsibility of 
administering alternative service lies with the Ministry of Defence and once applicants are 
granted conscientious objector's status, they are under military controL650 This is 
contradictory to the long-standing principle that the control of alternative civilian service 
undertaken by conscientious objectors must be in principle civilian. 
Procedural guarantees found in national legislation are largely based on the 
recommendations laid out in international and regional standard-setting texts. The existence 
of suitable time limits for the submission of applications for discharge on grounds of 
conscience is a fundamental aspect of these procedural guarantees; it is encouraged that the 
right to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience must be available in all 
different stages of military life, i.e. before, during and after military service. A discharge 
from military service and access to alternative civilian service should therefore be available 
to potential conscripts (persons liable to military service), serving conscripts, as well as 
reservists. It has also been recommended that persons affected by military service must be 
informed of their rights and procedures available in exercising them.651 The right of 
conscientious objection in the majority of the Member States of the Council of Europe is 
available prior to commencing national military service, with the exception of Azerbaijan 
which has not yet adopted a law on alternative service. 652 On the other hand, the right of 
conscientious objection is recognised for serving conscripts only in a limited number of 
States, namely Denmark, Finland and Norway.653 In relation to reservists, six Member States 
allow the right to be invoked by persons belonging to the reserve forces of the military,654 
while five Member States do not accept applications from reservists. 655 In relation to the 
independence and impartiality of bodies examining applications for exemption on grounds of 
649 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations (Russian Federation) 2006, para 17 (above n 560). 

650 In the Republic of Cyprus for example, the law specifically specifies that conscientious objectors are 

controlled and supervised by the military forces in their daily activities and duties. See. Article 55(4) National 

Guard Law No. 20 of 1964 (as amended in 2008 and 2011). 

651 Commission on Human Rights, UN doc. E/CNAI1992/52 (above n 303) 

652 See discussion above in section 4.5.1.2 

653 See discussion above in section 4.5.2.1 and in particular fn 596. 

654 Ibid. 

655 See discussion above in section 4.5.2.1 and in particular fn 599. 
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conscience, the detennination of applications in the majority of the Member States is under 
the Ministry of Defence.656 
Lastly, the final component of the identified procedural guarantees considers the 
availability of infonnation for persons affected by military service, where it has been shown 
that a number of Member States are adopting good practices, such as infonning potential 
conscripts of their rights and duties prior to commencing national military service through 
accessible publications, brochures and booklets.657 Moreover, due to the expansion of the 
Internet, and emerging nonns on freedom of infonnation, the majority of Member States of 
the Council of Europe are making available information relevant to the rights of military 
personnel, including the right to conscientious objection, in the web sites of bodies liable for 
the administration of alternative civilian service. 
656 Ibid. 

657 See discussion above in section 4.5.3.2 and in particular fn 634. 
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Chapter 5: Beyond conscription: The right to conscientious objection and professional 
members of the armed forces 
5.1. Introduction 
The present chapter explores the way in which the right to conscientious objection 
extends to professional members of the armed forces. It examines how principles and norms 
related to conscientious objections may be applied to professional members of the armed 
forces seeking a discharge from military duties on grounds of conscience, and outlines the 
existing standards available in this regard. The third section is based on a survey of the 
situation in the Council of Europe with regard to States that extend the right to be exempted 
from military duties on grounds of conscience to professional military personnel and 
identifies the most significant gaps, best practices and future challenges. 
5.2. Selective conscientious objection 
Selective conscientious objection is often perceived as a concept in conflict with what 
has been traditionally protected as a manifestation of the pacifist ideology: an opposition to 
all forms of violence and particularly the use of lethal force. 658 It is therefore comprehensible 
that professional members of the armed forces could be facing greater legal challenges if 
wishing to be discharged from the obligation to participate in particular military operations or 
be discharged from particular duties on the basis of a selective conscientious objection. In 
such cases however, other means of discharge or early termination of contract may be 
sought.659 The pacifist ideology does not accept that war can ever be justified; therefore the 
acceptance of claims of selective conscientious objection as a valid ground for discharge on 
grounds of conscience has been far more controversial than absolute conscientious objection. 
Nevertheless, some commentators are in favour of granting protection to military personnel 
658 See definition in Chapter 1, section 1.5. 
659 A survey conducted by the author, based on information received by competent Ministries across the 
Member States of the Council of Europe, indicates that only a small number of Member States recognise a right 
of selective conscientious objection to particular military operations in their legislation. The governments of the 
United Kingdom and Croatia replied that, although they do provide for a right of selective conscientious 
objection or recognise the term in their national laws, applications may be considered on their individual merits 
and an honorary discharge or early termination of contract may be granted on compassionate grounds. Germany 
allows for selective conscientious objections if it is demonstrated that a military intervention may be in conflict 
with customary rules of international law, however this is not stipulated in national legislation on conscientious 
objection. See Chapter 5, Section 7 for a more detailed discussion. 
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having an objection to deployment within specific conflict situations66o , even though it is 
acknowledged that the broad range of grounds that could justify selective conscientious 
objection could potentially cause problems in the processing of claims.661 
It is also worthy of consideration that the recognition of the right for military 
personnel to make decisions regarding their personal involvement in specific military 
operations could be perceived as being in conflict with established codes of military 
discipline and encouraging the politicisation of members of the armed forces. The credibility 
and genuineness of conscientious objection claims by serving members of the armed forces 
are largely affected by external factors related to the legality of particular military i 

operations.662 Such an example may be found in the large number of conscientious objection 
applications in States that participated in the US-led military action against Iraq, of which the ! 

legal basis remains contested.663 
Even though governments may be reluctant to recognise a legal right to selective 
conscientious objection, perhaps owing to a fear that this could obstruct or negatively affect 
the morale and consistency of their armed forces, one should not disregard that individuals I 

with an ethically-driven objection to a particular military operation may hold a genuine basis 
to support a discharge from military duties on grounds of conscience. The lack of clear 
guidelines providing for the exemption of individuals from military duties when selective 
conscientious objections arise, could lead to sentencing persons that may otherwise have a 
genuinely-held conscientious objection for disobeying a lawful command.664 
5.3. International standards 
It follows from the discussion above that domestic procedures for exemption from 
military duties on grounds ofconscience may be more complicated for professional members 
of the armed forces than conscripts. This is due to the fact that those who are employed on a 
permanent basis in the armed forces of a State would need stronger evidence to establish that 
their beliefs changed while in service and that this forbids them from engaging in military 
660 G. Clifford, 'Legalizing Selective Conscientious Objection', Public Reason, vol. 3 (2011), p. 22. 

661 G. Wilson, 'Selective Conscientious Objection in the Aftermath ofIraq: Reconsidering Objection to a 

Specific War', The International Journal o/Human Rights, vol. 12 (2008), p.665. 

66:: Khan v Royal Air Force Summary Appeal Court [2004J EWHC 2230 (admin) on 7th October 2004. 

6631. Yoo, 'International Law and the War in Iraq', American Journal o/International Law, vol. 97 (2003), p. 
563. 

654 United Kingdom, Anned Forces Act 2006 (c. 52), Art. 12. See also Lyons v R [2011] EWCA Crim 2808,

Judgment of I December 2011. 
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activities, either in general or in particular military operations. It may however be argued, that 
as discussed in the first chapter, and according to the recommendations of various 
international and regional human rights bodies, conscientious objections to military service 
may develop in military personnel while in service, and steps need to be taken to extend the 
protection of the right equally to all individuals affected by military service. In this regard, 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in its 2001 Report held that permanent 
members of the armed forces should in certain circumstances also be able to apply for 
conscientious objector status.665 
Similarly, in Recommendation 1518 (2001) PACE accordingly recommended that the 
Committee of Ministers invite those Member States that have not yet done so to introduce 
into their legislation, the right for pennanent members of the armed forces to apply for the 
granting of conscientious objector status.666 
The principle was endorsed by the Committee of Ministers in Recommendation No. 
CM/Rec (2010) 4 which provides the most advanced and detailed account of the rights of 
both conscripted and professional members of the armed forces. According to the 
recommendation, professional members of the armed forces should be able to leave the 
armed forces for reasons of conscience.667 The Committee ofMinisters was influenced by the 
findings of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,668 which highlights that 
the application of the right to conscientious objection to persons who voluntarily serve in the 
armed forces is based on the view that an individual's deeply held convictions can evolve and 
that individuals voluntarily serving in armed forces may over time develop conscientious 
b·· b· 669o ~ectlOn to eanng arms. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation CM(2010)4 emphasises the changing 
nature of conscientious beliefs and provides that: 
[ ... ] a person's beliefs, either religious or philosophical, are not fixed in time 
and therefore the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religious 
cannot be reduced to the time before joining the armed forces. A 
serviceperson's beliefs may also evolve when experiencing specific situations, 
665 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, doc. 8809 (2001) (above n 630). 

666 PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) (above n 168) para 5(ii). 

667 Ibid, para 42. 

668 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook on Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedoms ofArmed Forces Personnel (OSCEIODIHR, 2008),avaiJabJe at 

<http://www.osce.orglodihr/31393>accessed on 18 April 2012, p.46. 

669 UN doc. E/CNAI2006/51 (above n 120). 
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notably in armed conflict. Professional members of the armed forces should 
have the right to make a request to leave the armed forces for reasons of 
conscience which should be examined within a reasonable time. Pending the 
examination of such request, the requester should be transferred to non­
combat duties where possible.67o 
The Committee of Minister's Recommendation (2010)4 can, therefore, be said to have 
set out a requirement where professional members of the armed forces should not be 
persecuted if they are holding a valid conscientious objection and should not be denied the 
opportunity to make a request for exemption from military duties if such an objection arises. 
Yet, as the next section will reveal, the situation at national level in the Member States of the 
Council of Europe demonstrates that extending the protection of the right to professional 
members of the armed forces is a widely contested question. 
The question whether the European Convention on Human Rights applies to professional 
members of the armed forces is often a matter of controversy at national level, particularly as 
far as the extraterritorial application of the Convention is concerned in cases where soldiers 
are deployed outside of the Council of Europe.671 The applicability of the Convention with 
regard to the right to a fair trial for particular groups of individuals, including soldiers and 
prisoners is according to the European Court of Human Rights subject to the 'very nature of 
the offence in question,672. For example, the unauthorised absence of professional military 
personnel (most commonly known as 'absence without leave' ('AWOL') or 'desertion') 
would give rise to a disciplinary offence that is subject to military rather than civilian 
scrutiny, even though the right to an effective appeal to a civil tribunal is safeguarded by 
international and regional human rights treaties. 
670 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation CM(2010)4 
add 2final, 1077 meeting, 24 February 2010, para H. 
671 See R(on the application ofSmith) (FC) (Respondent) v. Secretary ofState for Defence (Appellant) and 
another [2010] UKSC 29, where the UK Supreme Court did not find that individuals serving in the anned 
forces have the same Convention (ECHR) rights as civilians. The issue whether British soldiers killed during 
military operations abroad were, at the time of their deaths, within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for 
the purposes of Article 1 ECHR has been examined in Allbutt, Ellis and Smith v MOD [2012] EWCA Civ 1365, 
where the Court of Appeal on its decision of 19 October 2012 ruled that the claims under Article 2 should be 
struck out on the basis that the soldiers did not fall within the scope ofthe United Kingdom's Convention 
jurisprudence. 
672 See Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, App nos. 7819177 and 7878/77, Series A no. 80, p. 36, Judgment 
of28 June 1984, para 71. The case makes a distinction between'criminal' and 'disciplinary' offences for the 
purposes of the Convention. 
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5.4. The situation in the Council of Europe 
The recruitment of fully professional military personnel to replace conscripted armies 
has been a recent phenomenon: the ovexwhelming majority of Council of Europe Member 
States has transitioned from conscripted to professional armies since 1995. At the present 
time, almost two thirds of the Member States of the Council of Europe maintain fully 
professional armies.673 The rights of professional staff members and, in particular, the right to 
be discharged from military service on grounds of conscience for those who voluntarily join 
the alIDed forces on their own free will, for a fixed or indeterminate period of time, have 
recently been the object of attention by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
which acknowledge, in a 2010 recommendation, that members of the armed forces do not 
surrender their human rights and fundamental freedoms upon joining the armed forces .674 
The relationship between professional service personnel and the Armed Forces is 
significantly different from the relationship between the Armed Forces and conscripts, liable 
for national military service for a defined period of time. Professional servicepersons enter 
into a contract of employement with the Armed Forces, and are expected to carry out specific 
contractual duties.675 Conscripts, on the other hand, retain most of their rights as civilians 
when conscripted into the armed forces and cannot be regarded as 'volunteers', waiving their 
rights without their free and uninformed opinion. 676 
The question of the recognition of the right to conscientious objection for professional 
staff members of the armed forces remained unexplored until 2006, when PACE adopted its 
first Recommendation recognising that the ending ofconscription and the professionalisation 
of the armed forces in several countries created new needs.677 It thus requested that the 
Council of Europe promote respect for human rights within the army ranks and increase 
human rights awareness among their own military personne1.678 Most recently in 2010, the 
Committee of Ministers' Recommendation added emphasis on the need to ensure that the 
governments are complying with the principles set out in the Council of Europe's 
recommendations both in law and practice, not only in relation to conscripts but also in 
673 See above Table 1 - Overview ofthe current situation in the Council of Europe, p. 86. 
674 Recommendation CMlRec(2010)4 (Explanatory Memorandum), CM Doc CM(2010)4 add2 final, p. 21. 
675 c.c. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organisation', Armed Forces and Society, 
vol. 1 (1977), p.4l. 
676 P. Rowe, The Impact ofHuman Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.52. 
677 PACE, Recommendation 1742 (2006) (above n 211). 
678 PACE, Recommendation 1742 (2006) (above n 211), para 3. 
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relation to the civil, political and economic rights of professional members of the anned 
forces. 
In Member States which have transformed their armed forces to employ all-volunteer 
professional personnel, the dissemination of information regarding the rights of armed forces 
personnel and particularly the right to conscientious objection is less frequent, particularly 
due to the fact that a legal framework has not yet been established to recognise such a right 
for professional members of the armed forces. 
In the Republic of Ireland there is no procedure set out for the examination of 
applications for exemption based on conscientious grounds.679 In the Netherlands, 
professional members of the armed forces are infonned of their rights at the initial training 
for all personnel, as part of the curriculum for basic training.68o In Portugal, while 
conscription was in place, citizens were adequately and mandatorily informed by the Cabinet 
of Civil Service of Conscientious Objectors, local municipalities and recruitment centres, of 
the rules and requirements of the Law on Conscription at the time of conscription and before 
incorporation and admission to the Armed Forces. However it is unclear whether professional 
servicepersons in Portugal are currently informed in their contracts of the possibility of 
terminating their contract on a conscientious basis.681 In Slovakia, information on the rights 
and obligations of military personnel are available through the military administrative offices 
in military units and facilities, and in electronic form through the website of the Ministry of 
Defence.682 In Slovenia, professional members of the armed forces are informed of their 
rights and the procedures available to exercise them before enlistment in the Slovenian 
Armed Forces.683 
The principle stipulating that professional members of the armed forces should have 
the right to be discharged from their duties if they developed a genuine conscientious 
objection, has not yet been well-accepted by the majority of the Member States of the 
679 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Republic of Ireland, C&A Branch (Entry and 

Promotion), 21 March 2012 [information on file with the author]. 

680 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Legal Affairs­

Department of Intemational and Policy Issues, 13 March 2012 [information on file with the author]. 

681 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Portuguese Embassy in London in communication with 

the Portuguese Ministry ofNational Defence (General Director), 11 July 2012 [information on file with the 

author]. 

682 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, Defence 

Policy, International Relations and Legislation Department (Human Resources Policy and Strategy Section), 

May 2012 [information on file with the author]. 

683 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Embassy ofthe Republic of Slovenia in London 

(www.london.veleposlanistvo.si). 23 May 2012, [information on file with the author]. 
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Council of Europe. The research undertaken for this thesis indicates that only six out of the 
twenty-seven Member States with professional armies recognise such a right either by 
legislation or through domestic policies and procedures. These are the United Kingdom684 , 
Gerrnany685, the Netherlands686, Portugal687, Sweden688 and Switzerland.689 It is interesting to 
note that, according to information received via a survey questionnaire to relevant Ministries 
across the Member States to the Council of Europe, various domestic bodies have suggested 
that professional members of the armed forces may be able to withdraw from their contract 
on compassionate grounds, not necessarily having to prove that they have an objection of 
conscience. This may justify the considerably small number of applications made on grounds 
of conscientious objection in the Member States under consideration. In this regard, the 
French Board member of the European Bureau of Conscientious Obj ection has submitted that 
the French authorities rarely receive applications for exemption on grounds of conscience by 
professional members of the armed forces. 69o It may thus be argued that the number of 
applications for exemption from military duties on grounds of conscience has been reduced 
where transition from conscription to fully professional armies took place due to altemative 
grounds for applicants to rely on. 
Conscription has been suspended in the United Kingdom since 1963. The right of 
conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces is provided in 
administrative procedures for each of the three services of the British armed forces (Army,691 
684 The United Kingdom has a tripartite system of recognising the right of its professional members of staff to 
seek discharge on grounds of conscience. These are provided in the following domestic procedures. For 
members of the territorial army: AP3392 vol. 5, Leaflet 113, Procedure for Dealing with Conscientious 
Objectors within the Royal Air Force; For all members ofthe Royal Navy: Personnel, Legal, Administrative and 
General Orders 0801, Application for Discharge on Grounds of Conscientious Objection. For all members ofthe 
Regular, Territorial and Reserve Forces: Instruction 006 - Retirement or Discharge on Grounds of Conscience. 
685 Right to conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces in constitutionally protected. 
See. Constitution of Germany <http://www.bundestag.de/ 
dokumente/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetzlindex.html>. English translation at 
<http://www.servat.unibe.chiicl/gmOOOOO_.html>accessed on 27 December 2011. 
686 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, Directorate of 
Legal Affairs, Department ofIntemational Legal and Policy Issues, 13 March 2012[information on file with the 
author]. 
687 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Portuguese Embassy in London upon communication 
with the Ministry ofNational Defence, Reference No. 10.11 Proc. 1I20l2, V/Oficio n.886, 18 June 2012. 
688 WRI, Country report and updates: Sweden, available at <www.wri­
irg.org/programmes/world _survey/country JeportieniSweden>accessed on 10 February 2013. 
689 CIA, World Factbook, Europe: Switzerland <https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world­
factbook/geos/sz.html>accessed on 10 February 2013. 
690 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Board member ofEBCO (European Bureau of 

Conscientious Objection) upon personal communication, 30 January 2012 [correspondence on file with the 

author]. 

691 Instruction 006 - Retirement or Discharge on Grounds of Conscience. 

162 
-

- -------------....... ..... 

Navy,692 Royal Air Force693). Claims are handled administratively in the applicant's chain of 
command. These procedures are not statutory regulations, but procedures for administrative 
action and are therefore not found in either primary or secondary legislation. A discharge is 
made on compassionate grounds but the availability of this right is not reflected anywhere in 
the call-out materials received by professional servicemen, including the 'tenns of service' 
for each of the three categories. In addition to this, access to the procedure for registering a 
conscientious objection is largely unknown to serving personne1.694 The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations of 2009, shows that there is still 
the need to make these procedure more visible, because, as the Memorandum explains, 
making the regulations on enlistment more visible by including them in a statutory 
instrument, ensures not only that they are properly scrutinised, but also that they are 
published and that servicemen may easily ascertain their rights and obligations.695 
In the case of Khan v. RAF,696 concerning the refusal of a reservist to serve at the time 
of the invasion of Iraq, the appellant was charged with the offence of being 'absent without 
leave', since he did not submit any documents explaining to the Royal Air Force that he had a 
conscientious objection to the said service. The High Court accepted that the 1997 regulations 
were accessible, even if their effect had not been expressly made part at the stage of call-out 
of the reservist (the appellant), nevertheless it emphasised that 'the call-out materials in this 
case, like the 1997 Regulations, do not mention conscientious objection expressly. In that 
respect, it would seem that the infonnation provided to the recalled reservist could be 
improved. ,697 While acknowledging the practical issues created by the absence of a clear 
legal framework regulating objections made on grounds of conscience, the Court maintained 
the view that the regulations are practically effective and can therefore protect a person 
wishing to be discharged on grounds of conscience, provided that a sincere and genuine claim 
is held by the applicant. 
The Court in Khan had dismissed the claim that conscientious objection was protected 
under Article 9 ECHR. At the time, the position of the European Court of Human Rights had 
692 Personnel, Legal, Administrative and General Orders 0801, Application for Discharge on Grounds of 
Conscientious Objection. 
693 AP3392 vol. 5, Leaflet 113, Procedure for Dealing with Conscientious Objectors within the Royal Air Force. 
694 ForcesWatch briefing: Conscientious objection in the UK Anned Forces 
<http;(/www.parliament.ukldocuments(joint-committees!human­
rt?htsfBriefingjrom _Forces _ Watch _Conscienti ous _ obj ecti on. pdf> accessed on 18 February 2013. 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulation 2009, No. 2057, available at 
<http:/(www.legislation.gov.ukluksil2009/2057/pdfsluksiem _20092057_ en.pdf> accessed on 19 February 2013. 
696 Mohisin Khan v. Royal Air Force [2004] EWHC 2230 (Admin), judgment of7th October 2004. 
697 Ib·d1 , para.57 
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not been detennined, as the Council of Europe had not yet engaged with the question of 
recognising the right of conscientious objection for professional members of the anned 
forces, since the judgment in Khan predated both Recommendations 2006 and CM(201 0)4. 
A genuine conscientious objection in the UK Forces results in a discharge on 
compassionate grounds. If the claim is dismissed by the superior officer handling the 
application, there is a right to appeal to an independent public authority dissociated from the 
Ministry of Defence, the Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objection (ACCO).698 To 
ensure the independence and impartiality of the authority, hearings are held in public, in 
premises away from the Ministry of Defence.699 If the Committee decides that the applicant 
does not have a valid objection on grounds of conscience, then the person concerned is still 
subject to complying with the terms of their employment, and must therefore continue their 
service until completion of their contract. 
Issues regarding the availability of information on the right and the means of 
acquiring conscientious objector status have been identified by NGOs. 7oo One of these issues 
concerns the sentences imposed to servicemen for whom the claims for recognition as 
conscientious objectors may be rejected by the military chain of command. According to 
Forces Watch, the Armed Forces are the only employers in the United Kingdom who legally 
require their employees to commit themselves for several years, with the risk of a criminal 
., 'fth I 701conVIctIOn 1 ey try to eave sooner. 
R702In the case of Lyons v. the appellant, a Royal Navy medical advisor refused to 
undertake anns training for his imminent deployment to Afghanistan, after he was informed 
at a medical training event that in his deployment to Afghanistan he should not waste 
698 According to the British Ministry of Defence, 'the ACCO was established in 1970 to hear appeals from 
Service personnel whose applications to leave the Service on grounds of conscience have been rejected by the 
Service Authorities. Members of the ACCO are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The panel consists of 8 
individuals, of whom the Chairman and the Vice and Deputy Chairman must all be Queen's Counsel. A quorum 
for a meeting of the Committee is a chairman together with two lay members. Hearings are held in public, and 
the procedure is informal. There is no wearing-in of witnesses, and, although the witnesses and the appellant 
may be questioned, there is no cross-examination. Information obtained by the author, provided by the British 
Ministry ofDefence (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel and Training) Secretariat, 31 January 2012 
{information on file with the author]. 
99 Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, First Special Report on the Armed Forces Bill, available at 

<http://www.publications.parliament.uklpalcm201011/cmselect/cmarmedl779/77902.htm>accessed on 22 

February 2013. 

700 WRI, United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland: Human Rights and the Armed F orees, 

Submission to the 91st Session of the Human Rights Committee (London, 2007) available at 

<http://www2.ohchr.org/englishibodieslHuman Rights Committee/docs/ngos/wri_uk.pdf> accessed on 20 

February 2013. 

701 Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, Written Evidence from Forces Watch, Ev 104. 

702 Lyons v R [2011] EWCA Crim 2808, Judgment of 1 December 2011. 
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resources in treating civilians. He formed the view that his involvement in this war was 
wrong and admitted that he had been influenced by what he had read in the press, which led 
him to believe that his participation would result to accountability for civilian casualties. 703 
His argument was deemed by the Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objection 
CACCO') and the Martial Appeal Court to be a political objection to a particular military 
engagement and not a genuine conscientious objection to all forms of war. Nevertheless, his 
Commanding officer supported the application and concluded that the appellant's claim was 
genuine.704 The applicant was therefore convicted by a Court Martial at Portsmouth under 
section 12(1)(a) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 for intentionally disobeying a lawful 
command/OS he was sentenced to seven months' military detention, reduction from the rank 
ofLeading Medical Assistant to Able Seaman and dismissal from the service. 
He appealed the decision and his case was considered by the Martial Appeal Court, 
which ultimately rejected his appeal on the basis that he had volunteered for military service, 
and so voluntarily accepted the responsibilities which go with such service, including the risk 
of deployment in a dangerous situation.706 The Martial Appeal Court stated that if such an 
objection was allowed, this could put at immediate risk the lives of comrades, the success of 
the operation and the safety of the civilian population, while it was also emphasised that 
training on the use of arms was an operational requirement imposed for the protection of 
service personnel and those under their care.707 Even though the applicant was a medical 
assistant and arguably had protected status under the terms of the Geneva Conventions, the 
policies of the Ministry of Defence required weapons training for defence purposes and for 
the protections of the persons being under his medical care, regardless of whether his claim 
for discharge on conscientious grounds would succeed. 708 
Recognising that the appellant had a valid conscientious objection claim would also 
set an important precedent, accepting objections based on political grounds as genuine forms 
of conscientious objection. It is therefore reasonable that the Martial Appeal Court was 
cautious in forming its views to avoid setting a strong precedent that would easily allow 
703 Ibid, para 8. 
704 Ibid, para 18. 

705 Section 12(1)(a), Anned Forces Act 2006 (c 52), entered into force on 31 October 2009. 

706 Lyons v R [2011J EWCA Crim 2808 (1 December 2011), para. 28; See also R. English, 'The limits of 

conscientious objection', The Guardian, 13 December 2011, available at 

<http://www.guardian.co.ukllaw/2011/decI13/conscientious_objection-soldier-afghanistan> [accessed 22-11­12]. 

~07 Lyons v R (ibid, para 35). 

,08 Ibid, para 35. 
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members of the Anned Forces to refuse participation in conflict zones. Allowing soldiers to 
invoke political arguments and disobey lawful orders by requesting to opt out from particular 
military operations or training sessions on the basis of their beliefs was deemed to be 
dangerous to the cohesiveness and discipline that is required by service personnel. It has to be 
emphasised that the appellant was not sentenced for having expressed a request for discharge 
on grounds of conscience, but for 'disobeying a lawful command' to undertake weapons 
training, which is significantly different to disobeying a command that would require him to 
be engaged in warfare. 
The situation in Germany with regard to the applicability of the right of conscientious 
objection to professional members of the armed forces is rather different. Under German law, 
the right of conscientious objection is a fundamental right of every citizen,709 with figures 
showing that the right to conscientious objection has been widely used also by professional 
members of the armed forces.7!O The right is enshrined in Article 4(3) of the 1949 Basic 
Law7!! while further details are regulated by the 2003 Law on Conscientious Objectionwhich 
made the law applicable to both conscripts and professional soldiers and provided for 
alternative community service.712 Additional provisions for the application of the right to 
professional soldiers were laid down by a 2003 decree,713 which stipulated that the procedure 
for the submission of applications for exemption on conscientious grounds was absolutely 
independent from the administration of the German Military Forces. 
In Germany, national military service was suspended in July 2011; as a result, the 
responsibility for the consideration of applications for exemption from military duties on 
grounds of conscience by professional servicemen lies with the Federal Office for Family and 
Civil Duties. With the suspension of conscription in 2011, the Federal Office of Civilian 
Service,714 the body responsible for the control and administration of alternative civilian 
service for conscientious objectors was re-organised and renamed as 'Federal Office of 
709 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz) (above n 361), Article 4(3). 
710 In 2011,1.398 German soldiers (406 temporary soldiers and 4 professional soldiers) demanded to be 
recognised as conscientious objectors. In the same year 1.171 soldiers have been accepted as conscientious 
objectors. Information obtained by the author, provided by FriedheIm Schneider, EBCO President, 5 September 
2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
711 Constitution of Germany (above n 685). 
712 Art. 2(6), Act on the Reform of Conscientious Objection Law of 9th August 
2003<http://www.bmfsfj.delRedaktionBMFSFJ/Arbeitsstab-ZivildienstlPdf-Anlagenlkdvg­
englisch,property=pdf,bereich=bmfsfj,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdt> [English translation] accessed on 23 March 
2013. 
713 Erlass des Bundesministers fur Verteidigung vom 21.10.2003, last amended on 3 November 
2005<http://www.zentralstelle-kdv.de/z.php?ID=5>accessed on 24 March 2013. 
714 This departmental body was part of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth. 
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Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions' ('BAfzA,).715 BAfzA took responsibility for the 
control and administration of a new type of voluntary social service for both men and 
women.716 In essence, this 'new' type of service fulfils the roles previously undertaken by 
conscientious objectors in hospitals, retirement homes, emergency medical services and 
public utility institutions in the fields of ecology, culture and sportS. 717 The voluntary civilian 
service has a duration of no less than six, and no more than eighteen months, while volunteers 
receive an allowance of at least 335 euros per month, free health, accident and liability 
insurance, contractually regulated holidays and accompanying seminar days.718 In its first 
year, the service could enlist at least 30,000 volunteers, whereas the target in 2012 was raised 
to 35,000, according to information provided by the Federal Office of Family Affairs and 
Civil Society Functions. 
Since the suspension of national military service, the German Armed Forces are liable 
for the administration of three types of military service: the "Soldatenim Freiwilligen 
Wehrdienst' ('FWDL') where volunteer soldiers are required to perform military service of 
up to twenty-three months; the 'Soldaten auf Zeit' ('Sal') where soldiers volunteering for 
service have signed up for a period between two and twenty years; and finally, the 
'Bemfssoldaten' which includes professional soldiers without time restrictions in their 
contracts.719 The constitutional right to conscientious objection, as enshrined in Article 4(3) 
of the Constitution still applies to all the aforementioned categories of volunteers and for 
professional members of the armed forces. 720 
Although the German legislation makes no explicit reference to selecti've 
conscientious objection by professional soldiers, a case decided by the Federal 
Administrative Court of Leipzig in June 2005 shed some light on this controversial issue.721 
The case concerned the refusal by a professional soldier, Major Florian Pfaff, to operate 
software developed by the military and to obey military orders of his senior officers in fear 
715 Bundesamt fUr zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben (abbreviated as 'BafzA '). 
716 Bundersfreiwilligendienst ('BFD'). 
717 Information obtained by the author, provided by the BundesamtfiirFamilie und 
zivilgesellschaftlicheAufgaben (Federal Office of Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions), 28 February 
2012 [correspondence on file with the author]. 
718 Federal Volunteer Service <http://www.bundesfreiwilligendienst.de/> accessed on 23 March 2013. 
719 Information obtained by the author, provided by FriedheIm Schneider, EBCO President, 5 September 2012 
[correspondence on file with the author]. 
720 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Federal Office for Family and Civil Duties, 28 
November 2011 [correspondence held on file with the author]. 
721 Second Military Service Division of the Federal Administrative Court Leipzig (,Wehrdienstsenat des 
Bundesverwaltungsgerichts Leipzig'),BverwG 2 WD 12.04 of 21 June 2005 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworldldocidl4a54bbfdf.html> accessed on 24 March 2013. 
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that he would have served the 'unlawful' (as he perceived it) participation of Gennany in the 
war against Iraq. On 27 March 2003 he informed his colleagues that his refusal to contribute 
to the military intervention against Iraq stemmed from the view that any participation would 
have violated fundamental rules of international law. He subsequently refused to follow the 
orders of his Superior and as a result, on 9 February 2004 he was disciplined and demoted to 
the rank ofCaptain by a Military Disciplinary Tribunal.722 The applicant appealed against this 
decision before the Federal Administrative Court of Leipzig CBundesverwaltungsgericht'), 
arguing that he should be acquitted from disobeying an order on the basis that he had serious 
reservations with regard to the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and that he should be 
allowed to exercise his right to freedom of conscience as protected by the German 
Constitution.723 The Federal Administrative Court delivered a ground-breaking judgment, 
acquitting the soldier and held that the soldier's right to freedom of conscience required that 
he be offered alternative tasks that were not related to a way that he had reasonably believed 
to be illegal.724 
It was noted that, even if the soldier had not formed a clear view with regards to the 
legality of the military intervention against Iraq, some credible doubts existed with regards to 
the legality of the intervention from a public international law perspective.725 While the Court 
avoided expressing a conclusive opinion on the legality of the intervention, it is important to 
observe that the Court focused on the Constitutional right of freedom of conscience, noting 
that this should be respected and that the Armed Forces should allow its members to 
undertake an alternative type of action, including duties of alternative civilian service, in 
order to ensure that objections of conscience are reasonably accommodated.726 It was 
expressly stated that if an individual has doubts about the legality of military intervention, 
and consequently, his conscience is in conflict with the obligation to carry out superior duties, 
the concerned individual is not under a strict obligation to follow orders, even though he has 
to explain his objection and establish that such an objection is based on serious and truthful 
considerations. This allows for a reversal of the burden of proof; i.e. it is not the soldier who 
722 Military Disciplinary Tribunal (Truppendienstgericht) Decision of9 February 2004 Az.: N 1 VL 24/03. For 
academic commentary on the case see M. Bohlander, 'Superior Orders - Unjust War and the Soldier's 
Conscience: Casenote of the judgment of the German Federal Administrative Court of 21 June 2005, Case No.2 
WD 12.04', Inter Alia (2005), vol. 4, p. 17. 
723 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution], Art. 4(3) (Federal Republic ofGermany) 
<http://www.servat.unibe.chlicl/gmOOOOO_.html> accessed on 22 April 2012. 
7241. Baudisch, 'International Decisions: Germany v. N, Decision No.2 NW 12.04,21 June 2005', American 
Journal ofInternational Law, vol. 100 (2006), p. 911. 
725 BverwG 2 WD 12.04 of21 June 2005, para 4.1.4.1. 
726 Ibid, para 4.2.4.4. 
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has to prove that his refusal to follow orders was lawful, but it is for the government to 
adduce evidence to prove that the military action does not violate principles of public 
international law and/or the German Constitution.727 
The decision of the Court to fmd that the soldier was excused from following superior 
orders and was entitled to an 'alternative course of action' ('Handlungsaltemative') that did 
not affect his conscience728 is important for two reasons. First, it provides an interesting 
commentary and legal analysis into the arguments related to the legality of the US-led 
military operation in Iraq. Second, it reiterates the importance of the constitutional protection 
of the right to conscientious objection in German law that is still strongly defended by the 
judiciary and applied to professional members of the armed forces even in cases where the 
decisions of the executive are contested at judicial level by members of the armed forces. 
The German case may be usefully contrasted with the British case of Lyons, where the 
UK. Court of Appeal held that the appellant's objection was based on a political opinion on 
the lawfulness of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. This may suggest that the United 
Kingdom give more emphasis to ensuring obedience to the policies of the armed forces, and 
consequently overlooking questions regarding the legality of an intervention or participation 
in a military intervention. The UK. Ministry of Defence is of the view that 'service personnel 
are fully committed to giving their best in defending our country and its allies; this includes 
the requirement to bear arms and accept all assignments and deployments'. 729 The latter 
suggests that military personnel in the United Kingdom should refrain from making a 
conscientious decision regarding the disputed legality of an operation730 and refuse to take 
part in a conflict which they consider unlawful, either because it is has not been given an 
express or implied authorisation by the United Nations, or when there are doubts as to 
customary principles of international law being violated, as a result of such an intervention. 
As the judgment in Lyons v. R indicates, there is still a strong perception regarding obedience 
of orders as an indispensable characteristic of military discipline that may be trumped by the 
right of military personnel to make conscientious decisions and refuse to comply with a 
military order regarding their involvement in particular operations. 
727 Ibid, para 4.1.5.3.2 
728 Ibid, para 4.1.2.5. 

729 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry ofDefence (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff 

(Personnel and Training) Secretariat, 13 March 2012 [information on file with the author]. 

730 Lord Steyn, 'The legality ofthe invasion ofIraq', European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 1 (2001), p.l; 

See also K. Qureshi, 'Politics, the United Nations, and the legality of war', European Lawyer, vol. 39 (2004), p. 

78. 
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The Kingdom of the Netherlands suspended conscription in 1997.731 The Constitution 
still contains an obligation for conscription but in practice the Dutch Armed Forces consist of 
voluntary service members only. While conscription was in place, the right of conscientious 
objection was guaranteed by Article 99 of the Constitution of the Netherlands which States 
that 'exemption from military service because of serious conscientious objections shall be 
regulated by an Act of Parliament' .732 
Article 2 of the 1962 Law on Conscientious Objection for Service Members defines 
conscientious objections as 'insurmountable conscientious objections to the personal 
fulfilment of military service in connection with the use of force in which a person in the 
fulfilment of his service can be involved' .733 Some parts of the law have now been suspended 
and consequently the fulfilment of civilian service is not applicable to professional members 
of the armed forces. However, professional members can still invoke Article 9(3) of the 1962 
Law on Conscientious Objection for Service Members to be recognised as conscientious 
objectors and be discharged from the Armed Forces as soon as possible.734 Professional 
members are informed of their rights and procedures available to exercise them at the initial 
training for all serving personnel, as a part of the curriculum for basic training.735 According 
to the Dutch Ministry of Defence, there have been no cases of conscientious objection by 
voluntary service personnel since 1997.736 The procedure for application is outlined below. 
The procedure for the submission of applications is not substantially different from 
the procedure applying to conscripts before the suspension of military service. The Ministry 
of Defence initiates an inquiry into the objections of the applicant, which is carried out by 
one or more members of the Advisory Commission, under the administration of the Ministry 
of Defence. The members of the Commission are appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree 
731 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence ofthe Netherlands, Directorate of 
Legal Affairs, Department of International Legal and Policy Issues, 11 January 2011 [information on file with 
the author]. 
732 Constitution ofthe Kingdom of The Netherlands (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 
Constitutional Affairs and Legislation Division in collaboration with the Translation Department of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2008)<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publi catieslbrochures/20081 1 0/20/the­
constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.html> accessed on 27 March 2013. 
733 1962 Law on Conscientious Objection/or Service Members, available 
at<http://wetten.overheid.nIIBWBR0002386/geldigheidsdatum_06-09-2012> translation provided by the 
Ministry of Defence upon personal communication on 13 March 2012. 
734 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence ofthe Netherlands, Directorate of 
Legal Affairs, Department ofInternational Legal and Policy Issues, First personal communication: 11 January 
2011 [information on file with the author]. 
735 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence ofthe Netherlands, Directorate of 
Legal Affairs, Department of International Legal and Policy Issues, Second personal communication: 13 March 
2012 [information on file with the author]. 
736 Ibid. 
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and the applicant is given the opportunity to represent himself and give evidence before a 
fOIDlal decision is made, and before forwarding their decision to the Minister of Defence.737 It 
has to be emphasised that, according to the Ministry of Defence, voluntary service personnel 
with conscientious objections can apply for an honourable discharge, without being obliged 
to give the reasons for their refusal.738 If the Minister rejects the application, there is a right to 
appeal to the Advisory Commission which conducts an investigation with at least three of its 
members.739 Upon a third dismissal of the application, there is a right to appeal to the 
department of administrative law of the Council of State740, which gives the applicant the 
opportunity to appeal the decision before an impartial tribunal that is dissociated with the 
Ministry of Defence. 
In relation to partial conscientious objections to particular military operations, even 
though conscientious objections are traditionally acknowledged as 'grave objections against 
I.:~ 11 H'~.' all forms of armed service', the Ministry of Defence is of the view that voluntary service 
.l'Pr 
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" '1 'I ~ ! : !I personnel may apply for an honourable discharge for military service if their involvement to a (~ ~i ul 
.,:::H particular military operation is at odds with their conscientious beliefs. An honourable ~ : 
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,,,., q~: discharge would have the same effect for both total objectors and partial objectors, since 
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 there would be no alternative offered to a professional serviceman in the same extent that it 
iio;) would be offered for a conscript being released of his military obligations, therefore a 
1'-" ~,~ ~ 
11111 discharge may be obtained without the obligation to reveal the reasons. 
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~ I M ~ \ Finally, Portugal abolished national military service in 1999 with Law 174/1999 in 
i !JI~ J ! 
:::~H: 
::::ji: order to reform its armed forces and transform them into a fully professional army.741 The 
.J::d: 
right of conscientious objection to military service is a constitutional right, recognised in the 
Portuguese Constitution which States that 'the right to be a conscientious objector, as laid out 
by law, shall be guaranteed,.742 According to Article 276(4) of the Constitution, 
'conscientious objectors who by law are subject to the performance of military service shall 
perfonn civic service with the same duration and degree of arduousness as armed military 
737 Kingdom of the Netherlands, Law on Conscientious Objection for Service Members, entered into force on 27 
September 1962, Article 5. 
738 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, Directorate of 
Legal Affairs, Department ofIntemational Legal and Policy Issues, 13 March 2012[information on file with the 
author]. 
739 Law on Conscientious Objection for Service Member (above n 737), Article 7(a). 
740 Ibid, Article 7(b). 
741 Law 174/99, Military Service Law, DR No. 221, Series IA, 21 September 1999 
<http://www.mdn.gov.ptlNRlrdonlyresIEE0812AB-BC25-4A 4D-9270 211E9 AFF60CF/OILSM 
~df> accessed on 22 March 2013. 
42 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, adopted on 8April 1976, Seventh Revision (2005), Article 41(6), 
available at <http://www.servat.unibe.chJicl/poOOOOO_.htm1> accessed on 24 March 2013. 
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service,.743 In 2009, the NGO 'War-Resisters International' submitted that Portugal did not 
recognise the right of conscientious objection to professional members of the Anned 
Forces,744 which was confirmed in 2011 by the European Bureau for Conscientious 
Objection.745 However, according to the Portuguese Ministry of Defence 'while there is no 
norm that expressly establishes the right to conscientious objection by military personnel of 
the Armed Forces, any citizen regardless of being military personnel or not, can initiate the 
procedure by which the right is recognised, there being no limitations to its use on military 
personnel' .746 This means that the same application procedure that was established by Law 
no. 7/92 on Conscientious Objection which regulates the question of conscientious objection, 
can still be read in conjunction with the Law on Military Service (Law no. 174/99 of 21 
September 1999, as amended by Law no. 112008 of the 9 May 2008), by a professional 
serviceman wishing to withdraw on grounds of conscience. 
A provision is found in Act No. 6/85 as adopted by the Portuguese Parliament on 4 
May 1985, granting conscientious objector status 'to those whose convictions, whether they 
are based on religious, moral or philosophical grounds, forbid them to use force against other 
human beings' .747 Furthennore, according to Article 2 of Law 711992 establishing who can 
object and on what grounds, 'conscientious objectors are considered as those citizens who 
believe that for religious, moral, humanistic or philosophical reasons, they cannot 
legitimately employ violent means of any killd against any person, even for the purpose of 
national, collective, or personal defence' .748 It is therefore observed that legislation accepts 
only absolute conscientious objection to all fonns of violence against others, therefore a 
selective objection to particular military operations would probably not be accepted. 
Professional members of the armed forces deciding to withdraw from their services on 
grounds of service are required to tenninate their contract if the objector is working in a 
contractual or voluntary basis or through a request for resignation as permanent staff. 
743 Ibid, Article 267(4). 

744 A. Speck, 'Conscientious objection: Legal Practices and Framework among ED Member States', 

Presentation for the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, WRI, 15 January 2007 

<http://www.wri-irg.orginode/6484> accessed on 25 March 2013. 

745 EBCO, Report to the Council ofEurope, 18 July 2011 <http://ebco-beoc.org/files/2011-EBCO-REPORT­
CoE.pdf> accessed on 27 March 2013. 

746 Information obtained by the author, provided by the Ministry ofDefence of the Netherlands, Directorate of 

Legal Affairs, Department ofIntemational Legal and Policy Issues, 13 March 2012 [information on file with the 

author]. 

747 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Report on conscientious objection to compulsory military 
service (Rapporteur: Mr de Kwaadsteniet), Doc. 5663, 9 December 1986. 

748 Translated by the portuguese Embassy in London, upon personal communication with the Ministry of 

National Defence, Reference No. 10.11 Proc. 1/2012, V/Oficio n.886, 18 June 2012. 
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An application for acquiring the status ofconscientious objector needs to be addressed 
to the National Commission of Conscientious Objection.749 The composition of the 
Commission is outlined in Article 28 of the Law on Conscientious Objection, which 
stipulates that the Commission comprises: a law judge appointed by the Supreme Judicial 
Council as president; a citizen of recognised merit appointed by the Ombudsman; and finally, 
the Director of the Cabinet of Civic Service for Conscientious Objectors (GSCOC). The 
National Commission of Conscientious Objection receives the declaration from the applicant 
and takes all necessary steps to ensure that there are no irregularities with the application, 
carries out any investigation necessary to prove the accuracy of information presented and 
makes a duly substantiated decision by a majority within 3 months of the declaration. 
According to Article 23(1) of the Law on Conscientious Objection, recognition of 
conscientious objector status can only be refused on the basis of false information contained 
in the Statement or declaration of the applicant. The remaining paragraphs of Article 23 
contain important provisions ensuring the right to a fair hearing. The provision emphasises 
that the recognition of the status of conscientious objector may not be denied unless the 
applicant is given the opportunity to be heard at the hearing before the National Commission, 
and may even be accompanied by a lawyer and present witnesses to support his argument. A 
hearing scheduled in the preceding paragraphs may be public at the written or oral request of 
the applicant. The hearing focuses on the reasons for the declaration and on the practice of 
life that demonstrates that the applicant's refusal is consistent with such motives. Finally, it is 
pointed out in paragraph (6) that the unjustified absence of the applicant at the hearing 
amounts to a waiver of the right to be heard. 
If it is to be assumed that the aforementioned principles are applicable for 
professional members of the armed forces, then a professional serviceman with a valid 
conscientious objection should be able to be released from their duties following a standard­
practice termination of their contract with the Armed Forces, without the need to perform 
civic or any other duties as an alternative. According to the Portuguese Ministry of Defence, 
there are no implications or consequences for members of the Armed Forces who terminate 
their service with the Armed Forces on the grounds of conscientious obj ection, as the legal 
effects of such a situation are exactly the same as those for members of the Armed Forces 
who terminate their service on any other grounds or legally admitted reasons. 
749 The National Committee on Conscientious objection (CommissaoNacional de Objecao de Consciencia­

CNOC) was established under Article 19 of Law 7/92,Objection ofConscience Act, DR No. 109, Series lA, 12 

May 1992. 
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As seen in this detailed analysis of State practice, a few Member States do recognise 
in clear terms that their domestic procedures allow members of the armed forces to resign 
from the service on grounds of conscience. In the majority of States however, resignations 
particularly on grounds of conscience are not envisaged in domestic legislation and therefore 
claims may be brought on different grounds to terminate employment. Resignation may be 
possible even when an application for discharge is rejected by the armed forces, since in most 
jurisdictions a decision would be subject to some form of judicial review. Nevertheless as 
discussed above, requests for exemptions from particular military duties on the basis of a 
genuine conscientious objection could be accommodated as in the case of Germany, where 
the constitutional right to conscientious objection was extended to the case of a soldier who 
selectively opposed to be engaged in a particular military operation on grounds of conscience. 
Since selective conscientious objection accepts the legitimacy of some types of military 
action, States should maintain some discretion as to how requests for exemption are to be 
accommodated. However, the decision of the German Federal Administrative Court ill 
Pfa/fer will certainly play a crucial role in future debates over the applicability of 
conscientious objection standards to professional members of the armed forces. 
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Conclusions 
The recent, and - in this author's view - long overdue developments in the case law 
of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights on the right to 
conscientious objection have had a considerable impact upon the the national implementation 
of standards relating to exemptions from military service on grounds of conscience and 
sunsequent procedural obligations regarding the availability and provision of alternative 
civilian service. The recent jurisprudence of the Court, and in particular its decisions that 
have been delivered after Bayatyan v Armenia, have placed the right of conscientious 
objection on a more solid legal ground, since this was fInally recognised as a right protected 
under treaty law. 
As a result of the recent developments in the jurisprudence of the European Court and 
the Human Rights Committee on conscientious objection, the Member States of the Council 
of Europe are now required not only to recognize the right of conscientious objection in their 
domestic legal systems, but, most importantly, to also respect the full range of standards and 
guarantees elaborated throughout the years by the UN and the Council of Europe. Although 
the case-law post-Bayatyan and post-General Comment No. 22 is still relatively limited, it is 
to be expected that the dramatic shift in the approach of the two bodies to the issue of 
conscientious objection as a protected right will encourage more applications and allow the 
Court and the Committee to develop a consistent and comprehensive jurisprudence on the 
right to conscientious objection. Some of those cases have already been decided and contain 
important statements as to the duties of States to amend their legal fran1ework in order to 
effectively implement international human rights standards. The growing number of cases 
brought by conscientious objectors before the European Court of Human Rights provides the 
context for a more consistent development of legal obligations on conscientious objection in 
the future. The implications of the transition in the Court's jurisprudence are not simply a 
transformation of the Court's views in acknowledging the applicability of the Convention in 
cases concerning manifestations of belief, and particularly conscientious objection to military 
service. It should be expected that the jurisprudence of the Court on questions regarding 
conscientious objections to military service will continue to evolve rapidly toward the 
emergence and development of legal standards and obligations. These standards and 
obligations have been in place long before the Court began to change its position over the 
applicability of the ECHR on conscientious objection cases, however, these were to be found 
in soft-law instruments without any binding effect. What is now a reality is that the Court has 
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finally considered that in light of a strong European consensus, these standards emanating 
from soft-law instrument have a far more considerable influence. Thus, the European Court 
will now be able to introduce, as binding obligations under the ECRR, the principles and 
standards contained in the soft-law instruments of persuasive authority that have been 
developed by various UN Charter-based bodies and the institutions of the Council of Europe 
over the years. 
With regard to the impact on States (and consequently on the position of 
conscientious objectors) of the recent developments in the practice under the ICCPR and the 
ECRR, three main conclusions are to be drawn. 
The first consequence of the major shift in the European Court's jurisprudence is that 
States may no longer rely on the doctrine of a 'margin of appreciation' or considerations of 
national security and public safety to argue that they have certain discretion in introducing the 
right of conscientious objection to military service in their legislation. This particular 
argument has been refutted by the Court both in Bayatyan v. Armenia and Ercep v. Turkey 
and has been reiterated in all of the conscientious objection cases that the Court has 
considered, particularly since Ercep v. Turkey and up to the present date. In relation to 
Turkey, the Court in Demirtas v. Turkey went a step further to emphasise the State's positive 
obligation not only to recognise the right to conscientious objection, but to have in place an 
effective and accessibly procedure for persons wishing to be recognised as conscientious 
objectors.750 
Quite apart from Turkey, which is currently the only exception in the Council of 
Europe that does not recognise a right of conscientious objection, the recent jurisprudence of 
the Court and its shift towards upholding international standards on conscientious obj ection 
will have a significant impact on any future accession to the Council of Europe and, by 
definition, to the European Union, given that one of the most important conditions for 
accession to the European Union is to be a party to the European Convention on Ruman 
Rights. The Court's major shift is therefore important not only for existing Council of Europe 
Member States, but it is also an important tool for political leverage for the future Member 
States of the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
750 Savda v. Turkey (above n. 298), para 98. 
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As held by Judge Ziemele in her concurring opinion in Tsaturyan v Armenia, 
[ ... ] the obligation to respect the right to freedom of religion of conscientious 
objectors applies from the moment the right itself is established in international law 
and the State concerned has ratified the Convention. This sheds an interesting light on 
the role of the Council of Europe and the political process of negotiating the entrance 
conditions for prospective Member States of the organisation.751 
The second consequence is that there is now a clear need for those Member States 
which still retain conscription but have already adopted legislation on conscientious objection 
and alternative service to review their existing laws in order to ensure that they are in 
conformity with international human rights standards which may now be considered as 
'binding legal obligations', rather than guidelines of persuasive authority, and thus, 
applicable to all 47 Member States of the Council of Europe. The now unequivocal 
recognition of the fact that the right to conscientious objection to military service is protected 
under the two major international treaties protecting civil and political rights which are 
applicable to all Member States of the Council of Europe, the ICCPR and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that therefore its implementation by the States Parties is 
subject to the control of the relevant monitoring bodies, reinforces the need for those Member 
States which still retain conscription to review their internal legislation and policies, and to 
ensure that these are in conformity to internationally agreed standards. 
At national level, various international and regional human rights bodies have been 
assisting Member States with legislative amendments in order to bring their legislation in line 
with international human rights standards. In this regard, the work of the Venice Commission 
which works closely with governments to improve domestic legislation on alternative service 
has improved the Annenian legislative framework significantly. At judicial level, the recent 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights that upheld the right to conscientious 
objection to military service as a right protected under the Convention have positively 
affected the promptness of national legislatures to keep improving domestic laws where 
complaints have arisen. 
Third and fmally, the change in the approach of the Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court, whilst settling the long debated question of the existence of a 'human' right 
-51 
f App. no. 37821/03 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012), para 2 
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to conscientious objection to mandatory military service (conscription), provides an 
opportunity for further reflection, at the international level, on the question of conscientious 
objection for professional members of the armed forces. The question of extending the 
standards which apply to those individuals who are forced to serve in the armed forces to 
individuals who join on a voluntary basis is still a hotly debated issue that needs to be 
explored further. The right to be exempted from military duties on grounds of conscience for 
professional members of the armed forces is recognised in a remarkably small number of 
Member States of the Council ofEurope752 (and the percentage is even lower if one considers 
UN Member States). In the majority of the Council of Europe Member States there is no 
legislation to extend the application of the right of conscientious objection to professional 
armed forces personnel, with the exception of countries where the right to conscientious 
objection is constitutionally protected and may therefore be challenged as a matter of 
constitutional law. ill some States, even when the right to be exempted from military duties 
may not be recognised in domestic legislation for professional members of the armed forces, 
military personnel may seek a discharge and terminate their contract on other grounds if they 
develop a conscientious objection to either the involvement in a particular conflict, to specific 
military operations, or on other grounds. Germany is at present the only Member State where 
the constitutional provision on the right to conscientious objection is read in conjunction with 
the previous legislation that was adopted while conscription was in place, and can therefore 
be applied to professional personnel. However, the most important feature of the German 
model is found in the principle emerging from the case of Pfaffer,753 which stipulates that 
first, selective objections to particular military operations may be justified if there are 
concerns regarding the legality of the military duties assigned to the person and second, that 
work of an alternative nature should be assigned to a person claiming to have a conscientious 
objection, rather than following the habitual procedure for the termination of their contract. 
In conclusion, the importance of minimum legal standards on conscientious objection 
cannot be emphasised enough; international standard-setting texts are in many instances 
demonstrating whether sufficient consensus exists at political level. The formation of 
guidelines through resolutions and recommendations agreed at both international and regional 
levels plays an important role at influencing the European Court of Human Rights to interpret 
752 The right to be discharged from military obligations on grounds of conscience for professional members of 

the armed forces is recognised in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and 

Switzerland (above n 684 - 689). 

753 BverwG 2 WD 12.04 of21 June 2005 (above n 721). 
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the Convention as a 'living instrument', when the Court is called to examine whether an 
applicant's right falls within the protections afforded by the Convention. As it emerges from 
the decision of the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan v. Armenia, soft law instruments outlining 
minimum standards can be understood as signs of mutual agreement and reinforcement 
between the intertwined institutions and mechanisms of the Council of Europe. Therefore, 
once the European Court of Human Rights is convinced that there is sufficient political and 
social maturity on a disputed human rights question between the Council of Europe Member 
States, such as allowing exemptions from military service on grounds of conscience, the 
existence of norms that acquire a strong consensus may influence the Court to interpret the 
Convention as encompassing legal duties and obligations for Contracting States. Since the 
landmark decision in Bayatyan v. Armenia - which shed some light on the application of the 
right at least as far as conscription is concerned - the observance of minimum standards on 
conscientious objection gains significant importance and opens up the possibility for the 
Court to set the scope of the right within a more firm context. It is therefore envisaged that an 
anticipated situation that will test the readiness of the Court to define the limits of the right is 
that of professional soldiers that wish to be exempted from military duties on grounds of 
conscience. 
The future development of further legal obligations on conscientious objection by the 
Court depends on how speedily structural deficiencies in the practice of Member States will 
be challenged by individuals before the Strasbourg Court. Although negative obligations are 
easy to identify, positive obligations require that a fair balance needs to be struck between the 
general interest of the community and the interests of the individua1.754 Even though different 
approaches may be employed to explain their differences due to the open-ended nature of 
positive obligations, it is fair to say that there is considerable interplay between negative and 
positive duties to safeguard Convention rights. For example, negative obligations include the 
duty not to interfere with a persons' right to manifest their belief by refusing to perform 
military service; this is an implied duty emerging from the recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
since the ruling of the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan v. Armenia. Another is to refrain from 
repeatedly prosecuting conscientious objectors for their failure to perfonn military service; 
according to Ulke v. Turkey this amounts to inhumane and degrading treatment.755 A third 
negative obligation emerging from Gutl v. Austria, suggests that the State is under a duty not 
754 Rees v. United Kingdom (1986) 9 E.H.R.R. 56, para 56. 

755 Olke v. Turkey (above n 237). 
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to apply its legislative provisions concerning exemptions from military and civilian service in 
a discriminatory manner against conscientious obj ectors on the basis of their particular 
religious beliefs.756 Another negative duty is to refrain from trying civilians who refuse to 
perform military service on the basis of their conscientious objection in military tribunals or 
to involve military judges in civil law cases.757 This may also give rise to a positive duty to 
ensure that conscientious objectors that have not accepted to be enlisted in the armed forces 
of a State are treated as civilians and to safeguard their Convention right to an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law, as protected by Article 6(1) ECHR. Other 
obligations may include the duty to adopt legislation providing for alternative civilian service 
to a person refusing to undertake military service on grounds of conscience. It may be 
contended that even if legislation has been adopted on a particular issue, the State is under a 
positive obligation to ensure that the legal protection offered in legislation is practical and 
effective.758 It may further be suggested that a positive obligation may be implied under 
Article 8 ECHR for States to inform persons wishing to be recognised as conscientious 
objectors of available procedures to exercise their rights?59 
Even though these obligations may be elaborated in the future, a number of challenges 
remain. A challenge for the Council of Europe is down to the recognition of the right to 
conscientious objection in wartime. As discussed in Chapter 2.4, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has placed the right to conscientious objection within the scope of the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion as protected by Article 18 ICCPR which is a non-derogable 
right.76o The non-derogable nature of Article 18 ICCPR allows us to assume that no 
derogation should be permitted from safeguarding the right to conscientious objection to 
military service in times of war or public emergency, at least for those States that have 
ratified the ICCPR; thus, the right to conscientious objection is safeguarded equally in 
peacetime and wartime at UN level. On the other hand, the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion as protected in Article 9 ECHR is not a non-derogable right under the 
756 Giltl v. Austria, App. no. 49686/99, judgment of 12 March 2009 

757 Ercep v. Turkey (22 November 2011) (above n 298); Savda v. Turkey (12 June 2012) (above n 298); 

Demirtas v. Turkey (17 January 2012) (above n 298). 

758 X & Yv the Netherlands (1985) 8 E.H.R.R. 235, para 30; Savda v. Turkey (above n. 298), para 98. 

759 Such positive obligations have been identified in Guerra v. Italy (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 357, where the Court, 

finding a violation of Article 8 ECHR, concluded that if residents were informed about potential risks from a 

chemical plant in their area, they could have taken reasonable measures to protect themselves from any 

imminent risks. In their opinion, the concurring judges emphasised that 'the State may have a positive obligation 

to make available information to the public and to disseminate such information which by its nature could not 

otherwise come to the knowledge of the public'. 

760 Article 4(2) ICCPR provides: 'No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 

may be made under this provision'. 
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European Convention. 761 Therefore, the ECHR does not suggest that any derogation from 
Article 9 ECHR in times of war or other national emergency would be unlawful. It has been 
shown, however, that a Contracting State will be in breach of its Convention obligations if it 
tortured or ill-treated a conscientious objector and if the treatment is as severe as to reach the 
threshold of Article 3 ECHR, but - arguably - it would not be in breach of its Convention 
obligations if it did not recognise this right to applicants in war time or in situations ofpublic 
emergency. 
Although it is clear that State practice in the Council of Europe, with the exception of 
Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Armenia is generally satisfactory 
with regard to implementing international standards on conscientious objection, at least in 
peacetime, practice is not providing a clear answer as to what duties conscientious objectors 
would be requested to perform in times of war or mobilisation and whether the scope of the 
right to conscientious objection would be significantly restricted in such circumstances. The 
question is significant considering that conscription in most Member States of the Council of 
Europe is currently suspended, but there is a possibility that it may be re-enacted in situations 
of public emergency. It is therefore important for the Council of Europe to examine how the 
right to conscientious objection is safeguarded in wartime and whether the existing standards 
on conscientious objection would be applicable in times ofmobilisation. 
The guidelines developed by the United Nations at the global level and the Council of 
Europe at the regional level, and the various obligations identified in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights are mutually reinforcing strands of the overall standards 
regime that has been developed in international human rights law to protect the right of 
conscientious objection to military service. The role of the European Court of Human Rights 
is vital in addressing jurisprudential gaps in national legislation. In order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Courts jurisprudential power it is important to ensure that two 
requirements are met. First, that the judgments of the Court are enforced and implemented by 
the State in which a Convention violation occurs, and second that domestic laws are in 
conformity with the guidelines endorsed by the institutional bodies to which Member States 
adhered upon accession to the Council of Europe. This process sets the foundations for 
enhancing and facilitating legislative and procedural reforms to prevent the re-occurrence of 
761 Article 15(1) ECHR provides: 'In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under intemationallaw'. Para. (2) of the same provision specifies that '[n]o derogation from 
Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 
shall be made under this provision'. 
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Convention violations. Even though the Court has dealt extensively with violations occurring 
to persons affected by national military service, it has not yet received any applications 
concerning the right of conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces. 
There is no doubt that the latest developments in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights have had a considerable impact on determining the scope of the right 
to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience, at least for persons liable for 
conscription. Since the Court has placed the right to conscientious objection firmly within the 
scope of the Convention, legal standards and obligations on conscientious objection will 
continue to evolve rapidly in the near future. Even though the scope and limits of the right 
will be tested particularly by applicants affected by mandatory military service, the potential 
views of the Court regarding the contours of this right and its applicability in situations other 
than conscription will also be highly anticipated. 
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APPENDIX A: Survey Questionnaire 
Researcher: 
Mr. Andreas Yiannaros 
PhD Candidate in International Law 
2012 
School ofLaw 
University ofBedfordshire 
Survey Questionnaire for doctoral thesis entitled: 

Conscientious Objection to Military Service: 

Standards and Practice in the Council ofEurope 

Questionnaire can be filled in ENGLISH / GREEK 
The purpose ofthe survey 
The present survey aims to assist the researcher in screening the current situation with regard 
to the effective protection of the right of conscientious objection in the Member States of the 
Council of Europe based on the guidelines adopted by its key institutions. For this reason two 
types of questionnaires are available. Type 1 is addressed to those Member States 
maintaining conscription and/or professional armed forces, and Type 2 which is addressed to 
Member States that suspended or abolished conscription and currently maintain professional 
armies. The responses submitted by governments, NGOs and national experts on 
conscientious objection will be analysed and compared in order to triangulate the information 
and arrive at accurate conclusions that will be subsequently consulted to map the effective 
implementation of minimum standards in the Council ofEurope. 
Questionnaire Type 1 applies to: 
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Questionnaire Type 2 applies to: 
Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, the Former 
Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro Netherland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
If otherwise than stated, please specify and fill out the relevant questionnaire. 
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Submission: 

Please submit directly to a Yiannaros@hotmail.com or alternatively to 

andreas.yiannaros@beds.ac.uk 

Compiling method: 

Please, provide a clear reference to the relevant national legislation, practice and/or case­

law ifknown. You are encouraged to attach the relevant texts, ifyou have them handy. 

First rifime, 
I ,j" ~>~ ~ 'C:,fft'~',"iiJurisdiction covered' . 
''',;,\ 
(in case you provide . 
'_.,'. !,:":" 
informationfor '1!JfJ'fe 
:\~, ,-~, '. \., ".. ,: ~<' ) ­
'urisdiction!cpunry, Bl~:a.~jill' 
~, '»f!:~' «',~,_i~f _~";~ 
separate questionnaires) 
t~$is,.~ouldJ!o-q~il«!.fllk~~~· 
mentiol1ed as a contrlhzitik. 
',," '-,1~:,:~,:j';' ,,~:1!,?'~:~: /<}J;' 
expert? 
Please find questionnaires attached in the next pages and fill out as appropriate. 
Thank you kindly for your participation! 
" 
Should the results ofthe 
., ",' ,~,':'-:),;~' 
questionnaire be disctdijedfn 
the researcher ,~.JO:rlli:iL;,;12., 
~:" '-'< s·' ,w.:-, t'1-" 
Yes/No 
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Type 1 Questionnaire (Type of Armed Forces: conscripted only or conscripted and 

professional). 

Questions: 

1) Is the right of conscientious objection recognised by 
law for conscripted and professional members of the armed forces? 
2) Does your country allow for absolute conscientious objection to military service? (see 
adopted definition below) 
3) Does your country allow for selective conscientious objection to military service? (see 
adopted definition below) 
4) Is there a suitable procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 
applications? Please outline this procedure briefly. 
5) Is the alternative service offered to conscientious objectors replacing military service of 
a civilian nature? Please indicate in which civilian departments/institutions alternative service 
is usually carried out. 
6) How lengthy is alternative service in relation to military service? Please provide the 
exact length ofboth military and alternative civilian service. 
7) Is the right to be considered as a conscientious objector available at any time, 
namely before, during and after military service? 
8) Is the right of conscientious objection to military service available for reservists (members 
of the reserve armed forces)? 
9) Are members of the armed forces informed of their rights and the procedures available 
to exercise them? If so, is access to such information facilitated by the authorities and at what 
stage (before or after enlistment)? 
10) Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? Please 
specify. 
11) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has been 
examined? 
12) Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent and 
impartial bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil administration? (I.e. are 
the bodies/committees examining such applications independent from the administration of 
the Ministry of Defence)? 
13) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious 
objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial ofbenefits etc) 
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14) Is there any option for a conscientious objector to be fully discharged from the 
obligation to perform either military or civilian service? (i.e. paying a lump sum/fee instead 
of performing service of any kind). 
Working definitions: 
Conscientious objection to military service is the objection to military service deriving 
from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from 
religious, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives. 
Alternative service of civilian character replacing armed military service refers to non­
combatant social work or other work of national importance that is under civilian control, in 
the public interest and not of a punitive nature. 
Conscripts are persons compulsorily enrolled to perform military service in the armed forces 
of a State. The relationship of conscripts with the armed forces' authorities is by its very 
essence temporary and lasts only for the duration of the military service. 
Conscription refers to the compulsory enrolment of individuals for service in the Armed 
Services. 
Professional members of the armed forces are professional servicemen voluntarily joining 
the armed forces and serving for longer periods. 
Absolute conscientious objectors are opposing to participation in war of any form because 
of their personal convictions. 
Selective conscientious objection is primarily distinguished from absolute conscientious 
objection by the fact that the objector does not claim to be opposed to all forms of use of 
armed force, and would, were the circumstances different, be willing to participate in military 
action. i.e. refusing to participate in particular military operations. 
Important Notes: 
a) If one of the terms listed above is otherwise defined by national law in different terms, 

please specify. 

b) Please indicate whether you would like to remain anonymous. 

c) If you meet any difficulties in answering some of the questions above, please forward 

this questionnaire to any colleague with expert knowledge on the matter. 
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Type 2 Questionnaire (Type ofArmed Forces: Professional ONLY) 
Questions: 

1) Is the right of conscientious objection recognised by law for professional members of 

the national anned forces? 

2) Is the right of conscientious objection available for reservists? (i.e. members of the 

military reserve forces) 

3) Does your country allow for selective conscientious objection to military service? (see 

adopted definition below) 

4) Is there a suitable procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 

applications? Please outline this procedure briefly. 

5) Are professional members of the armed forces informed of their rights and the 

procedures available to exercise them? If so, is access to such information facilitated by the 

authorities and at what stage (before or after voluntary enlistment)? 

6) Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? Please 

specify time-frames for the examination of applications from the initiation of the claim until 

the [mal decision. 

7) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has been 

examined? 

8) Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent and 

impartial bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil administration? (Le. are 

the bodies/committees examining such applications independent from the administration of 

the Ministry ofDefence)? 

9) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious 

objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial ofbenefits etc) 

Working definitions: 
Conscientious objection to military service is the objection to military service deriving 
from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from 
religious, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives. 
Professional members of the armed forces are professional servicemen voluntarily joining 
the armed forces and serving for longer periods. 
Selective conscientious objection is primarily distinguished from absolute conscientious 
objection by the fact that the objector does not claim to be opposed to all forms of use of 
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Member State BELGIUM 
Communication Date 13 December 2011 
Type of Armed Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
* Article 182 of the Constitution provides that the rights and the obligations of the military 
have to be regulated by law. 
* The law determines in which manner personnel for the Armed forces is sanctioned. Before 
1995, when the Belgium Army had a military service, the law of 30 Apr 1962 (Coordination 
des lois sur la milice) regulated the rights of enlisted men in the Belgium Army who were 
conscientious objected to serve. 
We have 3 royal decrees (RD) that regulate that procedure: 
- RD 30 Jul 1987 (Portant execution des lois sur la malice coordonnees Ie 30 Avril 1962) 
- RD 20 Feb 1980 (Lois portant Ie statut des objecteurs de conscience, coordonnees Ie 20 Fev 
80 ) 
- RD 03 Mai 1989 (Determinant les renseignements it joindre it la demande d'obtention du 
statut d'objecteur de conscience) 
* Since 1995 we have in Belgium the suspension of the military service, so we're not 
confronted anymore with conscientious objected persons. 
*These laws mentioned here above are not valid for professional members of the armed 
forces that have a form of conscientious objection. Our laws have not foreseen a specific 
procedure for professional members who are faced with a conscientious objection. 
*The only legislation that we can refer to is the Disciplinary Law of 14 Jan 1975. 
* In chapter II Art 7 they speak about the superior who can give orders. 
* Art 8 of that same chapter speaks about the order itself 
* In chapter III they speak about the rights and obligations of the military: 
*Art 9 §1 to serve the country conscientiously and honourable, with the risk to endanger 

your own life. 

*Art 11 §2 speaks about the fact that every member of the armed force has to execute the 

orders that were given to him in a loyal way except when executing the order implies 

committing crimes and misdemeanours. 
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* To sum up: A professional member of the armed forces that has a form of conscientious 

objection HAS to execute the orders that were given to him. lfnot he commits 

insubordination (Law of27 Mai 1870 ofthe Military Criminal Law, Art 28 and 29) and that 

is considered as a crime. 

*The Law 27 Dec 1961 (for NCO); the law of 1 March 1958 (Offr) and the Law of 12 Jul 

1973 (volunteers) have been adapted with the Jaw of 16 Mar 00 § 1 (law of 26 Apr 09). This 

adaptation states that every category of personal can ask in writing for his resignation at any 

moment. This resignation will be effective ONLY after acceptance by the King (or the 

MOD). 

* These laws also specify for each category of personnel when resignation will not be 

granted, for instance due to reasons of service interests if the demand is introduced just before 

the announcement of an operation abroad. (Ref. Law 1 March 1958 (coordinated) (Offr) Art. 

21 §3) 

DGHR 
HRP-MiOC 
9-2820-5732 02/264 5732 
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Member State CROATIA 
Communication Date 110 February 2012 
13 March 2013 
Type ofArmed Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
CC: infor@morh.hr 
Subject: Information on conscientious objection to military service - Croatia­
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 16:06:45 +0100 
Dear Sir, 
Referring to your questions, we send you following answers: 
1) The Law on Defence ("Official Gazette", No. 33/02, 58/02, 76107 and 153/09) regulates 
the duties of the citizens concerning the defence, and Article 25, paragraph 1 of this law 
states that: "Military service comprises of recruit commitments, compulsory military service, 
that is, civilian service and compulsory service in the reservist component of the Anned 
Forces of the Republic of Croatia". 
On 5th October 2007 Croatian Parliament has brought a Decision (Official Gazette, 
No. 105/07) that as of 1 January 2008, recruits will not be drafted for compulsory military 
servIce. 
Therefore, the aforementioned decision is currently in effect about non drafting the recruits 
with the possibility of voluntary military service, although compulsory military service is 
kept in the aforementioned Law, and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia has been 
primarily manned with professional soldiers. 
2) The Constitution and the Law on Defence (Article 38.) regulates that conscientious 
objection shall be allowed to all those who for religious or moral reasons are not willing to 
participate in the perfonnance of military service in the armed forces. Such persons shall be 
obliged to perform other duties specified has been regulated by special law (Law on Civil 
Service). 
Article 28 of the aforementioned Law on Amendments of the Law on Defence of 2007 
regulated that "After the Decision on non drafting the recruits for military service the 
provisions of the Law on Civil Service" will not be applied ("Official Gazette" No. 25/03). 
3) Taking all this into account with regards to the first question we wish to add that Article 4 
of the Law on Military Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Official 
Gazette Nos. 33/02, 58/02, 175/03, 136104, 76107, 88/09,124/09) regulates that military 
persons are the following: active military personnel, conscripts (taking into account the 
decision on non drafting the recruits for military service), reservists and cadets. 
4) With regards to the character and meaning of the "conscientious objection" it has been also 
applied for the professional soldiers. 
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5) Legal duty of compulsory military service has been suspended by the previous decision 
that came into effect on 5th October 2007 after which there has been no amendments. The 
Republic of Croatia updates its legislation and harmonizes current laws and regulations and 
makes out new texts but at the moment it is not possible to say anything about the concrete 
amendments on Law on Defence and the Law on Military Service in the Armed Forces of the 
Republic ofCroatia regarding the mentioned subj ect. 
6) In addition to the aforementioned, the subparagraph 5. the control over the implementation 
of the Law on Civil Service is performed by the responsible ministry of social care and the 
amendments to the mentioned Law, that is the elaboration of the new law will be made within 
this ministry in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence which is responsible for the 
implementation of regulations in the field ofmilitary obligation. 
Best regards, 
Public Relations Department of Croatian MoD 
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Second communication: 
Sent: Monday, February 27,20123:41 PM 
Subject: RE: Infonnation on conscientious objection to military service - Croatia-
Dear Madam, 
Firstly, I would like to express my apprecIatIOn for taking the time to answer some 
preliminary questions in relation to my academic research. I am glad to inform you that a 
table with general results has been presented to an academic panel and an open audience at 
the University of Bedfordshire where a unanimous decision was made to the advancement of 
the project at its fmal stage. 
A considerably important aspect of my research project is the questionnaire-based survey 
which is conducted via open-ended questionnaires submitted to all 42 member states of the 
Council of Europe currently maintaining armed forces (either conscripted, professional or a 
mixture). 
In order to attest the effective implementation of Council of Europe standards in Croatia, I 
would be grateful if you could provide an answer to the questions outlined 
below. The official response of your government is crucial for cross-checking the validity of 
findings. 
Questions: 
In 2010 the Council ofEurope Committee of Ministers adopted a recommendation on human 
rights of the members of the armed forces inviting member states to allow the application of 
the right to conscientious objection for both conscripts and professional soldiers, placing 
emphasis on the right ofprofessional members of the armed forces to be able to leave the 
armed forces for reasons of conscience. (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
Recommendation eM/Rec (2010) 4, Human Rights of Members of the Armed Forces, Text 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 February 2010 at the 1077th meeting of the 
Ministers'Deputies). 
This recommendation is by no means legally binding but it creates a political commitment for 
member states to extend human rights protections to professional members of the aImed 
forces. 
I would therefore appreciate some further comments on some well-founded questions 
borne out ofthis latest development. 
In your previous response you mention that conscientious objection legislation is applicable 
for professional members of the armed forces. This contradicts some previous NGOs findings 
suggesting that Croatia does not recognise a right of conscientious objection for professional 
soldiers. This is why your communication is crucial in cross-checking the validity 
information and ensuring that the infonnation used in academic research is accurate. 
In a hypothetical scenario where a soldier is opposed to participating in military activities on 
grounds ofconscience, please consider the questions below. 
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b) Please indicate whether or not you would like to preserve your anonymity. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation and I look forward to receiving your response. A 
table outlining the current situation in all Council of Europe member states which is based in 
preliminary information submitted by governments can be made available to you upon 
request. 
Response (13 March 2013): 
Dear Sir, 
Referring to your e-mail, we send you following explanation: 
Croatian legislation does not know the term: "selective conscientious objection" although 
Article 92, paragraph 3 and 4 of the Defence Law sets forth the following: "Members of the 
:\rmed Forces shall in all situations while deployed in combat or non-combat operations 
abide by the principles of International Humanitarian Law on human treating the enemy 
soldiers and other inherent regulations in compliance with the Constitution, international 
agreements and the law." 
"Members of the Armed Forces are allowed to refuse orders compelling them to act contrary 
to the provisions of the Constitution and international law ." 
For everything else mentioned in your mail, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of 
Croatia is not the appropriate body to contact, please go to the official link of the Government 
of the Republic ofCroatia www.vlada.hr. 
Best regards, 
Independent Public Relations Department of Croatian MoD 
[l 
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Member State CYPRUS 
Communication Date 22 December 2011 
4 July 2012 
:J.J~,)..),...C!..t.c.C' 
Type of Arrned Forces Conscri pti on 
Questionnaire Type Type 1 
KYTIPIAKH ~HMOKPATIA fENIKO EDITEAEIO E0NIKHL <l>POYPAL 
YDOYPfEIO AMYNAL ~IEY0YNLH LTPA TOAOrIKOY 
TMHMA E<l>APMOfHL 
LTPATOAOrIKHL NOM00ELIAL 
AE YKnLIA, 22 ~£K£~~piou 2011 
Em(JK£1rTYJ ()'[o ~taOiKruo 
a _yiannaros@hotmail.com 
w<; yvropisou~£, (J£ anavTYJ(JYJ £ProTYJflaTrov (JU<; (J'[O 8ta8iKruo, YJfl£P. 09 ~EK 201 I nou ~Lo.~ 
8ta~t~a(J8YJKav ~£ TYJV Ap. <l>aK.6.18.02.3114 ~£K 201l1YDAM , La napaK(lTco: 
H t(Jx,Dou(Ja vo~08wia Kat ()UYK£Kpt~tva 0 No~o<; n£pi E8vtKij<; <l>poupa<; 'tOU 2011, 
npo~A£n£t unox,p£ro<YYJ 8YJTcia<; (JTYJV Eevucrl <l>poupa OAroV TroV nOAmov TYJe; KunptaKij~ 
~YJ~oKpaTia<; ano TYJV 1YJ Iavouapiou TOU £LOU<; KaTa 'to onoio (JU~nAYJPwvoUv 'to ()tKo.'tO 
oy800 £'to<; TYJ<; YJAtKia<; 'tou<; fl£x'Pt TYJ (JU~nAijpro<YYJ 'tou n :(J(JapaKo(J'tOD n£~1t:Tou £'tOue; 't11~ 
YJAtKiu<; 'tOue;. 
H i8ta vo~08wia pu8flis£t 8tflaTa £KnAijpro(JYJe; uno)'J)£ro<YYJ<; unYJPwia<; (JTYJV EevtKij <l>poupa 
TroV avnppYJ0twv (JUvci8YJ<YYJ<; Kat fl£ Ta onoia Ka8t£pWVCTat 0 8£(JflO<; TYJ<; evaAAaK'nKij~ 
(JTpanronKij<; Kat KOtVroVtKij<; 8Y]Tf:(a~ . 
M£LaSD aAAroV npO~A£n£Tat on Ot (JTpaT£D0t~Ot nou 'AOyro TroV 8PYJ(JK£UUKWV ij t8COAoytKffiv 
TOUe; nenot8ij(J£rov, apVODVLat va £KnAYJpW(JOUV unox,ptro<YYJ unYJpwia<; (),[YJv E8vlKij <l>poupa 
Kat avayvropisoVTat roe; aVTtPPYJ(Jtc<; (JUv£t8ij(J£ro<;, unox,pCODvTat va £KnAYJPW(JOUV 
evaAAaKTtKij (JTpaurouKij 8YJTcia ij evaAlcaKTtKij KOtVroVtKij 8Y]Tcia, avaAoya ~£ Tllv 
n£pinTro<YYJ . 
n(JOV a<popa La unOAoma £proTij~aLa, YJ anaVTYJ<YYJ civat apVYJUKij Ka8o(Jov 8ev unapx,ouv 
enayy£AI.!aTtc<; (JTpaUWT£<; (Ju<; tvonAc<; 8uva~£t<; TYJ<; KunptaKij<; ~YJ~oKpaTia<; 01)'[£ Kilt 
(Jx,t8ta yta npo(Jroptvij ij nAijpYJ 8taKoni) TYJ<; unox,p£roTtKij<; (JTpaurouKij<; 8YJT£ta<;. 
Lae; yvropisou~ eni<YYJe; OU, (J'tOV D£pi EevtKij<; <l>poupae; No~o TOU 201 J 8ev £x,ouv enOl-8Et 
~£Ta TYJ \jIij<pt<Yr'j 'tou, onot£(J8ijnoT£ aAAayte; (J£ 8tflaLa nou tx,ouv (Jx,£(JYJ fl£ LOUe; avnppYJcrt£c; 
(JUVci8YJ <YYJ e; 
Eifla()'[£ (JTYJ 8ta8£<Yr'j (Jae; yta onOta8ijnoT£ n£pantpro nAYJpo<popia ij 8t£UKpivt<YYJ. 
086<; A8aM(J(Jae; LTp80 ' 'Xp.Laflapa 2116, 
TYJA.0035722417121, <l>aS.22375989, I(J'tO(J£Ai8a: www.army.gov.cy 
227 
Tra 
CYl 
Mil­
SEC 
Nic( 
Inte: 
In n 
201 
The 
in tl 
whic 
The 
obje 
Arne 
refu 
are 
appr 
For 
the 
sus~ 
We 
con, 
Nati 
We 
Atb, 
Tel : 
Sec( 
KYI 
YTI( 
TM] 
LTP 
AE~ 
Emc 
ay l 
Translation: 
J CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD 
I 
i 
" 

" 

v 
~1 
:1 
:c; 
,a 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE - DEPARTMENT OF RECRUITMENT 
SECTION FOR THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY LEGISLATION 
Nicosia, 22 December 2011 
Internet visitor: a _yiannaros@hotmail.com 
In response to your queries on the internet, dated 9 December 2011 (Folder No. 6.18.02.3114 
201 1 NPAM) we are sharing the following infonnation: 
The current legislation, namely the National Guard of 2011 provides for compulsory service 
in the National Guard for all citizens of the Republic born from 1 January of the year in 
which they reach their eighteenth birthday to complete military service until the age of 45. 
The same law regulates the obligation to fulfil the National Guard service for conscientious 
objectors which established the institution of military and alternative civilian service. 
Among others, the law states that conscripts who because of religious or ideological beliefs 
refuse to fulfil a service in the National Guard and are recognised as conscientious objectors 
are required to perform alternative unarmed service or alternative civilian service, as 
appropriate. 
For all other questions, the answer is negative, because there are no professional soldiers in 
the armed forces of the Republic nor there are any plans for a temporary or complete 
suspension ofmilitary service. 
We would also like to inform you that no amendments have occurred with regards to 
conscientious objection matters as a result of the adoption of the recent Law concerning the 
National Guard of2011. 
We are at your disposal for any further information or clarifications. 
Athalassa, Chr. Samara Street, 2116, Nicosia 
Tel: 0035722417121, Fax. 22375989, Website: www.army.gov.cy 
Second communication (4 July 2012): 
KYDPIAKH ~HMOKPATIA fENIKO EnITEJ\EIO EGNIKHL: <1>POYPAL: 
YDOYPfEIO AMYNAL: ~IEyeYNLH LTPATOAOflKOY 
TMHMA E<DAPMOrHL: 
L:TPATOAOrIKHL: NOMOGEL:IAL 
AEYKnL:IA, 4 IOUAiou 
EnlOlCbnll O"'to ~la8iKTUo 
a 3iannaros@hotmail.com 
Lac; yvrop{SOU~E, O"E a1taVtllO"ll cpro'tll~La'tcov O"a<; 0"10 Sl<l&iKTIlO, ll~EP. 25 Mat 2012 nou ~ac; 
olaPl~aO"ellKav ~ 'tl1v Ap. <1>aK.6.18.02.21118 10DY 2012IYTIAM , 'ta napaKa'tro: 
H l(JxUouO"a vo~oewia Kat cru'YKcKpt~tva 0 N6~0<; m:pi E8vl1djC; <1>poupac; 'tou 2011, 
228 

2012 
Wii¥4M Mg­
npo~MnGl u1tOxpecoCYll 8rl'tdas G'tllV E8vtK1l <Dpoupa OAroV 'tON nOAl'tCDV 'tllS Ku1tptaKf!s 
D.llJlOKpa'ttas ano 'tllV III Iavouaplou 'tou houS Kanx 'to 01'[OtO cruJlnAllPWVOUV 'to c5eKa'to 
oyooo e'tOS 'tllS llAtKias 'touS Jlexpt 't11 GUJl1'[A1lPro<J'11 'tou 'tEcrGapaKOG'tOU nEJl1'['tOU E'tOUS 
'tllS llAtKtas 'tOuS· 
H {c5ta VOJl08EGta pU8JltSEt 8£Jla'ta EK1tA1lPCOGllS U1'[OXP£COCYllS U1t1']pEcr1as G'tllv EBvtK1l <Dpoupa 
'tCOV aV'tlPPllGlrov cruvdc511G1']S JlE 'ta o1toia Ka9t£prov£'t(xt 0 8wJloS 't1']<; £va"AAaKnKf!s 
G'tpanconKils Kat £VaAAaK'tlKf!s KOtvWVtK1lS ell'tdac;. 
Ot Ota'taS£tS 't1']S EV 'AOyco VOf.WeWtas, 11 onoia pu8JllsEt geJla'ta £KnA1lPCOG1']S u1tOxpeCOGllS 
u1tTjp£Gtas G'tllv EBvtK1l <Dpoupa 'tcov avnpPllGtrov O"Uvdo1']CYIlS, a<popouv G'tpa't£ucrtJlous Kat 
0Xl JlOvtJla Gn:A.tXll 't1']e; E.<D (ASKOUC;, VnSKOUS Kat EDV). 
M£'tasu a"AAcov 1tpo~A.t1t£'tat on ot O''tpa'tEucrtJlot ot 01'[0101 'AOyco 'twv epllcrKEunKrov 1l 
to£OAOytKrov 'touS 1t£1tOt01lG£wv, apvouv'tal va C;KnA1']proGOUV unoXP£WO'll u1tTjpWla<; cr'tllv 
EBvtKil <Dpoupa dvat ouva'to va avayvwptsov'tat coS avnpp1']O'{C;S cruvwS1lO'£WS, npOKC;tJl£VOU 
va £K1tAllProO'ouv £VaAAaK'ttKil (J'tpanw'ttKil 911't£1a 1l £vaAAaKnKil 
KOtvwvual 811'tc;la, avaAoya Jl£ 't1']v n£pinnDCYIl. 
H EVaMaK'ttKil O''tpanumK1l U1tllP£cria £KnA11prov£'tat Il1tOKAc:tcrnKa 0'£ Jlova8£e; " u.1t11PWt£s 
't1']C; E8vtK1lC; <Dpoupas Ot 01tOl£C; KaeOptsov'tat a1to 'tOY V1touPYO 'JluvaS, Jl£ 'tllv avaO£CYIl O''tOV 
IlvnpP11O'ia <JUVc;lOllCYlle; KaOllKOV'trov Kat anOVOJl1l £tOtKO't1l'troV, nou O£V cruv£1tayov'tUl 't11 
XP"CYIl 1l 't1']v £Knatc5£uCYIl cr'tll XP1lCYll 01tAWV. 
H £VaAAaKnKil KotvooVtKil U1t1']p£crta £K1'[A11Provc;'tat cr£ u1t11p£O'i£S <pop£wv 'tou 811f.lOO'lOU 
'tOf.lea, ot 01'[01£e; Ka80piSoV'tUl Jlc a1to<pa<Yll 'tou Ynoupyou 'Jluvae;, Kat cruvlO''ta'tat G'tllv 
napox" a1to 'tOY avnpP11Gia cruvdOllG1']e; unllP£O'tcOV KOtV1lS oo<p£Mtas, " O''t1']v £K't£MCYIl 
Ka911Kov'trov nou U1'[llP£'toUV 'to KotVO Jl£ npo'tc;pato't11'ta 'tOY KOtVOOVtKO 'to~a 
Kat 'tllV 1tpoG'taO'ia 'tou n£p1~aAAov'toS. 
01 cr'tpa't£ucrtJlot ot OnOt01 £m8uJlouv va avayvroptO''touv we; aV'tlPPllO'i£e; O'UV£W11GllS, 
u1to~aM.ouv crx£'ttKil ai'tllGll O''tO apJl0810 L'tpa'tOAoytK6 f pa<p£1o, cruvoOWOJlEVll JlC 'ta 
Ka80plO'Jl£va avaYKaia OtKalOAoY11'tlKa £v'toe; Ka90p10'f.l,tv11S npoO£GJl{ae; Kal 0'£ Ka9£ 
1t£pi1t'troCYll 1tptv 'tllv llf.l£POJl11vill KIl'ta 'tllv o1toia O<pdAoUV va Ka'ta'tayouv 
O''tllV E8v1Kil <Dpoupa. 
Ta L'tpa'toAoytKa fpll<p£la £A.tYXouv 'til npOpMnof.lEVa 81.KIllOAoyrrnKa Kat £v'toe; 5 llf.l,£Prov 
napan£Jl1touv 'toue; at'tll'tES O''tllV apJl60ta Ia'tptKi! E1tt'tpon" (EELI) Y1a esbaGl1 'tllS 
O'roJlanKils 'toue; tKaVO'tll'tas. fla OGOUC; Kp1.90uv Ka'taMllAOl yta O''tpa'twCYIl, 11 O'XenKil 
aMl1Aoypa<:pia ot(l~tPaSe'tat ym nepal.'t£pw X£lptcrJlO O'e EtOtK" Ent'tponij, 11 
onoia EX£t crUf.l,<prova f.l£ 'tll v0f.l08£crta 'tllv apf.lo~h6'tll'ta va YVWJlooo'tet yta nap6Jlou,:S 
u1t08eO'£lS. H 1tapamlVID EtotKil E1tt'tponi! c;lvat 1'[£V'taJl£A"S Kat a1tO't£Ml'tat ano OVO 
Ka811Y1l't£S avro'ta'toov £Knat8£unKrov tOPUf.la'twv f.l£ £tOtKO'tll'ta O''tll <pt"AoO'o<p{a 1l O'ns 
K01VWV1K£S-1tOAt'ttKeS £ntG't1lJlC;S " O''tllv \jfuxoAoyia, £Va VOJl1KO AEl.'tOUPYO 't11S 
NOJll.K"e; V1t11P£O'{ac; 'tllS ~llf.loKpa'tias, Kat 8uo avcO't£poUC; aS1rof!UnKOus 'tllS D.uvaJll1S, £Va 
'tou L'tpa'toAoytKOU Ka1 £Va 'tou VY£lOVOJl1KOU LcOJla'tos KUl owpisov'tat ano 'tOY K. V1toupyo 
, Jluvas yta 't£'tpUe't1l 911't£iu. 
fta Ka8e D1t08eCYll 1tOD £S£'tat;et 11 EtotKil Em'tpon1l 'tT\pouv'tat npaK'ttKa O''tU onoia 
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Translation: 
CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE - DEPARTMENT OF RECRUITMENT 
SECTION FOR THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY LEGISLATION 
NICOSIA, July 4, 2012 
Internet visitor: a _yiannaros@hotmail.com 
In response to questions on the internet dated 25 May 2012 that we received via Folder No. 

6.18.02.21/18 June 20 12NPAM, we inform you of the following: 

The current legislation, namely the Law on National Guard of2011, provides for compulsory 

service in the National Guard of all citizens of the Republic from 1 January of the year in 

which they reach their eighteenth birthday until the completion of the forty-fifth year of age. 

The same law regulates issues concerning the fulfilment of service in the National Guard of 

conscientious objectors for which the institution of alternative (unarmed) military service and 

alternative civilian service is established. 

The provisions of this legislation which regulates issues concerning the fulfilment of service 

in the National Guard of conscientious objectors, are only applicable to conscripted soldiers 

and not permanent members of the National Guard (Officers, Lieutenants and 5-year Service 

Volunteers) . 

Among others, it is envisaged in legislation that conscripts who, because of religious or 

ideological beliefs refuse to fulfil a service obligation in the National Guard may be 

recognized as conscientious objectors to perform alternative military service or alternative 

social service, as appropriate. 

The alternative military service is fulfilled exclusively in units or departments of the National 

Guard as determined by the Minister of Defence, and comprises of the provision by 
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conscientious objectors of public services according to their skills, that do not involve the use 
or training in the use of weapons. 
The alternative social service is carried out in agencies of public sector bodies, which are 
detennined by the Minister of Defence, and is used to provide services by conscientious 
objectors, or serving the public with priority given on the social sector and the protection of 
the environment. 
Conscripts wishing to be recognized as conscientious objectors shall submit an application to 
the Recruiting Office , together with the prescribed necessary documents within a specified ! period and in any case before the date on which they are called to join the National Guard. I 
I 
The Enlistment Offices are examining the required documents and within five days they refer 
the applicants to the competent Medical Commission ( EESJ ) for examination of their 
physical capacity. For those who qualify for enlistment, the correspondence is forwarded for 
I 
further handling in Special Committee, which according to the law has the power to advice 
on such matters. The above Special Committee is composed of five members and two 
professors of higher education institutions specializing in philosophy or social ~political 
sciences or in psychology, a legal officer of the Legal Services of the Republic, and two 
senior officers of the Force, one of Recruiting and one of the Health Corps as appointed by 
the Minister of Defence for a period of four years. 
I 
~ 
For each case considered by the Special Committee, minutes are kept and an opinion is given 
upon recognition or not of a conscript as a conscientious objector for the purposes of 
perfonning alternative military or alternative civilian service. The correspondence fonned is 
submitted to the Minister of Defence to make a final decision no later than one month from ~ the submission of the relevant files. , 
I 
For those conscripts recognized by the Minister of Defence as conscientious objectors, the 
organization of the public sector which will be available and the deadline for entering the 
service is also established by the Minister. 
The length of alternative military service and alternative civilian service for conscripts 
recognized as conscientious objectors, is equal to that which would fulfil if serving military ~ 
service (full or reduced), increased as follows:.~ 
I, For a person liable for alternative military (unanned) service: 
( 1 ) Five months ifliable to fulfil 18 months and up to full military service. 
(2) Four months ifliable to fulfil military service of 12 months and less than 18 months. 
( 3 ) Three months if liable to fulfil military service shorter than 12 months. 
B. For a person liable for alternative civilian service: 
(a) Nine months ifliable to fulfil 18 months and up to full military service. 
( b ) Eight months if liable to fulfil military service lasting 12 months and less than 18 
months. 
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Member State DENMARK 
Communication Date 15 December 2011 
Type of Armed Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type I Type 2 
RELEASABLE TO INTERNET TRANSMISSION 
Dear Andreas, 
I have chosen to send you a little more information than you originally requested, as 
politicians in Denmark right now are discussing whether we should maintain the compulsory 
conscription system or if we perhaps should abolish it. You will fi nd your answers within the 
text and perhaps a lot more than needed. Hopefully it will give you an overview of the current 
situation in Denmark considering the actual system and future plans. Be free to contact me 
for further questions. 
Compulsory military service in Denmark 
The current Compulsory mil itary service system was introduced as part of the present 
Political Agreement concerning the Danish Armed Forces 2005 - 2009. As part of the 
agreement the general length of the compulsory military services was reduced from 9 to 4 
month. At the same time the Compulsory military services for junior NCOs and Reserve 
officers were terminated. The fi rst conscripts with only 4 months of service reported for 
service in FEB 2005. The current system marked the change from territorial defence to an 
international focus. This focus may not change for a long time to come, but there are still a lot 
of issues for us to look into, with the purpose of finding the best possible system. These days 
politician are discussing whether the current system still is considered relevant and therefore 
and examination was suggested within the Political Agreement concerning the Danish Armed 
Forces 2010 - 2014. The examination suggests four over all models of new systems, which 
the Danish politicians are going to make a decision about in autumn 2012. The four suggested 
models are: 
a. The current system continues on the whole. 
b. Women will be obliged to attend the 'Defence Day' will be called up fo r service as 
conscripts. 
c. Right to voluntary service for both men and women. 
d. 100% professional Army 
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The Danish Constitution declares in § 81 that all able bodied men must serve the country as 
conscripts. This can be done in the AImed Forces or in certain civilian organizations. 
All men must show up just for an examination before they pass 19 years of age unless 
otherwise agreed with the authorities. Allfemales receive a letter of invitation for basic 
military training when they pass 18 years of age. The first selection is based on medical 
standards and a few other tests. More than 38 % (2008) are disqualified due to medical or 
other deficiencies. Parallel to this the AImed Forces and The Civil Defence organization put 
forward their needs for recruits based on the Political Agreement. So based on these factors 
The Recruiting Agency formulate the actual "Lottery system" meaning deciding the limit 
when drawing lots for either doing service or not. But a lot of young men volunteer for basic 
training regardless of the result. In average 23 % are selected for compulsory military service, 
in either the Armed Forces or the Civil Defence organization, per year. 
The young men - and women will normally start their basic training within a year after the 
selection process and the main group will start either in early FEB or AUG for two reasons: 
In order to fit into our main training cycle within the AImed Forces for those who stay after 
their basic training, but also to enable the young people to have an easy start at universities 
etc. after leaving the Armed Forces. A few units have other starting dates due to more 
specialized duties i.e. duties related to the Royal family etc. We do not take into account their 
l'evel of civilian education in the selection process, but the young man can apply for a 
postponement of his military service if he is in the middle of a longer educational program 
and that will normally be accepted. Young people being convicted for a certain group of 
offences resulting in a prison sentence of more than 30 days will be excluded from the basic 
military service. We have less than 100 of these cases per year. 
We do not distinguish between various candidates for compulsory military service except that 
those applying themselves for basic training as conscripts can choose time and place and thus 
get some favors compared to the rest. But this has nothing to do with their background in any 
way. 
After the basic training they can apply for further training on a volunteer or contract basis 
either as private soldiers or NCOs, depending on their qualifications - civilian as well as 
military. For private soldiers a minimum of 8 months of further training is required for being 
fully trained for a simple job in a COY or equivalent and thus deployable into International 
missions. For junior NCOs the best are recruited right after the basic training, but most are 
selected after additional training as a private soldier. The Junior NCOs' training is composed 
of basic training for all branches of the Service and followed by a specialized training for 
each branch. 
All conscripts are given a monthly pay which is taxed. Additionally they get money for meals 
which are not taxed. Besides tIns they get free accommodation and they can travel free of 
charge with all sorts of public transports (trains, busses, ferries etc.) 
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All conscripts are given a common basic training within each Service - consisting of both 

traditionally military subject and more civilian subjects i.e. firefighting. In the Anny all basic 

training is controlled by our 2ndBrigade HQ through a number of training battalions and 

subordinated training companies. But the conscripted soldiers are only trained on 

section/squad level within a platoon level framework in a classic infantry role regardless of 

the Branch. In the Air Force and the Navy the basic training is given at one school each with 

a similar program as in the Army though the Navy takes the naval conscripts to sea for a 

period of 4-6 weeks. This common program is somehow different for conscripts in units 

attached to the Royal Household as mentioned in paragraph 3. Their training consists of 8 ­
12 month of service. 

During the basic training the conscripts are given a number of briefmgs about career options 

within the Armed Forces, including international operations. They also get a couple of 

practical, basic lectures on riot control and check point duties as an introduction to 

international operations. So at the end of the basic training they can apply for further training 

as mentioned in paragraph 4 on a volunteer or contract basis and this can lead to deployments 

for international operations. The only relation is a planning one so young people accepted for 

further training are transferred smoothly into training units as mentioned in paragraph 4. 

Those young people which end their basic training without applying for further training in the 

Arnled Forces are dismissed, but are transferred administratively into an organization for 

local territorial or Homeland defense. This organization can also in peacetime be activated in 

support of the Police or the Civil Defence organization in times of disasters like flooding, 

pollution etc. The ex-conscripts can be re-called within 3 years after their dismissal for this 

type of service. This does not apply for those conscripts with 8 or more months of service 

mentioned in paragraph 6. 

Since 1917 Danish men has been given the opportunity to render an alternative civilian 

service instead of compulsory military service, in Danish "Militrernregtertjeneste". 

Conscripts for whom military service of any kind are not compatible with their conscience, 

can apply for civilian services. The duration of the civilian service is similar to the 

compulsory military service. Applying for civilian service is at least two months ahead of the 

actual start of the service. It is also possible to apply for civilian services after starting the 

compulsory military service but very few men uses this opportunity. The amount of men 

applying for civilian services have dropped down since 2005. 

The legislation regarding conscientious objections has not been changed for a long time. 

Professional soldiers always sign contracts when entering the Danish Armed Forces, 

therefore any conscientious objections towards Armed Forces always will result in dismissal. 

Links: 
The Danish Constitution (Danish) 
https:/ /www.retsinfonnation.dkIF ormsIR071 O.aspx?id=45902 
Danish Defence Educations (Danish) 
http://forsvaretsuddannelser.dkiPages/default.aspx 
Militremregteradministrationen (Danish) 
http://militaernaegter.dklPageslF orside.aspx 
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FINLANDMember State 
Communication Date 9 December 201 1 
28 F 2012 
Type of Armed Forces Conscription 
Questionnaire Type Type 1 
First communication: 
Dear Mr Yiannaros 
Here are the answers to your questions: 
1) Does Finland currently maintain conscription which is compulsory for its citizens? 
E ery Finnish man is liable for military service (conscription). The civic duty of military 

service is defined in the second chapter of the law on conscription (called Conscription Act). 

This duty affects all Finnish men and begins when a man turns 18. It continues till be reaches 

the age of 60. This means a man is liable for military service and that he is either in service, 

in the reserve or in the auxiliary reserve. 

2) Does it recognize a right of conscientious objection to military service for conscripted 

soldiers? 

The Ministry of Employment and the Economy manages, supervises and develops the non­

military service option. The Civil Service Centre, which reports to the Ministry, is 

responsible for the realisation of non-military service, organising training relating to the 

obligations under it, and guidance regarding places of service. The Civil Service Centre is at 

the Educational and Civil Service Centre of Lapinjarvi. 

Someone can apply to do non-military service on the grounds of his convictions. It is a 

substitute for military service under the Conscription Act. The Non-military Service Act and 

Decree lay down provisions for non-military service. 

The period prescribed for non-military service is 362 days. There is no obligation to repeat 

the training. Non-military service consists of a period of basic training lasting 28 days and 

around 11 months of service work. The latter is done in places of service approved by the 

Civil Service Centre. There are approximately 1,800 such places around the country. 

The benefits that accrue during the period of non-military service are determined according to 

the same criteria as those for conscripts. Maintenance costs (daily allowances, food, 

accommodation, healthcare and travel) are the responsibility of the place where the service 

work is done. 

Non-military service can be applied for when someone is called up or afterwards or as an 

option to conscripted service that has begun. 

The application is submitted to either the Draft Board, the commander of the relevant unit, or 

the Defence Forces' regional office. 

A place in non-military service can be applied for by submitting a written application to the 

Civil Service Centre. 
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3) Does it recognise a right of conscientious objection for professional members of the anned 
forces? 
Not really, you have to obey orders, but after the studies at the National Defence University 
you can leave Finnish Defence Forces at any time. Normal employer-employee rules apply. 
4) If conscription is still compulsory in Finland are there any plans to suspend or abolish 
conscription in the near future? 
There are no plans to suspend or abolish the conscription system. 
5) Are there any important changes in the legislation regarding conscientious objection in 
Finland that the researcher should be aware of? 
No, there are will not be any changes to the legislation in this matter. 
You can read more about FDF and our conscription system on our website www.mil.fi 
Second communication (28 February 2012): 
Questions: 
1) In your email you state that the right of conscientious objection is recognised by 
law for conscripted but not for professional members of the armed forces (normal employer­
employee rules apply). 
"In 2010 the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted a recommendation on 
human rights of the members of the armed forces inviting member states to allow the 
application of the right to conscientious objection for both conscripts and professional 
soldiers, placing emphasis on the right of professional members of the armed forces to be 
able to leave the armed forces for reasons of conscience. (Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 4, Human Rights of Members of the 
Armed Forces, Text adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 February 2010 at the 
1077th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)." 
This recommendation is by no means legally binding but it creates a political 
commitment for member states to extend human rights protections to professional members 
of the armed forces. 
What is your response to this? Is the government currently taking any steps to extend 
conscientious objection legislation on professional members of the armed forces? 
About 50% of the FDF is made up of professional soldiers. Soldiers serve essentially under 
the same general contract as other persons employed by the state, which can be in form of a 
permanent post or a fixed-term contract. However, in addition there are regulations on 
military discipline and on personnel in crisis management operations. 
The act on civilian service (2007) does not include the right to conscientious objection for 
professional soldiers. There are no plans to change this! An officer or NCO can leave the 
employment with the FDF at any time if some personal or conscientious objections occur 
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(i.e.) the recommendation from Council of Europe Committee of Ministers isfuljilled as there 
is a right of professional soldiers to leave FDF on any reason. The right to conscientious 
objection is not recognized as long as you maintain your employment as a soldier! 
2) Does Finland allow for absolute and selective conscientious objection to military 
service? (please see definitions below) 
Conscientious objection is regulated by the Civilian Service Act of 2007 
(Siviilipalveluslaki 28. December 2007/1446). As the conscription act also applies to women 
who wish to perform a voluntary military service, the civilian service act also applies to those 
women (article 1). 
An application for conscientious objection is possible at any time, before, during and after 

military service (article 12). Applications must be made to the Ministry of Defence. 

Applications can be made with a standard application form that is available from the 

Ministry. Since 1987, there is no personal interview during the application procedure. 

Consequently, applications are almost automatically granted. 

An application is also possible in times ofcrisis or war. However, under those circumstances 

the application will be dealt with by a specially constituted board, which includes one 

member from the military. It is possible to appeal against the decision of the board (articles 

18-22). 

According to article 4 ofthe act, the period prescribed for non-military service is 362 days­

equal to the longest possible service time for conscripts, and twice as long as the service time 

of50% ofconscripts. 

3) Is there a suitable procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 
applications? Could you please outline this procedure briefly? 
Work duties during the service applied for a place on their own, preferably before the entry 
into service. If a suitable work is not found, the search will be continued during the period of 
training. If the place does not exist then, military service is the service center, so to speak, 
"legionnaires", until the location is found. The Centre may also order the service and the 
place where military service is such a fmd. 
Civilian service can be applied for at the call-ups, at any time and also after their military 
service during or after completion. How to apply by filling in a special application form and 
sending it to call up draft boards, military service during the brigade's commander, and at all 
other times, either their place of residence according to the Military Province Headquarters, 
or Lapinjarvi civil service center. If applying for civil service while on military service, the 
applicant will be sent home immediately. Already performed the service will receive a 
certificate, under which the civil service reduced the time It IS completed military 
service. The length of time provided for non-military time, which corresponds to the 
remaining part of the conscript service period. Women performing voluntary military 
service can apply for civilian service in the same way as conscripts. Women have, 
however, the special right to suspend the military or civilian service, the first 45 days without 
penalty. After this, women are treated as fully liable for military service as men. 
4) Is it possible to know the exact length of military service in Finland? 
Conscription lasts 180,270 or 362 days (6, 9 or 12 months). The training period for officers 
and non-commissioned officers or for special duties is 362 days. The period for conscripts 
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trained for work requiring special or professional skills is 270 days, and for the other rank 
and file duties 180 days. About 50% of conscripts perform a 180 days' military service. 
5) Is the right to be considered as a conscientious objector available after military 
service? Would you know if a reservist could apply for conscientious objection after military 
service? 
An application for conscientious objection is possible at any time, before, during and after 
0. military service (article 12). Applications must be made to the Ministry of Defence. 
e Applications can be made with a standard application form that is available from the 
Ministry. Since 1987, there is no personal interview during the application procedure. 
w Consequently, applications are almost automatically granted. 
e. 
Ie 6) Are members of the armed forces informed of their rights and the procedures available 
'e. to exercise them? If so, is access to such information facilitated by the authorities and at what 
stage (before or after enlistment)? 
es 
Yes, when you sign the working contract and you can access this statement at any time ne 
during enlistment. res 
7) Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? Please 
vs­
me specify. 
As stated above: Finland does not at the moment recognize the right to conscientious 
objection for professional soldiers, normal rules for employment within the state apply. ion 
8) Are applicants transferred to non-combat duties until their application has been 
examined?ltry 
dof 
This is highly theoretical. Conscientious objections seldom occur suddenly or unexpected. eak, 
But it is of course possible to apply for non-combat duties. But this is not a right, if there isn't 
.the 
any free job opportunities in this direction you won't get any such duty. nd. 
9) Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent andtary 
impartial bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil administration? (I.e. areand 
the bodies/committees exammmg such applications and making final
.t all 
decisions independent from the administration of the Ministry ofDefence)?ters, 
, the 
10) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious re a 
objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial ofbenefits etc)itary 

:>the 

It is forbidden by law to discrino.inate people on any grounds, so no, their will be noitary 
implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious objection grounds lave, 

thout 

11) Is there any option for a conscientious objector to be fully discharged from the 
obligation to perform either military or civilian service? (i.e. paying a certain fee instead of 
performing service of any kind). 
Draft evasion is punished with a fine and a new call-up, which has led some into a repeating fleers 
circle of fines and call-ups, if they refuse to comply.~ripts 
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Total objectors are sentenced according to two different laws, depending on whether they 
first applied for legal recognition as conscientious objector or not. 
Total objectors who are recognised as conscientious objectors and subsequently refuse to 
perfonn substitute service are sentenced according to Article 75 of the Civilian Service Act. 
According to the article, the maximum sentence is half of the remaining service time. 
However, if the sentence is less than half the remaining service time, then the total objector 
can be called up to finish his service after serving the prison sentence. The remainder of his 
service time is then calculated on the basis that each day in prison equals two days of civilian 
service. In practice, this means that the courts have not much choice when sentencing a total 
objector. 
Total objectors who did not apply for conscientious objector status will be sentenced 
according to the Conscription Act. 
1 
I, 
p 
[I 
Working definitions for the project: 
Conscientious objection is defmed as the objection to military service deriving from 
principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from religious, 
ethical, humanitarian or similar motives. 
Alternative service of civilian character replacing armed military service is understood to 
refer to non-combatant social work or other work of national importance that is under civilian 
control, in the public interest and not of a punitive nature. 
Conscripts are persons compulsorily enrolled to perfonn military service in the anned forces 
of a state. The relationship of conscripts with the armed forces' authorities is by its very 
essence temporary and lasts only for the duration of the military service. 
Conscription refers to the compulsory enrolment of individuals for service in the Armed 
Services. 
Professional soldiers are professional servicemen voluntarily joining the armed forces and 
serving for longer periods 
Absolute conscientious objectors are opposing to participation in war in any fonn because 
of their personal convictions. 
Selective conscientious objection is primarily distinguished from absolute conscientious 
objection by the fact that the objector does not claim to be opposed to all forms of use of 
armed force, and would, were the circumstances different, be willing to participate in military 
action. 
Notes: 
a) If a term is otherwise defined by national law in different terms, please specify. 
b) Please indicate whether or not you would like to preserve your anonymity. 
Please, I would like to preserve my anonymity. 
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Thank you in advance for your cooperation and I look forward to receiving your response. A 
table outlining the current situation in all Council of Europe member states which is based on 
preliminary information submitted by governments can be made available to you upon 
request. 
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1 
Member State GERMANY 
CommW1ication Date 9 December 20 11 
28 Febru 201 2 
Type of Anned Forces Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
Transl 
Dear tv' 
Thank 
Refusil 
enshrir 
First communication: 
Selu- geelmer Herr Yiannaros, 
haben Sie vielen Dank fUr Ihre freundliche Anfrage, die ich Ihnen geme beantworte. 
Bei der Moglichkeit, den Kriegsdienst mit der Waffe zu verweigem, handell es sich in 
Deutschland urn ein Grundrecht, das in unserer Verfassung (Grundgesetz ftir die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) verankert ist. Artikel 4 Absatz 3 Grundgesetz besagt: 
"Niemand darf gegen sein Gewissen zum Kriegsdienst mit def Waffe gezwungen werden. 
Das Nahere regelt ein Bundesgesetz." Somit ist das Recht auf Kriegsdienstverwei gerungen 
von der Form der Bundesweru, also auch von der Welu-pflicht, absolut unabhangig und steht 
jedem BundesbUrger jederzeit zu. Die Zustandigkeit fU r Kriegsd ienstverweigerungen liegt 
beim Bundesamt fUr Fami lie und zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben, das Sie linter den 
fo lgenden Kontaktdaten erreichen: 
BW1desamt fUr Familie und zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben 
Sibille-Hartmann-Stra13e 2-8 
50969 Koln 
Telefon: 0221 - 3 67 30 
Fax: 02 21 - 3 67 34 94 9 
E-Mail: service@bafza.bund.de 
In der Hoffnung hinreichend geantwortet zu haben, stehe ich fUr weitere Fragen gerne zur 
VerfUgung und wunsche Ihnen und Ihren AngehOrigen eine schone Adventszeit. 
Mit freundlichen Gru13en 
Streitkrafteamt InfoService Burgeranfragen 
Alte Heerstra13e 90 
53757 Sankt Augustin 
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Translation: 
Dear Mr. Yiannaros 
Thank you for your kind request, here is my answer. 
Refusing the possibility of armed military service is a fundamental right in GelUlany, as 
enshrined in our Constitution (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). Article 4(3) 
of the Basic Law states: "No one shall be compelled against his conscience to render military 
service under arms. Details are regulated by a Federal Law". Thus, the right to be recognised 
as a conscientious objector is absolutely independent from the actual set-uplconstitution of 
the Bundeswehr (German army) and consequently also from universal conscription (i.e. 
compulsory military service); as such it is a right of every citizen at any time. The 
responsibility for conscientious refusal applications lies with the Federal Office for Family 
and Civil Duties, which can be reached at the following contact details: 
Federal Office for Family and Civil Duties 
Sirnille-Hartmann-Strasse 2-8 
50969, Cologne 
Phone: 022136730 
Fax: 022136734949 
Email: Service@bafza.bund.de 
I hope to have answered your questions adequately. I am happy to answer any further 
questions. 
Armed Forces Information Service, Office for Citizen Inquiries 
I 53757 Sankt Augustin 
I 
I 
Second Communication with Bafza: 
Dear Mr Yiannaros, 
The former Zivildienst was a compulsory community service in place of military service, a 
substitution for the general conscription in the German armed forces. The duly performance 
of the Zivildienst was managed by the Bundesamt fur den Zivildienst (Federal Office of 
Civilian Service), an independent higher federal authority within the portfolio of 
the Bundesministerium fur Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (Federal Ministry for 
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Minister Kristina Schroeder). Anyone 
who refused to perform armed service for reasons of conscience and was officially 
recognized as a conscientious objector had to perform compUlsory community service that 
lasted six months. 
In June 2011 the general conscription in the German armed forces was suspended (not 
abolished, since this would require a change of the German Constitution). That means that 
the Zivildienst, the alternative community service to military service, was suspended, too. 
Since July 2011 the Bundesamt fur Familie und zivilgesellschaJtliche Aujgaben (Federal 
Office of Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions) is responsible for the 
244 
-

.... 'F ?He 
new Bundesfreiwilligendienst (BFD). The BFD is a voluntary social service not only for 
young men as the Zivildienst was. It isnow open for all men and women who fullfilled their 
compulsory education (according to the federal state at the age of 15 or 16); there is no 
maximum age. The federal volunteer service can be full filled in all areas where conscientious 
objectors worked before, e.g. hospitals, retirement homes or emergency medical services, but 
­
halso public utility institutions in the fields of ecology, culture or sports. The service has a 
duration of no less than six and no more than 18 month. Volunteers receive an allowance of 
at least 336 euros maximum per month, free health, accident and liability insurance, o
contractually regulated holidays and 25 accompanying seminar days. Currently (reference 
date February, 1 st 2012) we could enlist already more than 30,000 volunteers. In 2012 we are 
aiming for a total of35,000 volunteers. 
I hope this information has been of assistance to you. If you require further assistance or 
advice, please do not hesitate to write. 
Yours sincerely, 
Bundesamt fUr Familie und zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben 
Presse- und Offentlichkeitsarbeit 
Sibille-Hartmann-Str. 2-8 
50969 Kaln 
Tel.: 022113673-4203 
Fax.:022113673-54203 
E-Mail: pschloss@bafza.bund.de 
Internet: www.bafza.de; www.bundesfreiwilligendienst.de 
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Communication Date I 6 February 2012 
9 March 2012 
Type of Anned Forces I Conscription 
Questionnaire T ype I Type 1 
ITPOr.: 
KOIN.: 
@EMA: 
r.XET. 
K. Avopea ftawapo 
-YDE8AI~N~H ENHMEPQ~H~ 
-fEE8N~~~N2:I2° (2) 
~ta<popa 8eflaTU 
a. ~uvTUYf..la 'tll~ EAMoo~ 
p. N. 2510197 (<I>EK 136127-6-97 'to A'). 
fENlKO EnITEAElO E8NIKH~ AMYNA}: 
~lEY8YN~H ~TPATOAOfIKOY-
~TPATlQTlKQN NOMlKQN 
2:YMBOYAQN 
TMHMA ~YNTONl~MOY-EAEfXOY 
AElTOYPfIA~ ~K2:EQN 
TllAt<P.:210 6571203 
<I>.900/231240780 
2:.214 
A9i]va, 6 <I>EP 2012 
y. N. 29361200 1 EnaYYEAf..laTU::~ OnAhE~ Kat aAAc~ OtaTa~Et~ 
(<I>EK 166125-7-01 'to A'). 
O. N.3421105 «~TpaTOAoyia TOW EAAi]VOW Kat alli~ OtaTa~Et~» (<I>EK 
302/13-12-05, 'to A'), onco~ tcrXUEt f..lE'ta Tllv 'tpononoillm1 TOU f..lE 'to 
N.3883/2010, (<I>EK 167/24 ~£7r 2010, 'to A') 
E. H ana 25 lay 2012 HAcK'tPOVtKi] EntCHOAi] TOU K. Avopea ftawapou. 
cr't. <I>.900/8/150052~.3/26 lav 20 12IYDE8AI~v91) Evu!!epcocru£ 
I. LE anav't'llcrll TOU (E) crXE'ttKOU, nou f..la~ KotvOnoti]9llKE f..lE TO (crT) Of..lOtO, cra~ 
yvcopit;;ouf..l£ 'ta E~i]~: 
a . To VOf..ltKO Ka9wTffi~ nou ottnEt TO 9wf..l0 't'll~ cr'tpaTEucrll~ cr't'llv EAMoa Opit;;E'tat ana TO 
~uv'taYf..la 'tll~ Xffipa~, TOU~ KaT' E~oucrto06Tllcri] TOU Nof..lou~ 'tll~ BOUAi]~ TCOV EMi]vcov Kat Ta 
avaYKaia yta Tllv EK'teAcO"'ll 'tcov Nof..lcoV EKot06f..lEva DpoEOptKa ~ta'taYf..laTU Kat YnoupytKe~ 
Ano<pacrEt~. 
~. Ano Tt~ OtaTa~Et~ TOU (0) crXE'ttKOU, nou anO'tEAci 'tllv tcrxUoucra <JTpaTOAoytKi] 
vOf..l09wia, npopAtnoVTUt Ta napaKaTco: 
(1) H unoxpecoO"'ll yta <JTpaTEuO"'ll, crUf..l<pcova f..l£ TO ap9po 4 TOU (a) crXETtKOU, 
ElVat Ka90A1Kll Kat U1tOlP£(J)TlKlt, tcrxUEt OllAaoi] yta OAoU~ TOU~ 'EMllvE~ nOAiTE~, oUf..l<pcova 
Jl£ TO ap9po 1 TOU (0) crXEnKou, ana TllV 1'1 lavouapiou TOU eTOu~ nou otavUouv TO oeKaTO 
tvaTO (J 9) eTO~ f..l£XPt TllV 31 ~EKEf..lPptOU TOU eTou~ nou O"Uf..lnAllpffivouv TO TwcrapaKocrTo 
nef..lnTO (45) eTO~ Tll~ llAtKia~ TOU~. 
(2) H <JTpa'ttconKi] unoxpecocrll EKnAllPffivETUt £V61tAro~ crn~ f..lOVaOE~ Kat 
U7r11PWiE~ TCOV EvonAcov ~uvaf..lEcov. Ano1(),tO"'ll ana TOV npoava<pEpOf..lEVO Kavova 
npopAtnETat yta ocrou~ apvouVTUt 't'llv evonAll 9llTcia, EntKaAOUJ.lZVOt 'tt~ 9pllcrKEunKe~ " 
to£OAoytKe~ TOU~ nEnOtei]crEt~. Auroi J.lnopci va avayvcopit;;ovTat oUJ.l<pcova Jl£ n~ ota'ta~£~ 
TCOV ap9pcov 59 eco~ 65 W \) (0) crX£'t1KOU, co~ aVTlppll(JU:~ (J\)v£i()ll<rl1~ Kat va EKnlcllpffivouv 
Eva).l.a.KTlKtl u1t1l pE(Jia. 0 9wJ.l0~ TCOV avnpPll<Jtffiv O"Uvciollcrll~ Ka9t£pffi9llKE yLU npffiTll 
<popa TO 1997, Jl£ TO (P) 6J.l0tO. 
(3) 0 1 9pll<JK£u'ttKe~ i] to£OAoytKe~ n£7rOt9"crEt~ nou EntKaAoUVTat ocrOt Ent9uJ.louv va 
avayvcop l<JTOUV co~ aV'ttpPllcru::~ O"Uvciollcrll~ npenEt va anoppeouv a1Lo J.lia: YEVtKi] aVTtAll\jfll 
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ym Tll Srof], ~acrtcrf-LeVll ()£ <YUV£tOl1TSe; <ptAOcro<ptKSe; ij 118tKse; 1t£1tot8f]crcte;, 1tOU c<papjlOSOVTat 
a1tO TO aTOjlO a1tapapaLa Kat £KOl1AcOVOVTat jl£ TijPllGT) aVaAOYl1e; <YUjl1t£pt<popae; (1tX· eY£PY11 
CYUjljlctOXll crc opyavcOcrw;, KO\vCDVtKij opacrT), KA1t). K 
(4) H avaYVcOptcrll TCDV cvota<p£pojl£vCOV coC; avnpPl1crtrov CYUvdOllGT)S, 1tPOKctjl£vOU va 
8K1tAl1PcDcrOUV evaAMKnKf] u1tl1P£cria, yiv£Tat jlS a1to<paGT) LOU Y1touPYou E8vtKf]C; Ajluvo.e;, 
vcrT£pa a1to YVCDjlo06Tl1crll £totKijs E1ttTp01tf]e;, 1tO'O £~£'tas£t 'tll <YUvoPOjlf] tCDV 1tpou1t08scrscov 
ym avaYVcOptcrl1 TuN evota<pcpojl£vCOV ros avuPP1'\crtrov (J'I)Vdollcrl1C;. 
(5) H evUAMKUKf] u1t1'\Pwiu £K1tA11pcDV£1:Ut crs u1t1'\pccri£S <poptcov LOU 0l1f-L0criou LOjlSU 
(NocroKojl£iu, Taxuopojlda, Lll1f-LOO"t£C; OtKOVOjltKSe; Y1t1lpscrice;, Llf]f-L0Ue;, KA1t) Kat cruvima1:at ~ 
cr't1'\V 1tUpoxf] U1t1lPcO"tcOV KOtvf]e; ro<peMtw;, cr£ 1tSPtOxsr.; SKtOC; TCDV VO jlcOV AtLtK~C;, 
0WcrUAoviKl1S, ytvv1'\cr1'\C;, KUTUYCOyf]C; f] otajlovf]r.; TCDV evotu<psPOjl£vrov, Ka8cOe; Kat £K'tOS TCOV 1 
J.lQaA1'\C; 1tA118ucrf-LtaKijc; 1t'OKVOTllLae; acr'ttKcDV K£V'tPCDV. 
y. ncrov a<popa tOY maYY£AjlanKO crTpaTo crT1'\V EUaoa Kat 'W VOjltKO 1tMicrto 1tO'O OtS1tSl 
'taus E1tuyy£AJ.la'tics 01tAh£S (EIl.OIl), cras yvcopi~o1)f-LC 'ta £~'f]S: 
(1) To YIIE0A cr'tU 1tMicrta 'tllS avaotOpyavcocrlle; TuN EV01tACOV 
Lluvajl£COv, 8sO'1ttcrc TO 2001 1:0 8scrjlo TCOV E1taYYcAf-LancDV 01tAt-CcOV jl£ U1t0XPSCDGT) c1ttUSTOUS 
1tupajlovf]c; apXtKa, Kat ouva'tO't1'\TU jlOvtjlo1toi1'\GT)e; 'tOUS crt1'\ <YUvsX£ta, crUf-L<pcova jl£ ns 
ota'ta~£tC; 1:0'0 (y) crx£nKov. 
(2) LltKaicojlCt. U1tOPOAf]e; ah1'\GT)S SXOUV OAOt at 'EAAy\V£e; 1toAh£S (avop£s­
yuvaiK£e;) 1tOU SXouv <YUf-L1tAy\procr£t to 18° s'tOS 't1'\S llAtKiCt.S Kat oeY SXOUV U1t£p~d to 28° S1:Os 
Ka'ta to e1:Oe; Ku"Cam~l]C; 'tOUS 0''t0 8£O'jlo, ave~apT'l'\'ta uv £K1tAl]procrav f] Oxt nc; cr"CpanCO'tlKee; 
"Coue; U1tOXP£cOcrctc; f] U1t1'\PSWUV crTte; 'EV01tMS LlUVCq..IEtC; "C1'\ 81'\'tcia "COue;, s<pocrov sxouv w; 
ypCt.jljlu"Ct1CSC; yvrocrns 1tOU U1tat'touVTat ym Ka8e Stot1co't1'\"Ca a1to 't1'\V 1tpoKf]pu~l11tPOcrA1'\\lfl1S, 
1tOU cKoiocLat o'tCt.v 1tpoypaf-LjlCt.ncr80uv at 1tPOcrAf]'V£tC;. Ot etbtKO't1l"C£S TroV E1tayy£Al-ut.'ttcOV 
01tAtl(OV (EIl.OIl) avopcDv dvat KUpiroS e1ttxetp1'\crtaKec; - TcX;VtKeS, evro yta nc; yuvaiKes 
OtOtK1'\'ttKf]s f-LSptjlVUS Kat U1tOcr'tf]pt~1'\S. 
(3) M£ I1poebptKO LltaTaYjla "COU 2001, Ka8opiSoVTat1'\ otaotKaO'iu Kat Ta 
Kpt'tijpta £1ttMyijc; TroV U1tO'V1'\<piCDV E1tayyeAjlanrov 01tAt'troV, jlSTa~U 'tCDV 01tOlrov dvat at 
'thAct ()1tOUOcOV, 1'\ yvcOGT) ~evrov YArocrcrroV, 1'\ xPiJcr1'\ HN, 1'\ 1tpoi.i1tl1pccrta crns eV01tAeS 
Lluvaf-LstS KUt cr£ av'ticr"COtxeS nOlKO't1l"Ces crTOV tOtCOnKO "COjlea, 1'\ cv't01tto"C1'\'ta KA1t. 
O. fla 1tSptcrcro-t£pes 1tA1'\PO<pOpieS iJ yta "C1'\V c1tiAUGl1 U1tOptrov, jl1topehe va a1teu9uv9d"Cs 
cr"C1'\v £1tlGl1f-L1'\ tcr"Cocr£AtOa TOU LrojlU"COS L'tpa"COAoytKOU-LTpanCDnKcOv NOjltKcOV LUjl~OUACOV 
(www.stratologia.gr). 
2. XetptcrTiJS etjlaTOS: AyoS (LLNL) Eav801tOUAOU EAtv1'\, E1ttT£AiJS Tjlf]jla"COe; 
LUV"COVtcrjlOU ­ A~moupYlas LlKcrcCDV L'tpa"CoAcytKOu, 'tl1A.21 06574194. 
Sec 
YTTOO'TpCtTI1YO~ nEpIKA~~ MTToupa~ ond 
AKPI~E~ AVTfypacpo LlIEUeUVT~~ co mm 
uni 
cati 
on: 
Second communication: 
TIPOL KOV ftawapo Avopea fENIKO EIlITEAEIO E0NIKHL AMYNAl: 
LllEY0YNLH LTPA TOAOfIKOY­
LTPKQN NOMIKnN LYMBOYAnN 
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Translation of first document (the second document merely points out that the 
questions have been addressed in the first communication): 
Relevant materials: 
A. Constitution of Greece 
B. Law. 2510/97 (GG 136127-6-97 vol). 
C. Law 293612001 Professional Soldiers and other provisions (GG 166125-7-01). 
D. Law.3421/05 "Conscription of the Greeks and other provisions" (Official Gazette 302/13­
12-05), as in force after its amendment by Law. 3883/2010 (OG 167124 Sep 2010) 
E. The January 25,2012 e-mail by Mr. Andreas Yiannaros. 
F.900/8/150052/S.3/26 January 2012NPEThAlDnsi Infonnation 
A. The legal regime governing the institution of conscription in Greece is defined in the 
country's Constitution, the Laws of Authorization by the Greek Parliament and the 
Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Decisions that are necessary for the execution of the 
Laws. 
B. From the provisions of relevant material (D) which is the applicable military law, the 
following are provided: 
(1) The obligation of military service, in accordance with Article 4 of relevant material (A), is 
universal and compulsory, it is therefore valid for all Greek citizens, in accordance with 
Article 1 of relevant material (D) from the 1st of January of the year up to their nineteenth 
(19) birthday until the 31 st of December of the year that are completing their forty-fifth (45) 
birthday. 
(2) The obligation to serve is carried out with arms in the military units and services of the 
Armed Forces. A deviation from the aforementioned rule is allowed for those who refuse 
armed service, citing religious or ideological beliefs. These can be recognised in accordance 
with the provisions of Articles 59 to 65 of relevant material (D) as conscientious objectors to 
perform alternative service. The institution of conscientious objectors was first established in 
1997, with relevant material CD). 
(3) The religious or ideological beliefs of those who wish to be recognised as 
conscientious objectors must arise from a general conception of life based on conscientiously 
held moral or philosophical beliefs, which are applied by the person inviolably and occur in 
compliance with such behaviour (eg . active participation in organizations, social action, etc.) 
(4) The recognition of those interested to be recognised as conscientious objectors in 
order to perform alternative service, will be carried out by decision of the Minister of 
Defense, after consultation with the Special Commission, which considers the conditions for 
recognition of those concerned as conscientious objectors. 
(5) The alternative service is carried out in agencies of the public sector (hospitals, post 
offices, public financial services, municipalities, etc.) involving the provision of public 
services in areas outside the mucipalities of Attica, Thessaloniki, birth, origin or residence of 
the interested parties and outside of highly populated density urban centers. 
C. With regards to the professional army in Greece and the legal framework 

governing Professional Soldiers (EP.OP), we inform you that: 
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(1) The MOD as part of the reorganization of the Armed Forces, has adopted in 2001 the 
institutions governing professional soldiers staying on duty for seven year initially, and the 
possibility of permanent occupation thereafter, in accordance with the provisions of relevant 
material (C). 
(2) all Greek citizens have the right to apply (men-women) who have completed 18 years of 
age and have not exceeded the 28th year in the year ranking in the institution, whether or not 
they fulfilled their military obligations or serve previously in the Armed Forces, if they have 
the academic knowledge required for each occupation by recruitment notice, issued upon a 
call up for recruitment. The specialisms of professional soldiers (EP.OP) are usually 
operationally-oriented for men and logistical support for women. 
(3) A Presidential Decree of2001 established the process and criteria for selecting candidates 
as professional soldiers, among which are the qualifications, knowledge of foreign languages, 
use of PCs, the length of previous service in the armed forces and related skills in the private 
sector, locality, etc. 
D. For more information or to resolve any further queries, please contact the official 
website of the Military Corps Recruiting-Legal Consultants (www.stratologia.gr). 
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Member State IRELAND 
--------.-------.~--~ 
Communication Date 21 March 2012 
Type of Arnled Forces Professional 
Type 2Qu~stionnaire Type 
Dear Andreas 
In reply to the questions you raised in your e-mail dated 25 January 2012, I wish to advise 
that Ireland does maintain a professional army ie the Permanent Defence Force. 
Ireland has never had conscription or compulsory military service in the State and therefore 
does not "provide for a right of conscientious objection (the objection to military service 
deriving from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising 
from religious, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives) for professional members of the 
armed forces." 
The government is therefore not planning to introduce legislation providing for a right of 
conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces . 
The following is the response received from the Military Authorities to the additional 
questions raised in your e-mail dated 28 February 2012. 
Questions: 
1) Is the right of conscientious objection recognised by law for professional members of 
the national armed forces? - No 
2) Is the right of conscientious objection available for reservists? (i .e. members of the 
military reserve forces) - No 
3) Does your country allow for selective conscientious objection to military service? 
(please see definition below) - No 
4) Is there a suitable procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 
applications? Please outline this procedure briefly. - THERE IS NO PROCEDURE SET 
OUT. 
5) Are professional members of the armed forces informed of their rights and the 
procedures available to exercise them? If so, is access to such information facilitated by the 
authorities and at what stage (before or after voluntary enlistment)? - N/ A 
6) Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? Please 
specify time-frames for the examination of applications from the initiation of the claim until 
the frnal decision. - N/ A 
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7) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has been 
examined? - N/ A 
8) Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent and impartial 
bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil administration? (I.e. are the 
bodies/committees examining such applications independent from the administration of the 
Ministry of Defence)? - N/A 
9) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious 
objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial ofbenefits etc) - No 
I hope that this is ofhelp and I wish you well in your research. 
Regards 
C&A Branch (Entry & Promotion) 
Telephone: 045492127 
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Member State LITHUANIA 
Communication Date 8 March 2012 
Type of Armed Forces Professi nal 
Qu~stionnaire Type Type 2 
Mel 
COD 
Typ 
Que 
Dear Mr. Yiannaros, 
Dea 
We would like to thank you for contacting us regarding the implementation of minimum 
standards on conscientious objection to military service for conscripted and professional It w 
members of the aimed forces in the Council of Europe. and 
(pIe 
The best place to find the answers you request wou ld be to search it on some of the 
Lithuanian defence websites. We would like to send you a couple of links that might be MOl 
usefu l. topi 
In tl 
http://www.kam.ltlenltitle.html 
Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuani a main website: 
ho\\ 
Tha 
Armed Forces. In Service for Peace' as well as a 'White paper: Li thuanian defence policy 
2006'): 
Publications of the Ministry of National Defence (here you can download 'The Lithuanian 
Ver 
http: //www.kam.lt/enlpublications.html 
Chil 
MillLithuanian Armed Forces website: 
Rep 
Tel. 
As we are aware, you have also contacted the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic 
http://kariuomene.kam.ltlenlhome.html 
Fax 
of Lithuania. This institution is competent to provide you with the right infOlmation. 
1. 
We would kindly like to thank you once again for contacting us and we wish you success prer 
with yoW" project. reas 
2. 
serv 
Lithuanian Embassy in London 
Sincerely yours, 
reas 
3. 
Lithuania House I 2 Bessborough Gardens I London SWI V 2JE 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7592 2840 I Fax: +44 (0) 20 7592 2864 4. 
amb.uk@urm.lt I bttp:lluk.mfa.1t grot 
Cha 
serv 
fron *Please note that no response has been received from the Ministry of Defence up to this 
serv 
this 
date. 
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MOLDOVA Member State 
Communication Date 15 March 2012 
Type of Armed Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
Dear Mr Andreas Yiannaros, 
lffi 
It was our pleasure to assist with relevant information to your research project in particular 
and to the ground-breaking researches of international academic researches, in general 
(please see attached the replies on your survey). 
he 
be 
1al 
Moreover, as our military system has been undergoing the profound transformations, the 
topic of your research remains of great interest to us. 
In this respect, we would be very grateful to you for any relevant information in order to see 
how other member countries are coping with the same issues. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation. 
cy 
ian 
Very Respectfully, 
Chief International Treaties Implementation Service 
Military Cooperation Section, General Staff ofNational Army 
Republic of Moldova 
Tel. 00 373 22 2521 54 
,lie Fax. 0037322 232635 
1. Moldovan legislation, especially article 32 of the Law Nr. 1245-XV "On 
ess preparing people for homeland defense" provides for exemption from military service for 
reasons of conscience objection. 
2. Article 2 of the Law Nr. 1 56-XVI from 06.07.2007 "On civil 
service organization (alternative)" allows for total discharging from military service for 
reasons of conscience objection by replacing it with alternative service. 
3. Is not provided. 
4. The procedure for examining the application for discharging from military service on 
grounds of conscience objection and replacing it with civil service is provided by 
Chapter III of the Law Nr.1 56-XVI. from 06.07.2007 "On civi l 
service organization (alternative)" and requires that the applicant in order to get exemption 
is 	 from compulsory military service within 2 months before current incorporation in military 
service shall apply to be examined on commission for recruitment. The decisions of 
this cOllUnission can be attacked in the court ofjustice. 
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5. Article 2 of the Law Nr. 156-XVI from 06.07.2007 "On civil service organization 
(alternative)" in Moldova provides for total exemption from military service for reasons of 
conscience objection by replacing it with alternative service. 
6. The length of alternative service is 12 months and for those with university degree is 
6 months. The length of military service is 12 months and for people with university 
degree is 3 months. 
7. The right on exemption from military service is valid only before military emolment. 
8. See pct.4 
9. Recruits are familiar to the legislation in territorial military centers. However, all 
Moldovan cItIzens can access online information resource www.justice.md 
, which contains a full database of Moldovan legislation. 
10. Application for exemption from military service on grounds of conscience objection 
is examined up to 2 months. 
11. No, because the request for exemption from military service shall be filed until 
emolment into military service. 
12. Yes, the application is examined by recruitment-enrolment committee and 
its decisions can be appealed in the court ofjustice. 
13. Exemption from military service on grounds ofconscience objection does not 
attractfurther violation of the rights of the applicant. 
14. Total exemption from compulsory military service with alternative service 
without replacement is provided in article 32 of the Law "on preparing people forhomeland 
defense" Nr. 1245-XV for the cases when the recruit has lost his father (mother), brother 
(sister) who died during military service. The recruit may not use this right. Same 
provisions, according to Article 4. (2) of the Law Nr.156-XVI from 06.07.2007 "On civil 
service organization (alternative)" exists for priest, monk or student of the religious 
educational institution. 
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NETHERLANDSMember State 
Communication Date 13 March 2012 
Type of Anned Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
Conscientious objection for professional members of the Dutch Armed Forces: 
As an introduction it fi rst must be noted that under Article 98 Grondwet (Constitution of the 
Kingdom of The Netherlands), the Dutch anned forces consist of voluntary service members 
and may also consist of conscripted soldiers (dienstplichtigen). In 1997 conscliption was 
suspended (but not abolished). Only under extraordinary circumstances is it possible, when 
parliament unanimously agrees, to lift the suspension. Therefore, although founally the 
Consti tution still contains an obligation of conscription, in practice the Dutch armed forces 
consist of voluntary service members (hereinafter professional members) only. 
The suspension of obligatory conscription for Dutch nationals only has minor consequences 
for the answer to your question. Before 1997, conscripted members of the Dutch armed 
forces could invoke the 1962 Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militairen in Dienst (Law on 
Conscientious Objection for Service Members) . According to this law the Dutch Minister of 
Defence may recognize the objections of a conscripted soldier as serious conscientious 
objections on the basis of which the soldier may be relieved of his duties. 762 According to 
Article 2 of that Jaw, conscientious objections are 'insurmountable conscientious objections 
to personal fulfi llment of military service in connection with the use of force in which a 
person in the fulfil lment of his service can be involved'. When the objections are recognized 
as such by the Minister, Article 9 (1) of that law explicitly states that the conscripted 
conscientious objector is relieved of all of his military service obligations; under all 
circumstances. Conscripted members of the anned forces are, however, obliged to fulfill a so 
called 'vervangende dienst' (alternative non-military service) when they are recognized as 
conscientious objectors. However, as the suspension of obligatory conscription is still in 
place, the 1962 Wet Gewetensbezwaren is also partly suspended, resulting in the 
inapplicability of the alternative service for professional members of the anned forces. The 
alternative service only applies to conscripted conscientious objectors and is a third longer 
than the regular military service. 
As already mentioned, the Dutch armed forces now consist of professional members only. 
These professionals still have the ability to invoke the Law on Conscientious Objection for 
Service Members, with the exception that they cannot fulfill an alternative service. Any 
professional member of the anned forces who is recognized as a conscientious objector by 
the Dutch Minister of Defence will be discharged from the armed forces as soon as possible 
(Article 9 (3) 1962 Wet Gewetensbezwaren). According to Article 3 (2) of the law, the 
Minister initiates an inquiry into the objections of the applicant which is carried out by one or 
more members of a commission of advice (Art icle 5 (1) Wet Gewetensbezwaren). The 
advisory commission will advise the Minister after the applicant has been given the 
opportunity of a hearing (Article 5 (2) Wet Gewetensbezwaren). When the conscientious 
762 See Articl es 3 and 4 of the 1962 Wet Gewetensbezvvaren Mi/itairen in Dienst, to be found on: 
http://wetten.overheid.nlfBWBR0002386fgeldigheidsdatum _ 01-1 2-20 II 
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objections of an applicant are not recognized as such by the Minister, he may object to that 
decision to the advisory commission, which conducts an investigation with at least three 
members of the commission (Article 7 (a) Wet Gewetensbezwaren). In case the Minister, for 
the second time, after hearing the advice of the commission, maintains that the objections are 
not recognized, the applicant has the possibility, based on Article 7 (b), to appeal to the 
department of administrative law of the Raad van State (Council of State). 
In addition, both professional and conscripted members may also invoke the exception of 
article 5 of the 1953 Wet immunisatie Militairen which provides that members of the armed 
forces may be relieved of their duty to be vaccinated against smallpox and other diseases, 
based on religious, philosophical or moral grounds. 
In conclusion I can indeed confirm that the Netherlands allow a right of conscientious 
objection for both conscripted as professional members of the Dutch armed forces. 
Questions for clarification: 
1) Does your country allow for selective (as opposed to "absolute") conscientious 
objection to military service? (please see definition below) If not, what would be the 
consequences to a claimant and what would be hislher best available options? 
Conscientious objections must be acknowledged as "grave objections" to be objections within 
the scope of the Wet gewetensbezwaren militaire dienst (Act on conscientious objections to 
military service). Traditionally this is objection against all forms of armed service. Selective 
objections might not be acknowledged as such, but in the present circumstances the question 
is moot. There is only voluntarily serving personnel and rather than having to claim 
conscientious objections under the Act referred to above, they can ask for an honourable 
discharge from military service. The effect of being acknowledged as conscientious objector 
for voluntarily serving personnel is an honourable discharge on the basis of article 9, 
paragraph 3 of the Wet gewetensbezwaren militaire dienst, so it would have the same result. 
2) Is the advisory commission examining conscientious objection applications independent 
from the administration of the Ministry of Defence or does it fall under its control and 
jurisdiction? 
Apart from the fact that the advisory commission for the present is not operational, when it is 
activated it is part of the administration of the Ministry of Defence. 
3) Are professional members of the armed forces informed of their rights (including the 
right of conscientious objection) and the procedures available to exercise them? If so, is 
access to such information facilitated by the authorities and at what stage (before or after 
voluntary enlistment)? 
This is part of the curriculum for basic training (initial training for all personnel). 
4) Are applications to be discharged on conscientious objection examined within a 
reasonable time? Please specify timeframes. 
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Since 1997, the date of the suspension of mandatory subscription, there have been no cases. 
Voluntarily serving personnel acquiring conscientious objections can apply for an honourable 
discharge. They are under no obligation to give the reason. 
5) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has been 
examined? 
In theory, yes. According to article 4 of the Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire dienst. 
However, since 1997 there have been no cases. 
6) Is the right of conscientious objection available for reservists? (i.e. members of the 
military reserve forces) 
The right is available to all military personnel, including reservists. However, the question is 
moot because reservists only come into active service on a strictly voluntarily basis. 
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Member State NORWAY 
Communication Date 5 January 201 2 
16 March 2012 
Type of Armed Forces Conscription 
Questionnaire Type Type 1 
Sec 
De, 
We 
rest 
Dear Sir, 
With reference to your e-mail of 8th December 2011, we would like to give you the following 
infonnation on the Norwegian legislation regarding conscientious objection to military 
servIce: 
Section 109 of the Norwegian Constitution of 181 4 and Act of 17th July 1953 states 
the obligation of every male citizen between the age of 19 and 44 to serve in the armed forces 
in Norway. However this provision allows for exemptions in accordance with the rules laid 
down by law. 
The Norwegian legislation (Act of 19th March 1965) regarding the right to be 
exempted from military service, accepts pacifism based on religious, human ethical and 
political conviction. 
The procedures for obtaining military objector status was changed in the year 2000. 
After this moment, the Police no longer obtain the oral statement of the applicant. The 
application shall be made in a special application fonn, in which the applicant declares that 
be complies with the law' s requirements. 
The numbers of applicants is currently about 350 per year. 10 - 15 years ago, the 
numbers were much higher (between 2000 - 3000 per year). 
The alternative civilian service is of 12 months duration, but this is expected to change 
in 2012. The Norwegian Parliament ( "Stortinget") is currently handling a proposal from the 
Norwegian Government, which could lead to an arrangement that no longer maintain a 
civilian service for people who are exempted from military service for reasons of serious 
conviction. 
We hope this provides you with the necessary infonnation of the conscientious objection in 
Norway. 
If you need any fUlther infonnation, please do not hesitate to contact us. 
Kj nd regards 
Norwegian Ministry of Justice 
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Second communication: 
Dear Sir, 
We are pleased to hear that the information given by us was suitable for your academic 
research. 
With reference to your e-mail of 27th February 2012, we would like to give you this 
additional information on the Norwegian legislation regarding conscientious objection to 
military service: 
1) The right of conscientious objection is recognized by law for conscripted soldiers. 
Professional soldiers will have to quit their job before they can be exempted from 
military service. 
2) Conscripts who, by reason of sincere personal conviction, are opposed to military 
service may be exempted from such service. The Norwegian legislation regarding 
conscientious objection to military service, accepts pacifism based on religious, 
human-ethical and political conviction. The person must claim to be unable to 
perform military service of any kind. Norway does not allow selective conscientious 
obj ection to military service. 
3) The application shall be made in a special application form in which the applicant 
declares that he complies with the requirements of the law. The military body 
"Vernepliktsverket" handles the application. Normally the decision is based only on 
the information from the special application form, but in some cases it is necessary to 
call for additional information from the applicant. Normally this information is given 
in writing. The appeal body is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The 
applicant is entitled to challenge the decision made by the Ministry of Justice for the 
court. 
4) The military service is of 12 months duration. There is no longer a civilian service in 
Norway. Those who are exempted from military service for reasons of serious 
conviction, shall no longer perform an alternative civilian service of 12 months 
duration. 
5) The earliest opportunity for presenting an application for exemption is at the 
enrolment session. After this moment a person may submit an application at any time, 
even after he has finished initial military service. 
6) Information on the right to refuse military service is given on the enrolment session. 
Information is also available on the websites of military bodies. 
7) Decision is normally made within 4 weeks. 
8) Any conscript who has applied for exemption from military service for reasons of 
personal conviction, will not be called up for ordinary peacetime service as long as his 
application is under consideration. If the application is filed after the conscript has 
been called up, or during military service, the conscript will not be granted 
postponement, and he will have to continue the military service until exemption from 
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-military service is granted. However, the length of this service cannot last for more 
than 4 weeks, and the conscript shall not make use of weapons during this period 
(unarmed service). If the application is still under consideration after 4 weeks, the 
conscript will be granted postponement. 
9) 	 The appeal body is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (which is not a military 
body). Further information is given under no. 3) 
10) There are no implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious 
objection grounds. 
11) Norway no longer has an alternative civilian service for people who are exempted 
from military service for reason of sincere personal conviction. 
We hope this provides you with the necessary information on the conscientious objection in 
Norway. If you need any further information, please do not hesitate to contact us. 
Kind regards 
Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Public Security 
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Member State POLAND 
Conununication Date 
Type of Armed Forces 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
Dear Sir, 
I inform you politely that in Poland there is a professional army. The military service is 
realized nowadays exclusi vely in the voluntary form. The acceptance of the candidate to the 
professional military service takes place on the basis of the voluntary enlistment of the 
candidate. 
Best regards, 
Public Information Department 
Ministry of National Defence 
Second communication: 
Dear Sir, 
In connection of the answer given 07.02.2012 year I politely inform you that currently 
compulsOlY militaIY service in Poland is suspended. To the military service are appointed the 
volunteers only. 
Obligatory is instead the military qualification. The military qual ification is conducted for 
the purpose of the settlement abilities for persons coming to the military active service, the 
foundation of the military record and initials the destination to particular forms of the general 
duty of the Polish Republic' s defense. 
The person who declares that religious or moral beliefs are obstacle to the conducting of the 
military service in the army it should inform about this the qualifying-committee. Such 
person can be intended to the supplementary service. The aforementioned person has to turn 
an appl ication in this regard. If the application is considered positive in the record the 
information is written about it. The rules of intending to the supplementary service regu late 
law from the day 28 November 2003 about the supplementary service (with later changes). 
One ought to mark, that nowadays such application are rare, because persons who appeared 
to the military qualification, the military commander of supplements transfers the person to 
the reserve, with the day when the opinion of tbe district-medical board became final i.e. after 
14 days from the date of the delivery of the opinion. 
Best regards 
Public Information Department 
Ministry of National Defence 
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Member State PORTUGAL 
Communication Date 11 July 201 2 
Type of Armed Forces Professi nal 
Qu~stionnaj re Type Type 2 
Written response received by post from the Portuguese Embassy in London. 
See below. 
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N°il 
Proc.6.7 
London, 11 t11 July 2011 
Dear Dr. Yiannaros. 
Please find enclosed the reply from the Portuguese Mlnistry of 
National Defence regarding your request on conscientious objection to 
military service. 
Yours sincerely, 
Joao de Vallera 
Ambassador 
-
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Exmo, Senhor 

Diretor-Gsral de Politica de Uefesa N:s:ciona! 

Sua Refer~ncia 	 Nossa Referonda 
V/Oftcio n.o 886, de 30 de Malo de 2012 	 DSRASM 10.1'1 Proc." 1/2012 
AS$UNTO: leglstayao Portuguesa! apftc.flvel tI objetorea de con..clencla 
~, 
/' 
Rerativamente BO assunto em titulo e 113 sequAncia dasoliclta~ efetuada a roberto 
do VJOf/cio em ret", informs-sa 0 seguinle: 
'I.. 	 0 direito a obje~o de consci~ncia e um direilo f: . rndamental dcs cidadaos 
portugueses. consagrado no n.o 6 do artlgo 41.0 da Constitui~ de Republica 
Portuguesa. 
2. 	 0 regime do direito a objec;ao de consci~nda ccnsta da Lei n.CI 7'92, de 12 de 
"'1810 (Le! sobre Objeyao de Consc~ncia - LOC>. e do Decreto-lei n.~ 191/92, de 8 
de Setembro, que a tegulamenta, tendo sido est&s dois diplcmas alterndos pela 
lei n." 138/99. de 28 de Agosto. 
3. 	 Nestes diplomas encontram-se plasmados e ragutados 0 conceito de obJater de 
consci&ncis, " proc:esso para aquisic;ao do estatuto de objetor de oonsciOOcia, 
prazo e Iocais de apresenta:;ijo do pedldo ce reconhecimento do direito. efeitos do 
estatuto relatlvamente aptestaVSo de serviCfO mllitar, entidades competenles para 
o reconheclmento do dlreito, entre outros. 
4, 	 Nos term os do artlgo 2.C) da Lei n." 7/92. considerarn·se objetores de consci~ncia 
"Os cidaciaos cooviclos de que, par mot/vas de ordem religfosa, moral, 
humanfstics ou fifos6fica. Ihes ns" 9 legitimo U$S/' de mei06 viokmtos de Qua/quer 
natureza contra 0 seu ssmefhante, ai(1da que para fins de defesa naciOilsl, 
coIetiva au pessoa'" 
5. 	 Oesee is sa reara do conceilo selma ref.erido que a legisla<;ao portuguesa nSo 
consagrou umcont8ito seletivo de obj~o de consctencla. urna vez que enllOlve 
8 oonvicc;ao, per parte do objetor. de que nao e legitime 0 usc de melo$ violentos 
de Qvalguer natureza conlfa 0 seu semelhante. 
___M&________________~~~~~--~~------~~------------~pj'mJld.4 
CIt~.to4tr.1 d. "-I • MctutMlMIR Milbf 
"v, IIh • .:'4 ~tra K." I .... I'lIe, iQ-104 LIIboa, POIrTUGAI. 
Ttl. -)5121 :10004;1 001 .l5121 Ul27100'U. 35121 3D! JOJ7 [M1rJ,l.cIc!lfll\.!-~'.....pt UR1.:lItl(l:/I_.I!Id!I.!IIOY.P\ 
13 COnsice...,ando que 0 ptaneamento, o(ganiza~o e coordena~o do s&rvi~o c:v'co 
dos objetores de consciencia sao da eompetlfficia 03 Dillisao de Recurscs 
Humanos do Instituto Portugues do Desporto e cia Juventud{'l, loP, (IPDJ. tP,), 
Instltuto Publico integrado oa Adm:nlstra¢o IndJreta do Estado que pross~1J() 
atribuf(fi3GS da PresldillnCla dO COnselho de Ministros (PCM). sob superinten~ncla 
e tutela do Primeiro-Ministro OLl do membra do govemo com respo'lsabilidade ria 
area do desporto e da juventude. nos termos do artigo 1.° do Decrelo-lei n." 
98/20.11. de 21 de ~tembro. e dOl aHnea e) cln art1go 5." do Decreto-lel n.4 126­
Al2011, de 29 de Dezembro (lei DrgAnica de PCM). a CNOC runciona junto do 
IPDJ. LP., podendo, assim, afirmar-se que euma C9miss~irldep:encler\te e q;.)e 
nao esta sob a tutela do Mlnisb~10 da OefesaNaeional. 
'14, E. a CNOC que aprecia a regularidade formal da dec!arac;aa e desenvo!ve as 
ditigsncias necessarias 80 suplimenl0 de eventuais lrregularidaoos. precede as 
averigua¢$sconsideradas necessanas para a comp~oV8yao da ver&eidade cos 
elementos constantes da dedareyao e profare dec:isSo tomace por malone de 
votosoos seus elementos e devidamenle rU!ldamentada, no P!JlZO de t~$ r1§ses 
COntados da apresentacao da cfec!a~o Ce ob1eyao de consciencia, nos terrr:os 
dos artigos 21." e 25." da LOC. 
15. Os cases de recuse de estalOto enconllam-se regulados no artigo 23.° do mesmo 
diploma, 
16. A delibera;ao da CNOC t nolificada 80 dec!arante, £lcampanhada OS eta 
respetiva, no prazo de 5 dias. sando Que, em caso de reconheclmMto cia estaM~. 
eafnda enviada a ata qlJe contem a dellberayao. oticicsamGnte, 60 Gabinate 00 
Sel'vlyo Civico de Objetores de COnscienda e a DJreyao-Ge.ra1 de Pessoai e 
Re¢rUtamento Milltar (DGPRM). nos termos des n.OJ 1 e 2 do artigo 26.0 de LOC. 
'7. Da deliberaC§o da CNOCcabe reCUlSO contentioso para 0 competenle t;i.bunal 
acministrativc de circulo, a fnterpor palo interessado no pram de 20 dias contados 
de dala ds notifica~o. tendo 0 reCUfSO f1atureza de processo urgente.nos termos 
dos n.Q$ 1 e 2 do artigo 27.0 da mesma Lei. 
18. RelaUvamel'lte 	 aos efeiios de deC:ara~o de obje<;ao de consoon~a. a sua 
apresenta¢o, nos termos do n . .':1 1 do artigo 22.° da lOe, suspends 
imedlatamente 0 eumprimento (iss obrlga~s :nililares do declarante 
subsequentes so recenseamet:to, sendo imediatamenle (X)mu~icacla 
ofidoSamente aOOPRM. 
19. Se a declara~o nAo for apresentada ate 90s 30 dias anterioresa incorporac;ao, a 
data de corwoca~o para 0 Ois da Defesa Nacional OU durante a presta<;oo de 
saMoa milit.ar (excecionalmente obrigatMo. decorrenle de convoca~o ou 
mobihzac;ao). 0 cumprimel'tto das ooriga¢es mililares do declarante 56 sa 
/' 
-­
Um~(f1cial Trans/a/ion 
Portuguese legislation applicable to <:onscientious obj<.."Ction. 
1. 	 The right of conscientious objection is a fundamental right or aU Ponugu.ese 
citizens. established in n06 Art.41 of the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Repubb., 
2. 	 The tenns of the right of conscientious objection are in Law n,,)7/92. of 12 ~ay 
lay. on Conscientious Objection (Lei sobre Obje~lo de Consciencia - LOe), 
arld Law n<>19V92, of 8 September. which regulates those t.!rms, having both of 
these legislative texts been amended by Law n0138/99, of28 August. 
3. 	 In th\:"se legislative texts one can find the detlnitions and rules surrounding the 
concept of a conscientiolls objector, the pro\:t!SS to gain status as a consl!ientious 
objector. the term and location.<; where a claim can be made. the elJe(;ts of the 
statllte relating to military service. the competent authorities to recognize the 
right, etc. 
4. 	 According to article 2 of Law 7/92 those considered c(.)nscicnliotls objectors are: 
"Cifizens ·who belh'wt thai, for reasons (if religious. moral. humanistic or 
philosophical grolinDs. they cannot legitimately employ t"ioll!f1I means of (Il~V 
nature against any person. e1ltm if to the purposes of national. ,'o/lecliw; or 
personal defence." 
5. 	 From the afore mentioned concept. it is clear that Portuguese law did not 
establish a selective concept of conscientious objection, as it involves the 
conviction., by the objector. th~u lhe use of vioknt MI:.'rub of !l~ ..I.mtYlJi ~\g<tinst 
un)' pers(lI:1 is nq.li IcgitioKik. 
6. 	 According to n" 3,4 and 5 of article 3 of the Law on Military Service (Law nO 
174/99, of 21 September. amended by Law nl'l t12008. 6 May), Portuguese 
military service is based on willingness. be it in a contractual or voluntary basis, 
or in th..: permaOi:.'nt staff of the Anned Forces. mandatory military service only 
being all.owed exceptionally, in cases ofa dran or mobi!i7.ation. 
1. 	 While there is no nonn that expressly establishes the ril'lht to conscientiou~ 
objection by military personnel of the Amlcd Forces, an, ;.:itlzerLu!,:~c~J.~~~ ..(jr 
being mililan p!ers!,)nn.d..Qr.J1QJl canjuiliDlL!h~ oo;x,.'(;UUBl b\' wht!-!h th£.Ij.gl!L~ 
rec(.g~iz~ there being no limitations to its use on military personneL 
8, 	 Thus, '~lking into c()nsidcration that military service is currently rendered 
willingly, if a member of the military decides to initiate the procedure to have 
his status as a conscientious objector recognized, it is tu:ldctstO<."iJ that 
tnlL'>t. simultaneously and in good time. take· necCSSUI)' measures ttl r>esign 
fronl Am'c,J Forcej.., it dU'Jugh !.heir !.:i)ntme! in the case:.Vi. tIJ~~!:l,~~J'iI '" or !hfO~h ~I 
J!eq~.. tw J~li4JO as pc~nt Sbdlt~ al"'ll)'S in acoordul'ICle the 
not'nl:S. 
9. 	 In til';; ,case of mandatory milibl.ry service required by law or the fulfilmenu of 
military duties, such as attendance to me Day of National Defence, the Law of 
Military Service. Article 40, establishes the recognition of status as fin 
consc~cntious objector as a valid reason for exemption. 
10. The process by which status as a conscientious objector is acquired starts with 
the presentation, at any point, hy the citizen concerned, of a declaration of 
conscientious objection to the National Commission of Conscientious Objection 
I • 

(Commissao NacionaI de O~ie~ao de Conscir!ncia • CNOC), at :he regional 
dckgatiiH\S of the Portuguese Institute ('}f Sport and Youth, at c~)nsular ot11ces Of 
a1 the rdevant services of the Autonomous Regions, according 10 n"l and n"'2 of 
article 20 of the LOC. 
It. The declaration of conscientiolls ob;cction should contain the infonnalioll listcd 
in nr. 3 and n04 ofarticle 28 {)f the L{)c. 
12. Acknow'ledgcment of this status is in the purview or the (,NOe. which works 
together with the Cabinet of Civic Service ofConscicntiow~ Objc.:tors {Gabincl': 
do Servi<;o ('ivieo dos Objetores de Consdencia • GSCOC}. which is comprises 
a judge. sssigncd by the Superior Council of the l\.'lagistracy, as president, and a 
citizen of acknowledged merit, assigned by the Ombudsman and (he Director of 
the GSCOC. according to n° I and n"2 ofarticle 28 of the LOe. 
13. The: CNOC works together wilh the !PDJ. LP. 35 the planning. organization and 
coordination of the civic service of ~onscientious objectors falls within the 
responsibility of the Division for Human Resources or the Portuguese Institute 
lor Sport and Youth. J.P, (lnstituto Portugues do Desporto e da Juvcntudc. Lt>. ­
IPD.T. I.P.). a Public Institute integrated in the Indirect Administration of the 
State. sanctioned by the Head of the Government Cabinet (Presidcncia do 
Consclho de Ministros - peM), under the oversight and supervision of the Prime 
Minister or the member of government responsible for Sport and youth, 
according to article fi°l. of Lawn" 98/2011, from 21 {'If September. and 
subheading e) ofarticie n"5 of Law 126-A12011, from 29 of December (Organic 
Law of the PCM) •. We can thus say that it is an indeQ!;ndent CQmmission and is 
not tinder the supervision of the Ministry of National Defence. 
14. The CNOC receives the declaration and takes the necessary steps to ensure there 
are no irregularities. carries out any investigations deen1l..-d necessary to prove 
the veracity of the information presemed in the declaration and mak~s a du!)' 
substantiated decision by a majority of its members within 3 months of lhe 
presentation of th~_9.eclaration of £Q,l'lSCientiou$ objection. according to terms set 
in articles 21 and 2S of the LOC. 
IS. The c()nditions for a denial to the request of status as a consci.entious objector 
are set in article 23 of the LOC. 
16. The C-:-.:lOC·s ruling is reported to the claimant within 5 days, along with the 
respective protocol. and, in case the status is granted.. the protocol is also sent to 
the Cabinet of Civic Service of Conscientious Objectors and :0 the Department 
of Staff and Military Recruitment {Dire~iio-Geral de Pessoal e Recrmamcnto 
MiJitar - DGPRMj, according to subheading 1 and 2 ofarticle 26 orthe LOC. 
17. The claimant is granted 20 days from the date of notitication of the ruJing of the 
CNOC to tile a contentious appeal at the appropriate tribunal. the appeal being 
granted priority. according to subheadings i and 2 ofarticle 27 of the LOC. 
18. As f~)r the eftects of the declaration of conscientious objection, its presentation, 
according to subheading 1 of article 22 of the LOC. immediately suspends all 
military obligations of the claimant from his/her registration, the DOPRM being 
officially informed ofthis. 
19. If the claim is not presented :until the 30 days before the summons date tbr the 
Day of National Defence. or their incorporation into the military, or while 
military duties are being carried out (only exceptionally mandatory, in cases ·01' a 
draft or mobili7.ation). the fuUilmcnt of the military obligations is only 
suspended after they have been completed. according 10 subheading 2 of article 
22 (,(the LOC. 
s 

20. Concerning 	(he distrioution of illlhrmatisnl to memb~r.LQ.( the !~rm!;.!tFoJ:.<;~§ 
regarding "their ri~'h!5 and hmv they can he e~erdsed. the LOC Shlles in article 3 
thut dti7.ens arl! a4~alclv and mallgatorih jnti.)1"I]..i;.d_ClLJh~""[l!h;·;,>_ .~J)Q 
reSJuir..::m_eIlt~.-.Q.Lth~_JeOC. namely at the time of CO:1s.:ription. bdore 
incorporation and 'ldmission to the Armed Forces, this responsibility lalling to 
the GSCOc. the appropriate institutions of the Autonomous Regions, the local 
mU:1ieipaiities. (he recruitm.::nt centres and the f>,;muguese Consulates abroad. 
21. In P'Jrtugal. the role of non-combatant is not kgally provided for members of 
the Anncd Forces for whom Sotatus as a coc1scientioliS objector has been granted. 
However. the LOC itseli: in subheading :2 ()f article 2 states: "The rif:!ht to 
CO}1s.il..'lltiolls oNecliol? t... j ill!cess(il"i,:v implie~'''wllhose who can:v lhis stalll.;; 
will p.:rform ciric dUlie,\' I.lppropria/~' to (heir siwatilln ". civic duty being "tlms!;' 
not lillk(~d or bound 10 mm/at:v or mili/(Iri:t'd im;tiulIiol1s. being e."!;cill...i\'l!~~· 
cirililln. ll'ill pro....ide lise/it! pClrlicipatiol1 in la.~h I1(!Ccs.>(lry,lor fbI! commlmiO 
and will allow for the (Ippropritlle application of Knowledge and skifis (~( the 
o;~it.'i.'lOrS ", according to s::bheading I of urtic:e 4 of the LOC. civilian service 
being organi7.ed pursuant Law 191.'92.01'8 September. 
22. Lastly. 	I! is noted that th.crc arc n0 implications or consequences for members of 
the Armed Forces who tem1inale their sen-ice \vith the Armed Forces on the 
grounds of conscientious ohjcction. as the legal e\rects of such a situmion are 
exactly the same as those tor members of the Amled Forces who terminate their 
service on any other grounds 01' legally admitted reasons. 
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Member State ROMANIA 
Communication Date 2 Febmary 2012 
Type of Armed Forces I Professional 
Questionnai re Type Type 2 
Dear Mr. Yiannaros, 
We would like to thank you fo r your interest in the activities carried out by the Romanian 
Aim ed Forces and the way Romania passed from conscliption to professionalism based on a 
modem legislation. 
Thus, conscription at peacetime was suspended in Romania starting with January 1 S\ 2007. 
Once conscription suspended at peacetime, the Romanian Armed Forces employ professional 
soldiers. These are a distinct professional military corps recruited based on a volunteer 
joining to the armed forces. 
The military service becomes compulsory at wartime, mobilisation as well as siege 
status declar ed, according to the law. The observance of human rights legislation while the 
mandatory military service, recruitment, conscription, called-up reserve or mobilisation is 
ensured through the provisions of the Law 110.44612006 on the population training for 
def ence, issued by the Ministry of National Defence. 
The law provides the fo llowing regulations: 
1. The alternative service for the citizens who refuse to comply with their military service 
duties because of religious convictions or conscientious objection; 
2. The citizens who took holy orders or belong to a religious order legally acknowledged, 
the persormel officia ll y serving such an order, as well as the monks with two years of service, 
at least, do not perfo rm the military service; 
3. The freedom of religious convictions is acknowledged by the military oath phrasal. 
The laws making the transition from the conscription to the volunteer (professional) military 
service, as well as the rights and duties of this distinct professional military corps are the 
following: 
Law nO.395/2005 on the suspension of conscription at peacetime and transition to the 
volunteer military service; 
Law no.3 8412006 on the status of volunteer servicemen; 
Law no, 51120 I 0 to change and complete Law no. 384/2006 on the status of volunteer 
servIcemen; 
Law no.23/2012 to change and complete Law nO.386/2006 on the status of volunteer 
servicemen. Besides the changes made and completion of the previous law, this law 
changed the nomination ofvolunteer servicemen into professional servicemen; 
Law no.44612006 on the population training f or defence. 
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Taking into consideration the usefulness and the current trend of your research project among 
the armed forces of the member states of the Council of Europe, we are kindly asking you to 
electronically make available the conclusions of your research, subsequently to its 
publication. (via Internet to E-mail: publicinfo@mapn.ro) 
Regards, 
Information and Public Relations Directorate 
Romanian Ministry ofNational Defence 
E-mail:publicinfo@mapn.ro 
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Member State 
ong Communication Date 
u to 
its Type of Armed Forces 
Questionnaire Type 
SLOVAKIA 
1 June 201 2 
Profess ional 
Type 2 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Defense Policy, International Relations and Legislation 
Department 
Security and defence policy division 
Human Resources Policy and Strategy Section 
Dear Sir, 

In response to your email the answers on implementation of the Council of Europe standards 

on conscientious objection grounds in the Slovak Anned Force are outlined below. 

1) From the January 2006 the Slovak Anned Forces are fully professional. In the AIm ed 

Forces may serve soldiers who joined the Armed Forces voluntarily only and they had the 

opportunity to get acquainted with the all conditions of military service and are completely 

identify internally with them. 

The legal order of the Slovak Republic respects the principle of the right of every citizen at 

freedom of occupation choice. Citizen enters the service as a professional soldier only 

voluntarily and on the agreed period abandons its right of conscientious objection. 

The Constitution of the Slovak Republic stipulates that nobody forced to perform military 

service if it is contrary to his conscience or religious confession. The Act No 569/2005 ColI. 

on "Alternative Service at the Time of War and State of War" establish when and how can a 

citizen on the grounds of his conscience or religious confession denied the State Services. Act 

No. 570/2005 Coil. on "National Service and on Change and Amendment of Some Acts" 

scope of the obligation to national service is determined. The conditions to national service 

are laid down in section 4 of Act No. 569/2005 ColI. on the alternative service in time of waJ. 

Act No. 346/2005 ColI. on civil service of professional soldiers of the Armed Forces of the 

Slovak Republic and on amendments to certain laws, as amended in paragraph 13 lays down 

the conditions of admission to the civil service. One of the conditions for acceptance is that 

the tenderer at the date of adoption of the civil service as a professional soldier is not 

registered as a citizen, who refused the performance of special services on conscientious 

objection grounds. Citizen who decides to join the civil service does not exercise the right to 

conscientious objection, because during the performance of the services as a professional 

soldier cannot lodge a declaration and to refuse the service. 
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2) Reservists and also registered citizens for defence needs, i.e. in age 19 years and older 
have the right to withhold perfonnance of military services. Citizen at the time of security 
Ithe peace timel may refusal of special service by the documentary statements in the year in 
which he was registered or in January of each subsequent year, until the demise of the 
obligation at the age of 55 years. Citizen who refused the perfonnance of special servicesl 
e.g. on conscientious objection groundsl are not acceptable for the military service. 

Citizen as a reservist, who has been on his voluntarily basis incorporated in Active Reservists 

(§ 4 para 9 of Act No 569/2005 Col1.), this right do not have on the agreed time. 

3) The legal order of the Slovak Republic does not allow selectivity in the application of 
conscientious objection. Citizens who have refused the perfonnance of special service will 
not utilize within the anned forces in period of hostilities or war time. 
4) The special procedure for the examination of conscientious objection application, 
according to the valid legal situation in the Slovak Republic, does not exist. The time limit 
for the answer on the all requests in state service is 30 days. 
5) The availability of infonnation on the rights and obligations of the soldiers (including of 
conscientious objection) is ensured by the general availability of legal normative acts through 
the military administrative offices in military units and facilities, and in electronic fonn on 
the MOD a GS Intranet and Internet sites, which provide the designated authorities and 
bodies MOD as well as other outside government information providers. Information about 
the right to act in matters, which are contrary with the conscience the professional soldier, 
shall receive through military spiritual service possibly through doctors and psychologists of 
the Slovak Anned Forces too. The information is available for all civilians - candidates too. 
6) The conscientious objections applications are not examined, so there are not established a 
time limits. 
7) The valid legal situation in the Slovak Republic excludes such possible problems in the 
Armed Force. 
8) The applications on grounds of conscientious objection are not examined. hn.partiality 
and independence of the proceedings of that decision can ultimately ensured by the court, 
which is independent at the Ministry of Defence. 
9) Citizen enters military service as a professional soldier only voluntarily and for the 
agreed period will have abandoned his right of conscientious objection. There are not any 
implications for individuals leaving the anned forces on conscientious objection grounds. The 
conditions are same for all applicants who are leaving the military service. 
With regards, 
Ministry of Defence 
Bratislava 
Slovak Republic 
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Member State SLOVENIA 
Communication Date 23 May 20 12 
Type of Armed Forces Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
ion of Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia 
:e will 
1) Is the right of conscientious objection recognised by law for professional members of 
the national armed forces? 
~ation, Yes. 
e limit 
2) Is the right of conscientious objection available for reservists? (i.e. members of the 
military reserve forces) 
ling of Yes. 
1fough 
mn on 3) Does your country allow for selective conscientious objection to military service? 

es and (please see definition below) 

l about 

loldier, In case of reintroduction of obligatory military service for conscripts, selective conscientious 

~ists of objection would be allowed and the conscripts could perform military service without 

too. weapons or do alternative civi lian service. 

ished a 	 4) Is there a suitable procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 
applications? Please outline this procedure briefly. 
: in the 	 OnJy conscripts can apply for the examination of conscientious objection. The decis ion on 
recognising the ri ght of conscientious objections shall be made by commission covering 
several municipalities which shall be appointed by the ministry responsible for 
lrtiality administration . 
.~ court 	 Members of the Commission shall be a social worker, a psychologist, a physician other than 
regular employees and contract personnel of bodies responsible for defence and a 
representative of administrative bodies responsible for internal affairs, and defence matters or 
for the protection and rescue. 
lot any In proceeding with a request of a conscript to be recognized as a conscientious objector the 
ds. The commission shall verify all the statements of the conscript and, if necessary. collect 
appropriate evidence and hold a discussion with the petitioner. 
The commission must rule on the conscript's request within six month. The commission shall 
take under consideration petitioner' s wishes as to perform military service without weapons 
or as to the service or organisation he would prefer to do alternative civilian service, if 
possible. 
Conscripts shall have the right to appeal against the commission's ru ling within fifteen days 
of being informed of the commission' s decision. 
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5) Are professional members of the armed forces infonned of their rights and the 
procedures available to exercise them? If so, is access to such infonnation facilitated by the 
authorities and at what stage (before or after voluntary enlistment)? 
Yes, they receive all information's before enlistment in the Slovenian Armed Forces. 
6) Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? Please 
specify time-frames for the examination ofapplications from the initiation of the claim until 
the final decision. 
The time-frame from the initiation of the claim until final decision is 6 month. 
7) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has been 
examined? 
In case a professional soldier initiates a claim his contract will be terminated. 

Conscripts performing the obligatory military service will be transferred to non-combat 

duties and are not allowed to carry or use weapons until their application has been examined. 

8) Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent and impartial 
bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil administration? (l.e. are the 
bodies/committees examining such applications independent from the administration of the 
Ministry of Defence)? 
Yes, the application examined bodies are independent and impartial. (Please find details in 
question 4) 
9) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious 
objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial ofbenefits etc) 
Individuals with conscientious objections can not apply for jobs where they would have to 
carry weapons (e.g. police, security services) as long they have a valid recognition for not 
serving in armed forces because of conscientious objection grounds. 
Attachments: 
(2) Any citizen who has been recognised as conscientious objectors to military service shall 
participate in the defence of the State by carrying out an alternative service in Civil 
Protection or other units for protection, rescue and relief, or shall be trained in protection and 
rescue and carry out those duties also in wartime. 
Article 2 
......ZVD 
Citizens shall have the right of conscientious objection to military duty under the conditions 
set out by this Law. 
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v. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY DUTY 
Article 37 
A conscript who opposes the use of weapons in all circumstances may be a conscientious 
objector and do his military service without weapons or do alternative civilian service. 
A conscript may practise his right of conscientious objection on religious, philosophical or 
humanitarian grounds. The grounds on which a conscript pursues the right of conscientious 
objection must be confirmed by his general lifestyle and behaviour. 
Conscientious objection under provisions quoted under the first and second paragraph can 
also be implemented by national servicemen during or after the completion of the military 
service in accordance with this Law. Citizens who have been granted the right of 
conscientious objection after the completion of the military service are obligated to attend 
training for the performance ofprotection and rescue tasks in the duration of 30 days. 
The training programme for the performance of protection and rescue tasks from the 
preceding paragraph shall be prescribed by the minister responsible for protection against 
natural and other disasters. 
Article 38 
Civilian service as prescribed by this Law may also be done by citizens assessed as unfit for 
military service at their own wish. 
Article 39 
Conscripts doing military service without weapons shall serve on duties in military units and 
institutions where the carrying or use of weapons is not necessary. 
The regulations on rights, obligations and responsibilities of soldiers during military service 
shall also apply to soldiers doing their military service in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph. 
In the case of soldiers doing military service without weapons it shall be entered in their 
military record booldet on their dismissal from military service that they have not been 
trained in the use of weapons. 
The military units, institutions and duties under the first paragraph of this Article shall be 
specified by the ministry responsible for defence. 
Article 40 
Civilian service as a substitute for military service shall take place in the protection, rescue 
and relief system or in governmental and non-governmental organisations which perform 
rescue and humanitarian or other activities of public importance. These services and 
organisations shall be specified by the minister responsible for administration, with the prior 
consent of the organisations in question. 
As a rule, an organisation in which civilian service is performed must provide the following 
for citizens performing this service: accommodation, food and other conditions. It must also 
appoint a responsible person to organise and supervise the work of citizens doing civilian 
service. 
A citizen doing civilian service shall be obliged to work in the organisation to which he is 
sent in accordance with this Law and the regulations and acts which apply to employees in 
that institution. 
During civilian service a citizen and his family shall enjoy the same health and social security 
rights as soldiers doing military service in military units and institutions. He shall also have 
the right to free accommodation and food, or shall have his expenses for food, transportation 
to work and personal needs covered to the same extent that this coverage is provided for 
soldiers doing military service. 
276 

Civilian service shall be included in the years of employment in exactly the same way as 

military service. 

During civilian service citizens may not take employment or personally carry out any 

profitable activities. 

Article 41 
A conscript who desires to declare himself a conscientious objector shall, on being called for 
conscription or other related obligations by the relevant authority, submit a request with the 
administrative body responsible for defence matters, no later than on the day of conscription. 
A conscript who had undergone conscription procedures before 5 May 1991, and has not 
completed his military service may seek recognition of his right to be a conscientious 
objector with the administrative body from the preceding paragraph, no later than 15 days 
upon the receipt of the summon for military service. 
A soldier doing military service may file a request for the recognition of his right to be a 
conscientious objector with the relevant defence administrative office. A national serviceman 
who has already completed his military service shall file a request with the administrative 
body responsible for defence matters that keeps his military records. 
The request by a national serviceman from the first, second and third paragraphs of this 
Article shall include the justification for the recognition of his right of conscientious 
objection. While the request for the recognition of the right of conscientious objection is 
being processed, all of the obligations related to liability for conscription of conscripts and 
national servicemen shall be suspended. The processing of a request that was filed by a 
national serviceman doing his military service, has no affect on the fulfilment of obligations 
that derive from liability for conscription. 
Article 42 
The decision on recognising the right of conscientious objection shall be made by 
commissions covering several municipalities which shall be appointed by the ministry 
responsible for administration. 
Members of the commission under the preceding paragraph shall be a social worker, a 
psychologist, a physician other than regular employees and contract personnel of bodies 
responsible for defence, and a representative of administrative bodies responsible for internal 
affairs, and defence matters or protection and rescue. The head of the commission may not be 
a representative of an administrative body responsible for defence matters. Members of the 
commission shall have deputies. 
In processing the request of a conscript to be recognised as a conscientious objector the 
commission shall verify all the statements of the conscript and, if necessary, collect 
appropriate evidence and hold a discussion with the petitioner. 
The commission must rule on the conscript's request within six months or three months in the 
case of a soldier doing his military service from the day of submission. The commission 
shall take into consideration petitioner's wishes as to the service or organisation he would 
prefer to do alternative civilian service, if possible. Conscripts shall have the right to appeal 
against the commission's ruling within fifteen days of being informed of the commission's 
decision. 
Conscientious objection shall not be recognised to holders of permit to carry or possess 
weapons, to those who have been convicted of illegal possession of weapons or violent 
criminal offence, or to those who are involved in profitable activities related to weapons. 
Article 43 
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Appeals against the ruling of the commissions under the preceding Article shall be heard by a 
commission appointed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. The 
commission shall comprise, in addition to a physician and a psychologist, representatives of 
the ministry responsible for jurisdiction, administration, health and social security, internal 
affairs, defence and protection and rescue, and representatives of scientific or professional 
organisations, and independent organisations involved in the culture of peace and non­
violence. The members of the commission shall have deputies. 
Article 44 
A citizen who has been recognised as a conscientious objector and who has opted for civilian 
service shall be sent to do civilian service by the administrative body responsible for defence 
matters where his military records are kept. The proposal to send a citizen for civilian service 
shall be given by the commission which ruled on recognising the citizen as a conscientious 
objector. Civilian service shall be done in the Republic of Slovenia. 
A citizen who has been recognised as a conscientious objector during military service and 
who has opted for alternative civilian service shall be dismissed from military service and 
sent to civilian service as provided in the preceding paragraph so that the duration of military 
and civilian service does not exceed the period defined in the first paragraph of Article 22 of 
this Law. 
Before being sent for civilian service, the citizen must be assessed as fit to carry out the work 
to which he has been assigned. 
During civilian service, citizens shall not have the right to strike. 
Article 45 
A citizen shall be considered to have relinquished the right to do civilian service if without 
due cause he fails to report at the commercial company or organisation to which he has been 
sent for civilian service. 
A citizen who refuses to do civilian service or military service without weapons or who is 
evidently evading it shall be treated like a national serviceman who refuses or evades military 
servIce. 
In the case of a citizen seriously breaching discipline in the organisation where he is 
performing civilian service in a manner which clearly contradicts the grounds on which he 
was granted the right to be recognised as a conscientious objector, the ministry responsible 
for administration may re-investigate his fulfilment of the conditions for civilian service. 
Investigation shall be carried out at the proposal of the organisation in which the citizen is 
doing civilian service and in accordance with the procedure set out for granting the right of 
conscientious objection. The investigation shall be carried out by the commission which ruled 
on his objection to military duty on grounds of conscience. 
In the case of a citizen who in accordance with the preceding paragraph, is found to no longer 
fulfil the conditions for civilian service, civilian service will be stopped and the citizen sent to 
complete military service provided that at least fifteen days remain of his civilian service. A 
citizen may relinquish his right to perform civilian service provided that at least three months 
remain ofhis civilian service. 
The provisions of this Law on the time of sending for military service, deferral, interruption 
and completion of military service shall also apply to civilian service. 
Article 46 
A citizen doing civilian service must within fifteen days of completing his civilian service or 
training report to the administrative body responsible for defence matters that keeps his 
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military records, which shall then note his completion of civilian service in his military 
record booklet or prescribed training, and remove him from military records. 
A relevant administrative body responsible for defence matters shall, upon the completion of 
service send a citizen who has been granted the right to be recognised as a conscientious 
objector, to the 30-day training in the area of protection and rescue in the adequate training 
organisation and remove him from military records. Provisions per this Law that govern 
military exercises shall also apply for sending, and deferral procedures, as well as rights and 
obligations during the protection and rescue training. 
After they have completed their civilian service or protection and rescue training, citizens 
under the first and the preceding paragraph shall be assigned to Civil Protection or other 
protection and rescue duties. 
Citizens who assert the right of conscientious objection shall never be issued a permit to carry 
or possess weapons or carry out any profitable activity connected with weapons. 
Article 47 
Supervision of civilian service under Articles 41, 45 and 46 of this Law shall be carried out 
by the ministry responsible for administration. 
Supervision under the preceding paragraph shall mutatis mutandis follow the provisions of 
the regulations governing inspection and supervision in the state administration. 
The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia shall issue more precise regulations on 
the manner of performing civilian service. 
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Member State SPAIN 
~ 1- ~:~ _­Communication Date I 7 December 2011 
Type of Armed Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
Good morning, 
After several days of research through our databases, we send a list of references of 
documents of the Documentation Centre with the subjects: 
• "The right of conscientious objection to military service. 1I 
Information appears in bibliographic references of books, documents and articles ofjownal 
or magazines and also in law references and judgments. 

Many of the articles in magazines that you will find in the file are magazines published by the 

Defence Department, which you can access through the internet, and you will find the 

complete text in pdf. 

The route is the fo llowing: 

Official page website of the Defence Department 

http ://www.defensa.gob.es/ 

Cultura de Defensa 

http://www.portalcultura.mde.es/ 

Area of Publications 

Catalogo de revistas 
Http://www.portalcuJtura.mde.es/publicaci ones/rev istasl 
We are also sending you reports in pdf on the subject collected through the years . 
With regard to the "right of conscientious objection for professional staff of the Armed 
Forces", we have not found information 

We have found references for "resen'ists" (we send you pdf files) 

We hope lhat you ' ll find it helpfu l. 
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Member State 
Communication Date 2 March 2012 
13 March 2012 
Type of Anned Forces Conscription 
Questionnaire Type Type 1 
~'» 
SWEDEN 
- 1­REG ER I NG SKA NS LI ET 
Dear Andreas Y iannaros, 
Thank you for your letter. 
The Swedish armed fo rces are currently in the midst of a large reform. By parliamentary 

decision in 2009 Sweden has, in times when it is not needed, replaced conscription with an 

all-volunteer force. Individuals are offered voluntarily military basic training, and are 

thereafter offered voluntarily service on a contractual basis. The legislation on compulsory 

national service can nevertheless be used to reinstate conscription if the government deems it 

necessary. 

The Swedish government is at the moment preparing proposals on new legislation 

concerning, among other things, the employment of fu ll-time and part-time soldiers. This will 

hopefu lly result in new adopted legislation during 2012. It is too early to say what the 

legislation will contain when it's adopted. Therefore it is difficult for us to answer all of your 

questions, at this moment. 

Best regards, 

Department for Military Capabilities and Operations, Ministry of Defence 

Postadress Telejonvaxel E-post: registrator@defence.ministry.se 
103 33 Stockholm 08-405 1000 
Besoksadress Telefax Jakobsgatan 908-723 11 89 
Second communica tion (13 March 2012): 
1) Is the right of conscientious objection recognised by law for professional members of 
the national armed forces? 
Yes it is. Sweden has however changed its manning system for military personnel. The 
general conscription was cancelled on 2010-07-01 and we are now moving into an all­
volunteer professional military force. When conscription was in place, it was however 
possible to have selective conscientious objections in order to avoid military s rvice 
2) Is the right of conscientious objection available for reservists? (i.e. members of the 
military reserve forces) 
As all personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces are volunteers, the question is irrelevant. 
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3) Does your country allow for selective conscientious objection to military service? 
(please see definition below) 
Not applicable. 

4) Is there a suitable procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 

applications? Please outline this procedure briefly. 

Not applicable. 

5) Are professional members of the armed forces informed of their rights and the 

procedures available to exercise them? If so, is access to such information facilitated by the 

authorities and at what stage (before or after voluntary enlistment)? 

Not applicable. 

6) Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? Please 

specify time-frames for the examination of applications from the initiation of the claim until 
the [mal decision. 
Not applicable. 

7) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has been 

examined? 

Not applicable. 

8) Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent and impartial 

bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil administration? (I.e. are the 

bodies/committees examining such applications independent from the administration of the 

Ministry of Defence)? 

Not applicable. 

9) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on conscientious 

objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial ofbenefits etc) 

Not applicable. 

HQ Swedish Armed Forces - Personnel Staff 

+46 8 788 9503 

+46 76 560 3030 
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Member State SWITZERLAND 
Communication Date 8 December 2011 
Type of Armed Forces Conscription 
Questionnaire Type Type 1 
1) 	 Does Switzerland currently main tain conscription which IS compulsory for its 
citizens? 
Yes. 
2) 	 Does it recognize a right of conscientious objection to mil itary service for 
conscripted soldiers? 
Yes. 
3) 	 Does it recognise a right of conscientious objection for professional members of the 
armed forces? 
Yes . 
4) 	 If conscription is still compulsory in Switzerland are there any plans to suspend or 
abolish conscription in the near future? 
There will be a popular vote about this in 2012. 
5) 	 Are there any important changes in the legislation regarding conscientious objection 
in Switzerland that the researcher should be aware of? 
No. 
Eidgenossisches Departement flir Verteidigung, 
Bevolkerungsschutz und Sport 
Schweizer Armee 
Komrnunikation www.armee.ch 
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Member State UNITED KINGDOM 
Communication Date I 31 January 2012 
13 March 2012 
Type of Armed Forces I Professional 
Questionnaire Type Type 2 
Written responses received by the Ministry of Defence in PDF format. 
its 
See below. 
for 
the 
or 
on 
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MINrST~Y OF DEFENCE 

Main Building. London, SW1A 2HB. 

lele;:>hCi"~, 020121 89000 
",-----_._----,_.._------- ------------
Andreas Ylannaros Our Reference: 
(Andreas.Yiannaros@beds.ac,ukl FOI·26-01 M 2012-1S1405-005 
Date: 31 January 2012 
Deal" Mr Yiannafos. 
Thank you for your correspondence dated 25 January which has been considered to 
be a request for information In accordance With the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It 
has been passed to my department and I have been asked to respond. 
You asked the following question: 
1) Does the United Kingdom maintain a professional army? (professional 
servicemen. voluntarily Joining the armed forces and serving for longer periods 
under a contract)? 
2) Does the United Kingdom provide for a right of conscientious objection (the 
objection to military service deriving from principles and reasons of conscience, 
Including profound convictions. arising from religious, ethical, humanitarian or 
similar motives) for professional members of the armed forces? 
3) Is the government pfannlng to introduce further klglsiatJon (apart from some 
already existing provisions which are found u Guidelines for the three different 
branches of the military) specifically providing for a right of conscientious 
objection for professio.nal members of the armed forces In the near future? Are 
there any recent changes in legislation regarding conscientious objecti.on in the 
United Kingdom that the researcher should be aware of? 
Please feel free to forward an.)' recent publications of the Government that can be 
useful for the purposes of this tesearch project or any other documents that may 
justify the answers given above. Further to this, please provide your full tltte and 
co.ntact detaUs for the purposes of the data coUection process. 
ill response to your first question. the United Kingdom maintains a fuJly profeS$ionaJ 
Armed Forces manned wholly by volunteers. Since 1963, it has been the policy of 
$Uccesslve Governments that the best way of providing for the defence of our country 
is by MEuntalning Armed Forces manned by votunteers. There are no plans for the 
restoration of any form. of conscription, 
Regarding your second question, each Service deals separately wi1h any applicants 
who wish to apply for conscientious objection, bot the tri-Sel'llice policy below gives the 
background to an appeal procedure: 
"Personnel serving in the British Armed Forces are ail volunteers. However. the 

, Ministry of Defence has a well-established appeal procedure for Service personnel 

who, during their&ervlce, develop e genuine conscientious objection to further 

I 
miU3ry service Si.:ch cases are handled adminrstratJvely by the Service concerned 
and .are first considered by the individual's chain of command. :f the conscientious 
objection is con.sidered to be genuine arrangements are made for the applicant to be 
discharged 011 compassionate grounds. If there is doubt as to the genuineness of the 
claim, it is rejected, But the applicant is advised that he or she may appeal to the 
Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objectors (ACCO). This Committee is 
independent of the MOO and its members are apPOinted by the Lord Chancellor. It 
conducts its hearings in public and tenders its advice to the Secretary of State for 
Defence's representative. A slJccessful appeal to the Advisory Committee is 
invariably accepted by the Department as decisive on the question of conscience 
and the applicant will immediatety be granted a release from military service. 
The ACeO was established in 1970 to hear appeals from Service personnel whose 
applications to leave the Service on grounds of conscience have been rejected by 
the Service Authorities .. Members of the ACCO are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. 
The panel consists of 8 individuals. of whom the Chairman and the Vice and Deputy 
Chairman must alf be Queen's Counsel. A quorum for a meeting of the Committee is 
a chairman together with two lay members. Hearings are held in public, and the 
procedure is informaL There is no swearing-in of witnesses, ana, although the 
witnesses and the appellant may be questioned, there is no cross-examination. 
If the ACCO :eject an appeal for discharge on the grounds of conscientious 
objection. the appellant is interviewed by their Commanding Officer and informed of 
the ACeD's deCision. The appellant is also informed that he Of she must continue 
their military servioe under the same conditions that applied to them before the 
ACCO heard their plea, unbl such time as they retire or are allowed to resign. if an 
officer. or are discharged on completion of their engagement or allowed to purchase 
their discharge, if a Serviceman or woman. The appellant is advised that they 
continue to be subject to Service discipline .. However, they are not prevented from 
resubmitting their case, provided that there is additional and relevant evidence to be 
heard. In such cases the whole appeals procedure is repeated, Bearing in mind the 
independence of these procedures, there is no question of unfair dismissal.· 
With regards to your third question. Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act gives 
an applicant the right to access recorded information held by pubtlc auihonties at the 
time the request is made and does not require public authorities to answer questions, 
provide explanations or give opinions, unless this is recorded information held. I can 
confirm that the Ministry of Defence holds no recorded information that would provide 
an answer to the questions you have asked in your request. 
You may find it helpful to know that The Information Commissioner's Office publishes 
guidance on how to make requests for Information under the Freedom of Information 
Act i!'l the ICO Charter for Responsible Freedom ·01 Inrormatio:'l Requests, available on 
the ICO website at the following address; 
http://www .Ico.gov. ukiuploadldocumentsJIibrarylfreedom_ oUnformationi 
practicaLapplicatio'llit5yublicJnformatioo_foi%20charteUinal.pdf 
1 hope that you find this information helpful, 
Yours sincerely 
The information supplied to you continues to be protected by the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988. You are free to use it for your own purposes, including any non, 
commercial research you are doing and for the purposes of news reporting. Any other 
reuse, for example commercial pubHcation, would require the permission of the 
copyright holder. Most documents suppUed by the Ministry of Defence will have been 
produced by government officials and win be Crown Copyright. You can find details on 
the ~ITC:Ingements for r&-yling CrQWnCopyrigbt from the Offjce -of Public Sector 
Information at !:!ttp;;I!~-.~'l,.LJ(I~ti~k-u~§~,ingex,htm, Information you receive 
WhlCh is not subject to Crown Copyright continues to be protected by the copyright of 
the person, or organisation, from which the intonnation originated. You must ensure 
that you gainthefrpermlssion before reproducing any third party (noll Crown 
Copyright) information. 
if you are not satisfied with this response or you wish to complain about any aspect of 
the handling of your request. then you should conta·cl me in the flfSt instance. If 
informal resolution is not possible and you are still dissatisfM3d then you may apply for 
an independent lotemal review by contacting the Head of Corporate Irlforrtlation, 1st 
Floor, Zone N. MOD Main Building, Whitehall. SW1A 2HB (e-mail CIO~F01~ 
~R@mod.uk). Please note that any request for an ;ntemal review must be made within 
40 working days of the date on which the attempt to reach Informal resolution has 
come to an end. 
If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may take your complaint to 
the Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of 
Information N;t, Please note that the Information COmmissioner will not Investigate 
your case until the MOO internal review process has been comp4eted. Further details of 
the role and powers of the Information Commissioner can be found on the 
Commissioner's website, http://www,ico.gov.uk, 
• 
MINISTRY OEOEFENCE 
Main Building, London, SW1A 2HB. 
1e!ephone' 020121 8900C 
Andreas Yiannaros Our Reference: 
[Andreas. Yiannaros@beds.ac,ukj BAUOOJ5112012 
Date: 13 March 2012 
Dear Mr Yiannaros. 
Thank you for your correspondence dated 28 February to the Minist.ry of Defence 
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It has been passed to my department and 
I have been asked to respond. Under section 1 of the FOl Act you have not requested 
recorded information but to enabie me to provide a response to your questions I am 
respond;ng under the term Business as Usual .. 
You asked the following questol'ls: 
"1. Does the United Kingdom provide for a right of selective 
conscientious objecUon? (Primarily dis1inguished from absolute 
conscientious objedion by the fact that the objector does not claim to be 
opposed to all forms of use of armed force, and would, were the 
circumstances different. be willing to particIpate in military action, in 
other words, opposition to particular military operations). 
2. Are professional members of the armed forces informed of their rights 
and the procedures available to exercise them? If so, is access to such 
information facilitated by the a.uthorities and at what stage (before or after 
voluntary enlistment)? 
3. Could you please specify the procedura.1 time-frames for the 
examination of applications for discharge on grounds of conscience? 
4. Are appficants transferred to non-combatant duties until their 
application has been examined?" 
First, I hope you will accept that members of the Armed Forces are a special group of 
people who are willing to lay down their lives in the Service of their country. Since 
1963, it has been the policy of slJccessive Governments that the best way of providing 
for the defence of our country is by maintaining Armed Forces manned by volunteers. 
The demanding nature of our defence roles today is such that we require highly 
trained. professional men and women who are dedicated and able to fully utilise our 
modem and sophisticated equipment and the associated tactics and strategies. It 
is equally important that Service personnel are fully committed to giving their best in 
defending our country and its allies This includes the requirement to bear arms and 
accept all assignments and deployments .. As these conditions of Service are clearly 
articulated during the recruitment process we do not feel there is a requirement to 
provide a right of selective conscientious objection. In addition, where persona! values 
-

Of choice are no longer compatible with the Armed Forces, there are ways in which an 
individual can seek a discharge. Where a request is made for a discharge on the 
groonds of conscien~ious objection, an application will be considered on ifs 
merits, However, while an applicatior. is being considered by the Compassionate 
Appeals Tribunal. the individual remains subject to Service Law with the Commanding 
Officer retaining the discretion to employ that individl.a! as appropriate. If the 
application at this stage is declined there is a right of appeal through the independent 
AdviSOry Committee on Conscientious Obj;ectors. If this too rs upheld individuals may 
apply to leave the Armed forces under nQrma~ early termination terms. 
I hope that you find t~js information helpful. 
YOJrs sincerel~ 
-------------------------- m ____________________________________ --.~ __________________ __ 
I 
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APPENDIX C: Interview with former Chairperson of the Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights ((oE) 
~.-41 University of 
.!''I.8edfordshire 
Main scope of the interview: 
How far-reaching is the scope of the right of conscientious objection and what does the 
current situation in Member States of the Council of Europe demonstrate about the effective 
implementation ofCouncil of Europe standards on conscientious objection? 
INTERVIEW FRONT SHEET 
Date and time of the interview: 28th December 2011, 11 :00 am 
Approx. length of interview: 60 minutes 
Interviewee: Mr. Christos Pourgourides (Advocate)763, Former Chairperson of the 
Parliamentary Assembly ofthe Council of Europe's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights. 
Interviewer: Mr. Andreas Yiannaros, PhD Candidate in International Law, University of 
Bedfordshire 
Location: Ch. Pourgourides and Co. LLC- Lawyers, Gladstonos & Griva Digheni str., 
Pamelva Building, 2nd floor, Office 206, Limassol, Cyprus. 
*This interview has been conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 

Ethical Approval ofthis project. 

**The interviewee has received a copy of the interview to confirm the accuracy of 

information submitted to the researcher and propose amendments where necessary. 

Question 1 
Is the right of conscientious objection protected sufficiently in the Member States of the 
Council ofEurope? How would you describe the overall situation as it now appears in the 
members of the Council and what are the views of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights? Are there any particular barriers identified? 
In some Member States of the Council of Europe the protection afforded to 
conscientious objectors is better and in some others it is worse. There are some Member 
States that implement the decisions of the ECtHR without delay, regardless of whether these 
decisions have an important effect upon them or not. 
Some of the problems identified by the Committee include the dimension between 
declarations made and accepted by the Member States of the Council and what actually 
763 Mr. Pourgourides agrees to be identified. 
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happens on the ground, i.e. mere words and actions particularly when it comes to serious 
human rights violations. In general, the protection of human rights in the Council of Europe 
shows a satisfactory improvement however there is still a lot to be done. 
There are no rights which can be regarded as less serious or less important than 
others. The right of conscientious objection is not found in the European Convention on 
Human Rights but it's covered by Article 9 of the Convention. Recommendations and 
resolutions issued by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights are important for 
many countries especially for those we consider as "new democracies" for various reasons. 
Publicity is given which creates a powerful source of pressure to governments. 
Resolutions and recommendations are evaluated by the Committee of Ministers. 
Recommendations are based on the findings of the Committee. The decisions of the 
Committee are creating a broader context of action which have an impact on the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
Question 2 
How important is the role ofthe PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in 
safeguarding that the right is protected in the Member States ofthe Council? 
The policy that is successfully implemented by the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights is the "naming and shaming" of States which do not respect standards 
affecting the national protection of conscientious objection to military service. 
Question 3 
What steps are currently taken to ensure that Member States are complying with Council 
ofEurope standards on conscientious objection? Is the Committee cooperating with other 
human rights bodies or institutions? 
The Committee is cooperating with many NGOs, human rights institutions, 
ombudsmen, committees working for the protection of human rights and individuals (human 
rights defenders). 
The role of the Committee of Ministers is to interact with the Parliamentary 
Assembly. It also supervises the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights. On the other hand, the role of the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights is to 
assist the Parliamentary Assembly by "naming and shaming" and by using arguments to 
convince that the protection of human rights is a duty of the government. The Committee 
does not have the power to use pressure on States for the implementation of ECtHR 
judgments. 
Question 4 
In an information document compiled by the Secretariat upon the instructions of the 
Chairperson of the Committee, dated 18 April 2011 the Committee is identifying States 
with major structural/systemic problems before the European Court ofHuman Rights. You 
had noted that one ofthe main issues faced by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
ofEurope is "the repeated imprisonment for conscientious objection to military service in 
Turkey" and in particular the non-implementations of judgments of the Court by the 
member State (Turkey). 
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It is assumed that you are referring to the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Ulke v 
Turkey (2009), which has still not been implemented by Turkey and remains unsettled. 
Another recent case is Ercep v Turkey (2011) where the Chamber found that Turkey had 
violated Article 9 and Article 6 of the Convention by sentencing the applicant to several 
terms ofimprisonmentfor failing to report for duty. 
How is the Committee planning to ensure the speedy and effective implementation of the 
judgment in Ercep if the Grand Chamber agrees to the aforementioned violation, bearing 
in mind that Turkey has not implemented the previousjudgment ofthe Court in 2009 (Ulke 
v Turkey). What steps are currently been taken by the Committee to ensure that the non­
implementation ofjudgments will not occur in the future? 
The Court's decision in Ulke against Turkey sets a principle applicable in all Member 
States of the Council of Europe. It means that the rest of the Member States are legally bound 
to implement the decision but under the principle of res interpretata all Member States should 
have the responsibility to implement these principles. If the Committee of Ministers produces 
a recommendation which in effect is calling Member States to implement a decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, then there is a duty to do so. 
There is a legal obligation to implement the principle of res interpretata for these 
principles to enjoy implementation by decisions of the other PACE organs, especially those 
of persuasive authority. These are not less important but no one can say that their 
implementation is compulsory. On the other hand, Court's judgments are issued on the basis 
of the interpretation of the Convention, therefore they are an extension of the ECHR. 
One of the powers of the Committee that should be used when systematic human 
rights violations occur is to challenge the credentials of the national legislation to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from the State that we consider responsible 
for persistent human rights violations and refusal to implement the judgments of the Court. 
This proposal, although it was accepted, it has not been used until today against Turkey or 
Russia because there are strong arguments against using this drastic measure, due to the fact 
that the national delegations are comprised of parliamentarians and not Ministers of the 
Government. Delegations do not belong to the government; therefore suspending the 
delegation would punish both those supporting the government and members of the 
opposition who criticise the government for these violations. Complete isolation is not an 
effective measure. It should also be used in the most rare circumstances when there are 
systematic and persistent refusals to comply. It is the duty of the Assembly to suspend those 
delegations in order to send to all the political forces of the country the message that they 
must do their duty to implement the Court's judgments. 
Question 5 
Have problems been identified in other Member States ofthe Council ofEurope? Are there 
any plans to raise these issues to the Parliamentary Assembly? 
Other Member States where conscientious objectors may face important legal 
challenges are Russia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. As previously said, in theory it might appear 
that the country has legislation on conscientious objection which is more or less sufficient, 
however the problems are on the ground and can be identified when looking at practical 
questions. 
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There is a plan to hold a hearing with experts on the matter with regards to the non­
implementation ofjudgments by Turkey. This hearing will be scheduled in 2012 and a report 
to the Parliamentary Assembly will follow. Some developments are expected for 2012. 
Question 6 
The professionalization of national armed forces is increasing in Council of Europe 
Member States. In February 2010, the Council ofEurope Committee ofMinisters adopted 
a Recommendation on human rights of the members of the armed forces. (Committee of 
Ministers ofthe Council ofEurope, Recommendation CMlRec (2010) 4, Human Rights of 
Members of the Armed Forces, Text adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 
February 2010 at the 1077th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). The recommendation 
invites the Member States to allow the application of the right to conscientious objection 
for both conscripts and professional soldiers, placing emphasis on the right ofprofessional 
members of the armed forces to be able to leave the armed forces for reasons of 
conscience. 
Is the Parliamentary Assembly concerned with the issue ofthe non-recognition ofthe right 
for professional soldiers in the vast majority of the Member States? [only 4142 Member 
States recognising the right for professional members at the moment}. As the 
recommendation is setting a standard (Committee of Ministers - adopted by the CoE 
ministers which is strong evidence of consensus) can it be assumed that human rights 
bodies should examine practice within Member States of the Council and propose steps to 
recognise a right ofconscientious objection for professional members ofthe armed forces? 
This is part of the wider problem. With the phenomenon of the professionalization of 
State armed force new issues are created in practice. For instance, some people might develop 
conscientious objection after joining the armed forces. For them, there is definitely an issue 
as to how this right is protected by Article 9 which is not limited to conscripts. The protection 
of the right of conscientious objection is relevant for every human being. Conscientious 
objection may be developed even in services which are not necessarily linked with the armed 
service. For example it can extend to civilians who are working on the development of 
explosiveslbombs that can be used in a military conflict. The right must be protected 
regardless of whether an individual is a conscript, a permanent member of the armed forces, 
or a professional/contracted soldier or citizen participating in acts linked to the military. 
Question 7 
Would you argue that a right of conscientious objection should be recognised for 
contracted soldiers? 
If conscientious objection occurs after the signing of the contract then conscientious 
objection should be a valid ground for the lawful termination of the contract. 
Question 8 

How is the implementation of Council of Europe standards of "persuasive authority" 

linked to the effectiveness ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights and its judgments? 

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is extending its activities in 
many human rights issues that are not covered by the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In many cases, it goes beyond the Court in expressing its opinion as to how things 
should be. It makes recommendations which in effect are essential in investigating human 
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rights in order to provide protection in issues which may not be covered by the text of the 
Convention and depend on a more liberal interpretation of the Convention. 
Question 9 
What is the main difference between European Convention on Human Rights standards 
and Council ofEurope standards? 
Standards which evolve from the Court's judgments are binding and very important, 
while standards set by the Parliamentary Assembly are standards which are not binding on 
Member States and can be rejected under the principle of subsidiarity, however we should not 
forget that the field of human rights has been broadened significantly. This shows how 
important these standards are for modem societies. 
An example which shows the importance of these standards is that the European Convention 
on Human Rights did not initially restrict the application of the death penalty. It was the 
resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly which led to the adoption of a protocol abolishing 
the death penalty in all Member States and it became compulsory for Member States to ratify 
the protocol. 
It was the actions of the Assembly through a number of resolutions that started to 
bring a change to the situation. 
Gender equality is another issue where the Assembly took an important role to 
safe!,'Uard the equal rights or men and women in all Member States. One of the measures 
proposed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary 
Assembly was that at least one judge from the opposite sex should be proposed by each 
member State in the process of appointing judges to the European Court of Human Rights. 
This was a practical measure that was introduced to address the gender imbalance between 
judges of the European Court of Human Rights and provide an example of how practical 
measures can promote the equal treatment of men and women. 
Question 10 
Are there any suggestions on topical issues that could be addressed throughout this 
research project? 
The question of conscientious objection is an important and very wide topic which 
has to do with a primary task; full respect for human rights not only in theory but also in 
practice all over the Council of Europe. There is a great difference between declarations 
were States come together and agree things, and the practical situation on the ground. This is 
what this research project should be looking at. 
An important issue that could be addressed is the situation in Russia. The Council of Europe 
considers the situation in Russia to be serious with regards to human rights violations 
particularly with regards to issues which attract the protection of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. It is a deeply religious State (Orthodox) and this creates 
obstacles to recognising rights for non-religious individuals. Another major cause of concern 
is the high rate of suicides among conscripted soldiers. 
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APPENDIX D: Response survey questionnaire from the European 
Bureau of Conscientious Objection (EBCO) on behalf of Mr. FriedheIm 
Schneider (Chairman), 8 May 2012, responding for the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
1) 	 Do you agree that the right of conscientious objection is recognised by 
law for professional members of the national armed forces? i.e. Article 4(3) of the 
German constitution? Are you convinced that this is applicable to professional 
soldiers? Are you aware of any recent cases? 
Indeed, Art 4(3) of the Gennan constitution covers conscientious objection (CO) of 
professional soldiers and reservists, too. 
After the suspension of conscription the Gennan anny makes the difference between 
"Soldaten im Freiwilligen Wehrdienst" (FWDL), i.e. soldiers doing a voluntary military 
service up to 23 months, 
"Soldaten auf Zeit" (saZ), i.e. soldiers who have signed up for a period oftime between 
2 and 20 years, and 
"Berufssoldaten", i.e. professional soldiers without time restriction. 
As to the last statistics, in 2011, 1.398 Gennan soldiers (406 ofthem were "Zeitsoldaten" and 
4 "Berufssoldaten") demanded to be recognised as conscientious objectors. In the same year 
1.171 soldiers have been accepted as conscientious objectors. 
In 2010 the applications of 370 "Zeitsoldaten" and 3 "Berufssoldaten" have been registered. 
2) Is the right of conscientious objection available for reservists? (i.e. members of 
the military reserve forces if these still exist bearing in mind that conscription was very 
recently suspended - July 2011) 
Yes it is as long as a reservist may be drafted for military training or intervention. 
3) Does Germany allow for selective conscientious objection to military service? (see 
definition below) 
No, principally the right to conscientious objection is restricted to cases of absolute 
conscientious objection. 
However in the case of professional soldier Florian Pfaff (and, later on, Jiirgen Rose) the 
Federal Administration Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) argued that the fundamental right 
of freedom of conscience is also to be respected in the anny and that in cases of conflict the 
anny should make possible to its members an alternative type of action that avoids 
discrimination and takes care of conscience ('gewissensschonende 
Handlungsaltemative').[See judgement BverwG 2 WD 12.04 of 21 June 2005] Pfaff refused 
to contribute by his activity to the Iraq war that according to his conviction violated 
international law . 
4) Do you agree that the procedure for the examination of conscientious objection 
applications coming from professional soldiers is a suitable one? 
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There has been an amelioration of the procedure. Since 2003 the examination is no longer 
part of a military framework, normally the decision is taken according the presented records 
(without personal hearing). 
5) Are professional members of the armed forces informed of their rights and the 
procedures available to exercise them? If so, is access to such information facilitated by 
the authorities and at what stage (before or after voluntary enlistment)? 
This is my personal experience: Normally military authorities are not interested in giving 
(detailed) information on conscientious objection. Military propaganda and recruitment 
information continuously play down the risks of being soldier and emphasize instead 
financial and formation advantages. 
6) 	 Are conscientious objection applications examined within a reasonable time? 
In 2011 the examinations took on average between 2 and 4 weeks. 
7) Are applicants transferred to non-combatant duties until their application has 
been examined? 
There is a recommendation to do so if continuing the use of arms is especially wearing for the 
applicant, but this depends on the military commander. 
8) 	 Are conscientious objection applications examined by independent and 
impartial bodies? Does the appeal body fall under military or civil 
administration? (I.e. are the bodies/committees exammmg such 
applications independent from the administration ofthe Ministry of Defence)? 
Before 2003 the requests of conscientious objectors who already had been drafted by the 
anny (or who were or had been soldiers) were examined by a commission formed under the 
military administration. In 2003 for all conscientious objectors (civilians, future conscripts, 
members of the army, reservists) the procedure of recognition has been transferred to the 
Federal Office for Civilian Service ("Bundesamt fUr den Zivildienst") that before decided 
only on the applications of conscientious objectors who had not yet been drafted by the army. 
In 2011 the Bundesamt fUr den Zivildienst (BAZ) that is part of the Federal Ministry for 
Family Affairs changed its name into "Bundesamt fUr zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben" 
(BAfzA = Federal Office for tasks of civil society). After the suspension of conscription the 
BafzA is responsible for the administration of the Federal Voluntary Service 
("Bundesfreiwilligendienst") that replaces Civilian service since July 2011. The recognition 
procedure for conscientious objectors remains within the civil administration frame of the 
BafzA. 
9) Are there any implications for individuals leaving the armed forces on 
conscientious objection grounds? (equal employment opportunities, denial 
of benefits etc) 
The reimbursement of costs of professional formation obtained in the military is one of the 
practical problems related to the conscientious objection of soldiers. 
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